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At the centre of this dissertation is the denial of a fundamental right based on personal 
attributes. This denial is due to preconceptions regarding what people should be, the behaviours 
they should adopt, and the romantic relationships that they should form. The question that the 
dissertation addresses is part of a larger issue of how heteronormative conceptions of sexual 
orientation, gender identities and gender expression shape the law and its institutions, 
excluding persons who do not fit this conceptual approach. 
The right to education is guaranteed under international and regional human rights law. It is 
key to promoting the full and harmonious development of children into adults who can 
contribute to the development of their communities. Despite this, learners with non-
heteronormative sexual orientations and non-binary gender identities or gender expressions 
(“SOGIE”) face discrimination and marginalisation in the school environment, preventing 
them from fully enjoying this right.  
On the African continent, two factors exacerbate the discrimination experienced by these 
learners. Firstly, the perception that non-heteronormative SOGIE are un-African. Secondly, 
non-heteronormative SOGIE are not explicitly listed as prohibited grounds of discrimination 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”), the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”), and the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Maputo Protocol”).  
Against this backdrop, this dissertation explores the perception that non-heteronormative 
SOGIE are un-African, and utilises queer theory and queer legal theory as tools to assist in 
unpacking and re-thinking heteronormativity as site of violence. This dissertation further 
utilises a teleological approach to the interpretation of treaties to develop the right to education 
of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo 
Protocol through the lens of the rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, equal protection 
of the law, and the principle of the best interests of the child. In this regard, guidance is drawn 
from the interpretation of these rights by the international, European, and inter-American 
human rights bodies.   
Although the current interpretation of rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, equal 
protection of the law, and the best interests of the child under the African human rights system 
does not provide adequate protection to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in 
education, it is shown that these rights can be purposefully interpreted to provide a framework 







Hierdie proefskrif handel oor die ontkenning van 'n fundamentele reg gebaseer op persoonlike 
eienskappe. Die ontkenning is te wyte aan vooroordele oor wat mense moet wees, die gedrag 
wat hulle moet aanneem en die romantiese verhoudings wat hulle moet vorm. Die vraag wat 
die proefskrif behandel is deel van 'n groter vraagstuk oor hoe heteronormatiewe opvattings 
van seksuele oriëntasie, geslagsidentiteite en geslagsuitdrukking die wet en sy instellings vorm, 
ter uitsluiting van persone wat nie by hierdie konseptuele benadering inpas nie. 
Die reg op onderwys word gewaarborg onder die internasionale en streeksmenseregte 
verdrae. Dit is die sleutel tot die bevordering van die volle en harmonieuse ontwikkeling van 
kinders tot volwassenes wat kan bydra tot die ontwikkeling van hul gemeenskappe. Ten spyte 
hiervan kom leerders met nie-heteronormatiewe seksuele oriëntasies en nie-binêre 
geslagsidentiteite of geslagsuitinge ("SOGIE") voor diskriminasie en marginalisering in die 
skoolomgewing te staan, wat hulle verhoed om hierdie reg ten volle te benut. 
Op die vasteland van Afrika vererger twee faktore die diskriminasie wat hierdie leerders 
ervaar. Eerstens bestaan daar ‘n indruk dat nie-heteronormatiewe SOGIE nie hoort op die 
Afrika kontinent nie; dit is ingevoer deur kolonialisering. Tweedens word nie-
heteronormatiewe SOGIE nie eksplisiet as verbode gronde van diskriminasie beskou onder die 
Afrika Handves oor die Menseregte en Volkeregte (“ACHPR”), die Afrika Handves vir die 
Regte en Welsyn van die Kind (“ACRWC”) en die Protokol by die Afrika Handves oor die 
Regte van Mense en Volke oor die Regte van Vroue in Afrika (“Maputo Protocol”). 
Teen hierdie agtergrond ondersoek die proefskrif die indruk dat nie-heteronormatiewe 
SOGIE nie hoort op die Afrika kontinent nie, en word queer-teorie en queer-regsteorie as 
hulpmiddels gebruik om heteronormatiwiteit as plek van geweld te heroorweeg. In hierdie 
proefskrif word daar verder gebruik gemaak van 'n teleologiese benadering tot die interpretasie 
van verdrae om die reg op onderwys van kinders met nie-heteronormatiewe SOGIE onder die 
ACHPR, die ACRWC en die Maputo-protokol te ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur middel van 
die regte op menswaardigheid, nie-diskriminasie, gelyke beskerming van die wet, en die 
beginsel van die beste belang van die kind. In hierdie verband word leiding getrek uit die 
interpretasie van hierdie regte deur die internasionale, Europese en inter-Amerikaanse 
menseregte-liggame. 
Alhoewel die huidige interpretasie van regte op menswaardigheid, nie-diskriminasie, gelyke 
beskerming van die wet, en die beste belang van die kind onder die Afrika menseregtestelsel 
nie voldoende beskerming bied aan kinders met nie-heteronormatiewe SOGIE in die onderwys 
nie, het hierdie proefskrif bevestig dat hierdie regte doelgerig geïnterpreteer kan word om 'n 
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1 1 Background to the study and research problem 
This dissertation aims to establish a purposive interpretation of the right to education under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”),1 the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”),2 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (“Maputo Protocol”)3 that protects children 
with non-heteronormative sexual orientations or non-binary gender identities or gender 
expressions (“non-heteronormative SOGIE”). Therefore, it focuses on the right to education of 
children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACRWC, read together with the ACHPR 
and Maputo Protocol. The research departs from the primary assumption that non-
heteronormative SOGIE rights are protected under African regional human rights law because 
all persons, due to their inherent dignity, are equally entitled to the rights enshrined under the 
ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol, including the right to education. This research 
furthermore aims to present a legal theory and a related methodology that assist in analysing 
the multifaceted vulnerabilities of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Non-heteronormative SOGIE refers to all identities and expressions that fall outside the 
heterosexual norm. For purposes of this research, non-heteronormative SOGIE includes 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons.4 However, it is not limited to these 
groups, embracing anyone who identifies as queer.5 In other words, persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE do not fit the expected romantic coupling of a biological man and 
woman who are also comfortable in complying with certain prescribed gendered behaviour.6 
Because persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE do not conform to expected sex, gender, 
and sexual orientation-related behaviours, they are often vulnerable to violence and 
 
1 (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 (1982). 
2 (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into force 29 November 1999) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
3 (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (2003). 
4 African Commission, IACmHR, UN “Ending violence and other human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity: A joint dialogue of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Inter-
America Commission on Human Rights and United Nations” (2016) PULP 1-2; Preamble to the Yogyakarta 
Principles “Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and 
gender identity” (11-2006) <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/principles_ 
en.pdf > (accessed 22-11-2020). 
5 LR Kepros “Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory” (1999-2000) 9 Law and Sexuality Rev 
Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 279 282; GA Yep “Queer Theory” in SW Littlejohn & KA Foss in Encyclopedia 
of Communication Theory (2009) 817 818. 
6  F Valdes “Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and 




discrimination. This, as further argued in this research, is exacerbated in states where non-
heteronormative SOGIE are not legally recognised.7  
The protection of non-heteronormative SOGIE on the African continent is a complex matter.  
From a regional, legal perspective, Article 2 of the ACHPR, Article 3 of the ACRWC, and 
Article 1(f) of the Maputo Protocol do not explicitly list non-heteronormative SOGIE (e.g. 
sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression) as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. Moreover, non-heteronormative sexual orientations and non-binary gender 
identities or gender expressions are often viewed as an illness, brought from Europe by the 
colonisers of the continent. As such, it is often viewed as un-African.8 This assumption prevails 
despite various accounts illustrating that non-heteronormative SOGIE was accepted in large 
parts of Africa before the arrival of colonialists and that the colonisers were responsible for the 
criminalisation of sexual conduct other than for the purpose of procreation.9 In light hereof, 
Vollmer highlights an argument that is habitually presented within this context: because non-
heteronormative SOGIE are un-African, individuals expressing non-heteronormative SOGIE 
are not carriers of human rights and, therefore, their rights are not protected under African 
human rights treaties.10 
The assumption of the un-African-ness of non-heteronormative SOGIE arguably 
exacerbates violence and discrimination against children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
However, few studies have been conducted on the prevalence of violence perpetrated 
specifically against learners based on their SOGIE on the African continent.11 In Namibia, a 
qualitative study focused on the experiences of self-identified homosexual learners in 
secondary schools.12 The study reported accounts of learners being bullied and provoked to 
 
7 African Commission, IACmHR, UN (2016) 15-16. 
8 AM Ibrahim (2015) “LGBT rights in Africa and the discursive role of international human rights law” (2015) 
15 AHRLJ 263 265; ST Eborah “Africanising human rights in the 21st Century: Gay rights, African values and 
the dilemma of the African legislator” (2012) 1 IHRLR 110 115; S Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities 
in Africa” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011) 11; J Bennett “Subversion and resistance: 
Activist initiatives” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011) 77 81. 
9 Eborah (2012) IHRLR 116-117; Ibrahim (2015) AHRLJ 267-269. 
10 DT Vollmer Queer families: An analysis of non-heteronormative family rights under the African human rights 
system LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 262. 
11 In contrast, there is more research available on the violence and discrimination experienced by children in 
schools in European countries and the United States. See, for example: R R Thoreson “Like walking through a 
hailstorm” Discrimination against LGBT youth in US Schools (2016); Lithuanian Gay League Homophobic 
bullying in Lithuanian schools: survey results and recommendations (2015); E Formby The impact of homophobic 
and transphobic bullying on education and employment: A European survey (2013); A Guasp The school report: 
The experiences of gay young people in Britain’s schools in 2012 (2012); P Gordon Review of Homophobic 
Bullying in Educational Institutions (2012); A W Brown & M Bochenek Hatred in the Hallways: Violence and 
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students in U.S. schools (2001). 




fight with their peers: “if you are man enough fight with me”; and of teachers refusing 
homosexual learners’ entrance to their classrooms. 13 One student reported being called out in 
front of the school assembly: 
 
“They [teachers] would call me from the school assembly and ask all the learners if they see a boy 
or a girl. Obviously, the learners reply it is a boy. The teacher would then ask me why I want to turn 
myself into a girl. I would tell her that I am not turning myself into a girl, I am born as a girl. I will 
then be suspended for being disrespectful”.14 
 
In Nigeria, qualitative research was conducted on homophobic bullying in Nigerian schools, 
with specific focus on the experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer 
university students.15 According to the research, the prevalence of homophobic bullying was 
connected to society’s disapproval of homosexuality.16 Students reported being threatened, 
subjected to physical violence and name-calling from their peers. However, the students 
indicated that this was inevitable and preferable to being suspended or expelled.17 
In South Africa, research conducted on the experiences of homophobia among queer 
learners in a township school reported that marginalisation of, and discrimination against, queer 
learners came across through the use of language and instilment of fear. In terms of the former, 
learners reported the use of terms such as ‘faggot’ (English), ‘moffie’ (Afrikaans) or ‘isatabane’ 
(isiZulu) in reference to homosexual students.18 Thus, language was a way in which 
homophobia and heterosexism were entrenched.19 This was also seen in the cautioning of girls 
against being tomboyish or expressing themselves as boys. This is both linked to what is 
considered as the feminine behaviour girls should strive towards, as well as how adopting 
behaviour that is ascribed to the opposite sex is “seen as one of the steps in the process of 




15 Okanlawon (2017) Journal of LGBT Youth 51. Because little data is available on homophobia and transphobia 
in educational settings, it must be assumed that the experiences of LGBTQ university students will be similar to 
those of schoolchildren.  
16 51. 
17 57-58. 
18 T Msibi “‘I’m used to it now’: experiences of homophobia among queer youth in South African township 
schools” (2012) 24 Gender and Education 515 523; D Bhana “Ruled by hetero-norms? Raising some moral 
questions for teachers in South Africa” (2014) 43 Journal of Moral Education 362 369. 
19 G M Herek “The psychology of sexual prejudice” (2000) 9 Current Directions in Psychological Science (2000) 
19 19. See also: E P Cramer Addressing Homophobia and Heterosexism on College Campuses (2014) 2. Herek 
defines ‘heterosexism’ as “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual 
form of behavior, identity, relationship, or community”. 




accounts of teachers “spreading the idea that homosexuality [is] contagious” and that ‘straight’ 
learners are therefore “in danger of being infected by queer learners”.21 Thus, using 
homophobic language and instilling fear both contributed to the othering of homosexual 
learners.  
There is a lack of research on the African continent regarding the experiences of transgender 
learners in schools. The unreported judgment of the Equality Court of South Africa in Mphela 
v Manamela and Limpopo Department of Education22 illustrates that transgender learners are 
subject to similar discrimination and victimisation as homosexual learners. The claimant, 
Mphela, was born male, but identified and expressed herself as female: she wore the girls’ 
school uniform and used the girls’ bathroom. Mphela testified that she was subject to verbal 
and physical abuse at the hand of the principal. Her allegations include that the principal beat 
her with a stick, blocked her from entering classrooms, and humiliated her in front of her peers. 
As a result, Mphela did not complete her education as the school did not provide a safe 
environment, conducive to learning.23  
Even though only limited research is available, these examples show that children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE are often subject to discrimination and degrading treatment in schools 
as a result of religious or cultural convictions. Consequently, an unaccepting school 
environment prevents children with non-heteronormative SOGIE from taking advantage of all 
the benefits that stem from the right to education to the same degree as other children. 
The realisation of socio-economic rights is integral to the right to a dignified life.24 In 
particular, the right to education is key to promoting the full and harmonious development of 
the child into adults who can contribute to the development of their communities.25 The 
ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol guarantee all African children an equal right 
to education.26 The right to education does not refer to the mere formal access to education. 
Rather, the school environment should be such that it enables each child to benefit equally from 
education. However, considering the violence and discrimination that children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE face in many schools, it is unlikely that they can fully enjoy their right 
 
21 524. 
22 (2017) (unreported case), Seshego Equality Court. 
23 Summary of evidence: MP Nare (2017). 
24 M Ssenyonjo “Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the African Commission: 30 
years since the adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 NQHR 358 359. 
25 KD Beiter The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (2005) 470-471 P Arajärvi “Article 
26” in A Eide, G Alfredsson, G Melander, LA Rehof & A Rosas (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A Commentary (1992) 409. 




to education. Moreover, any form of violence against children negatively affects their 
development, thereby infringing on their right to special protection and to have their best 
interests considered in all matters concerning them. As such, states that do not protect children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE against discrimination in schools and that do not take steps 
to address it, violate, as further argued in this research, the obligations imposed by the ACHPR, 
the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol to respect, protect, promote, and ensure the rights 
enshrined therein without discrimination.  
 
1 2 Research questions and hypotheses 
The primary research question that this dissertation seeks to address is whether the right to 
education, as it is formulated in the ACRWC read together with the ACHPR and Maputo 
Protocol enables equal access to, and enjoyment of, education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. The secondary research questions, considered to fully engage with 
the primary research question, are:  
(i) How do African conceptions of SOGIE in terms of traditional cultural and religious 
norms inform the current interpretation of the African Charter, the ACRWC and the 
Maputo Protocol?  
(ii) Can a teleological approach to the interpretation of the ACHPR, ACRWC and the 
Maputo Protocol facilitate the development of the right to education of children with 
non-heteronormative and non-binary SOGIE through the lens of the rights to human 
dignity, non-discrimination, equal protection of the law, and the principle of the best 
interests of the child?  
(iii) Is it possible to use a teleological approach that not only considers the background, 
Preamble, annexures and provisions of the instruments, but that is informed by, for 
example, the Yogyakarta Principles (“YP”)27 and the Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 
(“YP+10”)28, and that considers international law and the findings of other regional 
human rights systems?  
 
 
27 Yogyakarta Principles “Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity” (03-2007) yogyakartapinciples.org <http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/principles_en.pdf> (accessed 22-22-2020). 
28 Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 “Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics 






Based on the above, the research departs from the following primary, two-pronged, hypothesis:  
(i) The current interpretation of rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, equal 
protection of the law, and the best interests of the child under the African human rights 
system does not provide adequate protection to children with non-heteronormative 
and non-binary SOGIE in education; however  
(ii) These rights can be purposefully interpreted to provide a framework for the protection 
of SOGIE rights in education. 
The following secondary assumptions further guide the research. First, the ACHPR, the 
ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol protect the right to education of all children. However, 
given the experiences of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE, these instruments do not 
afford the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE on equal terms as 
children who express themselves within the existing gender binaries. Second, these instruments 
are formulated in broad terms to provide for the different national legal systems and traditional, 
cultural and religious values of the states in a region. Its broad formulation is ultimately aimed 
at promoting its signing and ratification. Third, as a result, states are not given detailed 
instructions as to what the protection of the rights guaranteed require: it is the sovereign state’s 
prerogative to govern over its people and determine its policies, sometimes to the detriment of 
vulnerable groups. 
 
1 3 Theory and methodology 
1 3 1 Queer theory, queer legal theory, and African conceptions of SOGIE 
At the core of the primary research question lies the heteronormative and non-heteronormative 
divide and how cultural and societal conceptions of sex, gender, and sexual orientation 
influence how individuals are viewed and treated. These conceptions ultimately influence the 
formulation, interpretation and application of regional human rights law instruments such as 
the ACRWC, ACHPR and the Maputo Protocol.  
Queer theory was chosen as the theoretical framework of this dissertation for its inclusivity. 
It seeks to address the criticism of the homophile-, gay and lesbian liberationist- and lesbian 
feminist movements, being that it elevated one identity above another and was, therefore, 
exclusionary.29 Queer theory includes any person who identifies within the framework of non-
 
29 P de Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 328 343; 




heteronormative sexual orientations or non-binary gender identities or gender expressions.30 
As such, it provides a framework within which it is possible to unpack how the conflation of 
sex, gender, and sexual orientation has culminated in the notion that biological men must be 
masculine and attracted to biological women who must be feminine and attracted to [biological] 
men.31  
In this context, the research also explores the impact of colonialist depictions of Africans as 
sexual spectacles and the introduction of the Christian faith on the ingraining of Victorian-age 
ideas about sex, gender, and sexualities into African cultures.32 This has resulted in a claim 
from most modern African states that non-heteronormative SOGIE are un-African and a white 
phenomenon, based on the assumptions that black identities are heterosexual and that racial 
and sexual identities are not comparable.33 However, accounts of the existence of diverse 
understandings and acceptance of what is now defined as non-heteronormative SOGIE in pre-
colonial Africa are also unpacked.34 In this regard, queer theory facilitates the exploration and 
deconstruction of African conceptions of non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
Together with queer theory, the research furthermore utilises intersectionality, allowing 
consideration of how, for example, sex, gender, sexual orientation, and age can exacerbate 
discrimination.35 Because the dissertation focuses on the right to education of children, the 
discrimination against children based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE necessarily 
intersects with discrimination based on age. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, queer theory, and intersectionality are framed by 
queer legal theory (“QLT”). The purpose of this layered theoretical approach is to create an 
informed understanding of the challenges faced by persons with diverse SOGIE and to illustrate 
how the establishment of heteronormative ideals permeate our entire existence and have 
culminated in a site of violence that disregards identities and behaviours that fall outside 
heteronormative norms.  
 
 
30 Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 282. 
31 Valdes (1995) Cal L Rev 42. 
32 Bennett “Subversion and resistance: activist initiatives” in African Sexualities: A Reader 81; Tamale 
“Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities: A Reader 15-16. 
33 Eborah (2012) IHRLR 115. 
34 AM Ibrahim “LGBT rights in Africa and the discursive role of international human rights law” (2015) 15 
AHRLJ 263 268. 




1 3 2  A comparative, reform-oriented, legal methodology  
A pure doctrinal methodology was considered too constricting for the purposes of this research. 
Instead, existing human rights law must, in line with the theoretical approach, be viewed 
through the lens of universality to afford children with non-heteronormative SOGIE the right 
to education. Therefore, a reform-oriented perspective is relevant. A reform-oriented 
perspective supplements the traditional legal doctrinal approach with other methods of research 
to address lacunas in the law. According to the Pearce Committee, reform-oriented research 
refers to “[r]esearch which intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and which 
recommends changes to any rules found wanting”.36 Thus, a reform-oriented approach enables 
researchers to not only consider the law as it is, but also the law as it could or should be.37 The 
non-doctrinal method applied in this research is the teleological interpretation of the ACHPR, 
ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol enabling a comparison of different sources of human rights 
law and accounting for the principles of universality and the best interests of the child.  
A reform-oriented approach is often utilised within the scope of doctrinal research. This 
means that despite considering results that stem from non-doctrinal research, legal researchers 
do not often engage in non-doctrinal research themselves.38 Under 1 1, limited results from 
psychological and educational studies conducted on the African continent was considered to 
provide some context to the research at hand. These results are valuable as it illustrates the 
experienced of learners with non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools in the African region, 
albeit not being the central theme of the research. 
A comparative perspective between international, European, inter-American, and African 
human rights law further complements the research. Comparative legal research is valuable for 
cultivating awareness of the different ways in which legal or social issues are addressed in 
various systems.39 Through this, comparative legal research also provides insight into how our 
perceptions and intuitions shape our understanding of the law.40 Comparative legal research 
necessarily requires that the researcher expand their knowledge, considering diverse solutions 
 
36 D Pearce, E Campbell & D Harding (‘Pearce Committee’) Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment 
for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (1987) quoted in Hutchinson & Duncan (2012) Deakin 
LR 101. 
37 Hutchinson (2015) ELR 131. 
38 130. 
39 EJ Eberle “The method and role of comparative law” (2009) 8 Global Stud L Rev 451 471; R Leckey “Review 
of comparative law” (2017) 26 Social & Legal Studies 3 14; M van Hoecke & M Warrington “Legal Cultures, 
Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law” (1998) 47 Int’l & Comp LQ 
495 497. 




to similar problems.41 In this regard, Örücü discusses the functional-institutional and problem-
solving approaches. In terms of the functional-institutional approach, the question is whether 
there is an “institution in system B [that] performs an equivalent function to the one under 
survey in system A”.42 On the other hand, the problem-solving approach asks how “a specific 
social or legal problem, encountered both in society A and society B is resolved”.43 The 
approach to determining the comparability of legal systems, therefore, relies on the similarity 
of the legal or social problems or the existence of a system addressing this problem.  
Frankenberg further draws attention to the “versatility and universality” of comparative 
legal research.44 This is in line with the increasing interdependence between regions and the 
spreading of ideas through globalisation. Peters and Schwenke argue that, as a result of 
globalisation, “different legal systems and different cultures are confronted with each other and 
must interact”.45 According to Muir Watt, “globalization brings heightened exchange in certain 
fields”.46 Human rights are one such field, with the international human rights system resulting 
in heightened interaction between nations and regions through the United Nations (“UN”), and 
other international and regional human rights bodies.47 As a result, it is becoming increasingly 
necessary to move beyond only comparing nation states, to also compare regional systems, 
considering the place of these systems in the broader international sphere.  
The success of comparative legal research is largely dependent on the comparability of the 
systems concerned.48 There are four grounds on which the international, European, inter-
American, and African human rights systems can be compared. Firstly, the foundational 
instruments of international and regional human rights instruments all indicate a commitment 
to the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). Secondly, these 
treaties all contain the following provisions in similar wording: the rights to human dignity, 
non-discrimination and equal protection of the law, the right to education, and the need to offer 
special protection to children because of their vulnerability. Thirdly, the European, inter-
American, and African regional human rights treaties are aimed at setting standards for the 
protection of human rights in a particular geographical region based on their commitment to 
 
41 E Örücü “Methodological aspects of comparative law” (2007) 1 EJLR 29 32. 
42 33. 
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44 G Frankenberg “Critical comparisons: Re-thinking comparative law” (1985) 26 Harv Int Law J 411 417. 
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46 H Muir Watt “Globalization and comparative law” in M Reimann & R Zimmerman (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
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rights set out in the UDHR. Thus, the protection of human rights in a particular geographical 
region is tied to the vision of universal human rights as contained in the UDHR. Finally, the 
interpretation of the various human rights treaties under the international, European, inter-
American, and African systems, can be guided by the teleological approach of interpretation, 
as set out in the Vienna Convention.  
 
1 4 Significance of the research project 
The research is significant as it offers a multifaceted interpretation of the right to education and 
related rights under the African regional human rights system in order to protect children with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE in the context of education. Such an interpretation is currently 
lacking in African literature and is yet to be addressed by the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”) or the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission). The contribution is of particular relevance in light of the African 
Commission’s withdrawal of the observer status of the Coalition for African Lesbians in 
August 2018, after months of pressure from the African Union Executive Council, made up of 
foreign ministers or other ministers designated by the governments of the African Union 
(“AU”) member states.49 The result is a strong indication that the AU views persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE as not having the right to equal protection of the law under the African 
regional human rights system. The argument presented in this research is that the law as it 
stands, to the contrary, protect persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
1 5 Scope and limitations of the dissertation  
As briefly explained above, the research topic requires the exploration of four separate rights 
under international and regional human rights law: (i) human dignity; (ii) non-discrimination; 
(iii) education; and (iv) the best interests of the child principle. In this regard, the international 
framework, analysed and applied in this research, consists of the UDHR, the International 
 
49 The Executive Council of the African Union is composed of ministers of the member states of the AU. It 
“coordinates and takes decisions on policies in areas of common interest to Member States”. The Executive 
Council put pressure on the African Commission to revoke CAL’s observer status because it contradicts 
“fundamental African values, identity and good traditions”. The fact that the African Commission succumbed to 
this pressure raises concerns as to the independence of the African Commission from political pressure. See: 
International Justice Resource Centre “African Commission bows to political pressure, withdraws NGO’s 
observer status” (18-08-2018) IJR Center < https://ijrcenter.org/2018/08/28/achpr-strips-the-coalition-of-african-
lesbians-of-its-observer-status/> (accessed 13-01-2019); AU “Executive Council” (2020) AU < 




Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),50 the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),51 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”),52 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”).53 Under European human rights law, the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),54 the European Social Charter (“ESC”)55 and the Revised 
European Social Charter (“ESC(r)”)56 are considered. In respect of the inter-American system, 
the research primarily draws from the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
(“ADRDM”)57 and the American Convention of Human Rights (“ACHR”).58 The Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador)59 and the inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belém 
do Pará”)60 are also considered, albeit to a lesser extent. Importantly, throughout the analysis 
reference is made to the YP and YP plus 10 where courts and treaty bodies have utilised these 
principles to interpret the above-mentioned treaties. 
The reason for the focus on international and regional human rights law is because the 
human rights bodies attached to these treaties are responsible for setting human rights 
standards, influencing other international and regional human rights bodies and elucidate state 
obligations. Furthermore, because human rights bodies are often the last forum for determining 
a human rights violation, their decisions can catalyse change in states where the government 
or domestic courts were – up to that point – unwilling to find a violation of a particular right. 
This is evident from the international and regional jurisprudence pertaining to the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE discussed in chapters 4 to 6. For the same reason as 
the chosen focus on international and regional human rights law, the jurisprudence of the 
African sub-regional courts is not considered.  
Because the research concerns the right to education of children with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE, the criminalisation of homosexual conduct in individual African states is not explored 
 
50 (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
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52 (adopted 3 September 1981, entered into force 3 September 1981) A/RES/34/180 
53 (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3. 
54 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
55 (adopted 18 October 1961; entered into force 26 February 1965) ETS 35. 
56 (adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999) ETS 163. 
57 (adopted 2 May 1948). 
58 (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 143. 
59 (adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) OASTS 69. 




in detail. Rather, the focus is on the obligations imposed by the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the 
Maputo Protocol to ensure that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE can enjoy their right 
to education. However, it is important to note that criminalising homosexual conduct 
exacerbates the discrimination that all persons experience based on their real or imputed sexual 
orientation.  
Furthermore, despite the importance of the African Youth Charter (“AYC”),61 it has limited 
application for the specific research questions set out under 1 2. The AYC applies to persons 
between the ages of 15 and 35.62 As this research is concerned with children, being persons up 
to and including the age of 18, the AYC does not provide protection to all children, but only to 
a select group between the ages of 15 and 18. Furthermore, the AYC refers to the ACRWC and 
reaffirms “the need to take appropriate measures to promote and protect the rights and welfare 
of children”.63 The ACRWC provides more comprehensive provisions relating to the protection 
and promotion of the rights of the child. The AYC does not add to the ACRWC, but rather 
extends its application to persons up to the age of 35.  
As a point of departure, it is important to note that the treaties under consideration recognise 
that human rights stem from the individual’s inherent human dignity. As such, human dignity 
also informs the right to equality and non-discrimination, education, and the best interests of 
the child. The purpose and object of all the instruments under discussion are to ensure the rights 
of all persons on equal terms without discrimination. Most of the monitoring mechanisms 
attached to the international, European, and inter-American human rights treaties have used the 
open-ended and inclusive nature of the right to non-discrimination to include non-
heteronormative SOGIE as a prohibited ground of discrimination, despite it not being listed in 
the non-discrimination provisions of these treaties. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
research does not, and arguably cannot, consider each case dealing with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE in detail. Moreover, it does not discuss the interpretation of each right insofar as it 
pertains to non-heteronormative SOGIE rights. Rather, the research presents the most 
significant cases and legal principles that have arisen in the development of the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under international and regional human rights law.  
The international, European, inter-American, and African human rights treaties enshrine the 
right to education. The right to education provided under the UDHR, ICESCR, CRC, and the 
ACRWC is comprehensive. These instruments protect a formal right to education but also set 
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out state obligations in respect of providing different levels of education and the aims that 
education should set out to achieve. In analysing the right to education, the research does not 
explore the obligations on states to provide for different levels of education. These obligations 
speak more to the organisational aspects of education, such as the available education budget. 
Instead, the research focuses not only on the meaning of education in the specific context of 
ensuring that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE are allowed to go to school, but also 
that the aims of education accommodate these children and foster acceptance amongst peers, 
teachers, and parents or guardians. Furthermore, although the prior right of parents in respect 
of their children’s moral and religious education in terms of Article 26(3) of UDHR is 
considered, the discussion is limited by the lack of interpretive guidance. As a result, the 
arguments made in this regard rely on a textual reading in the context of the right to education. 
The focus on children with non-heteronormative SOGIE presents a broad framework for 
exploring what a child-friendly education that accommodates and celebrates diversity should 
look like. In a practical sense, it means that schools cannot choose whether or not to comply 
with recommendations from international and regional bodies as it would mean that the right 
to education of children who identify within a heteronormative framework is elevated above 
that of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. This would also be in contradiction with the 
best interests of the child principle, which demands that in all matters concerning the child, the 
child’s best interests have to be considered. The research available on the best interests 
principle primarily concerns situations where children are separated from their parents or 
guardians, whether through incarceration or social services, or where decisions have to be made 
as to a healthcare procedure that the child should undergo. As such, the application of the best 
interests principle to the right to education is limited because it can only draw from the 
considerations that have been applied in this context.  
As stated in 1 1 above, there is little research on the experiences of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in schools on the African continent. This limits the extent to which 
the research can contextualise the issue. As a result, the research considers how the 
marginalisation and discrimination that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE experience 
impacts on their human dignity and ability to fully enjoy their rights. This is then applied to the 
right to education, read with the best interests principle, to expound on state obligations in this 
regard.  
Finally, the research undertaken is not concerned with guiding litigation on the right to 
education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. It also does not consider whether non-




Commission. Rather, it sets forth a holistic and purposive interpretation of the right to 
education under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol, one that is informed by 
international and regional human rights law.  
 
1 6 Chapter outline  
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical approach that underlies the research. Under 2 2, the various 
terms relevant to the research are introduced. An explanation is also provided as to how the 
conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation has resulted in heteronormative privilege and 
the othering of SOGIE that falls outside this framework. Thereafter, in part 2 3, the 
developments that led up to the establishment of queer theory is considered. This discussion 
starts with the essentialist and constructionist debate and how it influenced the current 
conceptions of the terms defined in part 2 2, after which the impact of the homophile 
movement, the gay and lesbian liberationist movement, and the lesbian feminist movement on 
the establishment of queer theory is considered. It is the criticism and gaps in these movements 
that ultimately gave way to queer theory, which claims to be a more inclusive theoretical 
framework.  
In part 2 3, the main elements of queer theory are introduced. In this discussion, it is 
illustrated that queer theory’s appropriateness as a theoretical perspective lies in its wide scope, 
which includes non-heteronormative SOGIE. Queer theory’s claim to inclusivity is utilised in 
support of a universalist approach to human rights under chapter 3. In part 2 3, reference is also 
made to QLT and how various strategies can be implemented in a manner that allows queer 
theory to inform the law to ultimately protect the rights of sexual minorities. 
Under 2 5, it is shown that that the social constructionist nature of sexuality and the 
establishment of heterosexuality as a privileged norm has influenced African conceptions of 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. In this discussion, the colonialist depiction of Africans as sexual 
spectacles is considered, as well as the resulting conception that non-heteronormative SOGIE 
is un-African. Finally, in part 2 6, the value of queer theory and QLT in exploring the subtle 
and complex ways in which heteronormativity enforces the othering of persons that identify 
outside the framework of heterosexuality is explained, as well as how this othering ultimately 
influenced the initial formulation of fundamental human rights as contained in the ACHPR, 
ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol.  
Chapter 3 sets out the legal methodology utilised in this research. Under 3 2, the teleological 




the teleological approach entails. Secondly, its value as a method of interpretation to provide 
substantive protection to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in law. Under 3 3, the 
principle that human rights are universal is discussed. This includes consideration of where the 
notion of universal human rights originated and how the current understanding of universal 
human rights stems from the ideological patrimony of the West. Furthermore, the debate 
between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism is considered, reflecting on 
how cultural relativism influences the interpretation and application of universal human rights. 
Moreover, this is informed by the idea that regional human rights systems are perhaps best 
situated to foster compliance with international human rights norms.  
Chapter 4 tracks the interpretation and development of the right to human dignity, equality 
and non-discrimination, education, and the best interests of the child principle under 
international human rights law. The structure under each main heading from 4 2 to 4 5 is the 
same. It sets out and analyses the development and interpretation of the right to human dignity, 
equality, non-discrimination, and education under the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. 
The structure under 4 6 is similar to that of 4 2 to 4 5, with an added section dealing with the 
best interests of the child under the UNCRC. Finally, this chapter considers what the YP and 
YP+10 add to the interpretation of the rights under discussion, as it “affirm[s] binding 
international legal standards with which all States must comply” and has the potential to 
“mould conduct on the international scene”.64  
Chapters 5 and 6 follow the same structure as chapter 4. Whereas chapter 5 sets out the 
interpretation and development of the right to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, 
education, and the best interests of the child principle under the ECHR, ESC, and the ESC(r), 
chapter 6 does so in respect of the ADRDM, ACHR, Protocol of San Salvador, and the 
Convention of Belém do Pará. 
Chapter 7, like chapters 4 to 6, aims to provide an interpretation of the right to human 
dignity, non-discrimination, and the best interests of the child that protects the rights to 
education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and 
the Maputo Protocol. The discussion on the ACHPR and the African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACERWC”) follows the same structure as that under 
chapters 4 to 6. However, the ACRWC is preceded by an analysis that seeks to balance the best 
interests of the child and the child’s right to participate against the duties imposed by Article 
 
64 Available at <https://yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en/> (accessed 27-05-2019); RMM Wallace & O 




31. The Maputo Protocol is explored under 7 5, firstly defining the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women as inclusive of any persons who identifies as a woman. 
Thereafter, human dignity is discussed in relation to the obligation to eliminate harmful 
practices. Finally, the right to education is considered in light of the right to non-discrimination. 
Chapter 7 concludes with an exposition of a teleological approach to the interpretation of the 
right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the African regional 
human rights system. 
Chapter 8 synthesises the research. 8 2 sets out the main findings of the research, indicating 
how it relates to the research questions set out under 1 2. Against the backdrop of the main 
findings, the value of the research is explained under 8 3. Under 8 4, recommendations are 
presented as to how best to protect the rights of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. Finally, under 8 5, potential avenues 




2 Queer theory and African conceptions of SOGIE 
2 1 Introduction  
As stated under 1 above, this thesis concerns whether the regional African human rights system 
enables children with non-heteronormative SOGIE equal access to, and enjoyment of, the right 
to education. In this regard, children with non-heteronormative SOGIE’s access to, and 
enjoyment of, the right to education is compared to that of children with heteronormative and 
binary conceptions of sex and gender. At the core of this question lies the heteronormative and 
non-heteronormative divide and how cultural and societal conceptions of sex, gender and 
sexual orientation influence how persons are viewed and treated. These conceptions ultimately 
influence the formulation, interpretation and application of regional human rights law 
instruments such as the ACRWC, ACHPR and the Maputo Protocol.  
 
2 2 Terminology and its conflation  
2 2 1 Terminology 
Various terms must be defined for purposes of this research. The YP and YP+10 are used as a 
point of departure in the formulation of these terms, setting out how various fundamental 
human rights can be interpreted to provide explicit recognition and protection of the human 
rights of all individuals, without distinction based on sexual orientation, gender identities or 
gender expressions. In this regard, a universalist approach is utilised, further discussed under 
3 4.  
Gender and sex are often conflated.1 Whereas sex refers to a person’s “biological features 
such as chromosomes, hormones, internal and external sexual and reproductive organs”2 – that 
is, male, female, intersex3 – gender is a social construct that dictates the accepted behaviour 
and roles to be adopted based on sex.4 Gender operates in different theoretical paradigms. This 
is further elaborated on in parts 2 3 and 2 4 below discussing Queer theory as the theoretical 
perspective that informs this research. 
 
1 See the text to part 2 2 2. 
2 Vollmer Queer families 46 quoting M Hawkesworth “Confounding gender” (1997) 22 Signs 649 656. 
3 African Commission, IACmHR, UN “Ending violence and other human rights violations based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity: A joint dialogue of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Inter-
America Commission on Human Rights and United Nations” (2016) PULP: “An intersex person is born with 
sexual anatomy, reproductive organs, and/or chromosome patterns that do not fit the typical definition of male or 
female” 2. 




The Preamble to the YP defines sexual orientation and gender identity. Sexual orientation 
is defined as referring to:  
 
“[E]ach person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate 
and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one 
gender”.5  
 
This definition recognises that sexual orientation is not just heteronormative. In other words, it 
does not just refer to emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to a person of the opposite 
sex. The reference to gender also indicates the recognition that sex and gender are different. 
The Preamble furthermore defines gender identity as follows: 
  
“Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience 
of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal 
sense of the body (…) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms”.6 
 
For purposes of this research, gender includes masculine, feminine, and transgender. The Joint 
Dialogue of the African Commission, Inter-American Commission and UN on Ending violence 
and other human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity (“Joint 
Dialogue”)7 defines transgender as: 
 
“[A]n umbrella term used to describe a wide range of identities … [including persons] whose 
appearance and characteristics do not correspond with the sex they were assigned at birth and/or are 
perceived as gender atypical”.8 
 
The definitions of sexual orientation and gender identity set out in the Joint Dialogue are similar 
to that of the YP. However, these terms are explained in more detail and less complex language 
in the Joint Dialogue. According to the Joint Dialogue, all people have a sexual orientation. 
Sexual orientation refers to “a person’s physical, romantic and/or emotional attraction towards 
other people”,9 and is unrelated to gender identity. In its definition of sexual orientation, the 
Joint Dialogue also refers to the meaning of gay, lesbian, heterosexual and bisexual: 
 
 
5 Preamble to the Yogyakarta Principles. 
6 Preamble. 






“Gay men and lesbian women are attracted to individuals of the same sex as themselves. 
Heterosexual people … are attracted to individuals of a different sex from themselves. Bisexual 
people may be attracted to individuals of the same or different sex”.10 
 
The human rights violations mentioned under 1 above and elaborated on under chapters 4 to 7 
below, are often founded in homophobia and transphobia. According to the Joint Dialogue: 
 
“Homophobia [refers to] an irrational fear of, hatred or aversion towards lesbian, gay or bisexual 
people; [whereas] transphobia denotes an irrational fear, hatred or aversion towards transgender 
people”.11 
 
These terms form the foundation of an understanding of the complexities surrounding the 
interpretation of the ACHPR, ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol in a manner that protects the 
rights of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Two things become relevant in the context 
of the terms set out here: first, the conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation and how it 
has contributed to the rise of heteronormative privilege in various societies and cultures across 
the world; and second, how Queer theory, in light of this conflation, can be utilised as a 
theoretical perspective to frame the interpretation of the ACHPR, ACRWC and the Maputo 
Protocol. 
 
2 2 2 Conflating sex, gender and sexual orientation 
Against the backdrop of the definitions provided, the conflation of sex, gender and sexual 
orientation must be further explored. According to Valdes12, the meaning of sex, gender and 
sexual orientation has been conflated, with this conflation having been accepted in most 
societies and thus going unnoticed. Valdes argues that the conflation has three legs; firstly, 
conflating sex and gender; secondly, conflating gender and sexual orientation; and thirdly, 
conflating sex and sexual orientation.13 In essence, “the conflation views sex as the determinant 
of gender, conceptualizes gender as the social dimensions of sex, and treats sexual orientation 
as the sexual dimensions of gender”.14 
In terms of the first leg, sex is conflated with gender. As stated under 2 2 1, sex refers to a 










sense, as referring to a person’s external genitalia. Whereas sex refers to a person’s external 
genitalia, gender is a social construct that influences how a person views and conducts 
themselves. In terms of the conflation of sex and gender, a person’s sex is also his or her 
gender.15 Gender is understood as either masculine or feminine, with the former associated 
with being “strong, assertive, virile, macho [and] rational” and the latter with being “weak, 
passive, quiescent, soft [and] emotional”.16 In terms of this conflation then, the masculine 
gender is assigned to the man-sex and the feminine gender to the woman-sex.17  
The second and third legs of conflation can be considered together. In the consideration of 
the conflation of gender and sexual orientation, the conflation of sex and sexual orientation 
becomes relevant. The conflation of sex and sexual orientation becomes clear when considering 
the heterosexual and homosexual divide. Where a man – a person with a penis, being the 
external genital of a man – is attracted to a woman – a person with a vagina, being the external 
genitalia of a woman – this coupling is viewed as heterosexual. In contrast, where a man is 
attracted to another man or a woman is attracted to another woman, this coupling is viewed as 
homosexual. In this sense then, sex is seen as determining sexual orientation.18 The conflation 
of gender and sexual orientation must be understood with consideration of the sex-gender 
conflation. The sex-gender conflation assigns the masculine gender to the man-sex and the 
feminine gender to the woman-sex, with the conflation of gender and sexual orientation then 
favouring a coupling which supports the sex-gender and sex-sexual orientation conflations: a 
man must be masculine and have erotic feelings towards or desire a woman who is also 
feminine.19 
The conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation contributed to establishing the 
correctness of a man having to be masculine being attracted to a woman having to be 
feminine.20 This conflation embodies the essentialist approach, which is discussed in more 
detail under 2 3 1. As a result of this understanding, those who conduct themselves outside this 
framework – for example, men who are feminine or women who are masculine – are viewed 
as inverts for their “failure to adopt the multiple gender stances assigned to her or him at birth 
based exclusively on external genitalia, or sex”.21 These persons are seen as being in the wrong 
 
15 12. 









and can therefore be “targeted and diagnosed [for breaking] … official sex-determined gender 
codes”.22 
 
2 3 The development of queer theory 
2 3 1 Essentialist versus constructionist debate  
The essentialist-constructionist debate influences how the terms set out are understood because 
the essentialist and constructionist conceptualisation of sexual orientation and sexualities 
differ. According to Kepros, the essentialist understanding of sexual orientation and sexualities 
stem from a biological model. In comparison, the constructionist understanding relies on a 
social model which considers how a particular context produces certain labels and modes of 
understanding behaviour.23 
According to the essentialist conception, sexual orientation and gender are objective and 
intrinsic characteristics that are independent of culture.24 Essentialism asserts that sexual 
orientation and gender are consistent regardless of culture, region and time.25 Therefore, for 
example, where a person of one sex is attracted to a person of the same sex, that coupling would 
be viewed as homosexual because sexual orientation and gender exist across time and space. 
In contrast to essentialism, the constructionist approach contends that sexual orientation and 
gender identities depend on cultural, geographical and historical context. According to 
constructionists, sexual orientation and gender identities are the result of social conditioning 
and the available cultural references in terms of which a person can find expression.26 In terms 
of this understanding, neither sexual orientation nor gender identities constitute the core of a 
person. In this sense then, the constructionism is associated with postmodernism which 
contends that all things must be understood within its context. In line with this, constructionism 
holds that because concepts have different meanings in different contexts, nothing can be truly 
universal.27 Therefore, in contrast with the essentialist approach, constructionism does not 
accept that the same homosexual identity can exist across culture, region or time. This can be 
 
22 55. 
23 Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 286. 
24 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 333; A Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction (1996) 
8; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 286.  
25 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 334 and 336; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 
9; GA Yep “Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Theories” in SW Littlejohn & KA Foss (eds) Encyclopedia 
of Communication Theory (2009) 421 422. 
26 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory in Jurisprudence 333-334; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 8-
9; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 286; Yep “Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual 
and Transgender Theories” in Encyclopedia of Communication Theory 422. 




illustrated at the hand of two examples. Firstly, the acceptance of the Greek “paederast” 28 and 
Native American “berdache”29 by their communities – both of whom would be viewed as 
homosexuals in terms of its modern conception.30 Secondly, the so-called birth of the modern 
concept of homosexual identities in the second half of the 1800s in Europe and its subsequent 
dispersion. 
Foucault sites 1870 as the birth of homosexual identities when medical discourse equated 
sodomy with homosexuality. Prior to this, sodomy was merely viewed with disinterested 
disapproval by the larger society: an activity that only some men chose to engage in.31 D’Emilio 
sites the same time as the birth of homosexual identities. However, whereas Foucault refers to 
the medicalisation of sexualities as the decisive event, D’Emilio argues that the rise of 
capitalism was also influential. According to D’Emilio, capitalism allowed individuals to earn 
their wages outside of the interdependent heterosexual familial unit. This enabled individuals 
to construct their personal lives around their sexual orientation, not the family unit.32  
Based on this discussion of the essentialist-constructionist debate, this research puts forth 
that the constructionist conception of sexual orientation and gender identities is more befitting 
to current modes of understanding and therefore more convincing. This is expanded on under 
2 5 where African conceptions of SOGIE is discussed, with consideration of how different 
cultural and geographic contexts inform different understandings thereof. The discussion under 
2 3 2 also favours constructionism, illustrating how the homophile, gay and lesbian 




28 DA Hall “A Brief, Slanted History of ‘Homosexual’ Activity” in I Morland & A Willox (eds) Queer Theory 
(2005) 96 100; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 8: The Greek “paederast” refers to a married adult man 
who sometimes penetrate a man-adolescent during the classical period. This act was associated with power- and 
social status. 
29 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 336; Valdes (1995) Cal L Rev 224; Jagose Queer 
Theory: An Introduction 8; Yep “Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Theories” in Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory 423: The Native American “berdache” refers to where an adult man with feminine 
qualities marries another man, or vice versa. 
30 In terms of the modern understanding of sexual orientation, because one man penetrates or marries another, the 
coupling is homosexual. However, in the Greek and Native American societies, the conduct of these persons did 
not seem to have a defining impact on their sexual- or gender identities. Constructionism often site these examples 
as evidence that there can be no universal identities because it is deeply embedded in cultural conceptions. 
31 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 335; Hall “A Brief, Slanted History of ‘Homosexual’ 
Activity” in Queer Theory 104; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 286. 





2 3 2 Developing queer theory 
The homophile-, gay and lesbian liberationist- and lesbian feminist movements arose prior to 
the development of queer theory. These movements contributed to a wider tolerance and 
recognition of non-heteronormative SOGIE. Queer theory emerged in academic discourse in 
the United States in the 1990s as a philosophical and intellectual concept. It was put forward 
as an attempt to address the criticisms raised against a too narrow understanding of SOGIE and 
how this influences the social, political and economic circumstances of individuals.33  
It is impossible to cite the specific moment when the movement towards the acceptance of 
non-heteronormative SOGIE begun. The homophile movement, 1940-1970, is one of the 
earliest movements of this kind in the US. It was aimed at promoting tolerance of homosexual 
identities through educational programmes, ultimately bringing about legal and social reform 
that would place homosexuals on equal terms with heterosexuals.34 The homophile movement 
argued that the difference between homosexual and heterosexual persons was limited to the 
former’s same-sex attraction, in contrast with the latter’s opposite-sex attraction.35 
Furthermore, the movement put forth that same-sex attraction, like opposite-sex attraction, is a 
natural human phenomenon.36 Because of the conservative culture at the time, which “defined 
homosexuality as beyond respectability”, the homophile movement had limited success.37 
The gay and lesbian rights movement arose out of criticism of the slow progress of the 
homophile movement in the late 1960s.38 The Stonewall Riots of 1969 – a protest against the 
police violence perpetrated against gay men, lesbians and drag queens – catalysed the gay 
liberation movement in the US.39 Moving beyond the homophile movement’s approach that 
argued that there was little difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals, the gay and 
lesbian rights movement challenged the “structures and values of heterosexual dominance” and 
questioned conventional knowledge about gendered behaviour and sexual orientation.40  
Drawing from the civil rights movement’s approach to equal protection under the law, based 
on the “equal but different” logic, gay men and lesbians organised themselves based on “their 
 
33 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 343; Yep “Queer Theory” in Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory 817. 
34 J D’Emilio Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (1983) 108-109; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 22. 
35 D’Emilio Sexual Politics 79; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 30. 
36 Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 22.  
37 D’Emilio Sexual Politics 79; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 29. 
38 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 338; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 30. 
39 D’Emilio Sexual Politics 231-233; De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 337; Jagose 
Queer Theory: An Introduction 30. 




collective experience of homophobia”.41 In this sense, the movement was driven by identity 
politics, which enabled mobilisation towards a common cause: “the recognition of the rights 
of gay men and lesbians”.42 However, the utilisation of identity politics narrowed the meaning 
of “gay” and “lesbian” to same-sex attraction.43 This resulted in the alienation of those who did 
not find expression in this model which, in turn, gave rise to criticism that the gay and lesbian 
movement upholds normative identities to the exclusion of transsexual or bisexual individuals, 
as well as those part of racial or ethnic communities.44  
Furthermore, from within the gay liberationist movement and the women’s liberation 
movement, lesbian women contended that they remained marginalised and that the 
commonalities between gay men and lesbians were limited to their same-sex preference.45 
Moreover, they argued that men were viewed as superior to women. As such, women were 
expected to take their place as men’s subordinates.46 Thus, the 1970s saw the rise of the lesbian 
feminist movement. According to this movement, the gay liberationist movement was 
institutionally sexist: the perception of lesbianism as a mere male version of homosexuality 
failed to take into consideration women’s lack of cultural and economic privilege in relation to 
men.47 However, like the gay liberationist movement, the lesbian feminist movement too 
emphasised that gender and sexualities are fluid, and focused their efforts on “transforming 
oppressive social structures by representing same-sex sexual practices as legitimate”.48  
The homophile-, gay and lesbian liberationist-, together with the lesbian feminist movement, 
all contributed to the recognition of rights for, or at least tolerance of, persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. However, the shortcomings of these theoretical approaches gave rise 
to the need for a model that recognises non-normative categories of identities without elevating 
one above the other. Queer theory claims to be this inclusive model. In the discussion of queer 
theory, it is important to acknowledge the following two shortcomings of the movements 
discussed. Firstly, the utilisation of identity politics in these movements showed acceptance 
and recognition of the heterosexual-homosexual binary with heterosexuality being independent 
 
41 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 338. 
42 338; Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 77; Vollmer Queer families 38. 
43 Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 61. 
44 66. 
45 44 and 47. 
46 J Halley “Queer Theory by Men” in MA Fineman, J E Jackson & A P Romero (eds) in Feminist and Queer 
Legal Theory (2009) 9 10. 





of, and superior to, homosexuality. Secondly, the exclusion of those sexual minorities who do 
not identify within this binary – for example, transgender individuals.49 
 
2 4 Queer theory (or deconstructing life as we know it)  
2 4 1 Queer theory 
Against this backdrop of what led to the need for a model that recognises non-normative 
categories of identities without elevating one above the other, the term “queer” claims to rise 
above gay and lesbian theory’s reliance on identity politics. Its focus is on the inherent 
instability of identity and the social and cultural constructionist nature of gender and 
sexualities. As explained by Jagose:50  
 
“[Queer theory] offers a fresh perspective and a set of tools to critically examine, analyse, and 
understand social relationships, particularly those organised around current constructions of 
sexuality and desire. In addition, it highlights the centrality of power and power relations in those 
relationships and the need to examine and understand them”.51  
 
Queer theory cannot be defined and is therefore “an identity without essence”.52 Queer theory 
can have no definite meaning because it is a methodological description.53 Despite this, it does 
have characteristics by which it can be identified and explored. Queer theory is wide in scope 
and includes non-heteronormative SOGIE. According to Kepros: 
 
“Queer theory views sexuality as a widespread social condition and, thus, a matter of importance to 
all individuals whether they are in the sexual minority or majority … [and] embraces anyone who 
identifies … as ‘Queer’”.54  
 
Whereas Kepros argues that queer theory includes anyone who identifies as queer, Yep 
provides a more definitive definition. According to Yep: 
 
 
49 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 342. 
50 Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 77; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal 
Issues 291. 
51 Yep “Queer Theory” in Encyclopedia of Communication Theory 817. 
52 Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 96. 
53 A P Romero “Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories” in MA Fineman, JE 
Jackson & AP Romero Feminist and Queer Legal Theory (2009) 179 190. 




“[Queer] may mean lesbian, gay, bisexual, two-spirited, transgender, intersexed, questioning, or 
different because of the individual’s sexual and/or gender presentation and expression”.55 
 
These descriptions indicate the refusal of queer theory to limit itself to a particular form. This 
shows both its resistance to whatever constitutes normal, as well as an ambition to include 
those who do not fit a “culturally tidy label”.56 In this sense then, queer theory asserts that 
SOGIE is fluid.57 In so doing, queer theory not only erases heterosexual and homosexual as the 
all-encompassing categories of identification, it also develops the potential meanings of “man” 
and “woman” through its expansion of “visible, plausible, and liveable sexualities”.58 Instead, 
queer theory considers how the construction of heterosexuality has maintained itself as a 
privileged norm that has come to dictate current cultural arrangements and become the standard 
against which all sexual relations are judged.59  
Heterosexuality established itself as a privileged norm through its normalisation.60 It has 
come to be equated with being good and normal, whereas anything that falls outside of this is 
bad and abnormal.61 In this sense, “heterosexuality is defined in opposition to, and given 
content by, homosexuality”.62 Thus, heterosexuality and homosexuality mutually define each 
other, the one requires the other to exist.63  
The establishment of heteronormativity allowed the creation of sexual others and has 
therefore been described as a site of violence.64 As a result, queer theory focuses on 
highlighting and unpacking how this normalisation of heterosexuality has produced an 
unmarked and often invisible heteronormativity that informs “structures of understanding, 
practical orientations, cultural discourses and social institutions that construct heterosexuality 
as privileged, morally right, coherent and stable”.65 By drawing focus to the modes of 
 
55 Yep “Queer Theory” in Encyclopaedia of Communication Theory 818. 
56 Jagose Queer Theory: An Introduction 99; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal 
Issues 283; S Marcus “Queer Theory for Everyone: A Review Essay” (2005) 31 Signs 191 196. 
57 Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 282; Marcus (2005) Signs 196. 
58 Marcus (2005) Signs 200. 
59 Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 284; MA Fineman “Introduction: 
Feminist and Queer Legal Theory” in M A Fineman, J E Jackson & A P Romero Feminist and Queer Legal Theory 
(2009) 1 5; Yep “Queer Theory” in Encyclopaedia of Communication Theory 818. 
60 Yep “Queer Theory” in Encyclopaedia of Communication Theory 818: Normalisation “refers to the proves of 
constructing, establishing, and (re)producing an all-encompassing standard of goodness, desirability, morality, 
and superiority in a cultural system”. 
61 819. 
62 Vollmer Queer families: An analysis of non-heteronormative family rights under the African human rights 
system 37.  
63 Marcus (2005) Signs 197. 
64 JT Weiss “The gender caste system: Identity, privacy, and heteronormativity” (2001) 10 Law & Sexuality 
123 124; M Lloyd “Heteronormativity and/as violence: the “sexing” of Gwen Araujo” (2013) 28 Hypatia 818 818. 




understanding produced by heteronormativity and the power relations at play, queer theory 
creates a platform for “imagining, inventing and enacting other social arrangements”.66  
 
2 4 2  Queer legal theory 
Utilising the tenets of queer theory, QLT questions the social constructions surrounding the 
categories of sex, gender and sexual orientation, as well as how the conflation thereof has 
shaped the formulation, interpretation and application of law. Valdes sets out strategies of how 
QLT can be implemented in a manner that allows queer theory to inform the law to ultimately 
provide protection to the rights of sexual minorities and attain “sex/gender dignity and freedom 
for every individual”.67  
According to Valdes, the conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation must be 
contextualised as a cultural invention. It must be recognised that, as a result, discrimination on 
one ground implicates another: it cannot occur in isolation.68 However, it is not enough to 
recognise the conflation. What is required is a resistance to the stereotypes that have developed 
with the conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation because the conflation is strengthened 
thereby.69 Without a substantial move from this, “efforts toward both social and sexual equality 
will be necessarily limited to a system that subordinates some and privileges others”.70 
Valdes suggests that QLT brings accounts of the lived realities of sexual minorities into the 
law. These accounts illustrate the consequences of heterosexism, including the oppression and 
marginalisation of sexual minorities.71 Relevant examples concerning the lived realities of 
sexual minorities in various African states are discussed under 2 5. Valdes further recommends 
the development and subsequent active and insistent dissemination of constructionist 
sensibilities. This can be done through testing essentialist categories of sex, gender and sexual 
 
66 818. 
67 Valdes (1995) Cal L Rev 321 362. 
68 321. 
69 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 345: In essence, this means that the law must move 
away from thinking that a person with a penis (the external genitalia of a man, often equated with sex) must be 
masculine (the gender that has been attached to the man-sex) and must be attracted (the sexual orientation of the 
man) to a person with a vagina (the external genitalia of a woman, often equated with sex) who must be feminine 
(the gender that has been attached to the woman-sex). 
70 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 345; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev 
Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 295. 
71 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 345; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev 




orientation against the lived realities of sexual minorities, thereby “encourage[ing] exploration 
of potential alternatives to the sex/gender status quo” that would otherwise not be possible.72 
Of significance is the proposal that QLT develops sexual orientation into a coherent idea. 
The argument put forth is that should sexual orientation be developed into a functional social 
and legal construct, it could prevent the use of conceptions that are inimical to the recognition 
and protection of sexual minorities in law.73 As part of the conceptualisation, Valdes suggests 
that QLT defends desire as a “legitimate form of bodily pleasure [and] an important feature of 
human experience”.74 The de-shaming of sex and the recognition that “consensual affection 
and intimacy … are felt by all humans in one form or another” has the potential to have persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE not just be tolerated, but also celebrated.75 
Valdes explains that QLT should promote the idea that sexualities “function in various 
social, economic, and political settings on equal terms”76 and that it therefore transcends private 
life.77 As a result, it can be argued that all sexualities function in both public and private life, 
and that sexual minorities cannot, as such, be limited to private life. As stated by Valdes:  
 
“The ultimate goal, dignity and equality, requires the right of sexual minorities to be open – to be 
active in our occupations and secure in our homes without having to choose continually between a 
life of closeted deceptions and a life of enduring homophobic bigotries”.78 
 
Valdes’ final suggestion for how QLT can be implemented to provide protection to the rights 
of sexual minorities, concerns the intersectionality between various identity markers that shape 
people and their experiences.79 Intersectionality, he suggests, allows consideration of how 
“multiple axes of discrimination … operate in tandem”.80 In this regard, the interaction between 
SOGIE and culture is significant. 
 
 
72 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 346; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev 
Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 296; Valdes (1995) Cal L Rev 367. 
73 De Vos “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in Jurisprudence 346; Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev 
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74 Kepros (1999-2000) Law and Sexuality Rev Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 296-297. 
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76 Valdes (1995) Cal L Rev 370. 
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2 5 African conceptions of SOGIE  
2 5 1 Colonialist depictions: Africans as sexual spectacles 
The meaning attached to concepts relating to SOGIE mainly “reflect realities and experiences 
outside Africa”.81 This section discusses the perception that non-heteronormative SOGIE has 
been imported with the colonisation of Africa.82 Regardless of their origins, these concepts 
have nonetheless become central to the current understandings of “acceptable” or “appropriate” 
sexual orientations, gender identities and gender expressions in African states.  
The earliest written records of African83 sexualities contain accounts of the experiences of 
missionaries and colonialists in parts of Africa during the late nineteenth century.84 These 
accounts depict Africans as insatiable, subject to their “immoral, bestial and lascivious” 
sexualities.85 Africans, and African women, in particular, were viewed as barbaric and savage 
for their failure to hide their sexualities as was the norm in the Victorian-age in Europe at the 
time.86 Thus, with colonisation came the essentialist belief that African bodies were different 
from others. African bodies were viewed as biologically inferior to others based on “ideas about 
their distinctively pathological sexuality”.87 These conceptions developed and became 
ingrained as a result of research into African cultures and sexualities, framing them as 
“different, less urbane and inferior to those of the West”.88 
Despite being perceived as inferior, colonialists still saw Africans as “amenable to cultural 
assimilation and development”.89 As a result, the Christian faith was used to convince Africans 
to adopt the so-called civilised manners of their colonisers, excluding polygamous 
relationships, proscribing acting on desire or seduction in public, and prohibiting same-sex 
sexual conduct.90 The colonialist-project succeeded in ingraining religion and Victorian-age 
 
81 Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities: A Reader 12. 
82 12. 
83 In using the term “African” this research does not put forth that there is such a thing as a single African culture 
or understanding of SOGIE. Rather, the term is used in relation to how it has been utilised in colonial discourse: 
as referring to a uniform group without taking diverse behaviour and practices into consideration. In referring to 
manhood in Africa, the aim is to elucidate the essence of manhood across various cultures at the same time being 
aware of the potential essentialising effect thereof. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to consider 
the possible unlimited number of cultures and sub-cultures on this Continent and the differences of each one. 
84 SO Murray & W Roscoe “Preface: All Very Confusing” in SO Murray & W Roscoe Boy-Wives and Female 
Husbands (1998) xii; Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities 14. 
85 Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities 15. 
86 15. 
87 D Lewis “Representing African sexualities” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011) 199 200. 
88 Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities 19. 
89 Lewis “Representing African sexualities” in African Sexualities 200. 
90 Tamale “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in African Sexualities 16; Bennett “Subversion and 




ideas about sex, gender and sexualities into African cultures resulting in most modern African 
states claiming that non-heteronormative SOGIE is un-African. 
 
2 5 2 Non-heteronormative SOGIE are un-African and a white phenomenon 
In black communities, in both the US and in most African countries, it is often put forth that 
non-heteronormative SOGIE is un-black or un-African.91 This assertion is based on two 
assumptions. First, that black identities are heterosexual. Second, that there is a difference 
between racial identity and a sexual or gender identity.92 The assertion is that whereas race is 
a “biologically determined identity, [non-heteronormative SOGIE] is a freely chosen 
lifestyle”.93  
In terms of this line of argument, pre-colonial Africans were exclusively heterosexual with 
colonial contact bringing with it non-heteronormative ideas of sexual orientation, gender 
identities and gender expressions.94 As averred by Carbado, 
 
“Before the white man came, African men were strong, noble protectors, providers, and warriors for 
their families and tribes. In precolonial Africa, men were truly men. And women – were women. 
Nobody was lesbian. Nobody was feminist. Nobody was gay”.95 
 
Based on the above, non-heteronormative SOGIE are deemed un-African because it offends 
African values of procreation and the continuity of the family.96 Furthermore, because African 
cultures are deemed heterosexual with colonial contact bringing non-heteronormative SOGIE 
therewith, there is a backlash against abandoning African cultural values in favour of those of 
the colonisers.97 The perception that non-heteronormative SOGIE is un-African and in conflict 
with various cultures and their traditions “assume that cultures are static and fixed”.98 However, 
in line with a social constructionist conception, no culture or cultural practice can be fixed 
 
91 D W Carbado “Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights” (2000) 47 University of California Los Angeles Law 
Review 1467 1472-1484; J Todd-Gher “Policing bodies, punishing lives: The African Women’s Protocol as a tool 
for resistance of illegitimate criminalisation of women’s sexualities and reproduction” (2014) 14 AHRLJ 735 737; 
S Haskin “The influence of Roman laws regarding same-sex acts on homophobia in Africa” (2014) 14 AHRLJ 
393 393 and 400. 
92 Carbado (2000) UCLA L Rev 1471-1472. 
93 1471. 
94 Eborah (2012) IHRLR 115. 
95 Carbado (2000) UCLA L Rev 1476 quoting MT Riggs “Black Macho Revisited: Reflections of a SNAP! Queen” 
in D Carbado (ed) Black Men on Race, Gender, and Sexuality: A Critical Reader (1999) 306 310. 
96 Eborah (2012) IHRLR 113. 
97 Ibrahim (2015) AHRLJ 267. 




because “[e]ven the most seemingly pristine and unchanged cultural practices are affected by 
history, globalisation and social struggles”.99  
The supposed un-African-ness of non-heteronormative SOGIE must also be viewed against 
“discourses of national belonging [which] have been anchored in familial scripts and the 
invention of nations as biological families”.100 In this sense, states require citizens to fulfil their 
so-called natural roles in their communities.101 Connected to discourses of national belonging 
is the perception of manhood in Africa and the significance of sexual relations with women 
thereto: the more sexual partners a man has, the more masculine he seems to other men.102 
Therefore, sexual relations or gender expressions that fall outside a heteronormative 
understanding of sex, gender and sexual orientation cause discomfort when not serving 
heterosexual manhood. This discomfort often leads to acts of violence against and 
stigmatisation of those who identify within a non-heteronormative SOGIE framework.103  
 However, “anthropological and historical evidence reveals that the claim [that non-
heteronormative SOGIE are un-African] is unfounded”.104 Thus, the claim that non-
heteronormative SOGIE was introduced by the colonisers is equally unfounded.105 Instead, 
non-heteronormative SOGIE has been part of African identities long before the arrival of 
colonisers. In contrast, it is the rejection of these identities that are un-African.106 
There are accounts of the existence of diverse understandings and acceptance of non-
heteronormative SOGIE in pre-colonial Africa.107 The Islamic Hararri, who lived in the area 
close to Harar in Eastern Ethiopia, accepted same-sex sexual relations between men as persons 
were not excluded based on their same-sex sexual relations.108 In Southern Ethiopia, the Maale 





102 K Ratele “Male sexualities and masculinities” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011) 399 400-
402. 
103 405-406: The violence perpetrated is focused on disciplining non-heteronormative sexualities as to further 
serve heterosexual normalisation, as well as perpetuate masculine domination.  
104 Ibrahim (2015) AHRLJ 267. 
105 Murray & Roscoe “Preface: All Very Confusing” in Boy-Wives and Female Husbands (1998) xii. 
106 M Mutua “Sexual orientation and human rights” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011) 452 
459. 
107 Ibrahim (2015) AHRLJ 268: “There is evidence showing not only that same-sex intimacy was tolerated in 
ancient Egypt, but that at certain periods same-sex relationships were legally recognised. Among the Azande, in 
precolonial Sudan, male same-sex marriage was legally recognised where dowry was paid to boy-wives and 
damages were awarded for infidelity. The Meru people of Kenya, the Bantu of Angola and the Zulu of South 
Africa tolerated transgender men and allowed them to marry other men, while gay prostitution is reported among 
the Hausa of Nigeria. Effeminate males among the Langi of Uganda were allowed to marry men”. 
108 SO Murray & W Roscoe “Overview: Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa” in SO Murray & W Roscoe Boy-




biological man who “dressed like a woman, performed female tasks, cared for their own 
houses, and apparently had sexual relations with men”.109 Examples from the region that is 
now Sudan include the Otoro who recognised “men who dressed and lived as women”,110 as 
well as the Moro, Tira and Nyima who allowed “non-masculine males” to marry other men.111 
In Lesotho, some Basotho women engage in “erotic woman-to-woman relationships”.112 
Despite involving same-sex sexual conduct, it was not conceived as lesbianism.113 
Moreover, in some African cultures, supernatural beliefs surround non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. An example of this is the gatekeeping-role between this world and the otherworld in 
order to uphold society’s psychic balance fulfilled by gays, lesbians and transgendered persons 
among the Dagare of Burkina Faso.114 Another example includes the belief amongst the Ngwa, 
a sub-ethnicity of the Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria, that homosexual relationships between 
fellow warriors would strengthen them in war.115  
 
2 6 Queer theory and QLT’s value to the research in light of African conceptions of 
SOGIE 
2 6 1 The value of the queer lens to the present research  
In light of the discussion undertaken in this chapter, the value of a queer lens in analysing and 
interpreting the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE within the 
context of regional African human rights must be considered. The lens adopted consists of 
queer theory, informed by QLT and an intersectional approach to understanding discrimination 
and marginalisation.  
The value of queer theory for the research undertaken lies in its recognition of the unstable 
nature of identities and its inclusion of diverse non-heteronormative SOGIE without elevating 
one above the other. In this regard, queer rethinks the meaning of “man” and “woman” and the 
gendered behaviour attached thereto. Furthermore, queer theory is valuable for the framework 
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explored as social constructs. Queer theory allows and encourages questioning the 
normalisation of heterosexuality. The normalisation of heterosexuality is what ultimately 
culminated in the establishment of heteronormativity as a site of violence. It is this site of 
violence that informs the formulation of legal instruments that do not seem to provide explicit 
protection to persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
It is valuable to add a further intersectional lens to the queer lens. An intersectional lens 
encourages the deconstruction of sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, and race or ethnicity as 
oppressive identity categories. According to McCall, “the project of deconstructing the 
normative assumptions of these categories contributes to the possibility of positive social 
change”.116 Because the research is concerned with an analysis of African regional human 
rights law that protects children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in the context of education, 
it is valuable to consider the potential of QLT. 
QLT utilises the tenets of queer theory to question how the conflation of sex, gender, and 
sexual orientation, as well as the social constructions surrounding it, has shaped the 
interpretation and application of the law. Through this, QLT allows consideration of how 
conflation is a social invention, and therefore constructionist in nature. In this sense, QLT is an 
anti-essentialist lens. Of particular value is that QLT encourages taking into consideration the 
lived realities of sexual and gender minorities in the development and formulation of the law.117 
In this regard, QLT utilises queer theory to inform the law in a manner that allows recognising 
and protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE, which are deemed 
sexual minorities.  
Against the backdrop of the discussion under 2 5 1 and 2 5 2, QLT applied with queer theory 
allows for a consideration of how the establishment of heteronormativity ultimately influenced 
the formulation of fundamental human rights as contained in regional African human rights 
law instruments, and how this possibly exacerbates the discrimination and marginalisation of 
children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools. Ultimately, the value of a queer and 
QLT lens lies in how it challenges ideas surrounding essentialist identities, with an 
intersectional lens adding further layers to this approach. This layered approach has the 
potential to create a more informed understanding of the challenges faced by persons with 
diverse SOGIE. In light hereof, this research aims to illustrate how the establishment of 
 
116 L McCall “The complexity of intersectionality” (2005) 30 Signs 1771 1777. 
117 The research only engages with the lived realities of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE insofar as it is 
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heteronormative ideals permeate our entire existence and have culminated in a site of violence 
that disregards identities and behaviours that fall outside the norms created thereby. However, 
it is first necessary to further illustrate how the discrimination and marginalisation experienced 
by children with non-heteronormative SOGIE is exacerbated by: (i) their non-heteronormative 
SOGIE; (ii) their race or ethnicity; and (iii) their age i.e., reflecting on the intersectional lens.  
 
2 6 2 Intersecting grounds of discrimination viewed through a queer lens 
QLT elucidates how power and oppression operate on intersecting grounds. This research 
focuses predominately on the intersecting grounds of age, gender, sex, and sexual orientation. 
Based on the discussion in parts 2 2 and 2 5, it is clear that discrimination based on sex, gender, 
and sexual orientation intersect. This is a result of the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation. Therefore, this research considers how the conflation of these markers further 
intersects with others, promoting a nuanced understanding of the multiple dimensions of 
discrimination and marginalisation experienced by children with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
in education in the African context. In turn, this understanding forms the backdrop against 
which various regional African human rights provisions must be viewed. As suggested under 
1 above, the ACHPR, ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol provides protection to persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. However, despite this, the current interpretation of these 
provisions does not give effect to the purpose envisaged by the ACHPR, ACRWC and the 
Maputo Protocol. 
In terms of the right to education, discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation intersects with discrimination based on age.118 Children are generally viewed as 
vulnerable members of society, worthy of special protection and concern.119 The development 
and safety of children is widely perceived as the responsibility of parents, guardians, or the 
state.120 In this regard, the principle of the best interest of the child is relevant. 
The principle of the best interest of the child is derived from the UNCRC. Article 3(1) of 
the UNCRC provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children … the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration”.121 This principle is open-ended in that there are no objective 
criteria as to what constitutes the child’s best interest.122 However, the UN High Commissioner 
 
118 Article 1 of the UNCRC; Art 2 of the ACRWC.  
119 Preamble of the UNCRC; Preamble of the ACRWC. 
120 Articles 2-3 and 18-20 of the UNCRC; Arts 19-20 and 25 of the ACRWC; Art 6(i) of the Maputo Protocol.  
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for Refugees Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child provides some 
guidance: 
 
“The term “best interest” broadly describes the well-being of the child … [which must be] 
determined by a variety of individual circumstances, such as the age, the level of maturity of the 
child, the presence or absence to parents, [and] the child’s environment and experiences”.123 
 
Furthermore, “the child’s own views as to what is in his or her own best interest” should also 
be considered.124 The best interest of the child principle is related to the child’s participation in 
decision-making. Coyne and Harder explain the complexities surrounding the involvement of 
children in decision-making in the context of health care, stating that adults want to “protect 
children from distressing information and the burden of decision-making” and often think that 
children are incompetent to make these types of decisions.125 Although this comment was made 
in the context of children’s participation in decision-making in health care settings, it can 
nonetheless be applied to children’s participation in decision-making that affects them in 
general, as well as their competence to be aware of their non-heteronormative SOGIE and to 
make decisions in this regard. Children’s competence to be aware of or make decisions 
pertaining to their non-heteronormative SOGIE can be undermined by heteronormativity and 
results in a disregard of children’s claims. The best interests of the child principle is expanded 
on under chapters 4 to 7.  
Discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation also intersects with 
discrimination based on race. Discrimination and marginalisation based on race go back to the 
discussion on how African persons were historically viewed as barbaric, animalistic in terms 
of sexual urges, and genetically inferior to white people. This is evident from the discussion 
regarding the colonialist perceptions of black Africans. Racial discrimination exacerbates the 
experiences of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE who already experience 
discrimination based on their non-heteronormative identities or expressions. 
Bearing in mind the impact of racial discrimination on the experiences of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE, the argument presented is that a similar approach can be taken with 
regard to different ethnicities. In Africa, the issue is not necessarily that of black people being 
 
123 UNHCR “UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interest of the Child” (May 2008) 14. 
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considered inferior to white people.126 Rather, because all African countries have a majority 
black population, discrimination is more likely to occur based on a combination of both racial 
and ethnic grounds, where one group has a majority population or is more economically and 
socially powerful than another. Discrimination based on ethnic grounds is founded on the belief 
that ethnic groups are “fundamentally dissimilar in nature and irreconcilable in practice”.127 
Furthermore, the dominant group in a society or state often perceive themselves as superior to 
minorities. Minorities are viewed as threatening the privileges of the dominant group, 
competing for resources.128 
 
2 6 3 Heteronormativity as a site of violence 
According to Lloyd, heteronormative violence refers to the “violence that constitutes and 
regulates bodies according to normative notions of sex, gender, and sexuality”.129 In this regard, 
“gendered and sexualized physical harms” must be considered, as well as the ways 
heteronormativity manifests itself in society.130 Heterosexuality is viewed as the so-called 
natural and normal human experience. In contrast, any form of identity or expression that falls 
outside the heterosexual framework is perceived as abnormal.131 Heterosexuality not only 
includes sexual orientation, but also the gendered behaviour attached thereto as a so-called 
natural phenomenon and the result of normal psychological development.132  
The perception that sex determines gender and sexual orientation is violent for its regulation 
and maintenance of “reproductive sexuality as a compulsory order”.133 Butler suggests that, in 
this way, “the category of sex itself [becomes] a material violence”.134 The violence referred 
 
126 This is not the case in South Africa. During apartheid, white people were deemed superior to all other racial 
groups. Race determined the value of the individual, which in turn determined human rights. Discrimination 
against black South Africans was ingrained in legislation, regulating all aspects of life. In modern South Africa, 
racial discrimination is no longer legislated. However, the effects of apartheid still linger, clearly visible in the 
interactions between racial groups. Moreover, the white population remains the most privileged in terms of land 
ownership, access to services, and is the group with the lowest unemployment rate. In comparison, the black 
population remains the most excluded. 
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to here is the regulation of bodies through language, as well as through norms of gendered 
behaviour.135 
King considers how heteronormative language is used, directly and indirectly, to exclude 
and marginalise persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Heteronormative language has 
become institutionalised through the creation and continued sustaining of opposites within the 
categories of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. The result is being marked as either “he” or 
“she”.136 These opposing markers are also used to police masculine behaviour and to degrade 
feminine behaviour and queer identities. In this regard, men who do not conduct themselves in 
terms of approved masculine behaviour are called “female” or “homosexual”.137 
Heteronormative language is damaging to transgender persons in particular because persons 
often refuse to acknowledge the gender of transgender persons and address them with the 
pronoun that corresponds to the sex and gender assigned at birth.138  
King also considers how norms of gendered behaviour police persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. She illustrates the role of the media in establishing “appropriate” 
behaviour for men and women: women must be chaste in terms of dress and conduct, but also 
be open to the behaviour of men as natural predators.139 Religion too has a significant role in 
upholding gendered behaviour. McGuire et al conducted research on “how religion informs 
and is informed by normative notions of race, gender, and sexuality”.140 The research 
specifically focused on Christianity and how churches are sites of sexual norming, reproducing 
hetero-patriarchal masculinity amongst men and a conservative-femininity amongst women. 
As a result, religious spaces often reject individuals whose sexual orientations, gender 
identities, or gender expressions do not fit in a strict heteronormative framework. This in turn 
creates internalised homophobia and transphobia.141 
McGuire et al’s research focused on black Americans. Their research shows how race, sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation intersect and illustrate how the discrimination and 
marginalisation from white and black communities differ. Throughout US history, black 
Americans were made economically and socially inferior to white Americans. Despite the 
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progress made during the civil rights movement, white Americans still used cultural differences 
to exclude black Americans from heteronormative privilege in the post-civil rights era. Black 
Americans were stigmatised as sexually deviant for their “excessive or unrestricted 
heterosexual desire”.142 This was a result of “higher rates of out-of-wedlock births and female-
headed households”.143 Whereas the discrimination against and marginalisation of black 
Americans by white Americans is based on race, within black communities queerness is often 
rejected as “undermining community racial uplift[ment]” or as not being “authentically 
black”.144 Importantly, “queerness is considered a deviant outcome of absent Black father 
figures, decreased religious values, [and] anti-Black racism’s emasculation of Black men”.145 
Although the context of the single-state US and multi-state African continent differ, it is 
nonetheless possible to draw from McGuire et al’s research. Through colonisation, Africans 
were created into sexual others. Just as white Americans stigmatised black Americans for their 
“excessive or unrestricted heterosexual desire”, Africans were perceived by their colonisers as 
insatiable, subject to their “immoral, bestial and lascivious” sexualities.146 Just as some black 
American religious communities view queerness as undermining community upliftment or as 
being a result of not being authentically black, some African communities view non-
heteronormative SOGIE as un-African because it offends African values of procreation and the 
continuity of the family.147 
Ultimately, the result of McGuire et al’s research shows how black American college 
students’ “identities were fraught with heteronormative imperatives” as a result of the 
“messages received from guardians, cultural representations of acceptable femininities and 
masculinities, as well as how adults and peers embodied and performed their identities”.148 
This is also relevant in an African context where identities are tied up with discourses of 
national belonging. Citizens are expected to fulfil their so-called natural roles in their 
communities in a manner that serves traditional perceptions of manhood and masculinity.149 
Based on this discussion, it is clear that the heterosexual norm has been established as a 
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“The heterosexual norm is the idea that people are, by virtue of heredity and biology, exclusively 
and aggressively heterosexual: males are masculine men, and are attracted only to feminine women. 
The opposite is supposed to be true of females … [H]eterosexuality is not just a norm – it goes much 
further than that. It is actually a normative principle, a norm which creates a standard to be met, 
below which people are not permitted by society to deviate: a “heteronormative” standard. This 
standard has been enshrined into law, transforming a social custom into a legal control mechanism, 
a sort of “natural law” theory of gender”.150 
 
Weiss’ research compares the inequalities that exist between those who identify within a 
heteronormative framework, and those who do not, to the historical caste system of India which 
has created so-called “untouchables” who are excluded from society due to their heredity.151 
Signliore explains that heterosexual persons do not understand why queer persons demand 
recognition and protection because they do not realise the centrality of their sexuality in their 
everyday life.152 Utilising Signliore’s statement, Weiss points out how persons who identify 
within the heteronormative framework takes for granted their own sense of being male or 
female. According to Weiss, these persons are accorded the privilege to exist without question. 
They “do not experience the pervasive and life-altering effects of discrimination [based on their 
sexual orientation, gender identities or gender expressions], and may well wonder if such 
effects really exist and to what extent”.153  
The discrimination against persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE is pervasive to the 
extent that it affects all aspects of their lives. Ultimately, heteronormativity permeates both 
social and legal assumptions, with the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation 
mapping out the path of an individual’s expected existence as soon as sex is perceived at 
birth.154 Weiss’ argument is made in relation to transgender persons. However, the resulting 
infringement on the rights to equality and privacy, amongst others, can be applied to the wider 
queer community. This is of particular relevance when considered in light of Weiss’ statement 
that “[w]e must hear the voices of those who are not heard in the halls of power in order to 
understand what is happening to them and why”.155 
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2 7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter set out various terms which form the backdrop of the research and illustrated how 
the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation has culminated in an invisible and violent 
heteronormative ideal that influences modes of understanding and the formulation of the law.  
This chapter also presented the value of an anti-essentialist queer lens. The discussion 
centred around two points. Firstly, how various identity markers exacerbate the discrimination 
and marginalisation experienced by children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Secondly, how 
the establishment of heteronormativity permeates our entire existence, culminating in a site of 
violence that disregards identities and behaviours that fall outside the norms created thereby.  
A queer lens is valuable for the guidance it offers when used in conjunction with a reform-
oriented teleological interpretation of the rights mentioned, as discussed under Chapter 3. A 
queer lens has the potential to support an interpretation that is inclusive of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE, which in turn supports the argument that the ACHPR, ACRWC, and 
the Maputo Protocol are amenable to an interpretation that protects children with non-




3 A teleological approach to the interpretation of the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE  
3 1 Introduction  
As set out in part 1 3 2 above, this research applies a reform-oriented perspective on classic 
legal doctrinal methodology because such a perspective and related methods can provide 
substantive human rights protection to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. The reform-
oriented perspective is informed by queer theory as discussed in chapter 2 and applies a 
teleological approach to interpretation, as further discussed in this chapter. A key feature of the 
teleological approach to interpretation is the focus on the object and purpose of the treaty under 
interpretation. As further argued in this research, the universality of human rights has great 
bearing on the object and purpose of all human rights and is even more acute in the context of 
the right to education of children with a non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
3 2 A teleological approach to interpretation 
3 2 1 The formulation of the teleological approach: The Harvard Draft Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 
There are three main schools of thought pertaining to the interpretation of treaties: (i) the 
intention of the parties’ approach; (ii) the textual approach; and (iii) the teleological approach.1 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive and are often used in conjunction with one 
another. However, each approach has a preferred method of determining the object and purpose 
of treaties.2 Although this section focuses on the teleological approach to interpretation, a brief 
overview of the ‘intention of the parties’ approach and the textual approach will nonetheless 
be provided. 
 
1 According to ME Villiger Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2009) 421-422 
there are five methods that has been significant in theory pertaining to the interpretation of treaties: (i) the 
subjective method considers the intention of the drafters; (ii) the textual or grammatical method favours the text; 
(iii) the conceptual method “appreciates the terms in their nearer and wider context”; (iv) the teleological approach 
“concentrates on the object and purpose of a treaty and will, if necessary, transgress the confines of the treaty 
text”; and (v) the logical method, which “favours rational techniques of reasoning”. However, I focus on the three 
discussed by GG Fitzmaurice “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and Certain Other Treaty Points” (1951) 28 Brit YB Int’l L 1 1. It would be redundant to engage with the others 
for purposes of this research. 




The ‘intention of the parties’ approach, as its title suggests, is concerned with ascertaining 
and giving “effect to the intentions, or presumed intentions, of the parties” to the treaty.3 The 
textual approach, in contrast with the ‘intention of the parties’ approach, holds that the object 
and purpose of a treaty should be determined with reference to the meaning of the treaty text 
alone.4 In terms of this approach, no source outside the text itself is to be utilised to determine 
the object and purpose.5  
The teleological approach to the interpretation of treaties emerged from the Harvard Law 
School’s Research in International Law Programme.6 This programme formulated the Harvard 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Harvard Draft”)7 which lists various elements of 
what is now known as the teleological approach. According to the Harvard Draft, treaties must 
be “interpreted in the light of the general purpose which it is intended to serve”.8 The Harvard 
Draft mentions various other factors that must be considered in determining and giving effect 
to the general purpose:  
 
“The historical background of the treaty, travaux préparatoires, the circumstances of the parties at 
the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the 
subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and the conditions 
prevailing at the time interpretation is being made”.9 
 
Fitzmaurice confirmed and expanded on the approach formulated in the Harvard Draft. 
According to Fitzmaurice, treaties should be interpreted with “reference to its objects, 
principles and purposes, as declared, known, or to be presumed”.10 The general purpose of a 
treaty should be established by the wording of the instrument, the circumstances that existed 
upon its creation and “the place it has come to have in international life”.11 According to 
Fitzmaurice, it is valuable to also consider the preamble of a treaty because it can shed light on 
the meaning of treaty provisions where its purpose is unclear or explain the context in which 
the substantive treaty provisions should be read.12 Thus, because the preamble of a treaty often 
 
3 1; M Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties” in D Shelton (ed) International Human Rights Law 
(2013) 739 745. 
4 Fitzmaurice (1951) Brit YB Int’l L 1-2. 
5 7. 
6 Villiger Commentary 422; A Amin A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights LLD thesis, Stellenbosch University (2017) 21. 
7 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) Am J Int’l L 657. 
8 Article 19(a) of the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935). 
9 Article 19(a). 
10 Fitzmaurice (1951) Brit YB Int’l L 8. 
11 1-2. 




sets out the object and purpose of a document in the form of a vision statement of sorts, it can 
be used as an interpretative aid that forms the backdrop against which the treaty provisions 
must be interpreted. Viewed in this light, Fitzmaurice argues that “a preamble does have legal 
force and effect from the interpretative standpoint”.13  
Fitzmaurice further explains that the value of a teleological approach lies in its potential to 
clear up ambiguities regarding the interpretation of a particular provision or to expand or 
supplement the treaty text.14 Its value further lies in its affiliation to both the textual- and the 
‘intention of the parties’ approaches to interpreting treaties. With regard to a textual approach, 
the teleological approach too prefers “that a treaty is to be interpreted primarily in and with 
reference to itself, rather than with reference to what has or may be supposed to have taken 
place in the minds of its makers”.15 However, despite this, Fitzmaurice contends that the 
teleological approach also draws from the ‘intention of the parties’ approach. Because the 
teleological approach requires drawing from a wide range of aspects outside the treaty 
document itself, the intention of the parties to the treaty must necessarily also be considered to 
determine the object and purpose of the treaty.16 Neither the main elements of the textual nor 
the ‘intention of the parties’ approaches is paramount to the teleological approach. However, 
the teleological approach incorporates elements of both as to provide a detailed and accurate 
understanding of the object and purpose of a treaty.  
The Harvard Draft sets out the sources to be considered in a teleological approach to the 
interpretation of treaties. Fitzmaurice provides some insight as to the value of utilising these 
sources and expands on the Harvard Draft. However, neither the Harvard Draft nor 
Fitzmaurice, offers extensive guidance on how to utilise the teleological approach. In this 
regard, the role of the Vienna Convention is significant. 
 
3 2 2 The role of the Vienna Convention in the establishment of the teleological approach 
in the interpretation of treaties  
3 2 2 1 Article 31: General rule of interpretation 
Both the Harvard Draft and Fitzmaurice listed elements of the teleological approach without 
expanding thereon. Therefore, the development of this approach as per the Vienna Convention 
is relevant to establish the current understanding and utilisation of the teleological approach. 
 
13 Fitzmaurice (1951) Brit YB Int’l L 25; Fitzmaurice (1957) Brit YB Int’l L 229. 
14 Fitzmaurice (1951) Brit YB Int’l L 8. 





The Vienna Convention applies to all treaties concluded between states, with treaties referring 
to an “international agreement concluded between States … whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments”. 17 Thus, it applies to the ICCPR, ICESCR, 
CEDAW, and the CRC under the international system, the ECHR, ESC and the ESC(r) under 
the European system, the ADRDM, ACHR, Protocol of San Salvador, and the Convention of 
Belém do Pará under the inter-American system, and the ACHPR, ACRWC and the Maputo 
Protocol under the African system. Thus, the Vienna Convention guides the teleological 
approach utilised here. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention enshrines the general rule of 
interpretation applicable to the interpretation of treaties. According to the Vienna Convention: 
 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.18 
 
Upon first glance, the Vienna Convention seems to require a textual approach to interpretation 
which focuses on giving effect to the meaning of the text as it stands. However, various authors 
argue that the Vienna Convention does not prefer a textual approach above an “intention of the 
parties” approach or a teleological approach.19 Rather, the approach is a compromise between 
the textual, ‘intention of the parties’, and the teleological approaches.20 Article 31(1) can be 
split into three sections: treaties must be interpreted (i) “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning given to the terms of the treaty”; (ii) “in their context”; and (iii) “in the light of its 
object and purpose”.21  
According to Villiger, “[t]he ordinary meaning is the starting point of the process of 
interpretation”.22 This means that the object and purpose must be determined with reference to 
the terms used in the text and their normal meaning. However, the terms must be considered 
“in their context”.23 This is because “[t]reaty terms are not drafted in isolation”, and their 
 
17 Articles 1 and 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1115 UNTS 331. 
18 Articles 31(1). 
19 Amin (2017) 36; JM Sorel & V Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in O Corten & P Klein (eds) The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary Vol 1 (2011) 804 808; Villiger Commentary 435-436. 
20 DS Jonas & TN Saunders “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods” (2010) 43 
Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 565 578; Sorel & Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 808; Villiger Commentary 426-429. 
21 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.  
22 Sorel & Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary 829; Villiger Commentary 426. 




meaning can only be determined by considering the entire treaty text”.24 Article 31(2) indicates 
the aspects that must be considered to determine the context of treaties: 
 
“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”.25 
 
Based on the above, the treaty text, preamble and annexes are relevant contextual aspects that 
must be considered when determining the object and purpose of a treaty. In this regard, Sorel 
and Boré Eveno refer to these aspects as the internal context of a treaty.26 They further indicate 
that the context can also be understood as referring to how the parties envisaged the particular 
provision or treaty text. In this sense, the ‘intention of the parties’ becomes relevant.27  
Article 31(2) also refers to “any agreement relating to the treaty” and “any instrument which 
was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty”.28 Considering 
“any agreement relating to the treaty”, Villiger states that such an agreement can pertain to the 
implementation of the treaty or the interpretation of a particular term.29 Concerning “any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty”, Villiger argues that these instruments refer to “agreements inter se between certain 
parties or unilateral statements, e.g., interpretative declarations upon ratification or 
accession”.30 Importantly, any agreement or instrument must be accepted or agreed to by all 
the other parties to the treaty for it to be valid.31 
Article 31(3) provides for aspects that must be taken into consideration together with the 
context in the interpretation of treaties:  
 
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
 
24 Villiger Commentary 427. 
25 Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
26 Sorel & Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary 823. 
27 824. 
28 Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. 






regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties”.32 
 
Sorel and Boré Eveno further refer to these aspects as the external context of a treaty.33 Since 
reference is made to “subsequent agreement” or “subsequent practice”, these agreements or 
practices are necessarily agreed upon or established after the conclusion of a treaty.34 Article 
31(3) also includes “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relation between 
the parties”.35 The rules of international law refer to those sources which are set out in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.36 Furthermore, recourse can only be made to 
applicable rules of international law, that is, binding rules.37 Importantly, rules of international 
law can only be taken into account together with the context insofar as it assists with the 
interpretation of treaty terms.38 Finally, Article 31(4) also provides for giving effect to where 
parties envisaged a term to have a particular meaning. In general, this provision does not 
provide issues and will therefore not be further discussed. 
Based on the discussion above, treaties must be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context”.39 However, as was mentioned 
above, a treaty must also be interpreted “in light of its object and purpose”.40 Whereas Article 
31(2) concerns the context of treaties, there is no explicit guidance as to where the object and 
purpose can be found or what it means.41 Jonas and Saunders, referring to Buffard and 
Zemanek, state that object and purpose refer to the essential elements of a treaty.42 Despite no 
explicit guidance as to where the object and purpose of treaties can be found, the argument 
presented is that this general rule of interpretation does indeed provide guidance. The same 
aspects that determine the context can also be used to determine the object and purpose of 
treaties. In this regard, it is necessary to consider Fitzmaurice’s argument that the object and 
purpose of a treaty can be found in its preamble. 
 
32 Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
33 Sorel & Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary 825. 
34 Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention; Villiger Commentary 431. 
35 Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
36 Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
37 Villiger Commentary 433. 
38 432. 
39 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
40 Article 31(1). 
41 Jonas & Saunders (2010) Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 567; Villiger Commentary 428. 




The discussion above illustrated that in the interpretation of treaties, the Vienna Convention 
favours a combined process. In the interpretation of treaties, terms shall be given their ordinary 
meaning (textual approach) and be viewed in the context (‘intention of the parties’ approach) 
that it is being used with due regard to the object and purpose of the instrument (teleological 
approach).43 The general rule of interpretation allows recourse to the preamble and annexures 
of treaties, as well as agreements concluded, or instruments made, between parties related to a 
treaty. It further allows consideration of whether the parties agreed to the meaning of a 
particular term, whether subsequent agreements were concluded, or subsequent practices were 
established, as well as relevant rules of international law. In these references, the teleological 
approach to the interpretation of treaties is codified in the Vienna Convention. In the 
interpretation of treaties, the aim is arguably to give effect to its true object and purpose. The 
Vienna Convention, therefore, illustrates a conviction that the object and purpose are best 
determined through considering various aspects that can reveal it. 
 
3 2 2 2 Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that:  
 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 
31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable”.44 
 
Article 32 allows interpreters to consider “supplementary” means in order to help “reveal or 
confirm the meaning of a provision”.45 This means that recourse may only be had to these 
means where Article 31 was insufficient to determine the object and purpose of a treaty or 
treaty provision; that is, where the meaning is ambiguous or obscure, or where “he or she is 
confronted with two contradictory interpretations”.46 Furthermore, no reference is made to 
which means must be utilised; therefore, the interpreter has the discretion to determine which 
would be of most assistance.47  
 
43 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
44 Article 32. 
45 Le Bouthillier “Article 32 Convention of 1969” in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary 851. 





Article 32 mentions both “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion” as examples of aspects to consider in determining the object and purpose of a 
treaty.48 The preparatory work refers to the documents “generated by the parties during the 
treaty’s preparation up to its conclusion”.49 The value of the preparatory work, as 
supplementary means, lies in its illustration of the exact intention of the parties throughout the 
process. Article 32 also refers to the circumstances that existed at the time of a treaty’s 
conclusion. These circumstances are the broad social, political, and cultural factors that existed 
at the time the treaty was concluded and that could have had an impact on its formulation.50 
Article 32 further entrenches the teleological approach to interpretation. As stated above, in 
the interpretation of treaties, the aim is to give effect to its true object and purpose. Thus, the 
Vienna Convention illustrates a conviction that the object and purpose are best determined 
through considering various aspects that can reveal it.  
 
3 2 3 The relevance and value of the teleological approach  
The significance of the teleological approach for purposes of this research lies in its potential 
to be utilised in the interpretation of international, European, inter-American, and African 
human rights law. The formulation provided in the Vienna Convention enables an 
interpretation of relevant provisions that goes beyond what is included in the text. The 
argument presented in this dissertation is that the teleological approach is the most appropriate 
method of interpretation of law to protect children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. This is 
based on the premise that the teleological approach allows consideration of the provisions of 
these instruments in light of their purpose with guidance from what lies outside the text of their 
provisions. This is important because, as indicated under 1, there is no explicit reference to 
SOGIE or related terms in the international, European, inter-American, and African human 
rights instruments. The potential role of the preamble, annexures and other elements of the 
treaties under discussion in facilitating the development of the law as to provide explicit 
protection for diverse SOGIE rights in education will be expanded on in more detail under 
chapter 4.  
 
 
48 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  





3 3 The principle of universality 
3 3 1 The principle of universality 
The UDHR was adopted in 1948 against the backdrop of the atrocities committed in the Second 
World War and forms the foundation of current international human rights norms.51 The 
Preamble of the UDHR recognises that all human beings are equal and are born with certain 
inalienable rights.52 This enshrines the notion that human rights are universal, meaning that all 
human beings are entitled to the rights contained in the UDHR regardless of “race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”.53  
Since the adoption of the UDHR, various understandings of universalism have emerged. 
This section outlines some of these understandings in an attempt to elucidate the notion that 
human rights are universal. The aim is also to shed light on the universalism/cultural relativism 
debate, which is of particular importance in the context of the interpretation and application of 
rights within the African regional human rights law system.  
The universality of human rights means that all persons have certain rights by virtue of being 
human. This understanding has various implications: (i) having human rights depends on being 
a human being; (ii) being a human being is “an inalterable fact of nature, not something that is 
either earned or can be lost”; (iii) based on this, human rights are inalienable; and (iv) because 
all human beings have human rights, these rights are held in equal measure.54 Despite the 
argument that all human being are holders of certain rights, universal possession does not equal 
universal enforcement. Although human rights are viewed as universal, their enforcement 
depends on national implementation monitored by regional and international human rights 
bodies.55  
The UDHR is binding upon all states as part of customary international law. It represents an 
agreement to universal human rights and illustrates a commitment to work towards the 
 
51 MO Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? The Need for Anthropological 
Jurisprudence in the Globalising World” in A Bösl & J Diescho (eds) Human Righs in Africa (2009) 3 3; S 
Răduleţu “Regional Human Rights Systems and the Principle of Universality” (2013) 37-38 RSP 283 283; M 
Rosenfeld “Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural Relativism – A Pluralist 
Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities” (1999) 30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 249 249. 
52 Preamble of the UDHR. 
53 Article 2. 
54 J Donnelly “The Relative Universality of Human Rights” (2007) 29 Hum Rts Q 281 282; Răduleţu (2013) RSP 
284; Rosenfeld (1999) Colum Hum Rts L Rev 249. 
55 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 283; L H Hoffman “The Universality of Human Rights” Judicial Studies Board 
Annual Lecture (2009) 1 8; R Spano “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights – Strasbourg in the Age of 




recognition, promotion and protection of these rights.56 States further confirm their 
commitment through the ratification of international and regional human rights-related 
treaties.57 Through its continuous reference to the UDHR, international and regional treaties 
confirm the general conviction that all human beings “possess as part of their birth right a core 
of inalienable rights”.58 
Since its relative unanimous adoption, non-Western nations have been questioning the 
notion of universal human rights and what it embodies. The argument often presented is that 
the UDHR reflects the “ideological patrimony of the West”.59 However, Ramcharan argues 
that the role of developing countries in the formulation and establishment of the UDHR is 
underestimated. He illustrates that in the drafting of the UDHR, developing countries 
outnumbered Western nations. Thus, the UDHR draws on “the intellectual patrimony of the 
peoples of the world”.60 In contrast, Donnelly argues that the US, central, and northern Europe 
had, and still has, a significant impact on the formulation of international human rights norms.61 
What is often forgotten is that despite developing countries participating in the formulation of 
the UDHR, most of these nations were still under colonial rule at that time.62  
The continued political and economic dominance of the US, central, and northern European 
states enable them to exert pressure on developing nations to offer “formal endorsements of 
international norms advocated by leading powers”.63 As a result, some developing states have 
argued that certain human rights norms cannot find application in their societies as it conflicts 
with cultural values. This argument has arisen despite the acceptance of the UDHR and the 
ratification of related international and regional human rights treaties.64 This has resulted in a 




56 B G Ramcharan “A Debate About Power Rather Than Rights” (1998) 4 IPG 423 423. 
57 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 288; Ramcharan (1998) IPG 423; Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism and 
Cultural Relativism?” in Human Righs in Africa (2009) 6; Răduleţu (2013) RSP 283. 
58 Ramcharan (1998) IPG 423; Răduleţu (2013) RSP 285. 
59 CM Cerna “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity” Implementation of Human Rights in 
Different Socio-Cultural Contexts” (1994) 16 Hum Rts Q 740 740; Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism 
and Cultural Relativism?” in Human Righs in Africa (2009) 20; Rosenfeld (1999) Colum Hum Rts L Rev 249; A 
Stango “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism” (2014) 7 Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne 
157 159. 
60 Ramcharan (1998) IPG 425; Stango (2014) Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne 160. 
61 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 291. 
62 Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism?” in Human Rights in Africa (2009) 4. 
63 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 291. 
64 282; Rosenfeld (1999) Colum Hum Rts L Rev 249; Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural 




3 3 2 Cultural relativism and universal human rights 
The rights contained in the UDHR are reiterated in international and regional treaties. The 
interpretation of these rights relates to the debate between the principle of universality and the 
impact of culture on how human rights are interpreted and applied.65 To understand the impact 
of culture on the interpretation and application of international human rights norms, one must 
understand the concept of cultural relativism. In essence, cultural relativism refers to “a 
normative doctrine that demands respect for cultural differences”.66 According to Howard-
Hassmann, cultural relativism often aims towards cultural absolutism, meaning that “[c]ulture 
provides absolute standards of evaluation; whatever a culture says is right (for those in that 
culture)”.67 In terms of a more absolutist perception of cultural relativism, the human rights 
norms contained in the UDHR, and reiterated in other international and regional treaties, has 
“no normative force in the face of divergent cultural traditions”.68  
In contrast with cultural relativism, various authors have asserted that culture is malleable.69 
According to Donnelly, cultures change across time and space: they are not “coherent, 
homogenous, consensual and static”.70 Thus, the argument that a cultural practice or value can 
be either compatible or incompatible with a particular human rights norm cannot hold. The 
following statement provides insight into this argument:  
 
“All major civilizations have for long periods treated a significant portion of the human race as 
‘outsiders’ not entitled to guarantees that could be taken for granted by ‘insiders.’ Few areas of the 
globe, for example, have never practiced and widely justified human bondage. All literate 
civilizations have for most of their histories assigned social roles, rights, and duties primarily on the 
basis of ascriptive characteristics such as birth, age, and gender. Today, however, the moral equality 
of all human beings is strongly endorsed by most leading comprehensive doctrines in all regions of 
the world. This convergence, both within and between civilizations, provides the foundation for a 
convergence on the rights of the Universal Declaration”.71 
 
Based on the above, the acceptance or celebration of particular practices in the past does not 
justify its continuation in the present. Cultures and societies develop in terms of what is 
 
65 Ramcharan (1998) IPG 423. 
66 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 294. 
67 EH Howard “Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community” (1993) 15 Hum Rts Q 315 quoted in 
Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 294. 
68 Donnelly (2007) Hum Rts Q 294. 
69 296; Hinz “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism?” in Human Righs in Africa (2009) 
19; Stango (2014) Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne 163. 





rendered acceptable at a particular point in time. At this moment, there is general agreement 
between states that the UDHR enshrines fundamental human rights norms and that all human 
beings are entitled to these rights. This can be seen in the wide ratification of regional and 
international human rights treaties.  
According to Donnelly, there are general problems with the utilisation of an absolutist 
perception of cultural relativism to circumvent compliance with established human rights 
norms. Firstly, there are diverse ways in which one culture can be prescribed to or practiced. 
This indicates that cultural values cannot be endorsed or be representative of the moral 
experience of all people subscribing to that culture. Secondly, cultural relativism is often used 
to endorse intolerance towards other cultures or ideas that do not correlate with the practices 
and values of that culture. This in turn can lead to behaviour that infringes on the fundamental 
human rights of persons outside that culture.72 Thirdly, cultural relativism often confuses 
politics and culture. Thus, the state can utilise culture in support of their policies. In this sense, 
“what a people has been forced to tolerate [is confused] with what it values”.73 The final general 
problem with the utilisation of cultural relativism to circumvent compliance with established 
human rights norms relates to how the “cultures described are idealized representations of a 
past that, if it ever existed, certainly does not exist today”.74 Donnelly argues that arguments 
of cultural relativism do not consider the impact of colonialism, globalisation and ideas of 
human rights on the development of those cultures.75  
Despite these general problems, cultural relativism remains relevant in the current 
interpretation and implementation of human rights. This is of particular importance when 
considering the broad formulation of certain human rights provisions. The broad formulation 
of the rights contained in the UDHR and reiterated in regional and international human rights 
treaties provide scope for diverse interpretation and implementation.76 Furthermore, the lasting 
impact of colonialism on previously-colonised nations is also important when considering 
arguments in support of cultural relativism: “[a]nything that even hints of imposing Western 
values is likely to be met with understandable suspicion, even resistance”.77 Against this 











the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the African, European and inter-
American human rights systems. 
 
3 3 3 Cultural relativism and universal human rights under the African-, Inter-American-, 
and European human rights systems 
Regardless of the argument that an absolutist perception of cultural relativism cannot hold 
considering the fact that cultures are indeed relative, provision has nonetheless been made for 
considering cultural and societal differences when interpreting human rights. The 1993 UN 
World Conference occurred against the backdrop of this debate. At the Conference, Western 
states accepted that, despite the conviction that human rights are universal, it is amenable to an 
interpretation that considers regional social and cultural differences.78 The Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action was adopted at the Conference and confirms that: 
 
“While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.79 
 
Despite the wide ratification of the UDHR and the subsequent adoption of the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, certain provisions relating to the private sphere of 
individuals have still not been accepted as universal. These include rights concerning religious 
and cultural matters, the status of women and the protection of children, the right to get married 
and divorced, as well as choices regarding family planning. However, these are the domains 
“in which the most serious challenges to the universality of human rights arise”.80 
According to Cerna, human rights pertaining to the private sphere have not garnered 
universal acceptance because societies have their own codes of conduct. These codes are 
informed by religion or tradition which inform, for example, the status of women and the 
protection of minority rights.81 Because non-Western nations argue that the current 
understanding of human rights stems from Western ideologies, Cerna contends that regional 
human rights systems are perhaps better situated to foster compliance with international human 
 
78 Cerna (1994) Hum R Q 741. 
79 Para 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 





rights norms.82 This argument is based on regions often having “a shared history, geography, 
and, in some cases, language and religion, as well as a commonality of values”.83 Thus, regional 
systems have the potential to foster compliance with international human rights law in a manner 
that gives due consideration to regional peculiarities.84 In this regard, this sub-section will 
briefly touch upon the ACHPR, the ECHR, and the ADRDM as the foundational human rights 
documents of the African, European, and inter-American human rights systems respectively. 
A detailed discussion of the ACHPR, ADRDM, ECHR, as well as related documents, is 
presented under chapters 5 to 7. 
The ACHPR refers to the UDHR in its Preamble. The ACHPR undertakes to “achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa”.85 In this, the Organisation of African Unity (“OAU”) aims 
to give effect to the Charter of the United Nations (“UN Charter”) and the UDHR.86 The 
ACHPR enshrines both the principle that human rights are universal, as well as that the diverse 
cultures and peoples of Africa must be taken into consideration in the application of universal 
human rights. The Preamble confirms “that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes 
of human beings which justifies their national and international protection”. However, the 
“values of the African civilization” must be taken into consideration in the interpretation and 
application of human and peoples’ rights.87 Similarly, the ADRDM recognises that human 
rights are universal. In its Preamble, it provides that “all men are born free and equal in dignity 
and in rights”.88 Its Preamble also refers to the place of culture in American societies, stating 
that “it is the duty of man to preserve, practice and foster culture by every means within his 
power”.89 The ECHR, like the ACHPR and the ADRDM, indicates a commitment to the 
collective enforcement of the universal rights contained in the UDHR. Unlike the ACHPR and 
ADRDM, there is no explicit reference to culture. The ECHR simply refers to “a common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” that must guide the 
enforcement of the rights contained therein.90 The references to the principles of customary 
international law set out under the UDHR in the Preambles of these instruments illustrate that 
it favours a teleological interpretation. These instruments require that, in giving effect to its 
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purpose of ensuring equal rights for all without discrimination, consideration be given to what 
lies outside the text.  
From this discussion, it is clear that the European, inter-American, and African human rights 
systems enshrine the concept of universal human rights. Whereas the ACHPR and the ADRDM 
include explicit references to culture, the same cannot be said of the ECHR. The ACHPR is 
also unique in that it refers to a specific focus on the consideration of African values in the 
interpretation and application of international human rights norms. As was illustrated at the 
end of the discussion in part 1 1 above, the current interpretation of provisions in the ACHPR 
does not provide adequate protection to persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. In this 
regard, the interpretation of the various human rights instruments of the international, European 
and inter-American systems become relevant to guide the interpretation of the ACHPR, 
ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. A comparative study allows the exploration and evaluation 
of developments in the international, European and inter-American systems, and consideration 
of which can find successful application in the African system.   
 
3 4 Concluding remarks: the value of a teleological approach for the interpretation of the 
right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
The comparative approach, as discussed under 1 3 ties in with the teleological approach to 
interpretation in that, like the comparative approach, the teleological approach too requires 
consideration of the underlying internal legal sources. The Vienna Convention sets out the 
teleological interpretation for treaties. In terms of this approach, a treaty should be interpreted 
in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms. Importantly, a treaty 
should be interpreted in light of its objects and purpose. In this regard, the Vienna Convention 
provides accepted tools that can be used to reflecti on sources that are related to the treaty but 
go beyond the text thereof. Considering the similar objects and purpose of the international and 
regional human rights instruments under discussion, the principle that human rights are 
universal, is valuable when reflecting on the development of the law in light of changing 
societal values and how cultural factors can influence the interpretation and application of 
certain fundamental rights. A comparative approach, like an approach based on the principle 
that human rights are universal, provides scope within which to determine how cultural factors 
influence a legal system and how it can ultimately impact on the interpretation and application 




These reform-oriented approaches to legal research provide an opportunity to go beyond the 
law as found in its traditional sources. In doing so, the approach set forth aims to establish 
whether the law and reality are one. Often it is found, as hypothesised under 1, that there is a 
discrepancy between the law as it is, and the law as it could or should be. This multifaceted 
approach aims to bridge the gap between the law as it is currently interpreted, and how it could 
or should be interpreted as to provide substantive protection to children with non-




4 The right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
international human rights law 
4 1 Introduction 
The principal research question that this dissertation is concerned with is whether the right to 
education as provided under the ACRWC, read together with the ACHPR and the Maputo 
Protocol, enable children with non-heteronormative SOGIE equal access to and enjoyment of 
education as children who identify with heteronormative and binary conceptions of sex and 
gender. Similar to the African regional human rights instruments under discussion, the 
international instruments do not include explicit protection of the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
Based on the principle of universality, discussed under 3 3, the assumption is that the right 
to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE is indeed protected under 
international law. In this regard, how the right to human dignity, equality, and non-
discrimination, as well as the best interest principle as foundational human rights, can enhance 
the right to education is analysed. The purpose is to illustrate that international law demands a 
teleological interpretation of the right to education and that this interpretation protects children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE in the context of education. Thus, this approach does not 
require the establishment of new rights but aims to show that existing rights find equal 
application to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
 
4 2 UDHR 
4 2 1 Introduction to the UDHR 
The UN was established in 1945 against the backdrop of the atrocities committed during the 
First and Second World Wars.1 As a result, there was support from the Member States of the 
UN to include an international bill of rights in the UN Charter.2 Despite this support, the UN 
Charter does not include an international bill of rights. The UN Charter does, however, refer to 
the purpose of the UN, which is to “achieve international cooperation … in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion”.3 In this sense, the UN Charter contains the first element 
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of the intention of the drafters of the UDHR: to enshrine the equal rights of all persons to ensure 
that the atrocities committed against humankind during the two World Wars are not repeated.  
The UN Charter lists the Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) as one of the principal 
organs of the UN,4 and empowers it to “set up commissions in economic and social fields and 
for the promotion of human rights”.5 To this end, the Commission of Human Rights was 
established in 1946 and tasked with drafting an international bill of rights.6 The work of the 
Commission of Human Rights culminated in the adoption of the UDHR on 10 December 1948 
with a vote of 48 to 0, with eight abstentions.7 Seeing as the UDHR was a culmination of 
hundreds of proposals from governments and individuals, as well as discussions amongst 
member states,  the general opinion of the UN member states was that the UDHR was universal 
and cross-cultural.8 
Since its adoption, various states outside Central Europe and North America – often referred 
to as the collective “West” – have questioned the notion of universal human rights and whether 
the UDHR indeed embodies it. As discussed under chapter 3, Cerna argues that the UDHR 
reflects the “ideological patrimony of the West”.9 Considering its historical context, An-Na’im 
explains that the drafters could not prevent producing a document “based on Western cultural 
and philosophical assumptions”.10 The UDHR’s standards were formulated within the context 
of the Allied nations of the Second World War wanting to prevent the human rights violations 
perpetrated under the Nazi-regime from happening again. As a result, the fundamental standard 
that underpins the UDHR is that all persons are equal in dignity and rights and deserve equal 
respect and concern for these rights without distinction. Thus, at its core is respect for the 
freedom, equality, and human dignity of all persons.11  
A counter argument to the criticism of the UDHR presented is that Chile, China, Lebanon, 
the USA, and the USSR were the most influential states during the drafting of the UDHR.12 
These states display diverse social, economic, cultural and historical contexts and, therefore, 
represent diverse perspectives on what an international bill of rights should look like. However, 
 
4 Article 7. 
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6 ECOSOC “Report of the Committee on the Organisation of the Economic and Social Council” (15 February 
1946) E/20 para 2. 
7 UNGA “Verbatim Record of the Hundred and Eighty-Third Plenary Meeting” (10 December 1948) A/PV.183 
933. See also, WA Schabas Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2013) cix and cxi. 
8 UNGA “Verbatim Record of the Hundred and Eightieth Plenary Meeting” (9 December 1948) A/PV.180 858. 
9 CM Cerna “Universality of human rights and cultural diversity: implementation of human rights in different 
socio-cultural contexts” (1994) 16 HRQ 740 740. 
10 A An-Na’im Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus (1992) 427-428. 
11 Preamble of the UDHR. 




the question nonetheless arises as to whether the 48 states that voted in favour of the UDHR 
can be viewed as setting forth a universal and cross-cultural standard of human rights. This is 
significant when considered in light of the fact that these 48 states represent just short of a 
quarter of the now 193 UN Member states.13 Thus, although the intention of the drafters was 
for the UDHR to be a universal and cross-cultural instrument with the drafters believing that 
this aim was achieved, the foundation of their intentions was somewhat misguided based on 
the limited number of states involved. As a result, it is perhaps more relevant to consider 
whether the UDHR can be perceived as a universal and cross-cultural instrument today, rather 
than at that point in time. 
States accept the obligations enshrined in the UN Charter upon becoming a member of the 
UN.14 These obligations are concerned with maintaining international peace by developing 
positive relationships between nations to achieve “international cooperation in solving 
international problems”.15 Furthermore, these obligations include fostering respect for the 
rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons without distinction.16 At the outset, it must be 
noted that states cannot accede to the UDHR. Rather, upon becoming a UN member, states 
indicate their support of the rights proclaimed in the UDHR as an extension of the UN Charter. 
Thus, in being granted membership to the UN, states have to, at least to some extent, accept 
that the UDHR “distil those fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual that most 
members of the United Nations would regard as universal”.17  
As a declaration, the UDHR is not a binding instrument. Rather, it proclaims rights in broad 
terms.18 The UDHR sets out “basic principles of inalienable human rights” and a “common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” as guidelines for state conduct.19 These 
principles have broadly been accepted as customary international law.20 Despite not being a 
binding instrument, the UDHR nonetheless has considerable weight. In this regard, it is 
significant that the human rights treaties under discussion in this chapter refer to the UDHR in 
their Preambles and largely mirror the wording of the UDHR in their provisions. In this sense, 
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September 1948) A/C.3/SR.89. See also, Schabas UDHR cvii. 




the UDHR provides interpretative value in understanding and giving context to subsequent 
treaties adopted under the auspices of the UN. As a result, there is a constant cross-referencing 
between a right declared in the UDHR and its corresponding right contained in one of the 
subsequent treaties under discussion. Therefore, the UDHR forms the foundation of these rights 
and provides the historical context in light of which it must be understood and developed.  
Because the UDHR is a declaration, it does not have an implementation mechanism tied to 
it. The implementation bodies of the ICCPR, ICESCR, UNCRC, as well as CEDAW, give 
further content to the rights contained in these respective treaties. In doing so, these bodies also 
provide guidelines for understanding the rights set forth under the UDHR because these treaties 
were adopted with the UDHR in mind. The Preamble of the UDHR reflects the purposes and 
principles of the UN, as set out in the UN Charter. As discussed below, there are two 
foundational standards reflected in the Preamble that underlie the text of the UDHR. First, all 
persons are equal in dignity and rights,21 and second, states are obliged to promote, respect, 
and observe human rights.22  
 
4 2 2 Human dignity as an underlying value 
The Preamble to the UN Charter recognises and affirms the inherent dignity and worth of all 
persons.23 The Preamble to the UDHR reiterates this, with Article 1 of the UDHR stating that 
“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.24 According to McCrudden, 
the reference to human dignity in the UN Charter motivated its inclusion in the UDHR.25 The 
significance of Article 1 is clear from the time spent on its drafting.26 Part of the discussion 
was on whether human dignity should be a separate substantive right or whether it should be 
part of the Preamble as a guiding principle. In the end, 26 to six states were in favour of 
including human dignity as a separate substantive right.27 As such, Lindholm explains that the 
United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) viewed it as of “pivotal importance”, further 
emphasised through its placement as the first substantive provision.28 The idea that all persons 
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have inherent and equal human dignity, whether or not this is recognised by the state or by 
others, has been accepted as a “fundamental statement of fact”.29 Thus, human dignity has 
become central to the human rights discourse.30  
The UDHR is the foundational instrument of international human rights and influenced the 
formulation of subsequent international and regional human rights treaties. As a result, because 
human dignity was included in the Preamble and the main text of the UDHR, it has been 
adopted as the underlying principle of subsequent treaties, as discussed throughout this 
chapter.31 Despite recognition of and respect for human dignity being central to the human 
rights discourse, it is unclear what human dignity means as the concept does not lend itself to 
a clear definition.32  
The ICJ has referred to human dignity in its judgments and opinions, indicating the centrality 
of human dignity to other human rights.33 In a separate opinion on the advisory opinion on the 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa), Vice-President Ammoun asserted that most human rights flow from the right to 
human dignity as set forth in the UDHR.34 Furthermore, in a separate opinion on the judgment 
on Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), 
Cançado Trindade J referred to the international law obligation on states to protect human 
rights based on respecting the human dignity of all persons.35 Both these separate opinions 
illustrate the understanding that human dignity provides the “basis for human rights in general” 
and is a “key argument to why human beings should have rights, and what the limits of these 
rights may be”.36 
The reports of the special rapporteurs and independent experts of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (“Human Rights Council”) have provided some guidance on how human 
dignity frames other fundamental rights. Of relevance are the comments made in relation to the 
right to non-discrimination, health, and education. Concerning discrimination, the report of the 
Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual 
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Orientation and Gender Identity is significant.37 There it was stated that denying the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE through violence and discrimination “violates the 
dignity of victims and is offensive to the global conscience”.38 In this context, the right to 
human dignity requires states to ensure that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are 
accorded the same rights as all other persons.  
Considering the right to health, the Special Rapporteur on the Right of the Child to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health explained that the “survival, 
protection, growth and development of children in good physical and emotional health are the 
foundations of human dignity and human rights”.39 This statement speaks to the report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical 
and Mental Health, where human dignity was tied to both self-worth and mental health.40 In 
these reports, the Human Rights Council establishes that respect for human dignity 
encompasses the developmental aspects of the right to health and is tied to a person’s 
perception of themselves. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education has further 
indicated that human dignity “implies respect for the individual, in [their] actuality and also in 
[their] potential”.41  
Based on this brief discussion, the Human Rights Council adds the following to the meaning 
of human dignity under the UDHR. First, human dignity requires respect for all persons without 
discrimination. Respect includes refraining from infringing on other person’s rights through 
discrimination and further obligates states to ensure that all persons are afforded equal rights. 
Second, human dignity is tied to self-worth, which in turn is tied to a person’s overall health, 
development, and their ability to be an active member of their society. The Human Rights 
Council’s Thematic Study on the Right of Persons with Disabilities in Education illustrate both 
these elements.42  With specific reference to what human dignity requires in the context of the 
right to education, the Human Rights Council stated that the right to education refers to the 
 
37 Commission of Human Rights “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (11 May 2018) A/HRC/38/43. 
38 Para 86. See also part 4 2 3. 
39 Human Rights Council “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the right of 
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” (4 December 2012) A/HRC/22/31 para 3. 
40 Human Rights Council “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover” (27 April 2010) A/HRC/14/20 paras 7 
and 19. 
41 Human Rights Council “The right to education of persons in detention, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to education, Vernor Muñoz” (2 April 2009) A/HRC/11/8 para 18. 
42 Human Rights Council “Thematic study on the right of persons with disabilities to education, Report of the 




right to an inclusive education which “values students as persons, respects their inherent dignity 
and acknowledges their needs and their ability to make a contribution to society”.43  
Neither the ICJ, nor the Human Rights Council, provide a comprehensive definition or list 
of elements of what constitutes human dignity. Therefore, McCrudden’s research is of value in 
setting forth a basic minimum core of comprising three elements, namely an ontological, 
relational, and limited-state element.44 According to the ontological element, “every human 
being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human”.45 The relational element adds that 
“this intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others”.46 This requires others to 
act in a particular manner or refrain from particular conduct. In terms of the limited-state 
element, states “exist for the sake of the individual human being, and not vice versa”.47 In light 
of the discussion undertaken here, these elements clearly represent what has become a general 
understanding of human dignity.48  
 
4 2 3 Non-discrimination 
As mentioned above, the UN Charter is the first international instrument to refer to the equal 
rights of all persons without distinction.49 Articles 2 and 7 of the UDHR provides a more 
comprehensive right to non-discrimination and equality than the UN Charter.50 The essence of 
these provisions is that all persons are entitled to the rights set forth in the UDHR without 
distinction and that all persons are equal before the law and have equal protection of the law.51 
Article 2 does not list discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited 
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grounds.52 However, both the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (“OHCHR”) 
and the Human Rights Council has indicated that discrimination based on non-heteronormative 
SOGIE is prohibited under “sex” or “other status”.  
Resolution 17/19 was the first resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council to address 
the human rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.53 However, Brazil proposed a 
resolution on human rights and sexual orientation to the Human Rights Council in 2003 
already.54 Between 2005 and 2011, four joint statements were presented to the Human Rights 
Council on behalf of states from all UN regions. These statements expressed concern over the 
human rights violations perpetrated against persons based on their non-heteronormative 
SOGIE and how this infringes on the right to non-discrimination and other universal human 
rights, such as the right to life and health, as well as the right to be free from torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. Furthermore, these joint statements implored States to 
repeal legislation or administrative measures that penalise persons or impose criminal sanctions 
for their non-heteronormative SOGIE.55 The first joint statement is significant as it indicates 
that sexual orientation is “an immutable part of self” and that forcing individuals to not live out 
“their sexual orientation, or to discriminate against them on this basis … is contrary to human 
dignity”.56 
Resolution 17/19 departs from the guarantee that all persons are entitled to the human rights 
set forth in the UDHR, ICESCR, and the ICCPR without distinction. In light hereof, the Human 
Rights Council expressed concern over the violence and discrimination perpetrated against 
persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE as a global phenomenon.57 Resolution 
17/19 concluded with a request to the OHCHR to commission research into discrimination 
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against persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE and the acts of violence committed 
against them as a result. The report was presented to the UNGA on 17 November 2011 and 
affirmed that various UN bodies support for the prohibition of discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE.58  
In its report, the OHCHR reiterated that the prohibition of discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE stems from the founding principles of human rights law: that human 
rights are universal and that all human beings are equal and deserve equal respect for and 
protection of their rights. These two principles are founded on non-discrimination as the core 
of the international human rights regime. Regarding the work of the Human Rights Committee 
(“HRC”), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child (“CRC Committee”), as well as the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW Committee”), the report confirmed that the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination under the UDHR do not represent an exhaustive list. 
Rather, the reference to “other status” indicates the intention for the list to be added to, with 
the bodies mentioned having expanded the prohibited grounds of discrimination to include 
sexual orientation and gender identity.59   
The report also indicated that, under international law, states are obliged to ensure that 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are accorded equal rights to persons who find 
identification and expression within a heteronormative SOGIE framework. These obligations 
include ensuring that persons are not prevented from exercising rights based on their SOGIE 
in administrative processes or through legislation; that steps are taken to address discrimination 
against persons based on their SOGIE in all aspects of life; and that SOGIE-based 
discrimination and violence be prevented and addressed, with redress being provided in 
circumstances where it does occur.60 In Resolution 27/32, the Human Rights Council welcomed 
the OHCHR’s report, but expressed concern over the violence and discrimination that 
continues to be perpetrated against persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE in all 
regions.61 
 
58 The UN entities referred to in the UNCHR report are the OHCHR, the United Nations Development Programme 
(“UNDP”), the United Nations Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), amongst others. See, Human Rights Council “Discriminatory laws and 
practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity” (17 
November 2011) A/HRC/19/41 para 3. See also, Vollmer Queer families 159. 
59 Human Rights Council (17 November 2011) A/HRC/19/41 paras 5-7. See the text to parts 4 3 3; 4 4 3; 4 5 3; 
and 4 6 4 of this Chapter. 
60 Paras 8-19. 





Resolution 32/2 was adopted on 30 June 2016 and is significant for two reasons. First, it was 
established that cultural relativism has a place in international law, but that it cannot be used to 
undermine universal human rights norms.62 In this regard, the Human Rights Council stressed 
the “importance of respecting regional, cultural and religious value systems” but indicated that 
having regard for these diversities does not allow imposing “concepts or notions pertaining to 
social matters” that will be detrimental to the international human rights regime as agreed 
upon.63 Second, the Human Rights Council appointed an Independent Expert on protection 
against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity 
(“Independent Expert”) for a period of three years, during which annual reports had to be 
presented to both the Human Rights Council and the UNGA.64 Importantly, on 10 July 2019, 
the mandate was renewed for a further three years.65 The Independent Expert is mandated to 
assess how international human rights instruments have been implemented to “overcome 
violence and discrimination against persons on the basis of their [non-heteronormative 
SOGIE]” and to “address the multiple, intersecting and aggravated forms of violence and 
discrimination” perpetrated against them.66  
In the first two reports presented to the Human Rights Council, the Independent Expert 
summarised the core of the complex discourse surrounding the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. At the one end of the spectrum, it is argued that the law, in its current 
formulation and interpretation, does not protect the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. Reasons of public order or social mores, religion, culture, and an essentialist 
understanding of SOGIE often underscore this argument.67 Because the law does not protect 
non-heteronormative SOGIE rights, that there can be no discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE. Moreover, legal reform would be necessary to protect the rights of 
these individuals. However, as set out in the reports of the Independent Expert and argued 
throughout this dissertation, the law in its current formulation and interpretation does in fact 
protect the rights of all persons, including persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
62 See the text to part 3 3 2. 
63 Human Rights Council “Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity” (15 July 2016) A/HRC/RES/32/2. 
64 Paras 3 and 4. 
65 Human Rights Council “Mandate of the Independent Expert of protection against violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (10 July 2019) A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev.1 para 2. 
66 Human Rights Council (15 July 2016) A/HRC/RES/32/2 paras 3(a) and (e). 
67 UNHRC “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual 




Despite all persons being entitled to equal rights and equal protection of their rights, persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE are targeted for violence and discrimination as a result of 
diverging from heteronormative conceptions of SOGIE. The violence and discrimination are 
described as a “manifestation of deeply entrenched stigma and prejudice, irrational hatred and 
a form of gender-based violence, driven by an intention to punish those seen as defying gender 
norms”.68 The Independent Expert has further recognised that discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE often intersect with discrimination on the grounds of race, age, or 
gender, amongst others.69 This is significant as the question of whether the ACRWC, ACHPR, 
and the Maputo Protocol provide children with non-heteronormative SOGIE an equal right to 
education as children who identify within a heteronormative framework is tied to these three 
intersecting forms of discrimination.  
As with the OHCHR’s report, the Independent Expert reiterated that the criminalisation of 
same-sex relations, the lack of anti-discrimination legislation and measures, the failure to 
recognise the self-identified gender of transgender persons, as well as a lack of education that 
cultivates awareness and understanding of diverse SOGIE, exacerbate non-heteronormative 
SOGIE-based violence and discrimination, and leads to sociocultural exclusion.70 The 
Independent Expert recommended that these obstacles be removed in order to ensure that 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are accorded equal rights as to all other persons. 
This recommendation is in line with the obligation on states to ensure that all persons are equal 
before the law and not discriminated against based on “sex” or “other status”. Throughout the 
reports of the Independent Expert, it is repeated that the right of all persons to not be 
discriminated based on SOGIE applies to children as well. The comments made in relation to 
the impact of discrimination on education and the rights of the child give context to the 
discussion under 4 2 4.  
The resolutions and reports discussed above demonstrate that discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE is prohibited under “other status” in Article 2 of the UDHR. The 
OHCHR and the Human Rights Council recognise the importance of addressing violence and 
discrimination on these grounds through monitoring human rights violations, as well as through 
providing suggestions as to how states can ensure compliance with their international 
obligations. The Human Rights Council’s opposition towards this violence, discrimination and 
 
68 Human Rights Council “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (19 April 2017) A/HRC/35/36 paras 2-3; UNHRC (11 May 2018) 
A/HRC/38/43 para 51. 
69 Human Rights Council (19 April 2017) A/HRC/35/36 para 39. See also part 2 6 2. 




stigmatisation stems from the notion that human rights are universal, and that, as such, all 
persons are entitled to equal respect for and protection of their rights without distinction.  
 
4 2 4 Education 
4 2 4 1 The meaning of “everyone has the right to education” 
Article 26 of the UDHR provides a comprehensive right to education. Resolutions of the 
Human Rights Council and reports of the Independent Expert and the Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Education provide content to this provision. Resolution 1998/33 of the 
Commission on Human Rights, now the Human Rights Council, created the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Education. The Special Rapporteur is mandated to report on the progressive 
realisation of the right to education, to recommend means through which this realisation can 
occur, and to “promote the elimination of all forms of discrimination in education”.71 From the 
outset, the Special Rapporteur differentiated between education as a means to an “efficient 
production of human capital” and as a human right that accrues to all people based on the 
“equal worth of all human beings”. The latter conception of education view people as human 
rights subjects. This distinction fosters an understanding that realising the right to education 
for all requires an approach that ensures that all persons can access and benefit from it.72 
Article 26(1) sets out those obligations that explain to what extent states should provide 
certain levels of education. The Special Rapporteur importantly set forth the 4-A scheme 
“denoting the four essential features” of the right to education. According to this scheme, 
education should be available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable. The last three features are 
directly linked to the determination of the right to education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE.73 When considering the availability of education, it is enough to 
mention that states should provide sufficient school-infrastructure.74  
 
71 Commission of Human Rights “Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, social and cultural 
rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to 
achieve these human rights” (17 April 1998) E/CN.4/1998/33 para 6(a)(i)-(iii). 
72 Commission of Human Rights “Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Ms. 
Katarina Tomasevski, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/33” (13 
January 1999) E/CN.4/1999/49 para 13. 
73 Para 50. 
74 Para 52. This requires school buildings to be safe, that there are enough schools to accommodate the children 
of a particular area, that there are enough teachers, and that appropriate learning materials be available in the 




Whereas access to education requires that states admit children to public schools without 
discrimination, the acceptability of education relates to its form and content.75 An acceptable 
education must be child-friendly, ensure that the child is protected from humiliating or 
degrading treatment that could infringe on their human dignity, and should also respect the 
freedom of parents or guardians to decide on the moral and religious education of their child.76 
In this regard, the prior right of parents or guardians can pose challenges to ensuring that the 
form and content of education are acceptable for all children, including children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. This is explored in part 4 2 4 2.  
Whereas the acceptability of education relates to both its form and content, the adaptability 
of education adds to what the content of education should be. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, an adaptable education is one that reviews “[w]hat children should learn at school 
and how the learning process should be organized” with due consideration given to the 
“viewpoint of the child as the future adult” and the changing global landscape.77 This requires 
that the content of education be consistently reviewed to create a balance between local and 
global knowledge, as well as the type of skills and values taught. Importantly, human rights 
education should provide the overarching context.78 Here, the Special Rapporteur also stressed 
the role of education in identifying and replacing “discriminatory and/or stereotyped portrayal 
of girls and women” in an attempt to “help the new generation avoid the stereotypes that we 
have all been raised with”.79 Although this statement was made with girls and women in mind, 
it can be equally applied to how discriminatory or stereotypical ideas surrounding persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE are included in educational material, exacerbating the 
discrimination and marginalisation that these persons experience.80  
As intended, the 4-A scheme has visibly influenced the work of the UN bodies when 
considering this right.81 It aims to contribute to a holistic understanding of the right to education 
under international law that is cognisant of the need for education to be accessible to all 
children, including children with non-heteronormative SOGIE, and adaptable to changing 
values and ideas.  
 
75 Paras 57 and 63. 
76 Paras 67 and 68. 
77 Para 70. 
78 Para 72. 
79 Para 73. 
80 See the text to parts 5 4 2, 5 4 3, and 5 5 3.  




In its report of 17 November 2011, the OHCHR expressed concern over the impact of 
discrimination on the right to education.82 The OHCHR cited discrimination based on SOGIE 
as sometimes resulting in learners “being refused admission [to a school] or being expelled” 
and further indicates that learners with non-heteronormative SOGIE are frequent targets of 
“violence and harassment, including bullying” at the hand of their peers and educators.83 The 
report illustrates how discrimination can prevent children from accessing education. In this 
regard, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education has also drawn attention to how 
patriarchalism socialises children to adopt certain gender roles, which conditions them towards 
gendered behavioural patterns, resulting in men often becoming masculine, intolerant or 
violent.84 The Independent Expert explained that a lack of awareness of diverse sexual 
orientations and gender identities further compounds the stigma surrounding non-
heteronormative SOGIE and exacerbates violence and harassment.85 Addressing these issues 
requires a two-pronged approach to education that includes confronting prejudice and stigma 
pertaining to sex, gender, and sexual orientation in the curriculum, as well as “comprehensive, 
accurate and age-appropriate” sex education.86 The Independent Expert’s statements aim to 
ensure that education is acceptable in not exposing children to undignified treatment. 
Furthermore, education should adapt to changing values, reflecting that all persons are entitled 
to the rights outlined in the UDHR without discrimination.  
 
4 2 4 2 Weighing human rights education against the right of parents  
Article 26(2) of the UDHR provides that: 
 
“Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities 
of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace”. 
 
 
82 Human Rights Council (17 November 2011) A/HRC/19/41 paras 15-17 and 58-61. 
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84 Human Rights Council “Girls’ right to education. Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Mr. V. Muñoz Villalobos” (8 February 2006) E.CN.4/2006/45 para 28. 
85 Human Rights Council (19 April 2017) A/HRC/35/36 para 35. 
86 Human Rights Council (17 November 2011) A/HRC/19/41 paras 58-61. According to the Special Rapporteur 
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Arajärvi explains the minimum content of the four aspects that education shall be directed 
towards, as set out in Article 26(2). First, directing education “to the full development of the 
human personality” shows that it has a “general ethical aim” to develop the “physical, 
intellectual, psychological, and social” dimensions of the individual. Second, “strengthening 
respect for human rights” requires that, at a minimum, the content and aims of education should 
not be incompatible with the rights enshrined in the UDHR.87 Thirdly, promoting 
“understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations” prohibits discrimination and 
promotes the co-existence of diverse views.88 Finally, furthering UN activities of peace and 
cooperation refers to how the content of education should reflect the UN Charter.89  
In essence, Article 26(2) provides for human rights education, with Resolution 66/137 of 
the UNGA giving content thereto through the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights Education and Training (“Declaration on Human Rights Education”).90 Article 
2 of the Declaration on Human Rights Education explains that:  
 
“Human rights education and training encompasses (a) Education about human rights, which 
includes providing knowledge and understanding of human rights norms and principles, the values 
that underpin them and the mechanisms for their protection; (b) Education through human rights, 
which includes learning and teaching in a way that respects the rights of both educators and learners; 
(c) Education for human rights, which includes empowering persons to enjoy and exercise their 
rights and to respect and uphold the rights of others” [own emphasis].91  
 
Article 4 further states that human rights education should reflect the rights contained in the 
UDHR because it would contribute to the “effective realization of all human rights”, and 
promote “tolerance, non-discrimination and equality”.92 Human rights education therefore 
requires that learners are taught human rights principles and to respect the rights of their peers 
and all other persons in an environment where educators do the same. Furthermore, Articles 
26(1) and (2) read together mean that learners should be taught awareness of the stigma and 
prejudice against persons for not conforming to sex, gender, and sexual orientation norms. 
 
87 P Arajärvi “Article 26” in A Eide, G Alfredsson, G Melander, L A Rehof & A Rosas (eds) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (1992) 405 409. 
88 555. 
89 Arajärvi “Article 26” in UDHR 555. 
90 UNGA “United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training” (19 December 2011) 
A/RES/66/137.  
91 Article 2. 




Through this, children can be empowered to exercise their own rights, while upholding the 
equal rights of others.  
Apart from what education should seek to achieve, Article 26(3) also grant parents or 
guardians a “prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children”.93 
Thus, parents or guardians have the right to choose an education for their children that conforms 
to their religious or moral convictions.94 However, considering Article 26(3) in light of Article 
26(2), the prior right of parents or guardians cannot conflict with what education should be 
directed towards. Although parents or guardians are granted a prior right, Arajärvi explains that 
they cannot choose for their children to receive an education that is inimical to human rights 
education or the aims it sets forth to achieve.95 Moreover, it does not mean that children are 
“objects of agreements between their parents and their school”.96 Rather, children should be 
recognised as the subject of the right to education and should be consulted in this regard.97  
Ultimately, Articles 26(2) and (3) require that a balance be struck between the religious, 
cultural, and moral convictions of parents or guardians and education about, through and for 
human rights. However, Article 26(2) is clear that education should be directed towards the 
full development of the human personality and fostering respect for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all persons without distinction.   
The argument presented is that the religious, cultural, and moral convictions of parents will 
be outweighed when confronted with the right of all persons to an equal education. This is 
supported by the 4A-scheme, requiring that the right to education be available, acceptable, and 
accessible to all persons. In this regard, accessibility specifically refers to addressing 
discrimination to ensure that it does not hinder learners from benefitting from education. 
Education having to be adaptable will further outweigh the prior right of parents or guardians 
where their convictions contradict international human rights norms. Ultimately, the right to 
education is framed by the right to human dignity, granting each child the right to dignified 
treatment in schools.98 Considering the elements of the right to education discussed here, 
respecting the human dignity of learners requires that all learners should be afforded an equal 
opportunity to enjoy and benefit from education. 
 
93 Article 26(3) of the UDHR. 
94 Arajärvi “Article 26” in UDHR: A Common Standard of Achievement 567. 
95 555. 
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4 3 ICCPR 
4 3 1 Human dignity as an underlying value  
The Preamble of the ICCPR provides that the “equal and inalienable rights” of all persons 
“derive from [their] inherent dignity”. Although the ICCPR does not include an explicit right 
to human dignity as under the UDHR, the right to human dignity underscores all the rights 
contained in the ICCPR because these rights originate from dignity itself. Human dignity is, 
therefore, embedded in the language of the ICCPR.  
As its title suggests, the ICCPR is concerned with civil and political rights. According to the 
Preamble, recognising civil and political rights depends on the existence of conditions that 
enable the enjoyment of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 
The interdependence of these two groups of rights is thus established. The Preamble to the 
ICCPR refers to the rights of the UDHR, affirming that the ICCPR draws from and expands on 
its provisions.99 It further reiterates the obligations imposed on states under the UN Charter to 
“promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms” and indicates 
that individuals are also responsible for striving towards the promotion of the rights enshrined 
in the ICCPR.100  
 Because human dignity underlies the provisions of the ICCPR and is not included as a 
separate substantive provision, it is necessary to consider how the HRC has given content to 
human dignity through the interpretation of other rights, for example, the right to humane 
treatment, and the right to life. In discussing the right to humane treatment enshrined under 
Article 10 in General Comment 21, the HRC explained that: 
 
“Treating all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for their dignity is a 
fundamental and universally applicable rule. Consequently, the application of this rule, as a 
minimum, cannot be dependent on the material resources available in the State party. This rule must 
be applied without distinction of any kind, such as … sex … or other status” [own emphasis].101 
 
Although this comment was made in the context of persons deprived of their liberty, confirming 
that human dignity accrues to all persons without distinction in this context established the 
relationship between human dignity and non-discrimination in the broader framework of the 
ICCPR.  
 
99 See 4 3 1. 
100 Preamble to the ICCPR. 
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Human dignity has also been connected to the right to life under Article 6. In General 
Comment 36, the HRC explained that the right to life should not be given a narrow 
interpretation and that it includes the right to a dignified life.102 According to Joseph, a dignified 
life refers to being “[free] from threats to life that arise from general societal conditions”.103 
Furthermore, the right to life aims to “[address] those circumstances that plausibly threatens 
one’s life and simultaneously undermine dignity”.104 General Comment 36 is significant for 
calling on states to develop comprehensive strategies to promote non-violence in education, as 
well as establishing awareness-raising campaigns regarding “gender-based violence and 
harmful practices” as part of promoting the dignified life of all persons. Here, non-violence 
includes preventing and addressing the exclusion and bullying children based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE. 
In General Comment 26, the HRC further explained that human dignity has both a survival 
and developmental aspect. Whereas the survival aspect requires that persons have the needs 
necessary for their survival met, the developmental aspect entails that persons be treated with 
concern for their emotional and mental well-being in order to secure equal access to and 
enjoyment of their fundamental rights.105 This can also be applied in the context of education 
to ensure that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE are not discriminated against in 
schools and that the curriculum is inclusive of them. 
 
4 3 2 Non-discrimination 
4 3 2 1 Defining discrimination under Article 26  
Article 2(1) provides that all State Parties to the ICCPR must undertake to respect and ensure 
the rights of all persons contained therein “without distinction of any kind”. Whereas Article 
2(1) requires State Parties to respect and ensure the rights of all persons, Article 26 goes further. 
It establishes that:  
 
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection 
of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
 
102 HRC “General Comment 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
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equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as … sex … or other 
status” [own emphasis]. 
 
In Broeks v Netherlands,106 the HRC explained that Article 26 “derives from the principle of 
equal protection of the law without discrimination” under the UDHR and imposes obligations 
on states in respect of “their legislation and the application thereof”.107 States should, therefore, 
ensure that the content of legislation prohibits discrimination and that it applies to all persons 
on equal terms.108 Despite the inclusion of a comprehensive right to non-discrimination, the 
ICCPR does not define discrimination. However, in General Comment 18, the HRC provided 
guidance on what constitutes discrimination.109 This definition contains four elements: there 
has to exist (i) difference in treatment that is; (ii) based on a person’s belonging to a particular 
group; (iii) with the intended or unintended consequence of; (iv) infringing on a right under the 
ICCPR that persons are entitled to on equal terms. A claim of discrimination must satisfy these 
requirements to be successful.  
With regard to the first element, the HRC in General Comment 18 stated that not all 
instances of differentiation will constitute discrimination. Where differentiation is reasonable, 
objective, and has a legitimate aim, it is permissible.110 Concerning the second element, the 
complainant will have to show that the difference in treatment is based on one of the prohibited 
grounds contained in Article 26 and that it affects the group as a whole and not just the 
complainant as an individual.111 The third element refers to direct and indirect discrimination. 
Whereas direct discrimination “involves less favourable treatment of the complainant than that 
of someone else on prohibited grounds in comparable circumstances”, indirect discrimination 
refers to where the law looks neutral on face value but has a disproportionate effect on a 
particular group.112 With regard to the fourth element, it is logical that a matter brought to the 
HRC will require the complainant to allege an infringement of a right under the ICCPR.  
The second element is of particular importance to the primary research question as it pertains 
to what constitutes prohibited grounds of discrimination. As with the UDHR and the other 
treaties under discussion in the remainder of this chapter, the ICCPR does not explicitly 
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110 Para 13. 
111 Vos v Netherlands Communication 218/1986 (29 March 1989) CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986 para 1 of the Separate 
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prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression. 
However, as is illustrated below, discrimination based on these grounds has been included 
under discrimination based on ‘other status’ in Article 26 in the findings of the HRC related to 
submitted communications.113  
 
4 3 2 2 Communications that shaped the development of the prohibition of discrimination of 
non-heteronormative  
Toonen v Australia114 was the first case in which the HRC found a violation of a right under 
the ICCPR as a result of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Toonen concerned sections 
122 and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code’s alleged violation of the rights to privacy and 
non-discrimination under the ICCPR. The impugned provisions allowed prosecution for 
“unnatural sexual intercourse”, “intercourse against nature”, and “indecent practices between 
male persons”.115 Two of the three arguments set forth by the Tasmanian authorities are 
discussed here.116 First, it was argued that the provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code were 
last invoked in 1984 and that there were no policies in place to enforce it.117 Second, it was 
argued that “moral considerations must be taken into account when dealing with the right to 
privacy”.118  
With regard to the first argument, the HRC held that the “continued existence of the 
challenged provisions” infringed on Toonen’s privacy.119 In respect of the second argument, 
the HRC held that moral issues are not “exclusively a matter of domestic concern” and that 
adopting such an approach would prevent the HRC from scrutinising other statutes that infringe 
on the right to privacy.120 Furthermore, because the provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
had not been enforced since 1984, it cannot be viewed as essential to protecting and preserving 
Tasmanian morals.121 As a result, the HRC found that the infringement on Toonen’s right to 
 
113 See the text to part 4 3 3 1. 
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privacy was arbitrary because the interference was not proportional to the aim sought to be 
achieved and cannot be necessary in any circumstances.122 Through this approach, the HRC 
importantly dismissed the idea that cultural relativism can outweigh universal rights.123 
The judgment in Toonen is of particular significance as a result of the HRC’s claim that 
“sex” in Articles 2 and 26 includes sexual orientation.124 Despite being asked for guidance as 
to whether “other status” in Article 26 includes sexual orientation, the HRC refrained from 
commenting.125 According to Lau, the HRC’s interpretation in Toonen establishes that states 
have obligations in respect of protecting persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientations. 
Although there is no explicit reference to sexual orientation in the ICCPR, Toonen illustrates 
that “sexual orientation rights are embedded” in the language of the ICCPR.126 Furthermore, 
Mittelstaedt’s assertion that Toonen established the foundation for the protection of non-
heteronormative SOGIE rights under international law is valid considering the subsequent 
developments in international law.127  
Following Toonen, in Young v Australia,128 the complainant was denied a pension under the 
Veteran’s Entitlement Act because he did not fall within the definition of dependant.129 It was 
argued that Australia’s refusal to recognise the complainant as a dependant of his deceased 
partner was based on his sexual orientation and was, therefore, a violation of his right to equal 
treatment and non-discrimination.130 The HRC confirmed its decision in Toonen, stating that 
Article 26 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation.131 The HRC explained that 
where a distinction is “based on reasonable and objective criteria”, it will not amount to unfair 
discrimination.132 Because the state failed to prove how excluding same-sex partners from 
receiving pension benefits, but granting these benefits to unmarried heterosexual partners, was 
reasonable and objective, the HRC found that it had discriminated against Young based on his 
 
122 Para 8.3. 
123 See 3 4 1. 
124 Para 8.7. 
125 Para 8.7. 
126 H Lau “Sexual orientation: testing the universality of international human rights law” (2004) 71 U Chi L Rev 
1689 1700. 
127 E Mittelstaedt “Safeguarding the rights of sexual minorities: the incremental and legal approaches to enforcing 
international human rights obligations” (2008) 9 Chi J Int'l L 353 361.  
128 Communication 941/2000 (18 September 2003) CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (“Young”). 
129 Para 2.1.  
130 Para 3.1. 
131 Para 10.4. 




“sex or sexual orientation”.133 Lau points out that the decision in Young is significant for 
“elevat[ing] sexual orientation from an issue of criminality to an issue of equal opportunity”.134 
Moving further towards equal rights for homosexual persons, the HRC in Fedotova v 
Russia135 had to consider an allegation that the complainant’s right to freedom of expression, 
guaranteed under Article 19 of the ICCPR, was violated. The complainant was prosecuted 
under the Ryazan Region Law for putting up posters near a secondary school stating that 
homosexuality is normal and that she is proud of her homosexuality.136 It was argued that, 
because there was no objective justification for the prohibition of information being 
disseminated amongst children regarding homosexuality under Ryazan Region Law, the state 
violated Article 26.137 According to the HRC, any limitation of a right “must conform to the 
strict tests of necessity and proportionality”.138 With reference to General Comment 34, the 
HRC explained that 
 
“limitations … for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving 
exclusively from a single tradition … [but] must be understood in the light of universality of human 
rights and the principle of non-discrimination”.139 
 
The HRC found that restricting the complainant’s freedom of expression was not reasonable 
and objective. Furthermore, the state failed to show a legitimate purpose for prohibiting the 
complainant from “expressing her sexual identity and seeking understanding for it”.140 It was 
further held that convicting the complainant for spreading information about homosexuality 
amongst minors discriminated against her based on her sexual orientation.141 
 Toonen was a landmark decision for including sexual orientation under “sex” as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination which catalysed the development of the increasing recognition and 
protection of the rights of homosexual persons under international human rights law. Similarly, 
the HRC’s decision in G v Australia is another landmark decision in relation to the protection 
of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative gender identities and expression under 
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international human rights law.142 G is a transgender woman whose sex was registered as male 
at birth. G underwent hormone treatment and sex affirmation surgery, had her name changed 
on her driver’s license, bank and credit cards and had her name and gender changed on her 
passport.143 The matter came before the HRC as a result of the state’s refusal to allow G to 
change the sex on her birth certificate based on the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration 
Act of 1995 requiring a person to be “unmarried at the time of their application to register a 
change of sex”.144 G argued that this refusal infringed on her rights to privacy and non-
discrimination.145 
 The following facts are of particular relevance for understanding the decision of the HRC. 
G was married under the Marriage Act of 1961 and did not intend to get divorced. However, 
the Marriage Act did not allow same-sex marriages, which the marriage would become if the 
state allowed G to change the sex on her birth certificate.146 The state argued that the 
interference with G’s privacy was not disproportionate because it was reasonable and 
proportionate to the purpose of guaranteeing that the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration 
Act remained consistent with the definition of marriage in the Marriage Act.147 According to 
the HRC, the state’s argument did not amount to a legitimate reason for refusing to change G’s 
sex on her birth certificate to match her current sex and gender.148 In this regard, attention was 
drawn to the state’s failure to explain how changing “sex on a birth certificate would result in 
irreconcilable and unacceptable conflict with the Marriage Act”.149 G had been issued with a 
passport which reflected her identified sex and gender. Moreover, she was validly married in 
terms of the Marriage Act. Her birth certificate should, therefore, be amended to reflect this 
lawful reality.150  
 The HRC further found that the state’s conduct discriminated against G based on her marital 
status and gender identity. Thus, the state was found to have violated Article 26 of the ICCPR 
for failing to provide G and persons in a similar situation “equal protection of the law as a 
married transgender person”.151 The HRC’s decision is significant because it held, for the first 
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time, that Article 26 prohibits “discrimination on the basis of … gender identity, including 
transgender status”.152 
 The HRC’s interpretation of prohibited grounds of discrimination preceded that of the other 
human rights bodies in establishing the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity.  The communications discussed here illustrate the development 
of the understanding of what constitutes prohibited grounds of discrimination under the ICCPR 
and indicate that the HRC has established sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. It also shows that the rights and freedoms enshrined under the 
ICCPR are interpreted broadly and restrictions narrowly. The HRC further illustrated that 
arguments of public morality cannot be invoked to prevent persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE from enjoying the fundamental rights and freedoms that accrue to all persons equally. 
In this respect, states are obligated to take steps to ensure that persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE have equal rights and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms in law 
and in fact.  
 
4 3 3 Balancing children’s right to special protection and parents’ rights in respect of the 
religious and moral education of their children 
Article 24(1) provides that “[e]very child shall have, without any discrimination … the right to 
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, 
society and the State”. In this regard, states have to take into consideration the “vulnerability 
and immaturity of children, as well as their capacity for development”.153 From the 
jurisprudence related to Article 24(1), two trends can be deduced. First, that it includes the 
principle of the best interests of the child.154 Second, that where a violation of a different 
provision of the ICCPR is found, the HRC tends to not consider the claim under Article 
24(1).155  
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Article 24(1) is ancillary to Articles 2 and 26, focusing specifically on the additional special 
measures that must be adopted to protect children’s rights.156 All the rights enshrined therein 
apply equally to children. Article 24(1) is, therefore, not the only provision that protects the 
rights of the child under the ICCPR. It simply adds to existing state obligations.157 However, 
states will have to determine how to give effect to the rights contained in the ICCPR in a manner 
that is specifically geared towards children.158 In General Comment 17, the HRC explained 
that the measures taken to fulfil the rights under the ICCPR can also include those of an 
economic, social, and cultural nature. For example: 
 
“[E]very possible measure should be taken to foster the development of their personality and to 
provide them with a level of education that will enable them to enjoy the rights recognized in the   
Covenant, particularly the right to freedom of opinion and expression”.159 
 
In light thereof, it is clear that although the ICCPR does not guarantee the right to education, 
the rights enshrined therein nonetheless implicate and influence it. Here, it is important to 
consider how to balance the right to education and children’s right to special protection against 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and the related right(s) of parents in 
respect of the religious and moral education of their child. This is of particular importance 
considering that Article 5(1) of the ICCPR prohibits an interpretation of the rights enshrined 
therein in a manner that allows its “limitation to a greater extent than is provided for”. Article 
18(1) of the ICCPR provides all persons with the “right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion” and includes the freedom to manifest “religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching”. Article 18(4) is related hereto, providing that states should: 
 
“[H]ave respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions”.160 
 
In General Comment 22, the HRC explained that “teaching” under Article 18(1) includes the 
“freedom to choose … religious leaders, priests and teachers, [and] the freedom to establish 
seminaries or religious schools”.161 The argument set forth here is that although Article 18(1) 
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provides persons with the “freedom to choose”, this cannot be construed as meaning that 
parents have the freedom to demand that all public-school teachers are of the same religion or 
beliefs as them. Similarly, where it would be in the child’s best interests, either the child or the 
state, on behalf of the child, can choose an education that rejects the “freedom to choose” of 
their parents or guardian. 
Related hereto is the HRC’s indication that Article 18(4) allows public schools to teach the 
“general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way”.162 
Moreover, public schools are prohibited from teaching a particular religion or belief “unless 
provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives”.163 This is in line with 
General Comment 34, in which the HRC explains that laws are not allowed to discriminate 
against non-religious persons in favour of religious persons, and vice versa.164  
 In Ross v Canada,165 the HRC drew attention to the right to be free from “religious hatred”. 
In this matter, the complainant, a teacher, made anti-Semitic statements in public. As a result, 
he was demoted to a non-teaching position.166 According to the HRC, his statements could not 
be construed as a valid expression of his religious opinions because it degraded the Jewish faith 
and their beliefs through encouraging Christians to express contempt with Jews and their 
ancestry, as well as questioning the validity of the Jewish faith.167 The HRC explained that 
restricting the complainant’s right in terms of Article 18 was justified in the circumstances 
because there was a clear link between his conduct and the “poisoned school environment” that 
Jewish children experience as a result.168  
 The HRC’s decision in Ross can be applied to address discrimination against children with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools. The religious and moral convictions of parents, 
society, and the state have been shown to create an intolerant and often violent atmosphere that 
encourages the marginalisation of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE, preventing them 
from being able to benefit equally from education. Ultimately, as in Ross, this creates a 
“poisoned school environment” that does not respect the inherent dignity of the child. 
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Considering Article 18(4) in light of Article 26 and the vast jurisprudence of the HRC 
discussed above, states are not obligated to respect the freedom of parents to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children should it constitute discrimination against 
children based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. Rather, the freedom provided to parents 
in terms of Article 18(4) should be viewed in the broader context of the rights provided under 
the ICCPR. 
 
4 4 ICESCR 
4 4 1 Human dignity as an underlying value  
The wording of the Preambles to the ICCPR and the ICESCR are almost identical. Thus, the 
discussion under 4 3 2 can be applied almost verbatim. As under the ICCPR, the Preamble to 
the ICESCR provides that the “equal and inalienable rights” of all persons “derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person”. The only difference between the Preamble to the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR is that, whereas the purpose of the ICCPR is to create conditions that ensure 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights, the focus of the ICESCR is to do so in respect of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. Like the ICCPR, the ICESCR confirms that the rights 
contained under each are intertwined: creating the necessary conditions to fulfil the rights under 
the ICESCR inevitably requires the same for the rights under the ICCPR, and vice versa.169  
The CESCR’s references to human dignity in the context of the right to adequate housing 
and the rights of persons with disabilities are valuable for establishing the role of human dignity 
as an underlying value of the ICESCR. In General Comment 4, which deals with the right to 
adequate housing under Article 11(1), the CESCR confirmed that the rights in the ICESCR 
derive from the “inherent dignity of the human person” and that, as a result, all rights should 
be interpreted through the lens of human dignity.170 Furthermore, in General Comment 5, the 
CESCR explained that, although there is no explicit reference to persons with disabilities in 
the ICESCR, the provisions contained therein nonetheless apply to them by virtue of the fact 
that its “provisions apply fully to all members of society”.171  It was also confirmed that states 
are obligated to take appropriate measures to ensure that disabled persons can fully and equally 
enjoy the rights set forth in the ICESCR.172  
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Through these two general comments, the CESCR confirms that human dignity lies at the 
core of the human rights regime because all rights derive therefrom, that all persons should be 
ensured all rights without distinction, and that State Parties must take appropriate measures to 
enable persons who are prevented from accessing their rights due to disadvantage to access it. 
 
4 4 2 Non-discrimination  
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR requires states to undertake to guarantee the rights contained 
therein “without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” [own emphasis].173 
Related hereto, Article 10(3) provides that children are entitled to “[s]pecial measures of 
protection and assistance … without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions” [own emphasis]. Various authors have described non-discrimination as being the 
dominant theme of the ICESCR.174 Similarly to the ICCPR, “discrimination” is not defined in 
the ICESCR. However, the CESCR has defined discrimination.175 The definition provided in 
General Comment 20 is identical to the one provided in General Comment 18 of the HRC, but 
adds that discrimination “includes incitement to discriminate and harassment”.176  
As a point of departure, and in order for differential treatment to constitute discrimination 
under the ICESCR, it has to infringe on a right enshrined in the ICESCR. Furthermore, like 
under the ICCPR, treatment with a differential effect on a person based on belonging to a 
particular group is sufficient for the treatment to constitute discrimination. Thus, the treatment 
does not have to have discriminatory intent.177 This element prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination.178  
The CESCR in General Comment 20 explains that differentiation will not constitute 
discrimination if the “justification for differentiation is reasonable and objective”.179 A 
reasonable and objective differentiation requires that the “aim and effect of the measures or 
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omissions [be] legitimate” and that there exist a relationship between the differentiation and 
the aim sought to be achieved.180 However, where differentiation is based on a prohibited 
ground listed under Article 2(2), discrimination is presumed. Although Article 2(2) sets out 
numerous prohibited grounds, the reference to “other status” in Article 2(2) “indicates that this 
list is not exhaustive and other grounds may be incorporated”.181  
Sexual orientation was first referred to as a prohibited ground of discrimination in General 
Comment 14 of 2000 in relation to the right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
enshrined in Article 12 of the ICESCR.182 However, it was only in General Comment 20 that 
the CESCR listed sexual orientation and gender identity as general prohibited grounds of 
discrimination under the reference to “other status”.183 Significantly, the CESCR also included 
discrimination based on age under “other status” and explained how old age or youth often 
impede people from equal access to their economic, social and cultural rights. In the case of 
children, “unequal access by adolescents to sexual and reproductive health information and 
services amounts to discrimination”.184 In General Comment 20, the CESCR further drew 
attention to that individuals or groups of individuals can face discrimination on multiple 
intersecting grounds, for example, age, race, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. 
According to the CESCR, “[s]uch cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact 
on individuals and merits particular consideration and remedying”.185 The impact of 
discrimination based on age, sexual orientation, and gender identity as multiple and intersecting 
grounds on the right to education is considered in more detail under 4 4 3.  
Article 2(2) also requires states to guarantee the rights set forth therein without 
discrimination. To this end, states should address both formal and substantive discrimination, 
provide remedies to those who suffer discrimination, and ensure that the institutions that or 
persons who discriminate are held accountable for the consequences of their conduct.186 
Whereas formal discrimination is addressed through the prohibition of discrimination in laws 
and policies, substantive discrimination necessitates taking measures to address the 
 
180 Para 13. 
181 Para 15. 
182 CESCR “General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article. 12)” (11 
August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4 para 18. 
183 CESCR “General Comment 20” para 32. 
184 Para 29. 
185 Para 17. See 2 6 2. 




disadvantages faced by “groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice” 
in accessing certain fundamental rights as a result of this prejudice.187  
 
4 4 3 Education 
Article 13 of the ICESCR provides all persons with a comprehensive right to education. It has 
been described as the “most wide-ranging and comprehensive article on the right to education 
in international human rights law”.188 Article 13 must be considered in the historical context of 
the establishment of the UN and the adoption of the UDHR. As stated above, the UN was 
formed, and the UDHR adopted, against the backdrop of the atrocities committed during the 
First and Second World Wars.189 During the Second World War, education was used to 
promote the normalisation of discrimination; that specific groups of individuals should not 
have access to what is now recognised as fundamental rights. In light hereof, the drafters of the 
core UN human rights treaties were cognisant of how education could be used as an instrument 
in favour of human rights violations, while simultaneously recognised the liberating and 
developmental potential of education.190 As a result, the right to education in the ICESCR does 
not only recognise the right of all persons to education, but also includes the aims which 
education should strive towards.  
     Article 13(1) of the ICESCR “recognize the right of everyone to education”. The use of the 
term “everyone” in the first sentence of Article 13(1) is important for determining to whom the 
right applies. The recognition that everyone has the right to education implies that the right to 
education accrues to all persons without distinction. In General Comment 13, the CESCR 
explains that Article 2(2) applies to Article 13(1) and that the prohibition against discrimination 
“applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all internationally 
prohibited grounds of discrimination”.191 In this regard, Saul et al argues that discrimination 
on prohibited grounds infringes on children’s human dignity and can undermine or destroy 
their ability “to benefit from educational opportunities”.192 
The CESCR has expressed concern over the discrimination that children face in schools 
based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. In its concluding observations on Germany and 
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Costa Rica, the CESCR indicated that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity continues despite legislative and other measures having been taken to address it. In 
both concluding observations, the CESCR emphasised its concern with reports of this type of 
discrimination in schools, stating that the absence of recognising non-heteronormative gender 
identities presents a barrier to fulfilling the right to education.193 In its concluding observation 
on Kazakhstan, the CESCR again reiterated that discrimination based on non-heteronormative 
SOGIE inhibits access to and enjoyment of the right to education. Importantly, it drew attention 
to the persistent “[b]ullying, violence and discrimination” against these learners in schools.194  
The first sentence of Article 13(1) further states that “State Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to education” [own emphasis]. The use of the word “recognise” 
implies that states are obligated to take steps towards achieving the progressive realisation of 
the right to education.195 This requires that states take all the necessary and possible measures 
towards achieving clearly specified aims to, ultimately, fulfil the obligations imposed by the 
right to education.196 In light hereof, states have to take measures to ensure that children are 
not discriminated against based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE as it prevents them from 
enjoying their right to education in its entirety.197  
Besides the obligation on states to recognise the right of all persons to education, Article 
13(1) also sets forth three aims that education should be directed towards and seek to achieve. 
Education should, First, “be directed to the full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity”. Because the first aim is concerned with the individual’s development, it 
is individual-focused.198 In both the travaux préparatoires of the ICESCR and General 
Comment 13, this has been confirmed as the most important aim of education.199 Mehedi 
explains that the reason for focusing on the individual’s development ensures that education is 
not “directed exclusively at serving a social body or in extreme cases an ideology” as was done 
 
193 CESCR “Concluding Observations: Germany” (27 November 2018) E/C.12/DEU/CO/6 para 22; CESCR 
“Concluding observations: Costa Rica” (21 October 2016) E/C.12/CRI/CO/5 para 20. 
194 CESCR “Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan” (29 March 2019) E/C.12/KAZ/CO/2 para 10. See also, 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Cameroon” (25 March 2019) E/C.12/CMR/CO/4 para 23; CESCR 
“Concluding Observations: Chile” (7 July 2015) E/C.12/CHL/CO/4 para 12; CESCR “Concluding Observations: 
Guatemala” (9 December 2014) E/C.12/GTM/CO/3 para 9; CESCR “Concluding Observations: Peru” (30 May 
2012) E/C.12/PER/CO/2-4 para 5. 
195 UNGA “Draft International Covenants on Human Rights” (1 July 1955) A/2929 322-323. See also, M 
Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2 ed) (2016) 570. 
196 Ssenyonjo ESCR in International Law 571. 
197 This is discussed in more detail when considering the aims of education, state obligations at the different levels 
of education, as well as parents or guardians right in terms of their child’s religious and moral education. 
198 Beiter Right to Education 468. 
199 UNGA “Official records of the twelfth session” (16 October 1957) A/C.3/SR.782 para 38; UNGA “Official 




during the Second World War.200 Related hereto, the CESCR in its concluding observation on 
Venezuela noted that school programmes that focus on the indoctrination of learners are 
incompatible with Article 13(1) as it does not have the individual child’s development in 
mind.201 In considering what an education directed at the full development of the human 
personality entails, Beiter refers to Arajärvi. According to them:  
 
“[E]ducation must provide all those educational opportunities necessary for the development of all 
dimensions of the human personality – physical, intellectual, spiritual, psychological and social. In 
other words, education must not be limited to the transmission of academic knowledge. The goal is 
rather that every person should be able to develop all aspects of his personality to the best of his 
abilities and talents, to become a harmonious person” [emphasis in original text].202 
 
The first aim further requires that education be directed towards developing a sense of human 
dignity. Significantly, Article 13(1) is the only education provision under international human 
rights law to do so. According to Beiter, this requires that learners develop a sense of their own 
dignity, as well as the dignity of others.203 In this sense, the first aim is tied to the second aim, 
being to strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Whereas the first 
aim of education is focused on the individual, the second concerns the individual’s role in 
society at large.204 Respect for the dignity of others is the foundation of respecting the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of all. The first and second aims are also tied to the third, 
which requires education to “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups”.205 
In General Comment 13, the CESCR notes that the aims of education mirror the purpose of 
the UN. As a result, states should ensure that the content of education, at all levels, are directed 
at achieving the objectives set out under Article 13(1).206 The aims expressed, therefore, 
requires that human rights education be presented “at all levels of education both as a subject 
and as a methodology of instruction, reflecting values of participation and social inclusion”.207 
In promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship for all, education has the potential to 
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address stigma and prejudice towards certain individuals based on their belonging to a 
particular group.208 This includes children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Article 13(2) of the ICESCR indicates to what extent states are obligated to provide specific 
levels of education to all persons. Because this dissertation is concerned with the right to 
education of children, defined as individuals under the age of 18, the focus here is on primary 
and secondary education. Whereas primary education should be compulsory and free to all 
children, secondary education should “be made generally available and accessible to all by 
every appropriate means”.209  
In establishing the meaning of primary education, the CESCR incorporated the approach of 
the World Declaration on Education for All and Framework for Action to Meet Basic Learning 
Needs (“World Declaration on Education for All”)210 in Article 13(2)(a) of the ICESCR. 211 
The World Declaration on Education for All states that primary education should be universal 
and satisfy the basic learning needs of all children.212 Basic learning needs refer to the 
knowledge and skills that people require to “survive, to develop their full capacities, to live and 
work in dignity, [and] to participate fully in development”, amongst others.213 Secondary 
education follows on primary education and is largely concerned with completing basic 
education and ensuring that children are enabled to embark on a project of life-long learning, 
contributing to the development of their communities.214 Because states have to make 
secondary education generally accessible and available, secondary education should be made 
available to all learners on the same basis.215 
In General Comment 13, the CESCR indicated that all levels of education must comply with 
the 4-A scheme of being available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable. The CESCR 
confirmed the approach of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education and made two 
additional comments in relation to education being adaptable and accessible.216 With regard to 
education having to be adaptable, the CESR noted that education should be “flexible so that it 
can adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities and respond to the needs of 
students within their diverse social and cultural settings”.217 As to the accessibility of education, 
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the CESCR explained that it has three dimensions. First, education should be physically 
accessible in terms of geographical location. Second, education should be economically 
accessible in that it should be affordable. Finally, the CESCR also referred to accessibility in 
terms of non-discrimination. In this regard, the CESCR stated that: 
 
“[E]ducation must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups, in law and fact, 
without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds”.218 
 
When implementing measures to comply with their obligations under Article 13(2), states 
should ensure that all aspects of the 4-A scheme are reflected in its approach due to the 
interrelatedness of these elements. Significantly, despite the lack of an explicit reference to the 
best interests of the child principle under the ICESCR, the CESCR nonetheless indicated that 
the “best interests of the student shall be a primary consideration” when determining the 
application of the scheme.219 Here, the reference to “students” can also be read as “children” 
because children are the primary recipients of compulsory education. As such, in these 
circumstances, states must consider the best interests of the child.220  
Considering the aims set forth under Article 13(1) in light of the obligations imposed under 
Article 13(2), it is clear that the right to education requires more than just providing all children 
with access to schools as the place where learning occurs. Rather, Article 13 should be 
understood as presenting a holistic vision for education whereby each learner is offered the 
equal opportunity to benefit from an education that is aimed at their individual development, 
considering their human dignity, the right to not be discriminated against, as well as their 
ultimate role in their communities as respecting and enabling the right of others through 
promoting “understanding, tolerance and friendship among all”.  
Similar to Article 26(3) of the UDHR, Article 13(3) of the ICESCR places an obligation on 
states to respect the freedom of parents or guardians to “ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions”.221 However, this 
freedom should still be balanced against the child’s right to receive information that will 
contribute to their full development and ensure that the aims of education are achieved.222  
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Beiter, explains that the child’s right to receive information includes diverse sexual and 
reproductive health education, as well as human rights education.223 The child’s right to receive 
information ties in with the notion that education should contribute to the full development of 
all children, enabling them to become active members of their communities and developing a 
sense of their own dignity, as well as the dignity of others. Furthermore, the CESCR has 
indicated that Article 13(3) allows learners to be taught “subjects such as the general history of 
religions and ethics if it is given in an unbiased and objective way, respectful of the freedoms 
of opinion, conscience and expression”.224  
Comparably to Article 26(3) of the UDHR, the freedom of parents or guardians cannot be 
respected where their religion or beliefs are “racist, hostile to human rights or anti-democratic” 
and is inimical to the aims of education under Article 13.225 Thus, considering that the child is 
the subject of the right to education, entitled to the full range of benefits offered with due 
consideration of that the same right accrues to all other children, the freedom of parents and 
guardians under Article 13(3) is not unlimited.  
 
4 5 CEDAW 
4 5 1 Human dignity as an underlying value  
At the outset, it should be noted that CEDAW applies in respect of women and girls.226 
Comparable to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the Preamble to CEDAW reiterates the affirmation 
in the UN Charter and the UDHR that all persons are equal and have inherent human dignity.227 
Reference is also made to the obligations imposed under the ICCPR and the ICESCR to “ensure 
the equal rights of men and women” in respect of the rights contained therein. Despite the 
existence of various instruments that require equal rights for all, the Preamble to CEDAW 
draws attention to continuing discrimination against women. The Preamble does not explicitly 
state that the rights set forth in CEDAW derive from the inherent dignity of all persons. 
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However, it nonetheless states that discrimination against women violates their human dignity, 
is an obstacle to equality, and ultimately prevents the “prosperity of society”. As a result, 
traditional roles ascribed to men and women should be reconsidered and changed. To this end, 
the Preamble stipulates that it is also necessary to establish a “new international economic 
order” that allows “women [to participate] on equal terms with men in all fields”.228  
 Human dignity is not included in a separate substantive provision of CEDAW. Nevertheless, 
it has been referred to in several of the CEDAW Committee’s concluding observations and 
general recommendations, informing the right to education and assisting in framing the impact 
of gender-based violence and other harmful practices. In General Recommendation 36, the 
CEDAW Committee commented on the need for education to be acceptable in terms of form 
and substance. This is necessary to ensure that girls have equal access to education as boys, 
including access to the same quality of education.229 In this regard, the CEDAW Committee 
also explained that the failure to respect the human dignity of girls in school “depends on the 
gender regime of schools which reflects the wider social order”. For example, where the school 
environment is “marked by entrenched patriarchal ideologies”, it is far more likely that the 
rights of girls will be denied or not fully recognised and protected.230  
 In General Recommendation 31, the CEDAW Committee considered the impact of harmful 
practices on women and girls. Harmful practices refer to “persistent practices and forms of 
behaviour” based on the sex or gender of the victim, amongst others. Because these practices 
are detrimental to women’s “dignity, physical, psychosocial and moral integrity and 
development”, it can prevent access to and enjoyment of other rights.231 In its concluding 
observations on Argentina, the CEDAW Committee also reiterated the harmful impact of 
gender-based violence on the human dignity of women, specifically referring to lesbian, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons.232  
 According to Holtmaat, human dignity and equality as the underlying values of CEDAW 
are integral to ensuring that the circumstances are created for women to participate as 
autonomous and free individuals in society and that they are also seen this way.233 The work 
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of the CEDAW Committee supports this, illustrating that the meaning of human dignity is 
integral to its objects of achieving equality for women and eliminating discrimination against 
women.  
 
4 5 2 Non-discrimination  
Because CEDAW is concerned with the elimination of discrimination against women Articles 
1 and 2 lie at the heart of CEDAW and is vital to its implementation.234 Article 1 defines 
discrimination against women235 as a “distinction, exclusion or restriction” based on sex.236 At 
first glance, discrimination based on sex seems to require discrimination to be based on the 
biological attributes of women. However, it must be considered that the difference between sex 
and gender was not considered at the level of international law at the time of CEDAW’s 
drafting.  
Toonen was the first matter where differential treatment based on sexual orientation was 
deemed a violation of international law.237 Although Toonen was decided in 1994, the first 
resolution concerning discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE was only adopted 
by the Human Rights Council in 2011.238 Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that the 
CEDAW Committee has explained that CEDAW is aimed at addressing discrimination against 
women, whether based on sex or gender. For example, in General Recommendation 28, it 
indicated that, whereas sex is concerned with the different biological attributes of men and 
women, gender refers to the social and cultural roles attached to the two sexes that favours men 
and disadvantages women.239 The CEDAW Committee further recognised that women are 
often subject to multiple intersecting forms of discrimination, such as race, age, sexual 
orientation and gender identity.240 The CEDAW Committee has also expressed concern over 
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discrimination against women based on their sexual orientation and gender identity in 
numerous concluding observations.241  
Based on the above, there is room for an argument that discrimination based on SOGIE is 
prohibited under CEDAW. However, Otto highlights the unwillingness of the CEDAW 
Committee to engage further with discrimination based on gender identity in their concluding 
observations and general recommendations. She suggests that some members view gender 
identity as “watering down” the obligations of CEDAW towards women.242 In contrast, 
Holtmaat and Post draw attention to Article 5(a) which requires states to: 
 
 “[M]odify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”.243 
 
In light hereof, Holtmaat and Post discuss the direct impact that “[g]ender stereotypes and fixed 
parental gender roles” have on persons who “renounce traditional heterosexual and patriarchal 
feminine and masculine gender identities and gender roles”.244 Considering that discrimination 
based on non-heteronormative gender identities are based on prejudice for rejecting traditional 
gender identities and gender roles, it is possible to conceive that under Article 5(a), CEDAW’s 
application can extend beyond a sex-based approach and include all persons who identify as a 
woman.245  
Article 1 further states that discrimination must have the “effect or purpose” of preventing 
women from enjoying or exercising their rights, or having their rights recognised. This means 
that discrimination can be direct or indirect.246 Furthermore, for the “distinction, exclusion or 
restriction” to constitute discrimination under CEDAW, it has to be based on sex or gender and 
negatively affect women’s rights.247 Here, Article 1 sets out that women’s rights are not limited 
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to CEDAW, but include those in the “political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field”.248  
Whereas Article 1 defines discrimination against women, Article 2 sets out obligations in 
relation to eliminating discrimination against them. In this regard, states have to proclaim their 
condemnation of all forms of discrimination against women.249 States are further required to 
“pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women”.250 Thus, states not only have to adopt policies identifying all forms of 
discrimination against women but should also ensure the implementation and ultimate success 
thereof.251 Subsections (a) to (f) lists specific obligations, of which the obligation to enshrine 
equality as an underlying principle in national constitutions and legislation, as well as to refrain 
from or abolish practices that discriminate against women are the most significant. These are 
explored in more detail below in the context of eliminating discrimination against women in 
education.  
 
4 5 3 Eliminating discrimination against women in education 
The right to education under CEDAW is different to the UDHR and the ICESCR. Whereas the 
UDHR and the ICESCR are similar in providing that all persons have the right to education, 
setting out similar aims and state obligations, CEDAW discusses the steps to be taken to 
eliminate discrimination against women in education. According to Article 10 of CEDAW, 
states “shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order 
to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education”. To this end, men and women 
should have equal access to education,252 as well as have education of the same form and 
content.253 States are further obligated to eliminate gender stereotypes in education through 
revising and adapting the curriculum, teaching materials, and teaching methods.254  
In General Recommendation 36, the CEDAW Committee explained that despite the right of 
all persons to education under international law and the recognised potential of education – for 
promoting human rights, contributing towards individual development and empowerment, and 
“as the pathway to gender equality” – discrimination continues to inhibit women and girls from 
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the full range of benefits that the right offers.255 However, the challenges that women and girls 
face in the realisation of their right to education can be addressed by drawing from the 4-A 
scheme.256 By grounding the right to education in the 4-A scheme, the CEDAW Committee 
arguably placed it within the broader context of the right to education under international 
law.257  
In discussing the acceptability of education, the CEDAW Committee explained that the 
form and substance of education must be of the same quality for boys and girls.258 The 
challenge here is that the school environment and materials are often embedded with patriarchal 
values that reflect the wider social order, contributing to various forms of violence being 
tolerated in schools.259 Attention was further drawn to the increased risk of violence that 
disadvantaged groups of girls, such as girls with non-heteronormative SOGIE, face at school. 
In this regard, the CEDAW Committee referred to the sexism and homophobia experienced by 
girls with non-heteronormative SOGIE.260 
In discussing access to education, the CEDAW Committee considered how the harassment 
of girls with non-heteronormative SOGIE at the hand of their educators and peers presents a 
barrier to the right to education. This issue is exacerbated where schools either do not have 
policies in place to address harassment of this kind or where these policies are not implemented. 
Because stigma often drives violence, the CEDAW Committee recommended that prejudice 
be addressed in the curriculum and the larger schooling environment. Furthermore, specific 
reference was made to “ensuring [that] policies are in place to address the obstacles that impede 
[learners with non-heteronormative SOGIE from] access to education”.261 
The CEDAW Committee’s approach to the right to education illustrates that the right goes 
beyond mere access to the school environment. For education to eliminate discrimination 
against women and girls and perform according to its envisaged potential, it “should be gender 
sensitive, responsive to the needs of girls and women and transformative for both females and 
males”.262 This requires addressing the patriarchal values and stigma towards learners that do 
not conform to heteronormative sex and gender roles that often underpin the school 
environment and policies, curriculum, and teaching methods.  
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4 6 CRC 
4 6 1 Human dignity as an underlying value  
The Preamble of the CRC opens with a reference to the UN Charter’s proclamation of the 
inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all persons without distinction and reiterates 
that UN member states reaffirmed these principles in the UDHR. The purpose of the CRC is to 
provide a framework for the protection of the rights of children. Children, because of their 
physical and mental immaturity, require special care and attention to ensure the “full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality”.263 To this end, the Preamble requires that 
children:  
 
“[S]hould grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding 
… [and be] brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, 
and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity”.264  
 
Unlike the Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the Preamble of the CRC does not state 
that the rights of the child derive from their inherent dignity. However, despite this, it is clear 
that recognising and respecting children’s dignity and teaching them respect for other’s dignity 
is imperative to their full and harmonious development. 
In referring to the UN Charter, UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR, the Preamble of the CRC 
locates the rights of the child within the broader context of international human rights law. 
These instruments form the extensive framework in terms of which the provisions contained in 
the CRC should be interpreted. In this context, it is also significant that the Preamble draws 
attention to the “importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the 
protection and harmonious development of the child”. This reference opens up for arguments 
based on cultural relativism over universal human rights. However, it should be viewed against 
the overarching purpose of the CRC to respect, protect, and promote the rights of the child for 
their full development. Thus, although the CRC recognises that traditions and cultural values 
contribute to development, it cannot be to the detriment of universal human rights and the 
underlying values of equality and dignity. 
The CRC Committee has considered human dignity in relation to various rights. The 
statements made about the right to education and the right of the child to be free from all forms 
 





of violence are most relevant to this discussion.265 In General Comment 1, the CRC Committee 
indicated that the aims of education set out under Article 29 promote, support and protect the 
inherent human dignity of children and their equal rights as core values of the CRC.266 
Similarly, the CRC Committee has urged the Kuwait state to: 
 
“[E]stablish an inclusive education system for all children … in order to build a society that is 
genuinely inclusive, that values difference and that respects the dignity and equality of all human 
beings regardless of differences”.267  
 
With regard to the right of children to be free from all forms of violence, the CRC Committee 
in its concluding observations on Bulgaria explained that degrading treatment in schools, 
whether by educators or peers, violates children’s dignity.268 The CRC Committee has also 
stated that corporal punishment infringes on the human dignity of the child and that non-violent 
methods of discipline should, therefore, be adopted at schools and at home.269 Ultimately, any 
form of violence against children, whether physical or psychological erodes their inherent and 
absolute human dignity.270 
As an underlying value, human dignity provides a framework in terms of which the rights 
contained in the CRC should be interpreted. In ensuring the rights of the child, the dignity of 
the child should be taken into consideration. The dignity of the child is also closely related to 
the best interests of the child. This is because the best interests of the child, as a primary 
consideration in all matters concerning them, has the potential for contributing to respecting 
and promoting their inherent dignity.  
 
4 6 2 The best interests of the child 
Article 3(1) of the CRC guarantees the right of the child to have their best interests be a primary 
consideration in all matters concerning them. In its General Guidelines for Periodic Reports, 
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the CRC Committee lists the best interests of the child as one of the general principles that 
must be addressed in the periodic reports of states, thereby confirming its fundamental 
importance.271 Article 3(1) contains six elements, providing that: 
 
“[i] In all actions [ii] concerning children, [iii] whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, [iv] the best interests of 
the child [v] shall be [vi] a primary consideration”. 
 
According to Alston and Gilmour-Walsh, the phrase “in all actions concerning children” means 
that the best interests of the child principle has a wide application.272 Detrick agrees with this 
interpretation and argues that because no reference is made to particular rights contained in the 
CRC, the assumption is that the best interests principle informs the interpretation of each 
substantive provision.273 In General Comment 14, the CRC confirmed this, stating that the 
principle “seeks to ensure that the right is guaranteed in all decisions and actions concerning 
children”.274 Alston and Gilmour-Walsh have further stated that the phrase warrants a broad 
interpretation as reference is made to children as a group.275  
The best interests of the child principle must be considered wherever the work of an 
institution or its decisions affect the individual child or children as a group.276 This obligation 
applies in respect of both public and private bodies.277 Despite the inclusion of the best interests 
principle as a right under the CRC, it does not contain an explicit definition thereof. In General 
Comment 14, the CRC Committee explained that the principle is flexible, adaptable, and 
responsive, and should be determined in light of the circumstances of the individual child or 
group of children concerned.278 In this regard, the CRC Committee provided what Eekelaar 
and Tobin describe as a “non-exhaustive and non-hierarchical list” of elements that help 
determining the best interests of the child in a particular situation.279 These are: 
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“The child’s views; the child’s identity; preservation of the family environment and maintaining 
relations; care, protection and safety of the child; situation of vulnerability; the child’s right to health 
and the child’s right to education”.280 
 
Significantly, in General Comment 14, the CRC Committee indicated that children must be 
allowed to express their views on what would be in their best interest. However, the age and 
development of the child should be considered to establish how much influence a child’s views 
should have on what would be in their best interest.281 The CRC Committee further stated that 
children’s right to preserve their identity must be borne in mind when determining their best 
interest, with identity including characteristics such as sex and sexual orientation.282  
Article 3(1) further states that the best interests of the child “shall be a primary 
consideration”.283 The use of the phrase “shall be” does not afford states the discretion to decide 
whether or not to consider the child’s best interests – states are obligated to. Moreover, because 
the CRC provides that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration, “a larger 
weight must be attached to what serves the child best” where there is a conflict between the 
rights of the child and the rights of other persons.284 Significantly, the best interest of the child 
shall be a primary consideration, as opposed to it being the primary consideration. According 
to Vollmer, this means that there may be other factors that can overrule the best interests 
principle. The risk is that, in certain circumstances, this may lead to discrimination against 
children based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE.285  
In light of the above, it is relevant to note that the best interests principle has been criticised 
for allowing states to incorporate “cultural considerations … into their implementation of the 
rights recognized in the CRC, which could undermine the basic consensus reflecting those 
rights”.286 Although states are allowed to incorporate cultural considerations, it cannot overrule 
the rights guaranteed under the CRC and the norms established thereby.287 According to Alston 
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and Gilmour-Walsh, where cultural considerations conflict with human rights norms, human 
rights norms must prevail.288 Significantly, in General Comment 14, the CRC Committee stated 
that “the best interests of the child are to be the determining factor when taking a decision on 
adoption, but also on other issues”.289 In light hereof, there seems to be a move from the best 
interests of the child being a primary consideration, to it being the primary consideration.  
The CRC Committee has described the best interests principle as a threefold concept. It is 
(i) a substantive right; (ii) a fundamental, interpretative legal principle; and (iii) a rule of 
procedure.290 It is a substantive right in the sense that it imposes an intrinsic obligation on states 
to guarantee the best interests of the child in all matters concerning the child. Where there are 
conflicting interpretations of a legal provision, the interpretation that favours the best interests 
of the child must be followed. In this regard, the best interests principle is, therefore, a 
fundamental interpretative legal principle. The best interests principle is also a rule of 
procedure as it requires states to show “what has been considered to be in the child’s best 
interests; what criteria it is based on; and how the child’s interests have been weighed against 
other considerations”.291  
Related to the best interests principle is the obligation imposed on states under Article 3(2) 
to “ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being”. To this 
end, states have to take legislative, administrative and other measures. Although measures are 
subject to the state’s available resources, it still has to be effective and promote the purpose of 
the CRC.292 Unlike the best interests principle, “well-being” has not been defined and has also 
not featured much in academic writing. Ekelaar and Tobin argue that, at a minimum, “an 
outcome which is inconsistent with one of the rights under the Convention would be 
inconsistent with a child’s well-being”.293  
Article 3(2) also requires that states take into consideration the rights and duties of parents 
or legal guardians in ensuring children’s well-being. The aim here is to balance the 
responsibilities of the state towards children and the role of parents and guardians to care for 
their children.294 In certain instances, the view of the state and parents or guardians will conflict 
regarding what would be most favourable for the child’s well-being. Where a state’s views 
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conflict with those of parents or guardians, it should be determined whether it would be 
reasonable to infringe on the right of parents or guardians in the specific circumstances. In this 
regard, it must first be ascertained whether the views of the parents or guardians fall within the 
scope of their rights and duties in respect of their child. If it does, the state has to show that the 
“measure taken to secure child’s care and well-being was reasonable” [emphasis removed].295 
Reasonableness, in turn, requires that there exists a rational link between the measure adopted 
and the child’s well-being. Furthermore, there should not be a less restrictive means 
available.296 
Despite the importance of the best interests principle and the underlying obligation to ensure 
the well-being of the child, the CRC Committee has not referred to non-heteronormative 
SOGIE in this context. However, the CRC Committee has reiterated that the right of the child 
to have their best interests taken into consideration must be “interpreted and applied in all 
proceedings related to children”.297 As a result, the principle is arguably applicable to the right 
of the child to education, including not to be discriminated against based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE is the context of education.  
 
4 6 3 Non-discrimination 
Article 2(1) of the CRC provides that:  
 
“States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her 
parent's or legal guardian's … sex … or other status”. 
 
Article 2(1) is similar in wording to the ICCPR and the ICESCR.298  As such, it suffices to state 
that the CRC Committee has referred to discrimination as prohibiting unjustifiable differential 
treatment that restricts a child or group of children from enjoying rights guaranteed under the 
CRC.299 
As a point of departure, states must respect and ensure the rights of the child under the CRC 
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states to review existing policies and legislation to ensure compliance with the CRC.300 In this 
regard, the following principles should be taken into consideration: (i) non-discrimination; (ii) 
the best interests of the child; (iii) respect for the child’s right to life, survival, and development; 
and (iv) respect for the child’s views in all matters concerning them.301 
Article 2(1) also places an obligation on states to adopt special measures to realise the rights 
of vulnerable groups of children and to, ultimately, “diminish or eliminate conditions that cause 
discrimination”.302 In light hereof, it is clear that Article 2(1) not only requires states to simply 
prohibit discrimination in respect of the rights enshrined under the CRC, but also places an 
obligation on states to take “appropriate proactive measures … to ensure equal opportunities 
for all children”.303 Appropriate proactive measures include, but are not limited to, legislative 
changes, ensuring sufficient financial and administrative resources, as well as reviewing and 
adapting the school curriculum and environment to change discriminatory attitudes.304 
 Like the UDHR, ICCPR, and the ICESCR, the CRC also prohibits discrimination based on 
various listed grounds including “other status”. As a result, the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination present an open list. In General Comment 4, the CRC Committee stated that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited under the CRC.305 In General 
Comment 15, the CRC Committee added that discrimination based on gender identity is also 
prohibited.306 It has further reiterated the prohibition of discrimination on these grounds under 
the CRC in numerous concluding observations, indicating that states have to address 
stigmatisation, violence, and discrimination against children based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE in all contexts.307 
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4 6 4 Education 
4 6 4 1 Right to education 
Articles 28 and 29 of the CRC both concern the right to education. Whereas the former deals 
with the right to education, the latter deals with the aims thereof. Article 28(1) requires states 
to “recognize the right of the child to education” and that this be achieved “progressively and 
on the basis of equal opportunity”. To this end, Article 28(1) refers to obligations in respect of 
the different levels of education, mirroring those under the UDHR and the ICESCR.308 Relying 
on the discussion under 4 2 4 1 and 4 4 3 the analysis in this subsection does not consider each 
obligation, but rather considers the meaning of Article 28(1) and how it applies to children with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
According to Beiter, the formulation of Article 28(1) “entails instructions to the state rather 
than [an] actionable entitlement of the individual”.309 The progressive achievement of the right 
to education imposes positive and negative obligations on states. In this regard, states should 
ensure that nothing interferes with children’s right to education through repealing legislation 
and addressing administrative practices that allow or promote discrimination in education.310 
Furthermore, states have to draw from the 4-A scheme set forth by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Education.311 
The obligation to make education available based on equal opportunities requires that 
obstacles that inhibit access to education be removed.312 In light hereof, education must be 
adaptable to groups that are vulnerable to discrimination and that special policies are adopted 
to accommodate these groups.313 The CRC Committee has expressed concern over 
discrimination against vulnerable groups of children, such as children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE, explaining how it infringes on their right to an equal education. For 
example, in its concluding observation on Iran, the CRC Committee drew attention to children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE being harassed, bullied, or expelled “for failing to observe 
social expectations of femininity or masculinity” and recommended that such conduct be 
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prohibited, prevented and punished.314 Furthermore, in its concluding observation on Japan, 
the CRC Committee urged the state to strengthen human rights education to reduce and prevent 
discrimination against persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools, as well as in the 
larger society.315  
General Comment 20 considered the implementation of the rights of the child during 
adolescence. The CRC Committee explained that, as part of their rapid development, 
adolescents must negotiate dependence on their parents or guardians while also establishing an 
autonomous self.316 As a result, adolescents are particularly vulnerable to various societal 
pressures. Attention was further drawn to adolescence as a “source of discrimination” because 
adolescents are often “treated as incompetent and incapable of making decisions about their 
lives”.317 However, with reference to General Comment 12, the CRC Committee stressed that 
children’s evolving capacities must be taken into consideration when determining their best 
interests.318 In General Comment 20, the CRC Committee pointed to the importance of ending 
discrimination against adolescents in general but also indicated that states should focus on 
eliminating discrimination against groups that are vulnerable to discrimination based on their 
age, as well as their non-heteronormative SOGIE.319 In this regard, Article 28(1)(e) of the CRC 
is significant for requiring that states “[t]ake measures to encourage regular attendance at 
schools and the reduction of drop-out rates” because discrimination against children based on 
their non-heteronormative SOGIE has been connected to learners not completing their basic 
education. Considering this, the CRC Committee illustrates an understanding of multiple and 
intersecting grounds of discrimination and how it can exacerbate vulnerability.  
Moreover, Article 28 goes beyond providing the right to education. Article 28(2) refers to 
the use of school discipline and requires that states ensure that it is “administered in a manner 
consistent with the child's human dignity”. This provision is unique to the right to education 
under the CRC; it places strict limits on the types of discipline that can be used in schools and 
aims to promote non-violence.320 Article 28(2) is based on the understanding that corporal 
punishment and bullying in schools can constitute inhumane and degrading treatment and 
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infringes on the child’s right to human dignity.321 In this regard, General Comment 4 of the 
CRC Committee is of particular importance, urging states to: 
 
“[P]revent and prohibit all forms of violence and abuse, including sexual abuse, corporal punishment 
and other inhuman, degrading or humiliating treatment or punishment in school, by school personnel 
as well as among students”.322 
 
In light hereof, corporal punishment and bullying can also be viewed as infringing on the right 
of the child to be protected from “all forms of physical or mental violence”323 and to not be 
subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.324 Ultimately, the education 
environment should be such that all children can benefit equally from the opportunities offered 
by the right to education and contribute towards achieving the aims of education.  
 
4 6 4 2 Aims of education 
Closely related to Article 28 of the CRC, Article 29(1) provides the aims of education. In 
General Comment 1, the CRC Committee sets out the importance of the aims of education. 
These aims place an obligation on states to promote and protect the inherent dignity of the child 
and their equal and inalienable rights.325 States also have to take steps to ensure that the aims 
of education are reflected in the curriculum, as part of teacher-training, as well as in “education 
policies and legislation”.326 Importantly, the obligations imposed on states by Article 29(1) 
aims to establish a “balanced approach to education” that respects and values difference. As 
such, the CRC Committee has explained that these obligations should outweigh the 
“boundaries of religion, nation and culture”.327   
The aims under the CRC are similar to those set out under the UDHR and the ICESCR.328 
Article 29(1)(a) requires that education be directed to the full development of children’s 
“personality, talents and mental and physical abilities”. Thus, education should go beyond 
merely imparting knowledge. Rather, it should be “child-centred, child-friendly and 
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empowering”.329 The school environment should show and cultivate respect for the inherent 
dignity of children, and encourage them to express their views and participate in school life.330 
To this end, the CRC provides children with participation rights, which includes freedom of 
expression and association, as well as freedom of thought, conscience and religion.331 Article 
12(1) is of particular significance, providing children who are capable of forming views on 
matters that affect them with the right to express these views. However, the weight attached 
thereto will depend on the particular child’s age and maturity. In light hereof, a child-friendly 
education should be geared towards the “development of the individual child” in a manner that 
takes into consideration the child’s right to participate and influence their own development.332 
The CRC Committee’s concluding observation on North Korea further indicates that: 
 
“[Child-friendly schools are] based on the principles of creating healthy and protective environments 
for learning, inclusiveness and gender-sensitivity and establishing partnerships between schools and 
the community, to empower children and allow them to develop in a holistic manner”.333 
 
This observation should also be considered in the context of Articles 29(1)(b) and (d). Article 
29(1)(b) requires that education be directed towards developing “respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”. Article 29(1)(d) enhances this by adding that education should prepare 
children for a “responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance 
… and friendship among all peoples”.  
According to the CRC Committee, these two subsections require that human rights 
education be included at all levels of education.334 It has further explained that human rights 
education includes teaching children of the human rights enshrined in treaties, as well as that 
human rights be taught by example.335 In light hereof, the CRC Committee has condemned the 
“strong focus on ideological indoctrination” in the curriculum of North Korean schools, 
reiterating the aim of Article 29(1)(d).336 Ultimately, Article 29 requires that all derogatory 
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content be removed from the curriculum, as well as information that encourages violence or 
discrimination based on sex or religion.337  
The CRC adds two aims of education that do not appear in the UDHR or the ICESCR. 
Article 29(1)(c) requires that education should cultivate respect for diversity. More specifically, 
it states that education should be directed towards: 
 
“The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and 
values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he 
or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own”. 
 
Article 29(1)(c) has a dual function in prohibiting “degrading references to other states and 
cultures” while simultaneously imposing a “positive obligation to ensure that children develop 
some respect for such states and cultures”.338 This is confirmed in various concluding 
observations where the CRC Committee has encouraged states to include respect for diverse 
cultures and religions as part of its curriculum.339  
Significantly, Article 29 does not mention non-discrimination. However, the general 
prohibition of discrimination enshrined in under Article 2(1) of the CRC applies in respect of 
all rights contained therein, including the right to education. In General Comment 1, the CRC 
Committee explains that direct or indirect discrimination has the potential to undermine the 
right to education and offends the inherent dignity of the child. Furthermore, discrimination 
contradicts the developmental aim of education.340 The CRC Committee has also addressed the 
impact of intolerance on education and vice versa: whereas ignorance and a fear of difference 
exacerbate intolerance, an education that reflects the aims of Article 29(1) has the potential to 
combat it.341 Related hereto is the CRC Committee’s reference to the damaging effects of 
“gender stereotypes and patriarchal values” in General Comment 12.342 Although this 
statement was made in relation to the rights of the girl-child, Bucataru argues that the same 
reasoning can be applied to the rights of transgender children “because the same gender 
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stereotypes and heteronormative values place ‘severe limitations’ on their rights as well”.343 
This argument can be extended to include children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in general 
as the same logic applies.  
 
4 7 Yogyakarta Principles 
The YP was developed by the International Commission of Jurists and the International Service 
for Human Rights and was adopted in March 2007. Its purpose is to indicate how existing 
international human rights standards, like the ones discussed throughout this chapter, should 
be applied to protect persons from human rights violations based on their non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. The content of the YP is drawn primarily from the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the 
principles are formulated similarly to corresponding rights under international human rights 
treaties.344 Thus, it does not create new rights or new obligations, but “affirm binding 
international legal standards with which all States must comply”.345 Because the YP were 
developed with existing human rights law standards in mind, it has potential, as soft law, to 
shape the application of international human rights law to persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE.346  
The YP comprises of 29 principles, with the YP+10 adding an additional ten principles.347 
The general structure consists of a statement of an existing human right, followed by specific 
references as to how it should be applied in a manner that ensures that persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE are not discriminated against, as well as the state obligations required 
for its fulfilment. The additional principles provided in the YP+ 10 comprises of a combination 
of civil and political rights on the one hand, and social, economic, and cultural rights on the 
other. According to O’Flaherty, the YP are notable for including comprehensive legal 
obligations in relation to each right that are based on “well-established international law and 
practice”.348 These obligations require that states:  
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“(1) take all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to eradicate impugned 
practices; (2) take protection measures for those at risk; (3) ensure accountability of perpetrators and 
redress for victims; and (4) promote a human rights culture by means of education, training, and 
public awareness raising”.349 
 
Principle 1 of the YP confirms that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights” and that “[h]uman being of all sexual orientations and gender identities are entitled to 
the full enjoyment of all human rights”. Here, the YP mirrors equality and dignity as the 
foundation of the international human rights framework. Principle 2 concerns the rights to 
equality and non-discrimination and provides an explicit right to all persons to not be 
discriminated against based on their sexual orientation or gender identity in the exercise of their 
fundamental rights. This Principle further refers to the multiple intersecting forms of 
discrimination that people experience and indicates that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity are often “compounded by discrimination on other grounds, 
including gender, race, [and] age”. Throughout this chapter, it was illustrated that the treaty 
bodies under discussion have increasingly started interpreting the rights to dignity, equality, 
and non-discrimination in this way, without necessarily referring directly to the YP.  
 Principle 16 importantly indicates that all persons have the “right to education, without 
discrimination on the basis of, and taking into account, their sexual orientation and gender 
identity”. The recommendations refer to adopting measures to ensure the equal treatment of 
learners and staff, that the form and content of education “enhance understanding of and respect 
for, inter alia, diverse sexual orientations and gender identities”, and that learners are not 
bullied or harassed in the school environment based on their sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Similar approaches have been recommended by the general comments and concluding 
observations discussed in this chapter.   
The YP have been cited in the conclusions and recommendations of several of the Human 
Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Reviews as a source that states must consider in policy 
development.350 In General Comment 20, the CESCR cited the definitions of sexual orientation 
and gender identity provided in the YP in finding that the ICESCR’s prohibition of 
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discrimination based on “other status” includes discrimination based on both sexual orientation 
and gender identity.351 The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health also defined sexual orientation and 
gender identity with reference to the YP.352  
According to Brown, the YP constitute an accurate reflection of existing international 
law.353 As a result, the YP are “becoming a standard-setting document and the inspiration for 
a variety of efforts to combat sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in 
international law”.354 Thus, there is a clear indication that YP forms part of the international 
human rights discourse and influences the development and interpretation of rights by 
international human rights bodies. 
 
4 8 Concluding remarks 
The right to human dignity forms a framework for all international human rights norms. It 
communicates that all human beings are entitled to respect and concern based on being human. 
The international treaties discussed in this chapter are all founded on respect for human dignity. 
Respect for human dignity is, in turn, tied to equality. This chapter established that the right to 
equality demands non-discrimination. Where one person is treated as different to another, the 
situation warrants consideration as to the grounds behind this. The human rights treaties 
discussed all prohibit discrimination on listed grounds. It was shown that, although the non-
discrimination provisions of the treaties under discussion do not include an explicit reference 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, discrimination on these 
grounds are prohibited as a result of the open-ended nature of the formulation of the non-
discrimination provisions. The interpretation of the right to non-discrimination by the HRC, 
CESCR, the CEDAW Committee, the CRC Committee, as well as the by UN Special 
Rapporteurs, are explicit in their prohibition of discrimination based on non-heteronormative 
SOGIE.  
This chapter set out the right to education under international treaty law. The essence of the 
right is that all persons have a right to education. The right to education places an obligation 
on states to take steps to realise this right. Because all persons have the right to education, this 
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right accrues to all without discrimination. Discrimination includes all the grounds of 
discrimination prohibited under international law. As stated, discrimination based on non-
heteronormative SOGIE is established as a prohibited ground of discrimination under 
international human rights law. Thus, all persons are entitled to the right to education without 
discrimination based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. Not being discriminated against in 
the context of education requires education to be tolerant of and celebrate differences amongst 
learners. This requires human rights education, as well as comprehensive sexual education that 
covers a wide range of sexual orientations and gender identities. It also requires that learners 
not be exposed to inhumane or degrading treatment in the context of education, which includes 
bullying and stigmatisation based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. Ultimately, 
discrimination impairs the right to education as it prevents children from benefitting from the 
aims of education. The aims of education are tied to the full development of the child. In this 
regard, education must be child-centred, child-friendly and empowering, allowing children to 
express their views and explore their identity.  
The right of the child to have their best interests be a primary consideration in all matters 
concerning them is tied to the right to education as it must be interpreted and applied in all 
proceedings related to children. The best interests principle requires consideration of what 
serves the child best in a particular situation. The right to education is fundamental to the 
development of children who can participate in their communities and can contribute to the 
broader human rights project of tolerance and friendship amongst all peoples, as envisaged 
under the UDHR. Because children spend a substantial amount of time in educational 
institutions, the environment of these institutions is integral to ensuring that all children can 
equally benefit from the right to education. In the context of education, it is in the best interest 
of the child to not be discriminated against based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE, as this 
enables them to an equal right to education, as envisaged under international human rights law. 
Ultimately, “[a]ffirming the best interests of each child, and gradually equal rights of each 
child, has reversed the premises for decision-making – it is the school which has to adapt to the 
child, not the other way around”.355 
The international human rights treaties analysed in this chapter arguably contextualises the 
regional human rights treaties, explored under chapters 5-7. Not only did the UN treaties 
influence the formulation of the rights enshrined under the regional instruments, but the work 
 





of the UN treaty bodies also continues to significantly affect the interpretation of regional 
provisions. This is particularly true when considering the right to human dignity, non-
discrimination, education, and the best interests principle. Chapter 5 puts forth an analysis of 
the ECHR, ESC, and ESC(r). Although younger than the inter-American human rights system, 
the European Committee of Social Rights (“ECSR”) and, particularly, the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) development of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE precedes that of the inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”). As such, it is 




5 The right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
European regional human rights law 
5 1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present the interpretation of the right to human dignity, non-
discrimination and education under the ECHR, the ESC and the ESC(r), as the human rights 
instruments of the Council of Europe. To this end, the work of the ECtHR and the ECSR are 
considered.  
The analysis departs from the assumption that, in its diverse formulation of these rights, the 
ECHR, ESC, and the ESC(r) protects the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
in general. Corresponding to the approach of chapter 4 it is similarly argued that this protection 
extends to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE and should therefore inform their right 
to education. This argument is supported by the ECtHR and ECSR’s increasing implicit 
incorporation of tenets of queer theory and queer legal theory.1 Despite not explicitly 
mentioning these theories, the argument put forward is that the ECtHR and the ECSR 
appreciate that an essentialist perspective of sexualities conflicts with the inherent human 
dignity of all persons and their right to be accepted.2  
 
5 2 Overview of the European human rights system 
5 2 1 Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949.3 Its purpose is to unify its members in protecting 
and promoting its mutual ideals, as well as assisting in creating a platform for economic and 
social growth.4 To date, the Council of Europe has 47 Member States.5 The Council of Europe 
has three overarching aims, being the promotion of the rule of law, democracy, and human 
rights.6 Its human rights mandate, which aims to promote and protect human rights and ensure 
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social rights, is most relevant to the current discussion.7 The ECHR and ESC were adopted 
under the auspices of the Council of Europe to give binding legal force to the rights enshrined 
under the UDHR.8 As such, these treaties are central to the human rights mandate of the Council 
of Europe. Despite the individual importance of these treaties, the ECHR is nonetheless 
perceived as the “cornerstone of all Council of Europe activities” and thus overshadows the 
ESC.9 This can be attributed to ratification of the ECHR as a prerequisite for Council of Europe 
membership.10  
 
5 2 2 Human rights treaties of the Council of Europe 
5 2 2 1 European Convention of Human Rights 
The ECHR does not present a closed list of rights and freedoms. To date, six Protocols 
supplement its substantive provisions.11 Protocol 1 is the most significant Protocol for purposes 
of this research, as it enshrines the right to education – a social right.12 Despite the initial 
emphasis on civil and political rights, limited economic, social, and cultural rights have been 
incorporated over time.13 Because Protocols add or amend rights enshrined in the ECHR or 
procedures of the ECtHR, separate ratification of each Protocol is required.14  
The ECHR created with it the European Commission of Human Rights (“ECmHR”) and the 
ECtHR.15 The ECmHR was dissolved in 1998 with the adoption of Protocol 11, which 
restructured the ECtHR.16 The restructured ECtHR has jurisdiction over “all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto” and 
hears inter-state cases, as well as individual petitions.17 The ECtHR is empowered to grant 
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Rights: A Commentary (2015) 11-25. 
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remedies to injured parties18 and has to give reasons for its judgments or where it renders an 
application admissible or inadmissible.19  
The ECtHR emphasises a teleological approach in their interpretation of the ECHR.20 The 
object and purpose of the ECHR is to protect the human rights of all persons and to maintain 
democratic values that promote “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness”.21 When 
interpreting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR, the ECtHR should, therefore, 
favour an interpretation that gives effect to its object and purpose.22 In this regard, the ECtHR 
should take into account that the ECHR is a living instrument that should be read as whole and 
interpreted in the context of changing conditions.23 However, the ECtHR may, importantly, 
depart from its previous interpretation where it “reflects societal changes and remains in line 
with present day conditions”.24 As such, the ECtHR emphasises a dynamic interpretation, one 
that effectively protects the rights and freedoms guaranteed.25  
In deciding the merits of an application, the ECtHR must determine a fair balance between 
the conflicting interests of the individual or group and the general public.26 Deciding in favour 
of the general public means that the individual or group’s rights are limited, and vice versa. To 
ensure the effective protection of the rights guaranteed, the ECtHR has established that a 
limitation of rights will only be justified where it is prescribed by law and is reasonable and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved. In this regard, it also considers state 
practice in determining the fairness of a restriction.27 The margin of appreciation doctrine is 
central to this.  
Harris et al explain that this doctrine means that states have some discretion when deciding 
on the administrative, judicial, or legal action that it wants to take to give effect to or limit a 
 
18 Article 41. 
19 Articles 44-45 
20 See the text to part 3 6. 
21 Soering v United Kingdom Application 14038/88 (7 July 1989) para 87; Handyside v United Kingdom 
Application 5493/72 (7 December 1976) para 49. See also, Harris et al (2014) 7-8. 
22 Wemhoff v Germany Application 2122/64 (27 June 1968) para 8. See also, Harris DJ Harris, M O’Boyle, E 
Bates & C Buckley Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2014) 8. 
23 Tyrer v United Kingdom Application 5856/72 (25 April 1978) para 31.  
24 Cosey v United Kingdom Application 10843/84 (27 September 1990) para 35; Christine Goodwin v United 
Kingdom Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002) para 74: The ECtHR reformulated the approach adopted in Cossey, 
stating that “it is in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that [the ECtHR] 
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases”. See also, Harris et al (2014) 
21. 
25 Harris et al Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 18; Schabas The European Convention on 
Human Rights 33. See also, Artico v Italy Application 6694/74 (13 May 1980) para 33; Application 14038/88 (7 
July 1989) para 87. 
26 Application 14038/88 (7 July 1989) para 89. 




right. However, this discretion remains “subject to European supervision”.28 The margin of 
appreciation doctrine exists because states often have a better understanding of whether a 
pressing social need necessitates the challenged restriction.29 However, the margin of 
appreciation afforded to a state is contextual. It will be wide where, for example, the issue 
concerns the protection of public morals or raises sensitive moral or ethical issues. The margin 
afforded to states will also be wide where there is no consensus amongst Council of Europe 
members regarding the importance of the interest at risk or how to best protect it.30 In contrast, 
it will be narrow where “a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity 
is at stake”.31 The application of this doctrine is discussed in detail in part 5 3 2 1 in relation to 
the prohibition of discrimination, as well as in part  5 3 2 2 concerning the right to respect for 
private life. Against this backdrop, it is important to note the significance of the adoption of 
Protocol 15. Once it comes into force, it will add a new recital to the Preamble, incorporating 
the margin of appreciation doctrine in the ECHR.32 
 
5 2 2 2 European Social Charter and Revised Social Charter 
The ESC was adopted in 1961 as the standard-setting economic and social rights charter of the 
Council of Europe. Evju explains that the ESC protects three categories of rights: (i) worker’s 
rights; (ii) rights pertaining to social cohesion and the general population; and (iii) rights for 
the protection for vulnerable groups.33 In this sense, it does not mirror the ICESCR.34 
Part 1 declares that states parties to the ESC will pursue, through all appropriate means, the 
conditions for the effective realisation of the rights contained therein.35 Part 1 is not binding 
but can add interpretive value to the rights enshrined under Part 2.36 Part 2 is binding insofar 
 
28 Harris et al Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 14. 
29 Application 5493/72 (7 December 1976) para 48. 
30 Evans v United Kingdom Application 6339/05 (10 April 2007) para 77. See also, Application 28957/95 (11 July 
2002) para 85; Harris et al Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 14. 
31 Application 6339/05 (10 April 2007) para 77. 
32 Article 1 of Protocol No 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted 24 June 2013) CETS 213: The envisaged amendment provides that states “have the primary 
responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in 
doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights established by this Convention”. 
33 S Evju “The European Social Charter – Instruments and Procedures” (2007) 25 Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Menneskerettigheter 61-62.  
34 See the text to part 4 4. 
35 Introduction to Part 1 of the ESC. 
36 O de Schutter “The Two Lives of the European Social Charter” in J Carlier, O De Schutter & M Verdussen 




as states choose to be bound. This is because the ESC follows an a la carte approach.37 In 
comparison, the ECHR binds Member States to all its provisions, unless a reservation in respect 
of a particular provision is deposited.38 
Article 25 of the ESC created the Committee of Experts, now known as the ECSR. Articles 
21 to 24 require that Member States submit reports outlining their compliance with the ESC.39 
The ECSR examines these reports and publishes conclusions outlining whether states are 
compliant with the ESC.40 If not, states must legislate or adapt existing legislation and practices 
to bring it in line with the ESC.41 Similar to the ECHR in respect of the ECtHR’s judgments, 
the Committee of Ministers is responsible for ensuring compliance with the conclusions of the 
ECSR. Once the ECSR has adopted its annual conclusions, the Committee adopts a resolution 
in which it can make individual recommendations to states.42 Furthermore, where a state is in 
non-compliance with a conclusion, the Committee is authorised to adopt a recommendation, 
requesting the state to address its shortcomings.43  
As a result of its a la carte approach and the fact that the oversight of its implementation 
was limited to the publication of annual reports, the Council of Europe deemed the ESC and 
the ECSR as inefficient. Thus, a process was launched in November 1990 to “breathe new life 
into the European Social Charter and to re-establish the Council of Europe in setting human 
rights standards for the European continent”.44 This process resulted in two significant 
developments: (i) the adoption of a Revised European Social Charter in 1996; and (ii) the 
adoption of the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of 
 
37 Article 20(1) of the ESC. States have to bind themselves to a total of 10 articles or 45 numbered paragraphs, as 
well as to at least 5 of 7 core provisions 
38 Article 57(1) of the ECHR. 
39 Council of Europe “Governmental Committee of the European Social Charter – New system for the presentation 
of reports on the application of the European Social Charter” (3 May 2006) CM (2006)53: As of 2007, member 
states report annually on one of four thematic groups of rights contained in the ESC. Thus, state compliance in 
respect of each right is reviewed once every 4 years. These groups are: (i) employment, training and equal 
opportunities; (ii) health, social security and social protection; (iii) labour rights; and (iv) children, families, 
migrants. 
40 Article 27(1) of the ESC. 
41 Council of Europe “Follow-up of the Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights by the 
Committee of Ministers” Council of Europe <https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/follow-up-by-
the-governmental-committee-of-the-european-social-charter-and-the-european-code-of-social-security> 
(accessed 20-01-2010) 
42 Article 29 of the ESC. 
43 Council of Europe “Follow-up of the Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights by the 
Committee of Ministers” Council of Europe.  
44 De Schutter “The Two Lives of the European Social Charter” in The European Social Charter 12. See also, 
Para 2 of the Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System 




Collective Complaints (“Collective Complaints Protocol”) in 1995 to complement the state 
reporting procedure.45 
The ESC(r) came into force in 1998 and does not replace the ESC. It contains the same 
guarantees that are listed in Part 2 of the ESC but reformulated in some instances. Thus, the 
ESC(r) enhances the rights protected under the ESC.46 For purposes of this chapter, the most 
significant changes to the ESC are the reformulation of the right to education enshrined under 
Article 17 of the ESC(r) and the inclusion of an explicit prohibition of discrimination under 
Article E.47  
The structure of the ESC(r) is the same as the ESC. Similar to the ESC, the ESC(r) too 
follows an a la carte approach.48 Because the ESC(r) does not replace the ESC, states which 
have ratified the ESC, but not the ESC(r), remain bound to the former. However, where states 
have ratified the ESC(r), its undertakings in terms thereof supersede those under the ESC. 
States can simultaneously be bound by some provisions of the ESC and the ESC(r). This means 
that where states ratified some provisions of the ESC(r), but not those that correspond to similar 
provisions under the ESC, it will remain bound by the ESC in this respect.49  
Member states to the ESC(r), like those to the ESC, also have to submit reports to the ECSR. 
Significantly, the Collective Complaints Protocol is incorporated in Article D(2) of the ESC(r). 
Thus, Member States to the ESC(r) do not have to make a separate declaration in this regard. 
The Collective Complaints Protocol provides a mechanism through which certain organisations 
may submit written complaints to the ECSR regarding the alleged non-compliance of a member 
state with provisions of the ESC that they are bound by.50 The nature of collective complaints 
means that no individual matters may be submitted.51 This approach is distinguishable from 
the ECtHR which allows both individual and inter-state complaints. A further difference 
between the ECHR and the ESC is that under the latter, domestic remedies do not have to be 
exhausted for a matter to be brought to the ECSR.52  
In its consideration of compliance with the provisions of the ESC and the ESC(r), the ECSR 
undertakes an interpretive role. Like the ECtHR, the ECSR follows a teleological approach to 
 
45 (adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 5 May 1998) CETS 163; (adopted 9 November 1995, entered into 
force 1 July 1998) CETS 158. 
46 De Schutter “The Two Lives of the European Social Charter” in The European Social Charter 14. 
47 See the text to part 5 5. 
48 Article A(1)(b)-(c) of the ESC(r). Member States have to bind themselves to a total of 16 articles or 63 numbered 
paragraphs, as well as to at least 6 out of 9 core provisions. 
49 Article B. 
50 See Article 1 of the Collective Complaints Protocol. See also, Articles 2 and 4. 
51 Para 31 of the Explanatory Report to the Collective Complaints Protocol. 




interpretation, as set out in the Vienna Convention. The Preamble of the ESC provides that the 
purpose thereof is to facilitate economic and social progress and to promote the social well-
being of the urban and rural populations of its Member States without discrimination. It also 
refers to the ECHR and its role in the promotion of civil and political rights. The Preamble to 
the ESC(r) is similar to the ESC. Importantly, in International Federation of Human Rights 
Leagues v France53, ECSR has noted that “[h]uman dignity is the fundamental value and indeed 
the core of positive European human rights law”.54 Thus, human dignity should frame the 
interpretation of all ESC and ESC(r) provisions. 
In FIDH v France the ECSR set out the most important principles to the interpretation of 
the ESC and the ESC(r). First, the ESC complements the ECHR. In this regard, Khaliq and 
Churchill draw attention to that the ECSR also takes interpretative guidance from the ECtHR. 
Thus, where the ECHR contains a similar provision, the ECSR aims to interpret it in line with 
the approach of the ECtHR.55 Second, according to the ECSR, the ESC and ESC(r) are: 
 
“[L]iving human rights instrument[s] dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, 
autonomy, equality and solidarity … Thus, the Charter[s] must be interpreted so as to give life and 
meaning to fundamental social rights.56  
 
In Defence for Children International v Belgium57, the ECSR explained that a teleological 
approach requires that the interpretation that is most appropriate to realising and promoting the 
aims objectives of the ESC(r) should be followed. Thus, rights should be made effective 
through the enactment of national legislation and the implementation of policies.58 
 
5 3 European Convention on Human Rights 
5 3 1 Human dignity as an underlying value 
Unlike the international treaties discussed in chapter 4, the ECHR does not refer to human 
dignity in its Preamble or enshrine it as an explicit right in a substantive provision.59 The 
 
53 Complaint 14/2003(8 September 2004) (“FIDH v France”) para 31. 
54 Para 31. 
55 U Khaliq & R Churchill “The European Committee of Social Rights: Putting flesh on the bare bones of the 
European Social Charter” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and 
comparative law (2008) 435. 
56 Complaint 14/2003(8 September 2004) paras 27 and 29; World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v 
Portugal Complaint 20/2003 (7 December 2004) para 34. 
57 Complaint 69/2011 (23 October 2012) (“DCI v Belgium”) para 30.  
58 International Commission of Jurists v Portugal Complaint 1/1998 (9 September 1999) para 32.  
59 See the text to parts 4 2 2, 4 3 1, 4 4 1, and 4 5 1. See also, Preamble of Protocol No 13 to the European 




travaux préparatoires of the ECHR do not explain the reason behind the lack of reference to 
human dignity.60 Costa considers this absence surprising given that the rights guaranteed in the 
ECHR are similar to those of the UDHR. However, he explains that it might be a result of its 
“practical, pragmatic, and mechanism-oriented” nature, being to settle alleged violations of its 
provisions through the ECtHR.61 Despite the lack of an explicit reference to human dignity, the 
ECtHR has nonetheless referred extensively thereto in finding violations of rights enshrined in 
the ECHR.  
The ECtHR referred to human dignity as a requirement of judicial fairness,62 in determining 
the standard of detention conditions63 and in declaring corporal punishment as unlawful.64 It 
has further been held that racial discrimination can constitute degrading treatment, insofar as it 
negates the human dignity of the victim.65 The ECtHR’s judgments pertaining to the human 
dignity of children and persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are of particular relevance.  
DMD v Romania66 concerned an allegation that the ill-treatment of the applicant-child 
violated Article 3 of the ECHR, which enshrines the right to not be subjected to “inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”.67 In determining whether there was a violation, the 
ECtHR focused on the best interests of the child and their right to human dignity as the 
foundation for protecting children against ill-treatment.68 In this regard, attention was also 
drawn to children as a vulnerable group who require special measures of protection. 
Concerning human dignity as the underlying value of the CRC, the ECtHR held that respect 
for the dignity of the child requires that children grow up in an environment conducive to their 
development. As such, violence against children must be condemned and states “should strive 
to expressly and comprehensively protect children’s dignity”.69 The approach adopted by the 
ECtHR in this matter confirms that the best interests of the child principle, further discussed in 
 
Circumstances (adopted; entered into force 1 July 2003) CETS 187: The purpose of Protocol 13 is to protect the 
right to life contained in Article 2 of the ECHR as a basic value of democratic societies. In its Preamble, protection 
of the right to life is connected to “the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings”. 
60 Schabas The European Convention on Human Rights 66. 
61 J Costa “Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” in C McCrudden (ed) 
Understanding Human Dignity (2013) 393 394. 
62 Greece v United Kingdom Application 176/56 (26 September 1958). 
63 Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia Applications 32541/08; 43441/08 (17 July 2014); X v Turkey Application 
24626/09 (9 October 2012); Van der Ven v Netherlands Application 50901/99 (4 February 2003); Kalashnikov v 
Russia Application 47095/99 (15 July 2002); Kudla v Poland Application 30210/96 (26 October 2000). 
64 Tyrer v United Kingdom Application 5856/72 (25 April 1978). 
65 Cyprus v Turkey Application 25781/94 (10 May 2001). 
66 Application 23022/13 (3 October 2017). 
67 Paras 5 and 36. 
68 Para 49. 




part 5 3, is integral to the interpretation of the ECHR insofar as the rights of the child are 
implicated. More importantly, human dignity is established as central to the development and 
protection against ill-treatment of the child.  
Pretty v United Kingdom70 is a significant judgment, as the ECtHR for the first time held 
that the “respect for human dignity and human freedom” lies at the core of the ECHR.71 Like 
in DMD v Romania, the ECtHR in Pretty considered human dignity in its interpretation of what 
constitutes degrading treatment. It held that: 
 
“Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, 
his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an 
individual's moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within 
the prohibition of Article 3”.72 
 
Based on this statement, the inherent human dignity of each person requires that they be treated 
in a manner that does not cause fear or humiliation. Rather, individuals should be treated with 
respect and concern for their being. In this regard, the ECtHR further established a link between 
human dignity and the right of individuals to respect for their private life, stating that private 
life includes the “physical and psychological integrity of a person”.73 Reading the right to 
private life in light of the underlying value of respect for human dignity, therefore, requires 
that “aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity … such as, for example, gender 
identification, name and sexual orientation” be embraced.74  
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom75 concerned an application by a gender affirmed 
transgender women, declaring that the state’s lack of provision for legal gender recognition, 
and the resulting discrimination and humiliation suffered, infringed on various rights enshrined 
in the ECHR.76 The ECtHR had to determine whether the right to respect for private life 
imposes a positive obligation on the state to provide for legal gender recognition.77 To this end, 
the existence of uniform state practice had to be considered, as well as the balancing of the 
applicant’s interests against those of the general public.78  
 
70 Application 2346/02 (19 April 2002) (“Pretty”) 
71 Para 65. 
72 Para 52. 
73 Para 61. 
74 Para 61. 
75 Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002) (“Goodwin”). 
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With regard to the existence of uniform state practice, reference was made to the rejection 
of previous similar claims.79 However, in reiterating the object and purpose of the ECHR, the 
ECtHR indicated that consideration must be had to changing conditions and practices to 
determine the interpretation that would promote the most effective protection of human 
rights.80 It discussed the increasing allowance in Council of Europe Member States of legal 
recognition after gender reassignment, as well as the “continuing international trend towards 
[post-operative] legal recognition”.81  
In weighing up the applicant’s interests against those of the general public, the ECtHR cited 
Pretty, reiterating that respect for human dignity and human freedom is the essence of the 
ECHR. Reading human dignity with the right to respect for private life means that the “right 
of [transgender persons] to personal development and to physical and moral security in the full 
sense enjoyed by others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy”.82 This 
statement was later developed in XY v Turkey.83 Here, the ECtHR again drew attention to 
human dignity as the essence of the ECHR, stating that it requires that transgender person’s 
right to development and security be guaranteed.84 
The state in Goodwin could not show that post-operative legal gender recognition would be 
detrimental to the public interest. In comparison, the applicant suffered humiliation and 
discrimination as a result of her birth certificate reflecting that she was a man, including 
ostracisation in the workplace and being unable to claim a state pension at the retirement age 
for women.85 The state’s failure to afford her post-operative legal gender recognition resulted 
in continuous undignified treatment. As a result, it was held that “society may reasonably be 
expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and 
worth”.86 
The approach adopted in Goodwin is similar to the interpretation of human dignity under 
the UDHR:87 transgender persons should be afforded the same rights and to the same extent as 
other individuals. This a restatement of the notion that all persons are entitled to equal rights 
 
79 Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002) para 73. See also, Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom Applications 
22985/93 and 23390/94 (20 July 1998); X Y and Z v United Kingdom Application 21830/93 (22 April 1997); 
Cossey v United Kingdom Application 10843/84 (27 September 1990); Rees v United Kingdom Application 
9532/81 (17 October 1986). 
80 Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002) para 75. 
81 Para 84. 
82 Para 90. 
83 Application 14793/08 (10 March 2015). 
84 Para 58. 
85 Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002) paras 12-19. 
86 Para 90. 




as a result of their inherent human dignity. Similarly, the ECtHR also ties human dignity to the 
individual’s right to development, and the right to not be subject to treatment that negates the 
individual’s self-worth. Thus, human dignity has been established as an underlying value of 
the ECHR.  
 
5 3 2 Non-discrimination 
5 3 2 1 Defining discrimination under Article 14 
In 1949, the International Council of the European Movement adopted the first draft of the 
ECHR. This draft included the prohibition of discrimination based on “religion, race, national 
origin or political or other opinion”.88 The importance of the right to non-discrimination was 
discussed at various meetings at the Council of Europe, with an increasing focus on the 
inclusion of other prohibited grounds such as sex.89 Article 14 is identical to Article 2 of the 
UDHR insofar as its prohibited grounds of discrimination are concerned.90 Article 14 provides 
that: 
 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.91 
 
The purpose of Article 14 is to ensure that the rights enshrined in the ECHR and its Protocols 
are guaranteed without discrimination. According to Gerards, the guiding principle of Article 
14 is that no person should be “excluded from important social goods” and that all persons 
“should be able to take part in public life on an equal footing”.92 The prohibition of 
discrimination is, therefore, integral to each of the provisions in the ECHR and its Protocols. 
This means that similar to the ICESCR and the CRC, Article 14 is not a free-standing right.93 
 
88 Schabas The European Convention on Human Rights 557. See also, Council of Europe “Preparatory work on 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (9 May 1967) CDH (67) 3 3. 
89 Schabas The European Convention on Human Rights 557-561. 
90 However, Article 14 goes further than Article 2, prohibiting discrimination based on “association with a national 
minority”. 
91 Article 14 of the ECHR. 
92 J Gerards “Prohibition of Discrimination” in P van Dijk, F van Hoof, A van Rijn & L Zwaak (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 5ed (2018) 997 997. 
93 See the text to parts 4 3 2 1, 4 4 2, 4 5 2, and 4 6 4 2. Because CEDAW focuses on the elimination of 
discrimination against women, discrimination underlies all the rights enshrines therein. There is no separate right 
to discrimination to invoke. With regard to the ICCPR, discrimination itself constitutes a violation, as was found 
in Young v Australia. However, considering the decisions of the HRC discussed, applicants tend to claim a 




Rather, it prohibits discrimination in relation to the rights enshrined in the ECHR. As such, a 
complaint of discrimination must be attached to a right. However, what sets the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR apart, is that a violation of Article 14 can be found without a violation of the 
substantive right invoked.94 Weiwei, with reference to European Commission of Human Rights 
v Belgium,95 explains that: 
 
“[It is not] necessary to show an actual breach of one of the substantive rights. For example, a right 
may justifiably be restricted under one of the specified headings, but would amount to a breach of 
Article 14 if the restriction were applied in a discriminatory way”.96 
 
However, in the judgments discussed below, this did not occur. What happens more often is 
that once a violation of the substantive provision is found, the ECtHR does not consider the 
right to discrimination read with the substantive right. This is evident in the judgments 
discussed in part 5 3 2 2.  
In determining whether there has been a violation of Article 14 read with a substantive 
provision of the ECHR, the first step is to determine whether the complaint of differential 
treatment falls within the scope of a protected right. Once this has been established, the second 
step is to consider whether there has been discrimination and whether the reason for the 
discrimination is based on one of the listed grounds of Article 14.97 
Discrimination refers to where persons in comparable situations are treated differently or 
where persons whose situations are vastly different are treated the same.98 Thus, the ECtHR 
has adopted a substantive understanding of discrimination whereby the circumstances of each 
individual applicant are taken into consideration. Discrimination can be direct or indirect.99 
This approach corresponds to the interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination under the 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, and the CRC.100 
 
94 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium Application 4464/70 (27 October 1975) para 44; European 
Commission of Human Rights v Belgium Applications 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 
(23 July 1968) (“Belgian Linguistics”) para B-9. 
95 Applications 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 (23 July 1968). 
96 L Weiwei “Equality and Non-Discrimination Under International Human Rights Law” in BA Andreassen 
Research Notes 03/2004 (2004) 1 189. See also, Applications 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 
2126/64 (23 July 1968) para B-9. 
97 B Rainey, E Wicks & C Ovey The European Convention on Human Rights 7ed (2017) 641-642. 
98 DH v Czech Republic Application 57325/00 (13 November 2007) para 175; Thlimmenos v Greece Application 
34369/97 (6 April 2000) para 44. 
99 See, Gerards “Prohibition of Discrimination” in Theory and Practice 1005; Application 57325/00 (13 
November 2007) para 175. See also, Oršuš v Croatia Application 15766/03 (16 March 2010) para 150. 




Article 14 imposes both negative and positive obligations on states. Thus, states should not 
only refrain from discriminating against persons in guaranteeing their rights under the ECHR 
but should also take steps to prevent and address discrimination.101 In determining whether 
discrimination exists, the question is whether the complainant is in a similar or analogous 
position to the group compared to. If not, there can be no discrimination. However, if the 
complainant is in a similar or analogous position, discrimination exists.102 In this regard, it is 
significant that the ECtHR in Çam v Turkey103 explained that reasonable accommodation 
informs Article 14.104 Reasonable accommodation requires states to make the “necessary and 
appropriate modification and adjustments” in applying the law to ensure that it does not impose 
“a disproportionate or undue burden” on certain groups of individuals.105 This is explored in 
more detail in part 5 3 3.  
Article 14 provides an open-ended list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. The use of 
the terms “such as … or other status” indicates that Article 14 presents an illustrative, rather 
than a non-exhaustive list.106 In this regard, the ECtHR in Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen 
v Denmark107 held that “other status” in Article 14 refers to discrimination based on “personal 
characteristic (“status”) by which persons or groups of persons are distinguishable from each 
other”.108 The case law discussed below shows how the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 has been utilised to adopt a wide interpretation of “other status” to prohibit 
discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Once the applicant has shown that there is discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the 
state to prove that it is justifiable. In matters concerning indirect discrimination, the applicant 
must establish a prima facie case before the burden of proof shifts to the state.109 For differential 
treatment to be justifiable, it must be provided for in law and pursue a legitimate aim that is 
necessary in a democratic society.110 As discussed in part 5 2 2 1, this requires balancing 
individual interests against that of the broader public. 
 
101 Identoba v Georgia Application 73235/12 (12 May 2015) para 63. 
102 Gerards “Prohibition of Discrimination” in Theory and Practice 1014. 
103 Application 51500/08 (23 February 2016). 
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106 Engel v Netherlands Applications 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (8 June 1976) para 72. See 
also, Carson v United Kingdom Application 42184/05 (16 March 2010) para 70. 
107 Applications 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72 (7 December 1976) (“Kjelsden”). 
108 Para 56. 
109 DH v Czech Republic Application 57325/00 (13 November 2007) paras 177-178. 
110 Norris v Ireland Application 10581/83 (26 October 1988) para 39. See also, Taddeucci and McCall v Italy 
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Where differential treatment is based on a “suspect” ground, a strict test of justification 
applies. This means that “particularly weighty and convincing” reasons should be presented.111 
According to Gerards, “suspect” grounds “relate to personal characteristics salient to 
vulnerable, stigmatised groups, or to groups who have for a long time been subject to 
discrimination”.112 However, even in the presence of “suspect” grounds, the ECtHR will 
nonetheless consider the existence of uniform state practice and the nature of the right 
concerned in determining the margin of appreciation, discussed in 5 2 2 1, that should be 
afforded to states in a particular matter. 
In relation to the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE, it is significant that 
the ECtHR is attaching increasing value to international legal developments and democratic 
ideals when weighing up the interests of the public with that of the individual. In this regard, 
Article 8 has been instrumental in establishing non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination, without the ECtHR finding a separate violation of Article 14.113  
 
5 3 2 2 Role of Article 8 in establishing non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds 
of discrimination 
Since the start of the ECHR’s drafting process, there was a call to include the rights that arise 
from “marriage and paternity”, as well as those related to the family and the “sanctity of the 
home”.114 In speaking of the reason behind this, Teitgen recalls that in the then recent-past, in 
certain countries, people of certain races or religions were not afforded the right to marry and 
children were subordinated “to the benefit of the state”.115 According to the drafting committee: 
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112 Gerards “Prohibition of Discrimination” in Theory and Practice 1019. 
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“[If] the father of a family cannot be an independent citizen, cannot feel free within his own country, 
if he is menaced in his own home and if, every day, the State steals from his soul, or the conscience 
of his children”.116 
 
These statements communicate the importance of individual independence and the sacredness 
of private life to the drafters of the ECHR. The drafters drew inspiration from the UDHR and 
ultimately modelled Article 8 of the ECHR on Articles 12 and 29(2) of the UDHR.117 Article 
8 provides that: 
 
 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”.118 
 
The reference to respect for the private life of the individual in Article 8(1) is relevant to the 
current discussion. Private life may not be interfered with unless it is justified under Article 
8(2). Thus, Article 8(2) contains is own limitations clause. Like the grounds of justification 
established in the case of Article 14, an interference has to be provided for in law and be 
necessary in a democratic society. In this regard, the interests of the individual will have to be 
weighed against that of the general public. 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom119 is a landmark case under Article 8, as it is the first case in 
which a violation of the right to respect for private life was found as a result of discrimination 
based on the applicant’s non-heteronormative sexual orientation. The applicant argued that the 
criminalisation of homosexual sexual activities in Northern Ireland infringed on his right to 
respect for his private life and caused him “fear, suffering and psychological distress”.120 The 
 
116 Report of the Sitting of the Consultative Assembly (7 September 1949). See also, Schabas The European 
Convention on Human Rights 361. 
117 Schabas The European Convention on Human Rights 359; Article 12 of the UDHR provides that: “No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon 
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”. 
Article 29(2) of the UDHR provides that: “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society”. 
118 Article 8 of the ECHR. 
119 Application 7525/76 (22 October 1981) (“Dudgeon”). 




ECtHR found that there was a violation of the applicant’s private life, establishing that an 
individual’s sexual life forms part of his private life.121  
The justification presented by the state was that the legislation in question was necessary in 
a democratic society as it was aimed at safeguarding moral interests.122 According to the 
ECtHR, in order for an interference to be necessary in a democratic society, there has to exist 
a pressing social need. In this regard, states have a certain margin of appreciation in 
determining what it deems to be a pressing social need. However, because an individual’s 
sexual life “concerns a most intimate aspect of private life”, the state has to present “particularly 
serious reasons” to justify an interference.123 Considering tolerance and broadmindedness as 
hallmarks of democratic societies, it was held that negative social attitudes towards male 
homosexual persons and the government’s fear of eroding moral standards do not present 
reasonable justifications for the extent of the interference with the applicant’s private life.124  
The ECtHR’s approach in Dudgeon was confirmed in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom125 
and in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom126. Both matters concerned the discharge 
of the applicants, from the army, based on their non-heteronormative sexual orientations.127 
The state argued that the restriction was justified because having homosexual men in the armed 
forces would negatively impact morale and, ultimately, decrease its “fighting power and 
operational effectiveness”.128  
The ECtHR indicated that states have a wide margin of appreciation where matters of 
national security are concerned. However, the state will still have to show that the restriction 
has a legitimate aim that is necessary in a democratic society, built on pluralism, tolerance, and 
broadmindedness.129 Furthermore, reiterating Dudgeon, the ECtHR stated that serious 
justifications are required where restrictions involve an individual’s sexual life, as a most 
intimate aspect of private life.130 
The argument presented was that the operational effectiveness of the armed forces was at 
risk where homosexual service personnel were employed. However, in neither matter could the 
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122 Para 47. 
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state substantiate their claims. As a result, it was found that the ban imposed on homosexual 
men preventing them from entering the armed forces was based on negative attitudes, which 
did not constitute a reasonable justification for the discrimination suffered.131  
In various subsequent matters, the ECtHR referred to an individual’s sexual life as a most 
intimate aspect of private life in affirming that serious reasons must be presented to restrict this 
right. In the judgments of L and V v Austria132 and Alekseyev v Russia133, the ECtHR reiterated 
that negative attitudes towards a particular group cannot constitute reasonable justification for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.134 Furthermore, in Taddeucci and McCall v Italy,135 
it was also held that the protection of traditional family values cannot be accepted as 
justification for restricting the right to respect for private life through refusing to grant a family 
residence permit to someone in a same-sex partnership.136 
Against this background, the ECtHR has included the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under respect for private life. This was possible as a result of the broad 
conception of private life. Private life has been held to encompass the right to establish 
relationships with other individuals, to personal development and to self-determination, as well 
as to include the right of each person to respect for their physical and psychological integrity, 
and their choices as to their desired appearance as an expression of their personality, whether 
in public or in private.137 
In all the matters discussed here, the violations of the right to respect for private life were 
found to be a result of the applicants’ non-heteronormative SOGIEs. Because matters of 
SOGIE are deemed one of the most intimate aspects of private life, the states involved had to 
provide serious reasons as justification for the restrictions imposed. The ECtHR’s focus on 
respect for private life in protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
goes back to the importance attached to individual independence and the sacredness of private 
life during the drafting of Article 8.  
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As discussed in part 5 3 2 1, the test applied under Article 14 to determine whether 
differentiation constitutes unjustifiable discrimination requires the state to prove that it has a 
legitimate aim, with the means adopted being reasonable and proportionate to the aim sought 
to achieve. In this determination, the general principles applicable in democratic societies are 
considered. This test is similar to the one prescribed to determine whether a violation of Article 
8 is justifiable. As a result, it would be redundant for the ECtHR to consider whether there was 
a violation of Article 8 read with Article 14, where a violation of Article 8 has been found. 
However, it is important to point out that this approach does not mean that non-heteronormative 
SOGIE are not covered under discrimination based on “other status”.  
The case law discussed establishes that the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE are protected under the ECHR through the interpretation of the right to respect for 
private life. Importantly, the ECtHR’s approach to protecting the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE is supported by the YP. The YP has only once been referred to by the 
ECtHR, and only in a dissenting opinion of Sajó, Keller and Lemmens JJ in Hämäläinen v 
Finland.138 Furthermore, the applicants in X v he former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia139 
also relied on the YP in their arguments. However, the ECtHR did not consider this. 
Nevertheless, these references have the potential of ultimately establishing the role of the YP 
as providing interpretive guidance when considering the positive and negative obligations 
imposed on states to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. 
 
5 3 3 Education  
As mentioned in part 5 2 2 1 above, Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR provides for the right 
to education. Article 5 indicates that Protocol 1 enshrines additional substantive rights to the 
ECHR. As a result, the rights and obligations imposed under the ECHR applies to Protocol 1 
as well. Article 2 of Protocol 1 states that: 
 
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions”.140 
 
 
138 Application 37359/09 (16 July 2014) (joint dissenting opinion of judges Sajó, Keller & Lemmens). 
139 Application 29683/16 (17 January 2019). 




The wording of Article 2 is different from the right to education contained in the international 
instruments discussed under chapter 4. Although the title of Article 2 is the right to education, 
the first sentence of the provision is couched in negative terms. It is also significant that 
reference is made to the right of parents in respect of their child’s education. 
In Belgian Linguistics the ECtHR, for the first time, ruled on the right to education.141 It 
explained that the right to education should be accessible and effective and that the negative 
formulation of the right to education means that learners should at least have access to existing 
educational institutions and be able to benefit from education.142 Campbell and Cosans v 
United Kingdom143 added to this that the right to education includes knowledge instruction and 
should contribute to the development of the child’s character and abilities.144 Because of its 
importance to children’s development, the ECtHR in Timishev v Russia145 moreover held that, 
at the very least, the right to education includes the right to primary education.146 However, in 
Catan v Republic of Moldova and Russia,147 it was indicated that both primary and secondary 
education is fundamental to children’s “personal development and future success”.148 As such, 
the right to education includes both primary and secondary education.149 In light of these 
decisions, it is evident that the right to education under the ECHR is tied to the development 
of the child. 
Furthermore, the state has an obligation to regulate education. Notably, in Cosans, the 
ECtHR explained that this should not be done in a manner that infringes on other rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR or its Protocols.150 Rather, the right to education should 
be interpreted in a manner that promotes the ideals of the ECHR and the importance attached 
to democratic values.151 This is of particular importance in light of the broader societal function 
of the right to education as “indispensable to the furtherance of human rights”.152 In this regard, 
the ECtHR has drawn specific attention to the impact of the right to non-discrimination, respect 
for private life, and the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion on education. This 
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is because these rights are integral to the development of the child.153 The ECtHR has further 
indicated that Article 2 of Protocol 1 should be interpreted in light of the right to education as 
set out in the UDHR, ICESCR and the CRC.154 Thus, the interpretation of the right to education 
set forth under chapter 4 is relevant to the interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR.155 
Considering the discussion in 5 3 2 in light of the right to education of the child, the 
argument set forth is that the right to non-discrimination and the protection of the private life 
of the child enshrined in the ECHR means that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE have 
a right to not be discriminated against in education. The state has a positive obligation to 
address regulations that cause fear and humiliation to children with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE and must implement preventative measures. This is based on the discussion in part 5 3 
2 2 pertaining to the right to respect for private life as including respect for non-
heteronormative sexual orientations, diverse gender identities and gender expressions as a most 
intimate aspect of a person’s life.  
The ECtHR’s decision in Çam v Turkey is significant for setting out the positive obligations 
on states to ensure that all children can benefit from the right to equal education. The 
complainant, a blind woman, was denied enrolment in a tertiary education institution for failure 
to provide a medical certificate confirming her physical ability to attend and participate in the 
programme.156 On the facts, the relevant medical certificate was presented, stating that the 
complainant “could receive education and instruction in the sections of the Music Academy 
where eyesight was unnecessary”.157 However, this was rejected by the institution.158  
The point of departure in this matter was that the right to education is explicitly protected 
under the ECHR.159 The ECtHR reiterated that the rights enshrined under the ECHR should be 
interpreted and applied practically and effectively.160 In light thereof, attention was drawn to 
the universality and non-discrimination as internationally recognised principles that inform all 
rights, including the right to education.161 Moreover, the ECtHR explained that inclusive 
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education is the “most appropriate means of guaranteeing the aforementioned fundamental 
principles”.162  
According to the ECtHR, Article 14 places an obligation on states to reasonably 
accommodate persons who will otherwise not be able to enjoy their rights on equal terms with 
other individuals.163 Importantly, the ECtHR noted that reasonable accommodation in schools 
or other educational institutions can take various forms. It can be “physical or non-physical, 
education or organisational, [concern] the architectural accessibility of school buildings, 
teacher training, curricular adaption or appropriate facilities”.164 The decision to not reasonably 
accommodate the complainant was held to constitute discrimination based on the ground of 
disability because she could not enjoy her right to education on equal terms as other students.165  
Importantly, the ECtHR’s reasoning in Çam v Turkey can arguably be applied to the right 
to education of learners with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Considering the ECtHR’s 
arguments, a state’s refusal to, for example, include diverse SOGIE in the sexual education 
curriculum, allow transgender learners to wear the school uniform of their identified gender, 
or to ensure that learners with non-heteronormative SOGIE are not marginalised or 
discriminated against in schools, can constitute discrimination based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE and infringe on their right to equal education. 
The second sentence of Article 2 provides parents with rights in respect of their children’s 
education. The requirement that the rights of parents be respected implies that there is a positive 
obligation on the state to accommodate the religious and philosophical convictions of 
parents.166 In Kjelsden, the ECtHR explained that respect for the religious and moral 
convictions of parents is based on safeguarding pluralism in education and to prevent 
indoctrination.167 In Valsamis v Greece, religious convictions were clarified as referring to 
known religions.168 In comparison, the ECtHR in Cosans indicated that philosophical 
convictions concern “such convictions as are worthy of respect in a ‘democratic society’”.169 
However, it should not conflict with the right to education or be incompatible with human 
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dignity.170 In this regard, the ECtHR’s decision in Cosans is relevant. This matter concerned a 
school’s refusal to allow a learner to attend the school because the learner’s parents did not 
agree to the use of corporal punishment as it conflicted with their philosophical convictions. 
The ECtHR found that, not only did the school’s refusal infringe on the learner’s right to 
education but that the state’s regulation of corporal punishment infringed on the learner’s right 
to not be subjected to degrading treatment.171  
Of further significance is the ECtHR’s judgment in Kjelsden, where it was held that 
compulsory sex education does not infringe on the right of parents in respect of their children’s 
education. Furthermore, this right of parents does not prevent states from teaching 
philosophical or religious materials, as long as it is done in an “objective, critical and pluralistic 
manner”.172 In Dojan v Germany173, it was further confirmed that the regulation of education 
includes the “setting and planning of the curriculum” and that this can include philosophical or 
religious materials, as well as sexual education.174 Dojan involved a claim that the liberal 
sexual education provided in German schools infringed on the right of parents to ensure the 
education of their children in terms of their religious convictions.175 Reference was made to 
the aim of the sexual education curriculum as providing: 
 
“[P]upils with knowledge of biological, ethical, social and cultural aspects of sexuality according to 
their age and maturity in order to enable them to develop their own moral views and an independent 
approach towards their own sexuality. Sexual education should encourage tolerance between human 
beings irrespective of their sexual orientation and identity”.176 
 
It was held that these aims promote the pluralism envisaged under Article 2 of Protocol 1 and 
therefore, do not, infringe on the rights of parents.177 This judgment supports the argument that 
the right to education focuses on the development of the child. Nonetheless, the ECtHR has not 
discussed the best interests of the child principle in relation to the right to education. However, 
it has been used in the interpretation of the right to respect for the private life of the individual, 
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albeit referring to family reunification, child custody matter, and adoption.178 As a result of the 
broad formulation of the principle, having to be considered in all matters concerning the child, 
it is arguably possible to apply those references to the right to education.  
Strand Lobben v Norway179 reiterates the best interests principle and sets out its current 
interpretation under the ECHR. As a point of departure, the ECtHR explained that under 
domestic and regional European law, there is broad consensus that the child’s best interests are 
of paramount importance in all matters concerning the child.180 It is, therefore, of “crucial 
importance” to consider what would be in the child’s best interests in a particular situation.181 
The argument presented is that the child’s best interests being of “crucial importance” can be 
interpreted as imposing more onerous obligations on the state than if it were just of “paramount 
importance”. The ECtHR further indicated that where the best interests of the child conflict 
with those of their parents, a fair balance should be struck between these competing interests. 
In this regard, the “nature and seriousness” of the interests at stake should be considered to 
determine whether the child’s interests should override those of the parents.182 More recently, 
in its first advisory opinion, the ECtHR reiterated that “whenever the situation of a child is in 
issue, the best interests of that child are paramount”.183 What is in the child’s best interests 
must also be assessed “in concreto rather than in abstracto”.184  
Despite the lack of reference to the best interests principle in the interpretation of Article 2 
of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, the argument presented is that the case law of the ECtHR 
concerning the right of parents in respect of their children’s education has considered the best 
interests of the child. In both Kjelsden and Dojan, reference was made to the aim of diverse 
sexual education to promote tolerance and the child’s development of their own moral views. 
This approach is cognisant of a human rights-based approach to education, as discussed under 
chapter 4, and aims to give effect to the democratic values underlying the ECHR, as well as 
respect for human dignity as the essence thereof.185  
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5 4 European Social Charter (1961) 
5 4 1 Human dignity as an underlying value 
During the drafting of the ESC, there was strong support for the inclusion of human dignity as 
the “basic principle of progressive social development in Europe”.186 The support stemmed 
from the idea that human dignity is central to the full development and moral well-being of all 
persons. According to Tóth, although the potential role of human dignity in the realisation of 
social and economic rights was discussed, it ultimately did not have a significant impact during 
the drafting process.187 In the Preamble, human dignity was replaced with the “realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” as the overarching purpose of the ESC.188  
The ECSR has referred to human dignity in determining violations of rights under the ESC. 
As a point of departure, the ECSR in its Interpretive Statement on Article 15 confirmed that: 
 
“The very essence of the Social Charter is to guarantee and respect the dignity of all human beings, 
irrespective of their physical or mental condition. The idea of human rights implies that the dignity 
of all individuals must be recognised and respected”.189  
 
According to the ECSR, human dignity underlies human rights to the extent that human rights 
cannot exist without it. As a human rights instrument, human dignity is implied in the ESC and 
underlies the rights provided therein.190 The ECSR’s judgments in FIDH v France and 
Transgender Europe and ILGA-Europe v the Czech Republic191 confirm that “human dignity 
is the fundamental value and indeed the core of positive European human rights law”.192 
Significantly, in FIDH v France, the ECSR held that, because both the ESC and the ESC(r) are 
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living instruments dedicated to, and inspired by, human dignity, it should “be interpreted so as 
to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights”.193  
These two decisions illustrate that the ECSR reads human dignity as an underlying value of 
the ESC and aims to incorporate it in the interpretation of the rights contained therein. For 
example, in Transgender Europe, the ECSR found that setting sterilisation as a requirement 
for legal gender recognition violates the right to protection of health, contained in Article 11, 
because it disregards consent and violates the individual’s physical integrity and human 
dignity.194 Through this decision, the ECSR established that individual autonomy and bodily 
integrity is central to the inherent human dignity of each person. 
The ECSR has also cited human dignity in considering children’s right to social protection 
under Article 17 of the ESC. For example, public care institutions are required to “provide a 
life of human dignity for the children placed there and provide conditions promoting their 
growth, physically, mentally and socially”.195 The child’s right to human dignity therefore 
necessitates that their environment facilitates their full development. Similarly, in World 
Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v Portugal,196 the ECSR explained that children’s right 
to social protection includes the right to be protected from all forms of violence. To this end, 
states have to prohibit all forms of violence against children and ensure that perpetrators are 
punished. Violence includes “acts or behaviour likely to affect the physical integrity, dignity, 
development or psychological well-being of children”.197 In this decision, the ECSR reiterated 
the connection between human dignity and the child’s development, emphasising that the 
inherent dignity of the child demands that they be protected from violence. Related hereto, the 
ECSR in Association for the Protection of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd v Czech Republic198 
explained that violence against children, including corporal punishment, cannot be justified as 
it “erode[s] the child’s absolute right to human dignity and physical and psychological 
integrity”.199  
The ECSR has also made numerous references in their Conclusions to human dignity in 
their interpretation of the various rights, most notably, the right to health, social and medical 
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assistance, as well as in the context of the right of mothers and children to social and economic 
protection. In this way, human dignity has been incorporated as a consideration for states in 
giving effect to the obligations imposed by the ESC.200  
 
5 4 2 Non-discrimination  
The Preamble to the ESC indicates that “social rights should be secured without 
discrimination”.201 Although there is no substantive provision that provides for non-
discrimination, it can nonetheless be viewed as a foundational principle of the ESC.202 In this 
regard, the ECSR in European Roma Rights Centre v Greece203 explained that: 
 
“One of the underlying purposes of the social rights protected by the Charter is to express solidarity 
and promote social inclusion. It follows that States must respect difference and ensure that social 
arrangements are not such as would effectively lead to or reinforce social exclusion. This 
requirement is exemplified in the proscription against discrimination in the Preamble and in its 
interaction with the substantive rights of the Charter”.204 
 
In line with this judgment, the ECSR in European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v Czech 
Republic205 stated that a person to whom a right accrues should be empowered to exercise that 
right. To this end, appropriate measures should be implemented to ensure that disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups are not excluded from accessing their rights.206 The ECSR held that 
restricting the Roma population’s access to universal healthcare, as a group that is vulnerable 
to discrimination and social exclusion, impedes the effective exercise of their right to protection 
of their health. As such, the Czech Republic was found to have violated this right, read with 
the non-discrimination clause in the Preamble of the ESC.207  
These two judgments illustrate the dual purpose of the non-discrimination clause in the 
Preamble to the ESC: (i) to promote respect for diverse peoples; and (ii) to provide a foundation 
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for protecting groups that are vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion. Because non-
discrimination is provided for in the Preamble and not in a separate substantive provision, it 
must be attached to an allegation of the violation of a substantive right under the ESC.208 
The ECSR has found violations of the right to non-discrimination when read with the right 
to work, the right of mothers and children to social and economic protection, as well as the 
right to protection of health. The ECSR showed that, although the prohibited grounds of 
discriminations in the Preamble seem to be a closed list, it is not. In this regard, reference has 
been made to the prohibition of discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation, amongst 
others. 
With regard to the right to work, Article 1(2) of the ESC places an obligation on states to 
“protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered 
upon” and requires eradicating all forms of direct and indirect discrimination in employment.209 
In Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) v Greece, it was held that anti-
discrimination legislation should prohibit workers from being discriminated against based 
“inter alia on the grounds of … sexual orientation”.210 This judgment is significant as it 
confirmed the open-ended nature of the non-discrimination clause and included sexual 
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 1(2). This corresponds with 
the interpretation adopted under Article 14 of the ECHR, discussed in part 5 3 2 1, as well as 
the international treaties discussed in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights 
(INTERIGHTS) v Croatia211 concerned an allegation that the Croatian government was in 
violation of Article 11(2) of the ESC read with the Preamble, for failing to “provide 
comprehensive or adequate sexual and reproductive health education for children”.212 
Considering Article 11(2) together with the non-discrimination clause arguably means that 
sexual health education should be provided without discrimination, whether direct or indirect. 
The content of sexual health education therefore should not perpetuate prejudice or social 
exclusion.213 The ECSR found that the depictions of persons with non-heteronormative sexual 
orientations in educational materials was “manifestly biased, discriminatory and 
 
208 See, Complaint 104/2014 (17 May 2016) para 228; Complaint 15/2003 (8 December 2004) para 19. 
209 Article 1(2) of the ESC; ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 1(2)” (31 May 1969) I. See also, ECSR 
“Conclusions: Netherlands Antilles” (30 May 2003) XVI-1. 
210 Complaint 111/2014 (23 March 2017) para 133. 
211 Complaint 45/2007 (30 March 2009) (“INTERIGHTS v Croatia”). 
212 Para 13. 




demeaning”.214 As a result, the Croatian government violated the positive duties imposed by 
Article 11(2) to ensure that:  
 
“[E]ducational materials do not reinforce demeaning stereotypes and perpetuate forms of prejudice 
which contribute to the social exclusion, embedded discrimination and denial of human dignity often 
experienced by historically marginalised groups such as persons of non-heterosexual orientation”.215 
 
Although the ECSR did not make explicit reference to sexual orientation as the relevant 
prohibited ground of discrimination, it nonetheless relied on the demeaning depictions of 
persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientation in establishing the violation. Based on 
GSEE v Greece and INTERIGHTS v Croatia, it is set forth that sexual orientation is a prohibited 
ground of discrimination under the non-discrimination clause in the Preamble of the ESC. 
Like in GSEE v Greece, the ECSR in their Conclusions on the Czech Republic referred to 
various prohibited grounds of discrimination not listed in the Preamble. The ECSR indicated 
that, in a decision on the placement of a child in public care, the child should not be 
discriminated against based on their or their parent(s)’s “gender ... or any other status”.216 Of 
importance here is that the ECSR also recognised that the non-discrimination clause applies to 
the protection of children’s rights under the ESC.  
Transgender Europe could have been a landmark judgment establishing gender identity as 
a prohibited ground of discrimination under the ESC.217 At issue was whether the Czech 
Republic was in violation of Article 11, read on its own or in conjunction with the right to non-
discrimination in the Preamble, for requiring that transgender persons undergo sterilisation 
before being granted legal gender recognition.218 In their decision, the ECSR considered the 
obligation on states to “take appropriate measures to guarantee the full legal recognition of a 
person’s gender reassignment in all areas of life”.219 In this regard, states should provide 
“quick, transparent and accessible legal gender recognition procedures” without imposing a 
“prior obligation to undergo sterilisation or other medical procedures”.220  
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The complainants argued that requiring sterilisation for legal gender recognition constituted 
discrimination based on gender identity under the Preamble of the ESC. Unlike cisgender 
persons, whose sex and gender assigned at birth correspond, persons with non-heteronormative 
gender identities are not afforded the same privilege.221 Although finding a violation of the 
right to protection of health, the ECSR refrained from considering the complaint in light of the 
prohibition of discrimination under the Preamble.222 However, in a separate concurring 
opinion, Vice-President Lukas indicated that, given the facts of the case, the ECSR’s refusal to 
engage with the allegation of discrimination was difficult to understand. According to Vice-
President Lukas: 
 
“[The] difference in treatment [between cisgender and transgender individuals] lacks an objective 
and reasonable justification. Under international human rights law, medical treatment may only be 
imposed in emergency situations for the benefit of the health of the individual concerned, where that 
individual is not able to give his or her consent. Sterilisation for the purposes of legal gender 
recognition clearly does not meet these conditions and is therefore in grave violation of Article 11(1) 
and the Preamble to the 1961 Charter”.223 
 
Because the ECSR chose not to engage with the issue of discrimination based on gender 
identity in this matter, there is still no explicit pronunciation by the ECSR on the prohibition 
of discrimination based on non-heteronormative gender identities or gender expressions under 
the ESC. However, it is possible to argue that, in referring to gender as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in their Conclusions on the Czech Republic, Turkey, and Spain, the ECSR has 
established an avenue through which discrimination based on non-heteronormative gender 
identities and gender expressions can be prohibited.224  
As the two regional human rights bodies of Europe, the ECtHR draws from the ECSR, and 
vice versa. As a result, it is conceivable that the interpretation of gender as including non-
heteronormative gender identities and gender expressions under the ECHR will be incorporated 
under the ESC in the future. It is further significant that the ECSR referred to Resolutions 1728 
and 2048 of the Council of Europe in their judgment in Transgender Europe, which concerns 
the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the member 
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states of the Council of Europe.225 The incorporation of these resolutions indicates the 
commitment of the ECSR to uphold the standards set by the Council of Europe. These 
resolutions will likely be integral to establishing non-heteronormative gender identities and 
gender expressions as a prohibited ground of discrimination under the ESC. It is also important 
to note that, in Transgender Europe and ILGA-Europe v the Czech Republic,226 the applicants 
relied on the YP in their arguments before the ECSR. Although the ECSR did not draw from 
the principles in considering the merits of the complaint, its relevance was still not denied. As 
such, the principles have potential for guiding future developments under the ESC and the 
ESC(r). 
 
5 4 3 An implied right to education  
The ESC does not provide an explicit right to education for children as in Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR or the international human rights treaties discussed under chapter 4. Consideration was 
first given to the possibility of including a right to education in the Preliminary Draft of the 
Social Charter submitted in April 1955, two years after the drafting of the ESC started.227 It 
was described as a right related to social and cultural development and was drafted with similar 
wording to the right to education contained in the UDHR.228 Education was further mentioned 
in respect of the rights of children in general.229 However, the drafting committee expressed its 
doubts as to whether the right to education should form part of the ESC, since it is enshrined 
in Protocol 1 to the ECHR, as well as in the UDHR and the draft of the CESCR.230 What 
followed was an intense debate as to whether the right to education should be included, and if 
it was, how it should be worded.231 As a result of the disagreement amongst states – particularly 
Germany, Italy, France, and Belgium –  it was decided that an explicit right to education should 
 
225 Complaint 117/2015 (15 May 2018) paras 23-24. See also, Council of Europe “Resolution 1728: 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity” (29 April 2010); Council of Europe 
“Resolution 2048: Discrimination against transgender people in Europe” (2 April 2015). 
226 Complaint 117/2015 (15 May 2018). 
227 Working Party for the Preparation of a Draft European Social Charter: Preliminary Draft of Social Charter 
submitted by the Secretariat of the Committee (19 April 1955) AS/Soc I (6). 
228 Part II, Section D, Article 1. See, 4 2 4. 
229 Part II, Section B, Article 2; Part II, Section C, Article 3. 
230 Report of the Working Party appointed to draft articles for a European Social Charter (12 April 1957) CE/Soc 
(57) 5. 
231 See in general, Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) edition of the “travaux 
préparatoires” Vol II (1955); Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) edition of the 
“travaux préparatoires” Vol III (1956); Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) 




be excluded from the draft of the ESC, but that the references to education in relation to the 
protection of children, in general, should be kept.232  
Despite the absence of an explicit right to education, the ECSR has nonetheless inferred the 
right to education from Article 7. Article 7 enshrines the right of children and young persons 
to protection from the dangers associated with their employment. In International Commission 
of Jurists v Portugal,233 the ECSR held that the purpose of Article 7 is to protect children from 
“risks associated in performing work which may have negative repercussions on their health, 
their moral welfare, their development and their education”.234 In this regard, Article 7(3) is 
relevant for stating that “persons who are still subject to compulsory education shall not be 
employed in such work as would deprive them of the full benefit of their education”.235 In its 
Interpretive Statement on Article 7(3), the ECSR confirmed that this provision places an 
obligation on states to prohibit such employment.236 The ECSR’s reference to that children 
should not be placed in a position that undermines their education, specifically where they are 
“still subject to compulsory education”, implies that a right to education exists under the ESC. 
Article 17 concerns the right of mothers and children to social and economic protection and 
places an obligation on states to implement measures and establish or maintain institutions for 
this purpose. Article 17 has been discussed in relation to protecting children in public care, as 
well as protecting children from abuse.237 With regard to protection from abuse, the ECSR in 
APPROACH v Czech Republic reiterated their judgment in World Organisation against 
Torture (OMCT) v Greece,238 stating that Article 17 necessitates all violence against children 
to be prohibited and penalised, including corporal punishment.239 This requires that corporal 
punishment be prohibited in public and private spaces, including in schools.240  
The argument presented is that Article 7 read with Article 17 establishes that children have 
a right to education under the ESC. This right is not explicit but is inferred from the obligation 
imposed on states to implement measures to protect children from the negative repercussions 
that employment can have on their access to and benefit from education. Furthermore, states 
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should ensure that children are not subject to violence in schools. In this regard, the ECSR in 
APPROACH v Czech Republic reiterated that children should be protected from violence 
because it can negatively affect their “physical integrity, dignity, development or psychological 
well-being”.241  
Considering Article 11(2) in light of Articles 7 and 17, the right to education also includes 
the right to “comprehensive or adequate sexual and reproductive education for children”.242 In 
INTERIGHTS v Croatia, discussed in 5 4 2, the Croatian government was found to be in 
violation of Article 11(2) for failing to provide such education. According to the ECSR, the 
purpose of sexual health education is to develop children’s understanding of their “sexuality in 
its biological, psychological, socio-cultural and reproductive dimensions” in order to “enable 
them to make responsible decisions with regard to sexual and reproductive health 
behaviour”.243 The Croatian government violated Article 11(2) through its discriminatory 
portrayal of persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientations in educational materials.244 
Article 11(2), therefore, places an obligation on states to ensure that educational materials do 
not perpetuate direct or indirect discrimination or marginalisation.245 This obligation implies 
that sexual health education should cover the full spectrum of human SOGIE in order to provide 
for each child’s SOGIE. 
Unlike in respect of the instruments discussed under chapter 4 above, the ESC has not 
presented a clear interpretation of the best interests principle. Sparse references have been made 
thereto in their Conclusions on Spain and the Czech Republic, where the ECSR indicated that 
the best interests of the child should be taken into consideration in determining the limitation 
of the custodial rights of parents under Article 17.246 Based on these references, it is arguable 
that, under the ESC, determining what would be in the best interests of the child in a particular 
situation should focus on the child, and not on the parents’ perception of what would be in their 
child’s best interests. 
The best interests principle has only been mentioned in one case under the ESC. In 
APPROACH v Czech Republic, the ECSR quoted from General Comment 13 of the CRC 
Committee, where it is stated that “all forms of violence against children, however light, are 
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unacceptable”.247 To determine whether particular conduct constitutes violence, states have to 
consider whether there exist “intervention strategies in order to allow proportional responses 
in the best interests of the child”.248 However, such factors should never “erode the child’s 
absolute right to human dignity and physical and psychological integrity by describing some 
forms of violence as legally and/or socially acceptable”.249   
Considering the discussions in 5 4 1 and 5 4 2 respectively, the argument set forth is that all 
children, regardless of their SOGIE, are guaranteed a right to education under the ESC. Because 
human dignity lies at the core of the ESC, it necessarily informs each child’s right to education. 
The right to human dignity adds to the right to education that children should grow up in an 
environment that promotes their development. This requires that children are protected from 
all forms of violence, including bullying and discrimination, in public and private spaces. 
Considering the discussion in part 5 4 2 in relation to the prohibition of discrimination in the 
Preamble of the ESC in light of the right to education, there is an obligation on states to ensure 
that all children have access to education and that they are empowered to benefit from the 
opportunities that this right offers on an equal basis. This requires that educational materials 
are unbiased in their depiction of diverse SOGIE’s and that non-heteronormative SOGIE’s are 
not excluded from these materials. Furthermore, equal access to the benefits that education 
offers requires that children not be subjected to violence in educational settings. This 
necessitates that discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE perpetrated by learners, 
parents and teachers in schools be addressed. 
Unlike in the international treaties discussed under chapter 4, no reference has been made 
to whether the best interests of the child are a primary consideration or the paramount 
consideration under the ESC. However, when considering the child’s right to education, it is 
nonetheless necessary to consider what would be in the child’s best interest when giving effect 
to this right. In light of this discussion, the argument presented is that it is in the best interests 
of the child to have equal access to education and to not be discriminated against in the context 
of education. The basis of this is that discrimination, on whichever ground, can have a 
detrimental effect on their full development and their abilities to benefit from the various 
opportunities that education offers. 
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5 5 Revised European Social Charter (1996) 
5 5 1 An explicit right to human dignity 
Unlike the ESC, the ESC(r) contains an explicit reference to human dignity. Article 26 
enshrines the “right of all workers to protection of their dignity at work” and is the only explicit 
reference to human dignity in the ESC(r). Article 26 was included as a result of increasing 
concern over allegations of sexual harassment and victimisation in the workplace.250 It imposes 
obligations on states to protect workers from sexual harassment and “reprehensible or distinctly 
negative and offensive action” through promoting awareness and implementing preventive 
measures.251 Whereas sexual harassment refers to unwanted sexual conduct from a superior or 
colleague, “reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive action” refers to moral 
harassment that creates a hostile working environment.252  
The Council of Europe has found that a person who harasses often does so to violate the 
victim’s human dignity, with the harassment also drawing on a personal attribute of the victim 
that has been recognised as a prohibited ground of discrimination.253  The argument presented 
is that the interpretation of Article 26, by analogy,  provides essential insights for understanding 
the marginalisation and discrimination that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE often 
face in educational environments. This is because the work and education environments are 
similar, with peers as colleagues and teachers as superiors. The intention of discriminating 
against children with non-heteronormative SOGIE is also to violate their human dignity, 
communicating that their non-conformance with societal standards of SOGIE make them 
unworthy of respect and concern.  
Even though Article 26 contains the only explicit reference to human dignity under the 
ESC(r), the ECSR has nonetheless considered various other rights in light of human dignity. 
These include the right to social and medical assistance, adequate housing, the right of children 
to protection, as well as non-discrimination. The ECSR can read human dignity into these 
provisions because the ESC(r) is a living instrument inspired by human dignity. Thus, its 
provisions should be interpreted in a manner that not only gives content to the rights enshrined 
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therein, but that reflects human dignity as an underlying value.254 In this regard, the ECSR in 
FIDH v France explained that the rights contained in Articles 1-17 of the ESC(r) are of 
“fundamental importance to the individual since it is connected to the right to life itself and 
goes to the very dignity of the human being”.255 This means that any restriction of a right 
contained in the ESC(r) can be viewed as an infringement on the individual’s human dignity 
unless sufficient justification is provided for the limitation in terms of Article E.  
In terms of the protection of children, the ECSR in Defence for Children International (DCI) 
v Netherlands256 explained that the inherent human dignity of the child entitles them to all the 
fundamental rights provided to adults.257 Furthermore, in Defence for Children International 
(DCI) v Belgium258, reference was made to the need to protect children from negligence and 
violence in order to protect their most basic rights and to ensure respect for their human 
dignity.259 Similarly, in Equal Rights Trust (ERT) v Bulgaria, the ECSR stated that the child’s 
right to protection requires that, when considering the limitation of their rights, their best 
interests be taken into account.260 Related hereto, the ECSR in Association for the Protection 
of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd v France specified that corporal punishment infringes on 
the child’s right to protection from violence guaranteed by Article 17 of the ESC(r) because it 
violates their human dignity.261  
 
5 5 2  Non-discrimination  
The purpose of the ESC(r) is to “strengthen solidarity and promote social inclusion” with 
Article E aiming to give effect hereto through prohibiting discrimination in ensuring the rights 
guaranteed under the ESC(r).262 Significantly, non-discrimination was included as a separate 
provision under the ESC(r). The separate right to non-discrimination indicates that the drafters 
appreciated the role of a separate right to non-discrimination in ensuring the equal rights of all 
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persons under the ESC(r).263 Unlike the international instruments discussed under chapter 4 
and Article 14 of the ECHR discussed in part 5 3 2 1, Article E follows after the substantive 
provisions of the ESC(r). However, its location does not affect its importance and is a result of 
the structure of the ESC.264  The wording of Article E is identical to Article 14 of the ECHR.265 
Despite being a separate provision under the ESC(r), Article E is not an autonomous right. 
An applicant has to allege a violation of a substantive right under the ESC(r) and can then argue 
that the alleged violation also constitutes discrimination under Article E.266 For a violation of 
the ESC(r) to be found, there has to be (i) differential treatment; (ii) based on one of listed 
grounds or “other status” under Article E; (iii) without an objective reason or legitimate aim; 
with (iv) the differentiation constituting an infringement of one of the substantive rights 
contained in the ESC(r).267   
Article E prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination.268 Where an applicant presents 
credible evidence of an alleged violation, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent state to 
demonstrate that the limitation is “prescribed by law and [is] necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, 
national security, public health, or morals”.269 Comparable to the ECHR, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is central. States have a margin of appreciation in deciding which 
measures to adopt in order to ensure compliance with their obligations under the ESC(r). In 
terms hereof, states should seek to strike a balance between the competing interests of the 
general public and those of a specific group.270 However, a limitation will only be justifiable 
where it pursues a legitimate aim, with a reasonable and proportional relationship existing 
between the aim and the means adopted to realise it.271  
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In an indirect discrimination claim, the applicant in International Association Autism-
Europe v France272 alleged that the French government was in violation of Article E, read with 
Articles 15(1) and 17(1) of the ESC(r), for not adopting sufficient measures to “secure children 
and adults with autism a right to education as effective as that of all the other children”.273 The 
applicant argued that this violated the rights of disabled persons that are protected under Article 
15(1). Although disability is not listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 
E, the ECSR held that it can nonetheless be incorporated through the open-ended reference to 
“other status”. 274 This approach corresponds to that under Article 14 of the ECHR.  
With reference to Article 14 of the ECHR and the ECtHR judgment in Thlimmenos v 
Greece, the ECSR in Autism-Europe explained that Article E places an obligation on states to 
provide equal access to and enable the effective exercise of all rights despite the potential 
differences between people.275 In this regard, the ECtHR in Thlimmenos held that states violate 
the right to non-discrimination when it “without an objective and reasonable justification fail 
to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different”.276 
The ECSR incorporated Thlimmenos in its interpretation of Article E, stating that human 
difference should be celebrated and requires that states adopt practical measures to “ensure real 
and effective equality”.277 The ECSR’s approach in European Roma and Travellers Forum 
(ERTF) v France adds to the Autism-Europe judgment that discrimination should be eliminated 
in law and fact.278 To this end, states should address systemic discrimination, defined as “legal 
rules, policies, practices or predominant cultural attitudes, in either the public or private sector, 
which create relative disadvantages for some groups, and privileges for other groups”.279 
Ultimately, systemic discrimination engenders social exclusion. 
Although this interpretation can impose onerous administrative and financial obligations on 
states to address discrimination, the ECSR in Autism-Europe explained that this does not 
exempt it from its duties under Article E. States should adopt an incremental approach that 
enables it to realise the aims set out under the ESC(r) “within a reasonable time, with 
measurable progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available 
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resources”.280 However, states should be “mindful of the impact that [its] choices will have for 
groups with heightened vulnerabilities”.281  
In light of the discussion under chapters 1 and 2 above, persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE are vulnerable to discrimination for not conforming to heteronormative conceptions of 
sexual orientation, gender identities and expressions. Non-heteronormative SOGIE has not 
been established as prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article E of the ESC(r). 
However, the ECSR has discussed the obligations on states to address discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and transgender status in their Conclusions. In this regard, the ECSR has 
provided that, despite sexual orientation not being listed as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination, it can nonetheless be included under the reference to “or other status”.282 In 
discussing Article 1(2), which places an obligation on states to protect the right to work, the 
ECSR has indicated that national legislation should prohibit discrimination based on sex and 
sexual orientation in employment.283 Furthermore, states should ensure that “services managed 
by the private sector are effective and accessible on an equal footing to all, without 
discrimination on grounds of … sexual orientation”.284 In the context of Article 1(2), the ECSR 
has also expressed concern over discrimination against persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE as a vulnerable group. The ECSR has, therefore, requested states to report on “what 
concrete measures are being taken to eliminate discrimination against such persons”.285  
Besides the concern expressed over discrimination against transgender persons, the ECSR 
has not discussed the application of the rights under the ESC(r) to transgender persons or 
persons with non-heteronormative gender identities or expressions. In their Conclusions 
published at the end of 2017, the ECSR requested information from various states as to whether 
transgender persons are required to undergo legal sterilisation or similar invasive procedures 
for legal gender recognition, and if it is a requirement, to provide justification or a commitment 
to remove it. The ECSR alluded to that this practice infringes on persons with non-
heteronormative gender identities or expressions right to protection of their health and physical 
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integrity under Article 11(1).286 The states involved are expected to provide this information in 
their State Reports on the health, social security and social protection provisions of the ESC(r) 
due in 2021.  
 
5 5 3  Education 
One of the most significant changes to the ESC(r) was made in respect of Article 17.  Whereas 
Article 17 of the ESC enshrines the right of mothers and children to social and economic 
protection, Article 17 of the ESC(r) provides for the right of children to social, legal and 
economic protection. The ESC(r) removed the reference to mothers and focuses on the 
protection of children. The purpose of Article 17 is to ensure that children “grow up in an 
environment which encourages the full development of their personality and their physical and 
mental capacities”.287 It is founded on the CRC and aims to give effect to the rights contained 
thereunder. As a result, the CRC is incorporated under Article 17 and informs its 
interpretation.288 
Article 17(1) provides for the rights of children to (i) care, assistance, and education; (ii) 
protection from violence and negligence; and (iii) special protection where they are 
“temporarily or definitively deprived of their family’s support”.289 In terms of Article 17(1)(a), 
states are obligated to implement all appropriate measures to ensure the child’s right to 
education. Article 17(2) enshrines the more comprehensive right to education, setting out that 
states must “provide children … a free primary and secondary education as well as to encourage 
regular attendance at school”.290 Because Article 17(2) is more specific, the ECSR examines 
alleged violations of the right to education under this provision. However, where the state 
involved only acceded to Article 17(1), claims will be examined thereunder.291 
As a whole, Article 17 “requires states to establish and maintain an education system that is 
both accessible and effective”.292 In Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) v Bulgaria293, 
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the ECSR explained that public education should comply with the 4-A scheme of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right to education.294 As such, it is incorporated under Article 17.295  
With regard to the availability of education, the ECSR has indicated that education should 
be functional. This means that there should be enough schools for children in rural and urban 
areas, a fair learner-teacher ratio, and that education should be “compulsory in general until the 
minimum age for employment”.296 In turn, an accessible education requires the cost of 
education to be reasonable, and that equal access to education be guaranteed.297  
In Médecins du Monde-International v France298, the ECSR referred to the importance of 
access to education for the development of the child, stating that the “denial of access to 
education will exacerbate” the position of children who belong to vulnerable groups.299 States 
should, therefore, pay special attention to individuals who belong to vulnerable groups to 
ensure that they have equal access to education.300 Equal access to education necessitates that 
all learners are empowered to benefit from the opportunities that the right provides, and 
requires that measures be implemented to discourage learners from dropping out.301 To this 
end, education should also be acceptable and adaptable in the sense that all children should 
have access to the curriculum and educational institutions, with the circumstances being 
adapted to suit the needs of vulnerable groups.302  
Related to the above, in its Conclusions on Slovenia the ECSR indicated that Article 11(2) 
places an obligation on states to ensure that health education be incorporated into the 
curriculum “throughout the entire period of schooling”, with health education including sexual 
and reproductive education.303 In its Conclusions on Albania, the ECSR further explained that 
sexual and reproductive education should be “objective, based on contemporary scientific 
evidence and does not involve censoring, withholding or intentionally misrepresenting 
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information”.304 In these Conclusions, the ECSR referred to its judgment in INTERIGHTS v 
Croatia, decided under the ESC.305 As a result, the argument presented is that the ECSR has 
incorporated that judgment in interpreting Article 11(2) of the ESC(r). Thus, Article 11(2) of 
the ESC and ESC(r) read with Article 17 requires that children receive “comprehensive or 
adequate sexual and reproductive education”.306 For sexual and reproductive education to be 
comprehensive and adequate, educational materials should not perpetuate discrimination or 
marginalisation against persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.307 Ultimately, sexual 
education should enable children to “make responsible decisions with regard to sexual and 
reproductive health behaviour”.308 
Article 7 of the ESC(r) is identical to Article 7 of the ESC. Although this provision does not 
contain a reference to an explicit right to education, this right can nonetheless be inferred. 
Article 7(3) provides that “persons who are still subject to compulsory education shall not be 
employed in such work as would deprive them of the full benefit of their education”.309 The 
reference to “persons who are still subject to compulsory education” [own emphasis] indicates 
that all persons, at some stage, will be subject to compulsory education. As such, there exists a 
right to education. Furthermore, the right clearly requires that provision is made for children to 
benefit fully from this right.310 In this regard, the ECSR has, in numerous Conclusions, 
confirmed that the purpose of Article 7(3) is to “protect the right of every child to education by 
safeguarding their capacity to learn”.311 
Article 17(1)(b) contributes to safeguarding children’s capacity to learn through providing 
that children should be protected “against negligence, violence or exploitation”.312 In 
Association for the Protection of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd v Belgium313, the ECSR 
referred to its judgment of OMCT v Portugal, confirming that the meaning of violence under 
Article 17(1)(b) of the ESC(r) is the same as under Article 17 of the ESC.314 The ECSR 
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reiterated that states should implement national legislation that prohibits and penalises all forms 
of violence against children in schools and care settings, as well as at home.315  
The ECSR’s judgment in DCI v Belgium is significant for elucidating the interpretation of 
the right to education of children who form part of a vulnerable group. The applicant alleged 
that the Belgian government was in violation of the rights guaranteed to “unaccompanied 
foreign minors unlawfully present or seeking asylum and illegally resident accompanied 
minors” under Articles 7(10) and 17.316 The ECSR explained that, as human rights instruments, 
the ESC(r) and the ECHR aim to give effect to the UDHR at a regional level. As such, the 
ESC(r) should “give life and meaning in Europe to the fundamental social rights of all human 
beings”.317 Therefore, in interpreting the ESC(r), the ECSR should adopt a teleological 
approach to give effect to this object and purpose.318  
In DCI v Belgium, the ECSR also indicated that, because all the member states of the 
Council of Europe have ratified the CRC, the interpretation thereof must be taken into 
consideration when determining a violation of children’s rights under the ESC(r).319 As a result, 
the best interests principle informs the scope of the ESC(r) in respect of children.320 In this 
regard, the ECSR reiterated General Comment 5 of the CRC Committee, explaining that: 
 
“Every legislative, administrative and judicial body or institution is required to apply the best 
interests principle by systematically considering how children’s rights and interests are or will be 
affected by their decisions and actions”.321 
 
In DCI v Netherlands, the ECSR confirmed the incorporation of the best interests principle 
under Article 17 of the ESC(r). Importantly, it referred to the use of the best interests principle 
as an “internationally recognised requirement” in all matters concerning children.322 As 
discussed under the ESC and ECHR, as well as in relation to the treaties under discussion in 
chapter 4, the best interests principle is indeterminate. This comment also applies to the ESC(r). 
Therefore, the best interests of the child must guide the interpretation of the right to education 
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of the child in a manner that ensures that all children have access to effective education, 
including that steps should be taken to guarantee this right to vulnerable groups. 
 
5 6 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated that similar to the international human rights treaties discussed under 
chapter 4, human dignity forms the foundation of the European human rights system. Despite 
the absence of a reference to an explicit and general right to human dignity in the substantive 
provisions of the treaties discussed, as well as the lack of its inclusion as a value in their 
Preambles, the ECtHR and the ECSR has incorporated human dignity as the essence of the 
ECHR, ESC, and ESC(r) respectively. Under these instruments, human dignity is tied to the 
importance of respect for the physical and psychological integrity of persons.  
The most significant contribution of this chapter is that it set out the ECtHR’s unique 
approach to the protection of non-heteronormative SOGIE rights. Whereas the approach 
followed by the international treaty bodies focused on the right to equality and non-
discrimination, the ECtHR developed non-heteronormative SOGIE rights by reading the right 
to privacy with the prohibition of discrimination. Article 8 has, therefore, been fundamental to 
establishing sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination 
under Article 14. The reason for this lies in that both human dignity and privacy require the 
protection of aspects related to the individual’s identity, including sexual orientation, gender 
identity and gender expression. However, the fact that non-heteronormative SOGIE rights are 
protected under the right to privacy does not mean that it is confined to the private sphere. 
Rather, it is protected under the right to privacy because sexual orientation, gender identity, 
and gender expression are intimate aspects of a person’s life that should not be interfered with 
unless particularly serious reasons exist for doing so. In this regard, safeguarding moral 
interests, negative attitudes, and protecting traditional family values have not been deemed 
legitimate justifications for limiting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
In light of the above, the jurisprudence on the protection of the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE illustrates that the ECtHR increasingly draws from queer theory and 
queer legal theory in developing the law, albeit implicitly. The ECtHR has also illustrated that 
it appreciates the violence of heteronormativity, seeking to interpret the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the ECHR in a manner that best promotes its object and purpose of protecting 
the human rights of all individuals. In this sense, the ECtHR also follows a teleological 




Whereas the ECHR and the ESC(r) explicitly prohibits discrimination, the Preamble of the 
ESC simply refers to that social rights should be guaranteed without discrimination. 
Nonetheless, sexual orientation has been established as a prohibited ground of discrimination 
under both the ESC and the ESC(r). In this regard, the ECSR has drawn attention to the 
connection between discrimination and social exclusion, explaining that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation prevents individuals from fully enjoying the rights guaranteed under the 
ESC and the ESC(r). To date, the ECSR has not referred to non-heteronormative gender 
identities or gender expressions as prohibited grounds of discrimination. However, the ECSR’s 
Conclusions allude to the potential for future interpretation of “gender” or “other status” as 
including non-heteronormative gender identities, as increasing concern has been expressed 
over discrimination against this group. 
This chapter also outlined the current interpretation of the right to education under the 
ECHR, the ESC, and the ESC(r). Whereas education is an explicit right under the ECHR and 
the ESC(r), it is an implied right under the ESC. Although the formulation of the right is 
different under these instruments, its interpretation has been similar. Drawing from the UDHR, 
ICESCR, and the CRC, the ECtHR and the ESCR has explained that all children have the right 
to an equal and effective education that promotes democratic values. To this end, all children 
should be empowered to benefit from the opportunities that the right to education provides. 
This includes that the curriculum is focused on the development of the child, together with 
imparting relevant knowledge.  
Because the best interests principle is not a separate right under the ECHR, the ECR, or the 
ESC(r), it was discussed in the context of the right to education. It was found that the best 
interests principle also applies in the context of education. In this regard, it was explained that 
reading the right to education with the best interests principle requires that children be given 
comprehensive and diverse sexual and reproductive education to ensure that they can make 
responsible decisions regarding intimate aspects of their private life. Moreover, children should 
be taught democratic values to cultivate respect for all members of their communities. Finally, 
the best interests principle also prohibits discrimination against children in their access to 
education, as this goes against development as a fundamental aspect of education.  
This chapter established that reading Article 14 of the ECHR with Article 2 of Protocol 1 
prohibits discrimination against children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in the context of 
education. Under the ESC and ESC(r), discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited 
in the application of the rights contained therein. As a result, it is also prohibited in ensuring 




Against the backdrop of chapters 4 and 5, chapter 6 sets out the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ADRDM, the ACHPR, the Protocol of San 




6 The right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
regional inter-American human rights law 
6 1 Introduction 
The jurisprudence of the IACtHR illustrates the strongest support for the rights of persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE under international or regional human rights law. The reason for 
this is its recent jurisprudence in this regard, drawing from decades of developments under the 
international and regional human rights systems. As such, it presents the most up to date 
interpretation of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under international 
law, thereby establishing the current discourse surrounding human rights developments in this 
sphere. 
This chapter focuses on the ADRDM and the ACHPR. This is followed by a brief discussion 
on the Protocol of San Salvador and the Convention of Belém do Pará. The analysis departs 
from the assumption that the ADRDM and ACHR provide equal rights to all persons, including 
those with non-heteronormative SOGIE. It is argued that, as a result, these instruments also 
require the special protection of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. The further 
assumption is that children are entitled to the same rights but are also offered additional 
protection as a result of their status as minors. Based on the broad formulation of the relevant 
rights and its interpretation by the inter-American Commission of Human Rights (“IACmHR”) 
and IACtHR, it is argued that the ADRDM and the ACHR protect the right to education of 
children with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
The discussion reveals the unique approach of the IACmHR and the IACtHR in developing 
the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE in comparison to the international and 
European systems.1 Similar to the international and European systems, the inter-American 
system also inadvertently relies on queer theory to question what is perceived as acceptable 
behaviour and modes of being. Importantly, this chapter shows that the IACtHR has gone much 
further than its international and European counterparts, drawing extensively from the YP.2 
 
1 See the text to part 3 5 for the importance and value of comparative legal research for the development of human 
rights law in general. 
2 See the text to parts 4 7, 5 3 2 and 5 4 2. See also, Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination 
and Intolerance (adopted 5 June 2013, entered into force 20 February 2020). The Inter-American Convention 
against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance presents a novel approach to non-discrimination under the 
inter-American system as it not only sets forth a definition of discrimination, but also explicitly lists sexual 
orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination. However, because it only recently entered 
into force, there has been no interpretation of its provisions. Thus, no further analysis is possible. Nonetheless, 
this convention frames the inter-American system in which it was conceived and has potential for contributing 




6 2 Overview of the inter-American human rights system 
6 2 1 Organisation of American States 
Having its roots in 1890, the Organisation of American States (“OAS”) is the oldest regional 
human rights organisation in the world.3 Ratification of the OAS Charter is a prerequisite for 
membership of the OAS.4 The OAS Charter provides for the existence of the OAS General 
Assembly, comprised of representatives of all OAS Member States.5 The General Assembly is 
authorised to adopt declarations and resolutions at their regular and special sessions that are 
aimed at promoting the mandate of the OAS Charter.6 Although the OAS Charter sets the 
mandate of the OAS, it cannot be invoked to bring inter-state, individual, or collective 
complaints. As such, the OAS provided for the creation of the IACmHR in the OAS Charter to 
“promote the observance and protection of human rights” and envisaged the adoption of an 
inter-American convention on human rights.7  
 
6 2 2 Two main human rights instruments and the role of the IACmHR and IACtHR  
6 2 2 1 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
The ADRDM was adopted at the same time as the OAS Charter, making it the first international 
human rights instrument.8 The ADRDM is founded on the recognition that all persons are equal 
in dignity and rights, and that essential rights derive from the inherent dignity of the individual.9 
As a result, the principal aim of states should be to provide for the progressive protection of 
these rights, to create an environment that enables individuals to “achieve spiritual and material 
progress and attain happiness”.  
The IACtHR’s advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man within the framework of Article 64 of the American Convention of 
Human Rights is significant for expounding the status of the ADRDM.10 The Republic of 
 
3 B Ghidirmic “The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: An underrated gem of international 
human rights law” (2018) 4 JL & Pub Admin 50, 52-53. See also, C Medina Quiroga “The Inter-American System 
for the Protection of Human Rights” in C Krause & M Schenin (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: 
A Textbook (2012) 519 519-520. 
4 Article 4. See also, OAS “Member States” (2020) OAS <http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp> 
(accessed 02-06-2020): All 35 independent countries of the Americas are OAS members.  
5 Articles 54 and 56. 
6 Articles 57-59. 
7 Articles 106 and 145. 
8 The ADRDM was adopted on 2 May 1948, and the UDHR on 10 December 1948. 
9 The foundation of the treaties discussed under chapters 4 and 5 are the same. 




Colombia posed the question of whether Article 64 of the ACHR includes the ADRDM.11 
Article 64 authorises the IACtHR to interpret the ACHR or “other treaties concerning the 
protection of human rights in the American states”. According to the IACtHR, the point of 
departure is that the ADRDM, as an international instrument, should be interpreted and applied 
with consideration of its overall framework at the time of interpretation, as well as its evolution 
since its adoption.12 This alludes to the application of a teleological approach.13 
Although the ADRDM does not qualify as a treaty in terms of the Vienna Convention, the 
IACtHR explained that Article 64 of the ACHR empowers it to interpret the ADRDM.14 Its 
argument was based on that the ACHR explicitly refers to the principles elucidated in the 
ADRDM in its Preamble, and also provides in Article 29(d) that none of its provisions may be 
interpreted as “excluding or limiting the effect of the [ADRDM]”.15  
When interpreting the OAS Charter, its norms have to be connected to corresponding 
provisions under the ADRDM.16 This argument is supported by Article 1 of the Statute of the 
IACmHR, where it is provided that the ADRDM applies to the Member States of the OAS who 
have not ratified the ACHR.17 Although the ADRDM cannot be used in direct petitions where 
states have ratified the ACHR, it may still be referred to for interpretive guidance.18 
 
6 2 2 2  American Convention on Human Rights 
Like the treaties discussed under chapters 4 and 5, the Preamble to the ACHR reaffirms that 
the essential rights of man derive from their inherent human attributes. The object and purpose 
of the ACHR is therefore to provide an environment that allows all persons to exercise their 
rights and to offer protection against interference therewith. The Preamble further confirms 
 
11 Paras 1-2. 
12 Para 37.  
13 See the text to part 3 6 2. 
14 Paras 33-35. 
15 Para 36. 
16 Para 43. 
17 Paras 41-42 and 45-46. See also, Statute of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights (entered into 
force 1 November 1979). 
18 Para 47. See C Cerna “Reflections on the Normative Status of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man” (2009) 30 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 1211-1238, in particular, 1233-1237, where this approach is 
criticised. Cerna argues that although the ADRDM should be applied to states who are have not ratified the ACHR, 
it should not be considered in respect of violations that occurred prior to their accession to the ACHR. With 
reference to Lopez Aurelli v Argentina, IACmHR Report No 74/90 (22 February 1991), where the state was found 
in violation of both the ADRDM and the ACHR, Cerna explains that the IACmHR is not “mandated to consider 
violations of the [ADRDM] and the [ACHR] in the same case”. Determining a violation under these respective 
instruments sets in motion two different procedures. Similarly, the IACtHR may only interpret, apply, and render 




that the principles enshrined therein have been outlined in the OAS Charter, ADRDM, UDHR, 
and in other international and regional instruments.19  
The ACHR has both a substantive and institutional facet. Its substantive facet is concerned 
with the enumeration of rights, whereas its institutional facet concerns the establishment of the 
IACmHR and the IACtHR.20 States who have ratified the ACHR undertake to respect the rights 
and freedoms of all persons within their jurisdiction without discrimination.21 The civil and 
political rights protected under the ACHR are similar to the ADRDM. However, unlike the 
ADRDM, the ACHR does not enshrine specific economic, social, and cultural rights. Rather, 
Article 26 contains a single overarching obligation on states to ensure the progressive 
realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights. In relation to this, Article 77, read with 
Article 33, provides for the adoption of Protocols to supplement the rights and obligations 
contained in the ACHR. To date, two additional protocols have been adopted.  The Protocol of 
San Salvador is relevant in this regard for its comprehensive protection of economic, social, 
and cultural rights.22 
Like the treaties discussed under chapters 4 and 5, the ACHR should also be interpreted in 
terms of the Vienna Convention. Because the ACHR provides a legal framework under which 
states commit to protect the basic rights of individual human beings, the interpretation that best 
fulfils this purpose should be adopted.23 To this end, the IACtHR often draws from other human 
rights treaties in its interpretation of the ACHR, in particular, the CRC and the ECHR. It has 
justified this, stating that the broader international framework that treaties form part of, should 
be considered to ensure that the ACHR adapts to evolving human rights norms.24 Within the 
scope of this research, the Protocol of San Salvador and the CRC are of particular value for 
providing interpretative guidance in the interpretation of the prohibition on discrimination, the 
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Harris & S Livingstone (eds) Inter-American System of Human Rights (1998) 31 41. 
21 Article 1 of the ACHR. 
22 See the text to part 6 5 1. 
23 The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory 
Opinion OC-02/82, IACtHR Series A No 02 (24 September 1982) para 33. See also, D J Harris “Regional 
Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American achievement” in D J Harris & S Livingstone (eds) Inter-
American System of Human Rights (1998) 1 9-10. 
24 Bueno Alves v Argentina (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACtHR Series C No 164 (11 May 2007) para 76; 
Ituango Massacres v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series C No 148 (1 
July 2006) para 156. See also, TM Antkowiak & A Gonza The American Convention on Human Rights: Essential 




right to equal protection of the law, the right of the child to special protection, and the right to 
education.25  
 
6 2 2 3 Inter-American Commission and inter-American Court 
The OAS has two main organs, the IACmHR and the IACtHR. Whereas the IACmHR has 
jurisdiction in respect of parties to both the ADRDM and the ACHR, the IACtHR’s jurisdiction 
is limited to the ACHR. The IACmHR is tasked with promoting the observance and protection 
of human rights in all OAS Member States.26 Melish explains that the promotional mandate of 
the IACmHR enables it to address dimensions of human rights abuse that does not constitute 
admissible claims through its contentious mandate.27  
The IACmHR’s contentious mandate differs depending on whether a complaint is based on 
the ADRDM or the ACHR. Concerning Member States to the ADRDM, the IACmHR is 
empowered to examine communications submitted to it and make recommendations on the 
effective observance of fundamental human rights.28 Because 24 of the 35 OAS Member States 
have ratified the ACHR, claims brought under the ADRDM are scarce. As a result, additional 
interpretive guidance has to be drawn from the Annual Reports of the IACmHR, as well as the 
work of OAS Special Rapporteurs. In respect of Member States to the ACHR, the IACmHR 
can consider petitions from individuals, groups or non-governmental organisations, alleging 
violations of the ACHR, as well as inter-state complaints of the same nature.29  
The IACtHR was established in 1979 as “an autonomous judicial institution” of the OAS 
and has jurisdiction over states who have ratified the ACHR. Its purpose is the interpretation 
and application of the ACHR, distinguishable from the IACmHR.30 The IACtHR has both 
advisory and adjudicatory (contentious) jurisdiction.31 With regard to its advisory jurisdiction, 
OAS Member States may request advisory opinions from the IACtHR on the interpretation of 
the ACHR or other human rights treaties applicable to American states, as well as on whether 
 
25 Articles 1(1), 19, 24, and 26 of the ACHR. 
26 Article 1 of the Statute of the IACmHR. 
27 TJ Melish “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Defending social rights through case-based 
petitions” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (2008) 339 339.  
28 Article 20 of the Statute of the IACmHR. 
29 Articles 19-20 of the Statute of the IACmHR; Articles 44-47 of the ACHR. Complaints will be admissible 
where it concerns an alleged violation of a right guaranteed in either the ADRDM or the ACHR, where domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, where the matter is not pending in another international proceeding, and where it 
is not similar in substance to a prior complaint considered by the IACmHR. 
30 Article 1 of the Statute of the inter-American Court of Human Rights (adopted 1 October 1979, entered into 
force 1 January 1980). 




its domestic law is compatible therewith.32 Thus, it is not just states who have ratified the 
ACHR who may request advisory opinions. In terms of its contentious jurisdiction, the IACtHR 
is authorised to adjudicate complaints of violations of the ACHR. Complaints may be 
submitted by the IACmHR, or by a member State of the ACHR, provided that the state made 
a special declaration or concluded a special agreement to this effect.33 Even where the 
IACmHR does not submit a complaint, it is still required to appear in all cases before the 
IACtHR.34 Complaints will be admissible where it satisfies the same requirements as those in 
relation to the contentious jurisdiction of the IACmHR.35  
 
6 3 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 
6 3 1 Human dignity as an underlying vale 
There are four references to dignity in the ADRDM, two of which are relevant to this 
discussion. The first is contained in a section that precedes the Preamble, where it is recognised 
that “[t]he American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the individual”. In the 
Preamble, it is explained that all persons are “born free and equal, in dignity and rights”. 
Through these statements, State Parties acknowledge that dignity is an inherent human 
attribute, requiring that all persons be treated with respect and concern.36 
In its Annual Report for 1980-1981, the IACmHR referred to the overarching aim of the 
OAS to protect human rights, reiterating the obligation on states to guarantee respect for the 
right to life and human dignity.37 It has also incorporated the right to a dignified life under 
Article I, which provides for the right to life, liberty, and security. In this regard, the IACmHR’s 
Annual Report of 1993 is relevant for considering the effective use and allocation of resources 
to determine “whether adequate measures have been taken to implement and secure economic, 
social and cultural rights”. The IACmHR explained that “a certain minimum level of material 
 
32 Article 64 of the ACHR. See also, Articles 59-64 of the Rules of Procedure of the inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (entered into force 1 January 1997). 
33 Articles 61-62 of the ACHR. 
34 Article 57. 
35 Article 61(2). 
36 See the text to parts 3 4 1, 4 2 2, 4 3 1, 4 4 1, 4 5 1, 4 6 1, 4 7, 5 3 1, 5 4 1, and 5 5 1. From these discussions, it 
is clear that the right to human dignity has become universal. 
37 OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1980-1981” (16 October 1981) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54 Doc. 9 rev. 1 Chapter II. See also, Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v United States 




well-being” is required to guarantee the “rights to personal security, dignity, equality of 
opportunity and freedom from discrimination”.38 Member states are, therefore, obligated to: 
 
“[I]mplement positive measures aimed at guaranteeing dignified living conditions, equal 
opportunities, and full participation in decision-making as basic objectives of the integral 
development of the inhabitants and societies of the Hemisphere”.39 
 
Together with the indication that a dignified life requires a certain level of well-being, the 
IACmHR has explained that the right to a dignified life necessitates the prohibition of corporal 
punishment and other forms of degrading treatment because it infringes on the right to respect 
for “physical, mental, and moral integrity”.40  
When considering children’s right to a dignified life, the joint concurring opinion of 
Cançado Trindade and Abreu-Burelli JJ in the Case of “Street Children” (Villagran-Morales 
et al) v Guatemala (“Street Children”) is significant.41 Although the matter was decided under 
the ACHR,  Cançado Trindade and Abreu-Burelli JJ referred to the ADRDM in interpreting 
the right to life. According to them, protecting vulnerable groups, such as children, demands 
an interpretation of this right that considers the minimum conditions required for a life with 
dignity.42 Significantly, they explained that this includes the right to pursue a life project, which 
“encompasses fully the ideal of the [ADRDM] of proclaiming the spiritual development as the 
supreme end and the highest expression of human existence”.43 
Human dignity has also been mentioned in relation to Article XVII, which guarantees the 
right to judicial personality. According to the IACmHR in the Undocumented Workers v United 
States of America, this right stems from the “sole condition of being human”.44 The state’s 
failure to recognise a person implicates their enjoyment of various other rights, violating their 
inherent human dignity.45 
 
38 OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1993” (11 February 1994) 
OEA/Ser.L/V.85 Doc. 9. rev. Chapter V. 
39 OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2000” (16 April 2001) OEA/ 
Ser./L/II.111 doc. 20 rev. para x. Reiterated in: IACmHR “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights: 2011” (30 December 2011) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69 para 15. See also, OAS “Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights” (5 June 2018) AG/RES. 2928 (XLVIII-O/18) para vii. 
40 Prince Pinder v Commonwealth of the Bahamas (Merits) IACmHR Report No 79/07 (15 October 2007) para 
26. See also, Franz Britton v Guyana (Merits) IACmHR Report No 01/06 (28 February 2006) para 25. 
41 (Merits) IACtHR Series C No 63 (19 November 1999). 
42 (Joint concurring opinion of Judges Cançado Trindade and Abreu-Burelli) para 7. 
43 Para 8. 
44 (Merits) IACmHR Report No 50/16 (30 November 2016) para 94. 




Considering the above, it is clear that human dignity is one of the foundational values of the 
ADRDM, underlying each of the substantive rights enshrined therein. It requires states to 
ensure conditions for a dignified life, implicating minimum standards of rights, including the 
right to education, and the right to not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of rights. 
Based on this interpretation and the state’s obligation to provide an environment conducive to 
the well-being and development of all persons, the right to a dignified life has potential to 
ensure the right to education of children without discrimination based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
6 3 2 Non-discrimination  
The idea that all persons are equal underlies the ADRDM and is enshrined in Article II, which 
provides that: 
 
“All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor”. 
 
This provision establishes both the right to non-discrimination and equal protection of the law, 
prohibiting all forms of discrimination based on the listed grounds or “any other factor”. As a 
point of departure, the IACmHR has explained that the right to equality and non-discrimination 
derives from human dignity and underlies all other rights guaranteed under the ADRDM.46  
Article II requires that all persons be treated equally in law and in fact, placing an obligation 
on states to adopt legislation and public policies aimed at ensuring this, as well as adapting 
existing ones.47 Considering the wording of Article II, it is clear that distinguishing between 
persons based on them belonging to a particular group constitutes discrimination. However, 
differential treatment does not constitute discrimination if it pursues an aim deemed legitimate 
in democratic societies, with the means being reasonable and proportionate to the aim sought 
to be achieved.48 
 
46 Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 81/11 (21 July 2011) para 
47; Mayan Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize (Merits) IACmHR Report No 40/04 (12 October 
2004) para 163. See also, Rafael Ferrer-Mazorro et al v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 
51/01 (4 April 2001) para 238. 
47 Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 80/11 (21 July 2011) 
para 109. 
48 Undocumented Workers v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 50/16 (30 November 2016) 




Compared to the international and regional human rights instruments discussed under 
chapters 4 and 5, Article II provides a limited list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
However, like the other treaties discussed, it too contains an open-ended reference to 
discrimination based on “any other factor”.49 According to the IACmHR in Oscar Elías Biscet 
et al v Cuba,50 this means that any other form of discrimination is prohibited.51  
Although there has been no express confirmation that non-heteronormative SOGIE are 
prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article II, the argument presented is that these are 
protected categories. This argument is supported by four related points. First, that in the 
interpretation of provisions of the ADRDM, recourse must be had to the development of 
international law as reflected in human rights instruments and through customs. In this regard, 
the ACHR is of particular relevance as “an authoritative expression of the fundamental 
principles set forth in the [ADRDM]”.52 Second, that the OAS General Assembly has adopted 
numerous resolutions expressing concern over the human rights violations perpetrated against 
persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE, explaining its impact on numerous other 
rights, as well as recommending that steps be taken to address this. Third, that Articles V 
(protection from attacks on their private and family life) and XVII (recognition of juridical 
personality and civil rights) of the ADRDM support the prohibition of discrimination based on 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. Finally, that the underlying value of human dignity which 
requires states to ensure the well-being of all persons warrants this approach. 
With regard to the first point, the discussion under 6 4 on the ACHR’s prohibition of 
discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE is relevant. If the ACHR is deemed 
authoritative on the fundamental rights enshrined in the ADRDM, the IACtHR’s proclamations 
pertaining to Articles 1(1) and 24 of the ACHR is arguably applicable to Article II of the 
ADRDM. Moreover, the IACtHR has drawn extensively from international law to establish 
non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds of discrimination.  
Concerning the second point, it is important to note that OAS General Assembly adopted 
its first resolution on human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity in 2008. In this 
resolution, it expressed concern over the human rights violations committed against persons 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.53 This was followed by the establishment 
of a Unit on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Intersex Persons in 2011, and the 
 
49 See the text to parts 4 2 3, 4 3 2, 4 4 2, 4 5 2, 4 6 3, 5 3 2 and 5 5 2. 
50 (Merits) IACmHR Report No 67/06 (21 October 2006). 
51 Para 229. 
52 (Merits) IACmHR Report No 40/04 (12 October 2004) paras 86-88. 




subsequent creation of a Rapporteurship on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and 
Intersex Persons (“LGBTI Rapporteurship”) in 2014.54  
In the Annual Reports of the IACmHR, which includes the activities of the LGBTI 
Rapporteurship, there have been numerous expressions of concern and condemnation over the 
human rights violations that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE suffer in both the public 
and private spheres.55 Specific examples include the continuing criminalisation of same-sex 
sexual conduct, the lack of anti-discrimination legislation, and how this prevents persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE from the equal enjoyment of numerous rights.56  
In contrast, the IACmHR has also expressed its approval of increasing recognition of non-
heteronormative marriages and partnerships, as well as of simple administrative procedures for 
the rectification of sex markers on personal documents.57 The efforts of various states in the 
United States of America have been praised, including the prohibition of conversion therapy, 
the utilisation of “x” as a gender marker for persons with non-heteronormative gender 
identities, allowing persons to use public restrooms that correspond to their gender identity, 
and including lessons on the history of non-heteronormative SOGIE in the school curriculum.58  
Considering these statements in light of the obligation imposed by Article II, states have to 
address “deep-seated practices of discrimination, prejudice and negative stereotypes” based on 
non-heteronormative SOGIE, whether real or perceived, through legislation and education.59 
As a result, non-heteronormative SOGIE has been included under “any other factor” as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination.  
Unlike under the ACHR, the IACmHR is yet to determine a violation of the rights of a 
person with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ADRDM. However, in 2016, the IACmHR 
rendered admissible its first case pertaining to discrimination based on gender identity. In 
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Tamara Mariana Adrián Hernández v Venezuela60, it was argued that the state violated various 
rights enshrined under the ADRDM and the ACHR, including Article II of the ADRDM 
because it prohibited an amendment of the identification details of the petitioner to correspond 
to their gender identity.61 Although the IACmHR did not consider the merits of the matter, it 
nonetheless drew attention to the obligation on states to ensure the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative gender identities, providing quick and simple processes to change their names 
and sex or gender markers on their identification documents and records.62  
Considering the third point, the IACmHR’s statements in relation to the recognition of the 
rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE indicates that the right of all persons to 
protection from attacks on their private and family life, as well as the right to legal recognition 
supports an interpretation of Article II that prohibits discrimination based on these grounds. 
This is based on the interpretation of similar rights contained in Articles 3 and 11(2) the ACHR 
respectively, expanded on under 6 4.  
Finally, because human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the individual, all persons 
are entitled to respect for their rights.63 Human dignity is connected to the right to equal 
protection and to not be discriminated against based on belonging to a particular group. 
Ultimately, discrimination prevents the recognition of the inherent dignity of all persons, 
disabling them from enjoying the essential rights due to them, including the right to education. 
 
6 3 3 Education 
Article VII of the ADRDM guarantees the right of the child to special protection, care, and 
aid.64 This provides supplementary protection to children that complements their other rights.65 
Tied to this is the duty imposed on every person to protect their children, with a corresponding 
duty on children to honour their parents.66 These provisions require that children be given 
“assistance and care due to their status as minors” and imposes an obligation on states to adopt 
 
60 (Admissible) IACmHR Report 66/16 (6 December 2016). 
61 Para 2. 
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63 See the text to part 6 3 1. 
64 See the text to parts 4 3 2 3, 4 4 3 4, 4 6 2, 5 4 1 and 5 5 3. The international treaties that provide explicit 
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as children make them vulnerable. 
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measures aimed at ensuring their full development, as well as their right to a decent life.67 In 
this regard, the Rapporteur on the Rights of the Child has drawn attention to the importance of 
creating conditions favourable to the holistic development of children, including the 
implementation of policies and programmes that address the “structural  causes  at  the  origin  
of  situations  of  violations  of  human  rights  and  violence  against  children”.68 
In its interpretation of children’s rights under the ADRDM, the IACmHR draws from the 
CRC and the ACHR as the corpus iurus on children’s rights under inter-American human rights 
law.69 The IACmHR has utilised the CRC to incorporate the definition of a child as a person 
below the age of 18 into the ADRDM. In the same way, it has incorporated children’s right to 
non-discrimination, to participate in decision-making on matters that affect their lives, the right 
to life, survival, and development, and to have their best interests taken into consideration in 
all matters concerning them.70 The IACmHR, in its 1997 Annual Report, confirmed that all 
decisions that affect the rights of the child must be made with due consideration of their best 
interests.71 As a right that complements all other children’s rights, Article VII underlies the 
right to education, enshrined in Article XII. 
Article XII enshrines a comprehensive right to education. First, it provides that all persons 
have a right to education, which must be free at primary level. Second, education “should be 
based on the principles of liberty, morality, and human solidarity”. Third, it should enable 
people to live a dignified life and to participate in their communities, contributing to its 
improvement. Finally, the right to education includes the right to equal educational 
opportunities. Unique to the ADRDM is that Article XXXI imposes an explicit obligation on 
persons to “acquire at least an elementary [also known as primary] education”. The right to 
education under the ADRDM therefore extends much further than guaranteeing access to 
education.  
As regards the general right to education provided for under Article XII, the Special 
Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights (“SRESCER”) has 
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explained that education is an “intrinsic human right and an indispensable means of realizing 
other rights”.72 Through its concern expressed over inadequate school infrastructure, it can be 
deduced that the right to education includes the right to an accessible and secure educational 
environment.73 Furthermore, the approval articulated over the implementation of policies 
aimed at improving the quality of education indicates that this too is included under the right.74 
The requirement that education “be based on the principles of liberty, morality, and human 
solidarity” speaks to the content of the curriculum and the atmosphere at schools. In its 2017 
Annual Report, the IACmHR underscored the “right of children to receive an education free 
from stereotypes based on ideas of inferiority and subordination”.75 The argument presented is 
that this requires that educational materials cover diverse SOGIE when addressing topics such 
as sexual and reproductive health, presenting it in a manner that normalises diverse SOGIE. 
This argument is supported by the concern expressed by the SRESCER over the violence and 
discrimination perpetrated against children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools by 
administrative staff, teachers, as well as other learners. As a result, it has instructed states to 
implement all necessary measure to combat this and to ensure the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE within their jurisdictions.76 
Related to the above is the right to equal educational opportunities. Through this reference, 
Article XII integrates the right of equal protection of the law and the prohibition of 
discrimination, provided for under Article II, into the right to education.77 The right to equal 
educational opportunities not only necessitates that children be afforded equal access to 
educational institutions but also means that they should be enabled to derive equal benefit from 
education. Thus, in providing for the right to education, states must ensure that all children can 
enjoy this right without discrimination of any kind, including based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE.  
Considering non-discrimination based on religion and not non-heteronormative SOGIE, the 
IACmHR’s decision in Jehovah’s Witnesses v Argentina supports this point.78 It concerned a 
challenge to decree 1867 that entered into force in 1976, prohibiting all the activities of 
 
72 OAS “Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights: 2019” 
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Jehovah’s Witnesses.79 According to the decree, the denomination “maintains principles that 
are contrary to the national character, to the basic institutions of the state and to the fundamental 
principles of this legislation”.80 However, the state did not explain how the activities of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses violated these principles. Of relevance is that children of this faith were 
also prohibited from being assessed at school. This prevented them from accessing equal 
educational opportunities because examinations determine whether learners pass a grade, 
moving on to the next one until they have completed their schooling.81 As a result, the IACmHR 
found violations of the right to equal protection of the law and of children’s right to education 
without discrimination.82 
Article XII furthermore incorporates the right to a dignified life, envisaged under the 
Preamble and Article I, through requiring education to promote children’s right to a dignified 
life and enable them to uplift their communities. 83 This goal can only be achieved if children 
are accorded the special care due to them as minors, focusing on their full development in a 
secure environment, and considering their best interests in all matters concerning them. It is 
therefore imperative that states adopt legislation and implement measures to this end, including 
the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools and at home.84  
 
6 4 American Convention on Human Rights  
6 4 1 A unique right to human dignity 
Article 5 enshrines the right to humane treatment, stating that: 
 
“1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected. 2. No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons 
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. 
 
Article 5 is similar to Article 3 of the ECHR.85 However, what makes it unique is its recognition 
of a broad and autonomous right to respect for human dignity.86 Because Article 5(1) enshrines 
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an autonomous right, it means that conduct can constitute a violation thereof without meeting 
the thresholds for torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment under Article 
5(2). Article 27 further lists Article 5 as non-derogable, meaning that there are no 
circumstances under which State Parties can suspend the right to humane treatment.87 The 
decisions discussed below illustrate the broad application of Article 5(1), drawing attention to 
how the right to human dignity informs all other rights enshrined in the ACHR and is accorded 
to all persons equally, including children and persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras concerned the violation of Article 5 as a result of the 
State’s mistreatment of the victim under detention.88 The IACtHR explained that the right to 
humane treatment and to have one’s life respected emanate from the inherent human dignity of 
all individuals. Violations of these rights therefore indicate a “crass abandonment” of the values 
that underlie the inter-American system.89 Furthermore, because human rights derive from 
human dignity, it is superior to the power of the state, which undertakes to respect the rights 
and freedoms contained in the ACHR. As such, the rights to humane treatment and to have 
one’s life respected “require States Parties to take reasonable steps to prevent situations which 
are truly harmful to the rights protected”.90  
Against this backdrop, it is also significant that the IACtHR in Winston Caesar v Trinidad 
and Tobago held that the right to humane treatment prohibits the use of corporal punishment 
as a criminal sanction or an educational disciplinary measure.91 Regarding the ECtHR’s 
judgment in Tyrer v UK92, the IACtHR held that corporal punishment violates human dignity 
and physical integrity, and is therefore nothing more than institutionalised violence.93  
Where children are involved, the state has a heightened responsibility of protection. This is 
based on Article 19 of the ACHR, which enshrines the right of children to special protection 
as a result of their status as minors. This obligation falls on families, society, and the state.94  
By way of example, the IACtHR in Street Children considered the kidnapping, torture, and 
murder of five persons, including two minors. Its approach illustrates that determining whether 
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there has been a violation of Article 5 requires consideration of the position of the victim, as 
well as the context in which the violation occurred. The extent of the violation of the victim’s 
human dignity depends on their potential vulnerability and ability to protect themselves.95 In 
this regard, some groups may require more protection than others to guarantee their human 
dignity.96  
The child-victims in Street Children were vulnerable because of their status as minors, 
further exacerbated by their position as homeless persons and being unlawfully detained.97 In 
this regard, the IACtHR drew from the CRC to illustrate the obligations resting on states when 
children are involved.98 Reference was made to the right to non-discrimination, the obligation 
to create conditions for the guaranteed survival and development of the child, and the child’s 
right to special protection, amongst others.99 
The IACtHR expressed its strong disapproval of the state’s systemic violation of the rights 
of homeless children within its jurisdiction, stating that it constitutes a double transgression. 
Besides the violation of Article 5, the state’s failure to take reasonable steps to care for these 
children deprived them of the “minimum conditions for a dignified life … preventing them 
from the ‘full and harmonious development of their personality’”.100  
The IACmHR’s decision in Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo v Colombia101 further connects 
human dignity with the importance of human relationships. The IACmHR was tasked with 
determining whether a prison and a judicial authority’s refusal to grant the applicant, an inmate, 
intimate visits with her same-sex partner constituted a violation of her right to respect for her 
physical, mental, and moral integrity. It was explained that conditions of detainment should be 
compatible with human dignity. This included being allowed to have contact with friends, 
partners, families, and legal representatives. Attention was drawn to the sacredness of 
interpersonal relationships and that, even where persons are detained, the state is obligated to 
ensure that these relationships are not intruded upon or limited.102 Because the state’s 
conditions for conjugal visits differentiated based on sexual orientation, the applicant’s request 
 
95 IACtHR Series C No 63 (19 November 1999) paras 157-158, 163 and 166. 
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for an intimate visit with her partner was denied. While in prison, the applicant was also treated 
in a manner that showed a strong aversion towards her sexual orientation. She was also 
addressed in stigmatising language. These incidents, together with her overall experience while 
imprisoned, was found to have violated her right to human dignity.103 Thus, Giraldo is 
important for drawing attention to the sacredness of interpersonal relationships, whether 
heteronormative or non-heteronormative, and its necessity for a dignified life.  
In addition to the importance of relationships to a dignified life, the IACtHR has explained 
the equal importance of self-determination thereto. In its advisory opinion on Gender Identity, 
and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples, the IACtHR reiterated that human 
dignity is founded on self-determination. This requires that persons be seen as “ends in 
themselves in accordance with their intentions, aspirations and life decisions” and be treated as 
equals.104 Self-determination is central to the right to human dignity, as well as to the right to 
respect for private life, enshrined in Article 11.105 The right to respect for private life requires 
that all persons be allowed to define and develop their aspirations and personalities, and live 
according to their values, beliefs, and interests.106 Article 7(1), which contains the right to 
personal freedom, adds to Articles 5 and 11 that individuals are entitled to make their own 
decisions as to the organisation of their personal and social lives, placing them as “masters of 
themselves and their own acts”.107 As such, all persons have a right to choose and live their 
identities because the right to a dignified life requires it.108 
 
6 4 2 Non-discrimination 
6 4 2 1 Defining non-discrimination under Article 1(1) 
Article 24 of the ACHR enshrines the right to equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law, thereby establishing an autonomous right to equality. In comparison, Article 1(1) 
places a general obligation on State Parties to respect and guarantee the rights enshrined under 
the ACHR without discrimination, making it an accessory right. This is similar to the non-
discrimination provisions of the European and international human rights instruments 
discussed under chapters 4 and 5.  
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On the one hand, where there is an allegation of discrimination in respect of state obligations 
to respect and guarantee a right enshrined under the ACHR, the claim should be examined 
under Article 1(1) read with the substantive provision invoked. On the other hand, where 
alleged discrimination concerns unequal protection under domestic law, the claim should be 
examined in terms of Article 24.109  
The right to equality and non-discrimination stem from the “oneness of the human family 
and is linked to the essential human dignity of the individual”.110 As such, these rights are 
inseparable. In its advisory opinion on the Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented 
Migrants, the IACtHR explained that the rights to equality and non-discrimination have 
become part of the ius cogens of international law. This is because the “legal structure of 
national and international public order” rests on these rights, which “permeates all laws”.111 
Like the international and European treaties discussed under chapters 4 and 5, the ACHR 
does not define discrimination. However, in its application of Articles 1(1) and 24, the IACtHR 
and IACmHR have put forth several definitions. In Juridical Condition and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants, discrimination was defined as “any exclusion, restriction or privilege 
that is not objective and reasonable, and which adversely affects human rights”.112 Similarly, 
in its advisory opinion on the Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-
sex Couples, discrimination was interpreted as referring to treating persons as either superior 
or inferior to others based on their belonging to a particular group.113 However, as with other 
non-discrimination provisions discussed, affirmative action measures aimed at addressing 
inequalities do not constitute discrimination. In fact, states are obligated to adopt measures to 
address practices and legislation that are detrimental to particular groups.114 From the 
definitions provided, it is clear that there are at least two elements to consider when determining 
discrimination under the ACHR: (i) there has to exist differential treatment; and (ii) for the 
differentiation to constitute discrimination, it has to be unreasonable to differentiate under such 
circumstances.  
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Where differential treatment is based on one of the listed grounds of Article 1(1), 
discrimination is presumed. This is because these grounds often relate to “permanent personal 
traits that an individual cannot dispose of without losing his or her identity … [and involves] 
groups that are traditionally marginalized, excluded or subordinated”.115 The reference to “any 
other social status” means that the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination is neither 
exhaustive nor restrictive. Because discrimination is presumed in these circumstances, it is for 
the impugned state to prove that the differential treatment is legitimate. The focus is on the 
state’s onus of proof.  
In Yatama v Nicaragua116, the IACtHR found that the new electoral legislation of Nicaragua 
violated the political participation rights of indigenous minorities as the reform meant that only 
political parties could contest elections.117 Because political parties are not characteristic of the 
indigenous minorities of Nicaragua, this section of the population was excluded from political 
participation.118 At issue was whether this infringement resulted in a violation of Article 24 
read with Article 1(1).  
According to the IACtHR, Articles 1(1) and 24 places an obligation on states to take positive 
and negative measures to ensure that it does not discriminate in its laws or practices and that it 
promotes equal recognition and protection before the law.119 This includes that vulnerable and 
marginalised groups be enabled to exercise their rights on equal terms.120 The state may restrict 
the rights provided to certain groups, but may only do so if it can show that reasonable and 
objective reasons exist that justify the differentiation.121 As a result, the restriction has to be 
provided for in law, necessary in a democratic society, reasonable and proportionate to the 
purpose sought to achieve, and with the least restrictive means available being adopted.122 
Because the new legislation did not consider the position of the ethnic and indigenous 
minorities, the state was violating its obligation to guarantee the right of all persons to 
“participate, in equal conditions, in decision-making on matters that affect or could affect their 
rights and the developments of these communities”.123 
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Similarly, in López Álvarez v Honduras124, the IACtHR explained that where a state seeks 
to restrict a right that affects individual identity, the restriction acquires a serious nature.125 In 
this matter, the applicant was prohibited from speaking his native language while imprisoned, 
whereas other prisoners were not.126 The state had to justify its restriction of the applicant’s 
right to freedom of thought and expression enshrined in Article 13(1) of the ACHR.127  Of 
relevance is that the applicant’s native language was spoken by the Garifuna, an ethnic minority 
in Honduras. Because the applicant’s ability to express his identity was at stake, the IACtHR 
indicated that the prohibition is serious.128 As a result, the state therefore had to show that its 
treatment of the applicant was in the public interest and that this interest outweighed the social 
need of ensuring the right to freedom of expression.129 Because the state could not do so, it was 
found to have violated Article 1(1) read with Article 13(1) as a result of the discrimination 
suffered by the applicant due to his ethnicity, as well as Article 24, for subjecting the 
application to unequal treatment.130 
The Yatama and López Álvarez judgments illustrate that Articles 1(1) and 24 impose 
onerous obligations on states to ensure the rights enshrined under the ACHR. Where the nature 
of the right that is being infringed affects human dignity and self-determination, the onus on 
the state and the weight of the reasons it should present as justification increases. Against this 
backdrop, the manner in which IACtHR and IACmHR’s went about establishing non-
heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds of discrimination will be considered. The 
decisions discussed below illustrate that the progressive recognition and protection of the rights 
of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE does not necessarily have to follow the approach 
under the European system.131 Under the Inter-American system, “decriminalisation of 
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6 4 2 2 Decisions that established non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination 
Atala Riffo and daughters v Chile133 is a landmark judgment of the IACtHR for establishing 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 1(1) of the ACHR. 
Of relevance is the IACtHR’s discussion on whether the Chilean Supreme Court’s decision to 
remove Ms Atala’s daughters from her custody arbitrarily infringed on her right to respect for 
her private life, and whether it constituted discrimination based on her sexual orientation. 
The IACtHR departed from the obligation imposed on State Parties by the ACHR to respect 
and guarantee the rights enshrined therein without discrimination. As a result, discrimination 
is per se incompatible with the object and purpose of the ACHR.134 Because the purpose of the 
ACHR is to protect human rights, the reference to “any other social condition” in Article 1(1) 
should be given the meaning that is most favourable to ensuring the protection of human rights 
through non-discrimination.135  
As a human rights treaty, the ACHR is a living instrument that must be interpreted in a 
manner that evolves with changing times, reflecting the current state of affairs in the inter-
American and global context. Importantly, as expressed by the IACtHR, Article 29 of the 
ACHR read with the Vienna Convention requires this approach.136 The IACtHR, therefore, 
drew from the ICCPR and the ECHR in support of the prohibition of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.137 Considering the general obligation imposed on states by the ACHR in 
light of the ICCPR and the ECHR, the IACtHR held that “[a] right granted to all persons cannot 
be denied or restricted under any circumstances based on their sexual orientation”.138 The 
IACtHR therefore rejected the state’s argument that there was a lack of consensus on whether 
sexual orientation constitutes a prohibited ground of discrimination at the time of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. Given the historical and structural discrimination that sexual minorities have 
suffered and continue to suffer, an alleged lack of consensus as to the recognition of persons 
with non-heteronormative sexual orientation cannot be accepted as a valid argument for 
restricting their rights.139  
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Having established that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of discrimination under 
Article 1(1) of the ACHR, the IACtHR turned to determine whether the Supreme Court’s 
differential treatment of Ms Atala centred around her sexual orientation. If so, discrimination 
would be presumed, and the state would have to prove that its conduct was justifiable. Where 
a right is restricted based on sexual orientation, weighty reasons will have to be presented to 
justify the differentiation.140 
For purposes of establishing that the applicant was subject to differential treatment, it was 
sufficient to show that her sexual orientation was taken into account in the decision-making.141 
In this regard, the IACtHR considered the arguments and decisions of the national judiciary as 
well as the language used.142 It was clear that the proceedings focused on the potentially 
harmful consequences of the applicant’s sexual orientation for the development of her 
daughters, and that, as a result, it would be in their best interest to be removed from her care.143 
Because there was a link between the applicant’s sexual orientation and the Supreme Court’s 
decision, discrimination was presumed.  
The state argued that the Supreme Court’s decision was made in the best interests of the 
children involved. According to the IACtHR, protecting the child’s best interests is a legitimate 
aim that justifies the limitation of various rights.144 However, determining the child’s best 
interests requires assessing specific parental behaviour, in this case, the applicant’s decision to 
cohabit with her same-sex partner and the “real and proven damage or risk to the child’s well-
being” and development.145 This means that mere speculation cannot be relied on and that a 
causal link has to exist between the applicant’s sexual orientation and the real harm caused.146 
If not, the decision would be exclusively based on harmful stereotypes.147 
It was further alleged that the children experienced social discrimination as a result of their 
mother’s sexual orientation. The IACtHR rejected this argument because should such an 
argument be accepted, the state would be perpetuating societal intolerance and discrimination 
against persons based on their non-heteronormative sexual orientation. This would undermine 
the general obligation imposed on states to ensure the effective guarantee of the rights 
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enshrined under the ACHR, impede the state from promoting social progress, and ultimately 
risk legitimising certain forms of discrimination.148 
The Supreme Court further relied on speculation suggesting that living with their mother 
and her same-sex partner caused the daughters to confuse sex roles and that this would harm 
their development.149 The IACtHR rejected this argument, referring to both national and 
international jurisprudence where it has been held that there is no evidence suggesting that 
being raised in a non-heteronormative home, in comparison with a heteronormative one, is 
detrimental to the development of the child.150  
Moreover, of significance is the Supreme Court’s statement that the applicant, when 
deciding to cohabit with her same-sex partner, placed her own interests above those of her 
children.151 According to the IACtHR, the right to non-discrimination based on sexual 
orientation extends to a person’s expression thereof.152 Here, the IACtHR drew from the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the right to respect for private life, stating that all persons have a 
“right to establish and develop relationships with other people … including the right to 
establish and maintain relationships with people of the same sex”.153 The right to respect for 
private life is linked to the right to freedom of expression, self-determination, as well as human 
dignity.154 Arguing that the applicant is placing her own interests above those of her daughters 
not only perpetuates the traditional roles that women are expected to fulfil as caretakers but 
would require her to denounce an essential part of her identity.155  
The right to respect for private life under the ACHR is formulated somewhat differently 
than its corresponding provision under the ECHR.156 Whereas Article 8 enshrines the right to 
respect for private life, Article 11 provides that all persons have the right to respect for their 
honour and to have their dignity recognised. However, Article 11(2) nonetheless provides that 
“[n]o person may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life”. Like 
under the ECHR, private life under the ACHR also does not have an exhaustive definition.157 
The right may be limited, but only where it complies with the same requirements as should be 
satisfied where discrimination is involved: the restriction should be provided for in law, pursue 
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a legitimate goal, be suitable, necessary and proportional, “in other words, they must be 
necessary in a democratic society”.158 
Because sexual orientation is an integral aspect of a person’s private life, a decision to 
interfere therewith must meet the requirements set out. During the Supreme Court proceedings, 
various aspects of the applicant’s private life were exposed in justifying that removing her 
daughters from her care was in their best interests. Although ensuring the best interests of the 
child is a legitimate goal, the domestic courts went beyond examining aspects related to her 
suitability as a parent, acting in a manner that was unsuitable and disproportionate to the aim 
sought to achieve. As a result, the IACtHR found a violation of Articles 11(2) and 1(1).159 
Homero Flor Freire v Ecuador160 concerned a claim that discharging the applicant from the 
armed forces based on his perceived sexual orientation and engagement in homosexual sexual 
acts constituted discrimination under Article 1(1) and amounted to unequal treatment under 
Article 24.161 The applicant argued that the differentiation between the disciplinary action taken 
in respect of heterosexual and homosexual sexual acts constituted discrimination. Whereas the 
former resulted in a maximum 30-day suspension, the latter resulted in discharge.162  
In considering the claim, the IACmHR explained that a state’s decision to adopt measures 
towards ensuring discipline within its armed institutions is a legitimate aim. However, the 
means adopted must be crucial to achieving this – it has to be the least restrictive means 
available.163 Discharging the applicant based on his engagement in homosexual sexual acts 
cannot be deemed a reasonable manner to ensure discipline. Rather, it ascribes a:  
 
“[N]egative moral value to the sexual act between persons of the same sex itself, in addition to 
promoting the stigmatization of gay, lesbian or bisexual persons, those perceived as such, or those 
who maintain relations with persons of the same sex inside and outside the armed forces”.164 
 
As a result, the means utilised was unsuitable to the aim sought to achieve as it arbitrarily 
distinguished between persons based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation, resulting 
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in the criminalisation of homosexuality in the armed forces.165 The state was thus found in 
violation of Articles 1(1) and 24.166  
Like Atala and Freire, Duque v Colombia167 similarly dealt with a claim of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Of relevance for the discussion is the argument that the state’s 
denial of survival’s pension benefits to the applicant violated Articles 1(1) and 24 of the 
ACHR.168 Survival’s pension benefits were provided to the surviving permanent partners of 
the deceased. Because the state did not recognise same-sex partnerships, the applicant did not 
meet the requirements. Thus, only heterosexual partners would qualify.169 
The IACtHR reiterated that Article 1(1) obligates states not to discriminate in the protection 
and guarantee of the rights enshrined in the ACHR. Furthermore, Article 24 requires that states 
provide equal recognition before and protection of the law.170 Because sexual orientation is a 
prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 1(1), the state had to show that the 
differentiation fulfils an imperative social need and that the measure adopted is the only means 
available to achieve the purpose set out. It was found that the state could not present a 
reasonable or objective purpose for the differentiation.171 As a result, the state discriminated 
against the applicant based on his sexual orientation for not recognising the rights that stem 
from his same-sex relationship. The IACtHR held that the inheritance rights that stem from 
permanent partnerships should also be extended to same-sex couples.172 
Whereas Atala, Freire, and Duque concerned sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination, Luiza Melinho v Brazil173 dealt with gender identity. In Melinho, it was argued 
that the state’s refusal to allow the applicant to undergo gender affirmation surgery at a public 
hospital, or to carry the costs incurred for this procedure at a private hospital, violated the 
applicant’s right to equal treatment, a dignified life, as well as respect for her private life. 
Furthermore, it was contended that the state’s refusal resulted in discrimination based on 
gender identity.174  
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Because the IACmHR only had to determine whether the matter was admissible, it did not 
engage with the merits. However, attention was nonetheless drawn to the prohibition of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity as it constitutes “essential 
components of people’s private lives”.175 Moreover, the “right to privacy guarantees spheres 
of intimacy that neither the state nor anyone else can invade”.176 Based on this statement, 
Vollmer argues that:  
 
“Finding a violation of the ACHR from the facts of Melinho would suggest that states not only have 
negative obligations to respect gender identity but also positive obligations to actively assist in 
facilitating the amelioration of a trans individuals physical and psychological sex through gender 
affirmation surgery, when requested”.177 
 
Atala, Freire, Duque, and Melinho all contributed to establishing various aspects related to 
protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. However, the IACtHR’s 
advisory opinion on the Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex 
Couples, published in 2017 (5 years after the Atala judgment was handed down), is ground-
breaking for clarifying states’ obligations in respect of recognising, protecting, and ensuring 
the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
     The government of Costa Rica raised five questions in relation to two issues on which it 
wanted the opinion of the IACtHR. The first issue related to the recognition of non-
heteronormative gender identities, and the second to same-sex patrimonial rights.178 It is 
significant that before considering the questions posed, the IACtHR first discussed the most 
recent international understanding of various SOGIE-related concepts.179 The comprehensive 
list of terms considered illustrate an awareness of the fluid nature of SOGIE and challenges the 
constructionist and cultural relativist norm of seeking to define sexual orientation and gender 
identities within a heteronormative framework. Thus, the IACtHR placed a queer theoretical 
framework at the centre of its advisory opinion.180 
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Relying on Article 29 of the ACHR and the Vienna Convention, the IACtHR drew from 
international and European standards to inform its interpretation of the right to equality and 
non-discrimination in respect of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE and the obligations 
it imposes on State Parties.181 In discussing these general principles, the IACtHR echoed many 
of its prior statements.182 Its repetition of these now established principles confirmed that 
equality and human dignity are inseparable and that treating a particular group as inferior or 
superior is incompatible with the purpose of the ACHR.183  
The IACtHR went further than a mere confirmation of its position in Atala, that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited, by specifically considering 
discrimination based on gender identity and gender expression.184 According to the IACtHR, 
gender expression concerns the perception that outsiders have of an individual’s membership 
of a particular group, regardless of whether or not the individual identifies with that group.185 
It explained that: 
 
“The purpose or effect of discrimination based on perception is to prevent or invalidate the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the person 
subjected to such discrimination, irrespective of whether that person self-identifies with a specific 
category. As with other forms of discrimination, the person is reduced to a single characteristic 
attributed to him or her, without taking into account other personal conditions”.186 
 
As stated above, all persons have a right to choose and live their identities because the right to 
a dignified life requires it. The right to identity is part of other rights such as the right to human 
dignity, personal freedom, and respect for private life.187 The individual’s experience and 
expression of their sexual orientation and gender is essential hereto. In this context, the IACtHR 
held that: 
 
“[R]ecognition of gender identity is necessarily linked to the idea that sex and gender should be 
perceived as being a part of the constructed identity that is the result of the free and autonomous 
decision of each person, and without this having to be subject to their genitalia”.188 
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In its opinion, the IACtHR, more so than the European and international bodies, illustrated a 
queer legal theoretical approach to the interpretation of the ACHR. This is evident from its 
understanding that gender is not an objective and unchangeable characteristic. Rather, it 
depends on the individual’s subjective appreciation thereof. This appreciation must be 
protected and cannot be denied out of fear and social or moral prejudice against persons who 
do not conform to the behavioural norms of their societies.189 
A failure to recognise diverse sexual orientations, gender identities or gender expressions 
has the potential to censure whatever diverges from heteronormative perceptions of sex and 
gender, sending the message that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are not entitled to 
the equal recognition and protection of their rights.190 Moreover, a lack of legal gender 
recognition impedes persons with non-heteronormative gender identities and expressions from 
exercising other rights, such as the right to education and health, placing them in an even more 
vulnerable position.191  
Based on the above, the IACtHR held that states are obligated to respect and ensure the 
rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientations, gender identities or gender 
expressions.192 To this end, the right to personal freedom and respect for private life, read with 
the right to a name (Article 18) and juridical recognition (Article 3), requires that states must 
provide for legal gender recognition.193 In support of its decision, the IACtHR drew from 
domestic jurisprudence of OAS Member States as well as decisions of the UNHCHR and the 
ECtHR.194 Of significance is that reference was also made to Principle 3 of the YP, which 
establishes an obligation on states to ensure that procedures exist for the alteration of personal 
identification documents and registers so that it corresponds with the individual’s identified 
gender.195 The IACtHR explained that the procedure for legal gender recognition should allow 
persons to change their names, sex or gender, and photographs on all personal documents and 
registers.196 Importantly, the process should be confidential and only based on the free and 
informed consent of the applicant.197 
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The Costa Rican State also requested the IACtHR’s opinion on which patrimonial rights 
derive from same-sex relationships. As a point of departure, the IACtHR explained that the 
patrimonial rights that stem from the emotional relationship between couples are protected. To 
answer the question posed, the IACtHR had to consider whether same-sex relationships 
constitute families under Articles 11(2) and 17(1) of the ACHR.198  
In its opinion, the IACtHR recognised the importance of families as social institutions. The 
formation of families is a result of the human need for connection, the composition of which 
has evolved over time. As a result, it is impossible to put forth a literal interpretation or establish 
the ordinary meaning of the word “family”.199 Furthermore, although Article 17(2) refers to 
the right of men and women to marry and found a family, its wording does not present an 
exclusive understanding of marriage. Rather, it simply means that this type of marriage is 
expressly protected under the ACHR.200  
Considering the regional context of the ACHR, the IACtHR drew from similar provisions 
of the ADRDM and the Protocol of San Salvador, stating that none of these texts define 
families.201 Reference was also made to the draft texts of the ACHR, with the IACtHR stressing 
that the absence of a reference to same-sex couples as families is insignificant in light of the 
increasing acceptance of non-traditional family models under the ACHR.202  
The IACtHR ultimately turned to a teleological interpretation to determine whether same-
sex couples are protected as families. It drew attention to the assumption that drafters use 
generic terms knowing that the meaning of these terms will change with time.203 As a result, 
the IACtHR and the ECtHR’s assertion that human rights treaties are living instruments, the 
interpretation of which must evolve with time, achieved greater significance.204 The object and 
purpose of the ACHR is to protect the human rights of all persons without distinction. 
Therefore, excluding same-sex couples from the protection offered through a restrictive 
interpretation would defeat this purpose.205 Rather, Articles 1(1) and 24 require that same-sex 
couples be recognised as families. Whereas Article 1(1) requires State Parties to not 
discriminate in the recognition and protection of family rights, Article 24 places an obligation 
on states to ensure that domestic law provides equal protection to non-heteronormative 
 
198 Paras 173-174. 
199 Paras 176-177. 
200 Paras 181-182. 
201 Paras 183-184. 
202 Para 186. 
203 Para 189. 
204 Para 187. 




families.206 Principle 13 of the YP, which protects the right to social security and other social 
protection measures, supports this approach.207 The IACtHR concluded that protecting the 
rights of same-sex families goes beyond patrimonial rights and that states have to adapt their 
domestic legislation to ensure these rights.208  
With regard to the type of patrimonial rights protected by the ACHR, attention was drawn 
to several states in the OAS region who have recognised “civil or de facto unions, and equal or 
same-sex marriage”, as well as the pension, health, and inheritance rights that derive from 
marriage.209 The measures adopted by these states were used to illustrate what can be done to 
ensure the rights of same-sex couples. The adoption of such measures is critical for compliance 
with the ACHR as neither Article 11(2), nor Article 17, protect particular family types. In any 
event, “neither of these provisions can be interpreted to exclude a group of persons from the 
rights recognised therein”.210  
Asserting that there exists a lack of consensus regarding recognising same-sex marriage, 
that the purpose of marriage is procreation, or that philosophical or religious convictions dictate 
that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry cannot be accepted as legitimate reasons 
for limiting these rights. Furthermore, differentiating between heteronormative and non-
heteronormative relationships “does not pass the strict test of equality because … there is no 
purpose acceptable under the Convention for which this distinction could be considered 
necessary and proportionate”.211 The IACtHR expressed criticism towards “creating an 
institution that produces the same effects and gives rise to the same rights as marriage, but that 
is not called marriage”.212 This is because it merely serves “to draw attention to same-sex 
couples by the use of a label that indicates a stigmatizing difference or that, at the very least, 
belittles them”.213 Creating different marriage institutions communicates that non-
heteronormative relations are abnormal. As a result, having different unions for same-sex and 
different-sex partners is prohibited for differentiating based on sexual orientation, and is 
incompatible with the purpose of the ACHR to protect the rights of all persons without 
distinction.214 Finally, the IACtHR reiterated that because human dignity derives from 
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individual autonomy, it includes the right to choose whom to marry. This right speaks to the 
most intrinsic aspect of individual identities. Therefore, where there exists an intention to 
marry, states are obligated to give equal recognition and protection to this intention regardless 
of sexual orientation.215 
 
6 4 3 Education 
6 4 3 1 Exploring the misreading of Article 26  
 During the drafting of the ACHR, there were debates as to whether economic, social, and 
cultural rights should be included and to what extent. Some of the earlier drafts included 
extensive references to these rights, reflecting the ICESCR. However, the draft submitted by 
the IACmHR excluded these references in favour of “only cover[ing] those rights to which 
American states were actually willing to extend protection”.216 A working group was created 
to revise the IACmHR’s draft, culminating in the current version of Article 26.  
Article 26 of the ACHR provides a general right to progressive development, stating that: 
 
“The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international 
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving 
progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in 
the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires”.  
 
Despite recognising the existence of economic, social, and cultural rights, Article 26 does not 
give substance thereto.217 Furthermore, the jurisprudence on Article 26 is limited. Most matters 
brought to the IACmHR and IACtHR under the ACHR have concerned the violation of civil 
and political rights that occurred under the authoritarian regimes of many OAS states. 
Moreover, until the IACtHR’s decision in Acevedio Buendia v Peru218, the perception was that 
individuals could not plead the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights. Because the 
obligation is one of progressive realisation, the argument was that it does not provide a basis 
for legal action.219  
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Melish explains that the perception that Article 26 is not actionable stems from a misreading 
thereof which understands progressive development as the only obligation.220 According to this 
understanding, determining a violation of Article 26 would require the IACtHR to consider 
“statistical progress or setbacks over broad population aggregates”.221 However, because the 
IACtHR only has jurisdiction where there is a clear individual victim and a causal connection 
between the harm suffered and state conduct, it cannot adjudicate on matters of progressive 
development or realisation. As a result, the IACtHR has preferred to adjudicate social and 
economic rights under Chapter II of the ACHR, the rights of which are subject to the general 
obligations set out under Chapter I.222  
In 2003, 6 years before the Acevedo Buendia decision, the IACtHR in Five Pensioners v 
Peru223 considered the application of Article 26. For purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient 
to note that it was held that Article 26 can only be invoked where state conduct affects the 
entire population.224 However, in a separate concurring opinion, judge Roux Rengifo criticised 
this position, arguing that the IACtHR’s contentious jurisdiction does not authorise it to 
monitor the general human rights position of a particular state.225 Melish agrees, drawing 
attention to that the IACtHR only has jurisdiction where a specific human rights violation is 
alleged.226  
Despite the criticism against Five Pensioners, Melish explains that its significance lies in 
the IACtHR’s expression of economic, social, and cultural rights having both an individual and 
collective dimension.227 Whereas the collective dimension of economic, social, and cultural 
rights necessitates its progressive realisation, its individual dimension requires State Parties to 
respect and ensure rights without discrimination through the immediate adoption of appropriate 
measures.228 In this sense, the IACtHR signalled that Articles 1(2) and 2 applies to Article 26, 
as expressed in Acevedio Buendia.229  
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As mentioned above, Acevedio Buendia was the first judgment in which the IACtHR 
expressly took a stand on Article 26.230 The matter concerned a complaint of non-compliance 
with judgments of the Constitutional Court of Peru, ordering the state to reimburse pension 
amounts owed after arbitrarily reducing it.231 The IACmHR alleged violations of Articles 21 
(right to property) and 25 (right to judicial protection), read with Article 1(1) of the ACHR.232 
The state raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the IACtHR did not have jurisdiction to 
rule on the alleged violation of the right to social security as neither the ACHR, nor the Protocol 
of San Salvador, protects this right.233 In rejecting this, the IACtHR stated that: 
 
“As a judiciary organ, this Tribunal, in exercise of the authority vested in it, may determine the scope 
of its own jurisdiction (competence de la competence) … Moreover, the Tribunal has asserted on 
other occasions, that the broad wording of the Convention indicates that the Court has full 
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to its Articles and provisions … [Therefore,] the Court is 
competent to decide whether the State has failed to comply with or violated any of the rights 
enshrined in the Convention, even the aspect concerning Article 26 thereof”.234 
 
With reference to the drafting of Article 26, it was explained that the provision was formulated 
intentionally wide to allow the IACtHR to give content to social, economic, and cultural 
rights.235 The IACtHR indicated that although Article 26 is enshrined in Chapter III (economic, 
social, and cultural rights) of the ACHR, it is nonetheless part of Chapter I (general 
obligations), which places an obligation on State Parties to the ACHR to respect all the rights 
enshrined therein and to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect thereto.236 
Despite holding that Article 26 is actionable, the IACtHR did not find a violation thereof. 
Rather, it held that judicial non-compliance was at the core of the matter.237 As a result, the 
progressive realisation of social rights was not at stake, but the rights to judicial protection and 
property. Confusingly, the IACtHR concluded its discussion on whether there was a violation 
of Article 26 by stating that: 
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“[T]he commitment requested from the State by Article 26 of the Convention consist in the adoption 
of measures … with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of certain economic, social 
and cultural rights. In this regard, the State’s obligation that derives from Article 26 of the 
Convention is of a different, but complementary, nature to that related to Articles 21 and 25 of that 
treaty”.238 
 
This statement contradicts the IACtHR’s prior assertion that the same standards of obligations 
apply to states, regardless of whether Chapter II or Chapter III rights are concerned. However, 
in Cuscul Piraval et al v Guatemala239 and Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat 
Association (Our Land) v Argentina240 the IACtHR illustrated that the obligations imposed 
under Chapter I of the ACHR, applies to both Chapters II and III provisions. 
The IACtHR found a violation of Article 26 for the first time in 2018, in Cuscul Piraval. 
The case concerned the state’s failure to provide 49 HIV-positive individuals with medical care 
from 1994 until 2005, after which the state started to provide some assistance to some of these 
individuals. However, it was still inadequate and not made available to all HIV-positive 
individuals.241 In finding a violation of the right to progressive development, the IACtHR drew 
attention to Article 34(i) of the OAS Charter which requires states to “devote their utmost 
efforts to accomplishing the … [p]rotection of man’s potential through the extension and 
application of modern science”. Based on the obligation imposed under Article 34(i), the 
interdependence of human rights, and that human rights treaties are living instruments that must 
be interpreted in light of societal developments, it was held that Article 26 is justiciable.242  
With reference to Poblete Vilches v Chile, it was furthermore reiterated that Article 26 
protects the right to health as a stand-alone right.243 Moreover, as per its judgment in Acevedio 
Buendia, the IACtHR restated that state obligations in respect of economic, social, and cultural 
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rights are both immediate and progressive. In respect of the right to health, states have to 
“immediately ensure access without discrimination to healthcare services … [and] take 
concrete, continuous steps to increase the full enjoyment of the right to health”.244 With regard 
to the state’s immediate obligations, it was indicated that this increases where “individuals face 
an imminent risk of serious harm to life or personal integrity”.245 Moreover, although 
progressive realisation takes into account the resource constraints of the state, the obligation to 
implement measures towards progressive realisation remains. As such, inactivity is 
prohibited.246 
In Our Land, the IACtHR again found a violation of Article 26. It was reiterated that the 
rights guaranteed under this provision derive from the OAS Charter, and that the IACtHR may 
consider other treaties to which the impugned state is bound in determining a violation of 
Article 26.247 Significantly, it was found that the right to a healthy environment, food, access 
to water, and cultural identity all derive from Article 26. The IACtHR also confirmed that states 
must take immediate steps to respect and ensure these rights, as well as to adopt measures for 
its progressive realisation.248  
Against this backdrop of what Melish has referred to as a misreading of Article 26, and the 
recent recognition of the justiciability of Article 26, it is understandable that the IACtHR and 
IACmHR have utilised civil and political rights in order to protect economic, social, and 
cultural rights under the ACHR, including the right to education. In this regard, the right to a 
dignified life and the child’s right to special protections has played a significant role. 
 
6 4 3 2 Interpreting the right to education through children’s right to life and special 
protection 
Article 26 refers to the standards articulated in the OAS Charter. The right to education is 
amongst these, contained in various provisions of the OAS Charter. Article 49 enshrines an 
explicit right to education, providing for compulsory and cost-free elementary education for 
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school-aged children.249 Although the state is not obligated to provide middle-level education 
to all, it must extend it “progressively to as much of the population as possible”. According to 
Article 3(n), education “should be directed towards justice, freedom, and peace”, with Article 
34(h) requiring states to “expand educational opportunities for all”. Article 47 places a further 
obligation on states to encourage education, orienting it toward the “overall improvement of 
the individual, and as a foundation for democracy, social justice, and progress”. These 
provisions illustrate a comprehensive right to education that provides access to education, but 
also expands on what education should seek to achieve. 
The IACtHR and IACmHR have not found violations of the right to education under Article 
26 of the ACHR. This is a direct result of the development of the jurisprudence discussed in 
part 6 4 3 1. The IACtHR and IACmHR have nonetheless aimed to protect the right to education 
through the right to life and children’s right to special protection.  
Article 4(1) of the ACHR guarantees the right to life, stating that “[e]very person has the 
right to have his life respected” and that “[t]his right shall be protected by law”. In turn, Article 
19 of the ACHR guarantees that “[e]very minor child has the right to measures of protection 
required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state”. This is an 
additional right that accrues to children above the rights enshrined in the ACHR that they are 
also entitled to.250  
Street Children, was the first case in which the IACtHR referred to the right to life as 
including the right to a dignified life.251 States have an obligation to ensure the existence of 
“conditions that guarantee a dignified existence”.252 Article 4(1) read with Article 19 requires 
states to take steps that enable children to “harbor a project of life that should be tended and 
encouraged”, as well as to prevent violations of “their physical, mental and moral integrity”.253 
Importantly, the IACtHR drew extensively from the CRC in finding that the measures of 
protection referred to under Article 19 include guaranteeing the development of the child 
without discrimination.254 
For example, in Street Children, the IACtHR referred to at-risk children being victims of 
double aggression where states violate their rights or allow third parties to do so. Although this 
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statement was made in relation to homeless children as a vulnerable group, children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE can arguably also be perceived as an at-risk group in educational 
settings. Their non-compliance with normative patterns of behaviour makes them stand out and 
makes them more susceptible to discrimination and violence.  
The IACtHR’s advisory opinion on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child 
provides the foundation for children’s rights under Article 19.255 The IACmHR requested that 
the IACtHR interpret the CRC insofar as it “might contribute to specify the scope of the 
[ACHR]”. According to the IACtHR, it is authorised to “interpret any treaty as long as it is 
directly related to the protection of human rights in a member state of the inter-American 
system”.256 This includes instruments that were not adopted under the auspices of the OAS. To 
illustrate this point, reference was made to the Street Children judgment, where the IACtHR 
used the CRC to give content to Article 19 of the ACHR.257 Moreover, because all parties to 
the ACHR have ratified the CRC, there exists “a broad international consensus … in favor of 
the principles and institutions set forth in that instrument”.258 Butler argues that, in this way, 
the IACtHR “effectively imported provisions of the CRC into the [ACHR]”.259  
Although Article 19 does not define what a child is, the IACtHR in its advisory opinion on 
the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, defined a child as a person under the 
age of 18.260 Unlike children, adults have the capacity to exercise their rights in a personal and 
direct way. Because children lack this capacity, other adults, whether parents, guardians, or 
representatives, act on their behalf. However, children are nonetheless holders of the same 
inalienable and inherent human rights as adults.261  
Despite the ACHR’s commitment to equal treatment and non-discrimination, differential 
treatment of children will not constitute discrimination where it aims to protect them, “taking 
into consideration [their] situation of greater or lesser weakness or helplessness”.262 
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Nevertheless, the differentiation must not lack reasonable or objective justification.263 This 
approach is in line with international law, which aims to ensure the full and harmonious 
development of the child.264 Here, the IACtHR drew from Article 2 of the CRC and Article 
24(1) of the ICCPR, which recognises the right of the child to protection without discrimination 
based on their condition as a child. The right of the child to special protection is tied to the 
principle of the best interests of the child, which derives from their human dignity.265 
Considering Article 3 of the CRC, the IACtHR held that, despite the best interests principle not 
being expressly provided for in the ACHR, it should be used as a point of departure wherever 
decisions are made on the effective realisation of children’s rights.266 In this manner, the best 
interests principle has been read into Article 19. 
The child’s right to protection and the need to act in their best interests places an obligation 
on states to adopt measures to the maximum of their available resources towards this purpose, 
with due consideration given to the situation of the specific child.267 Provision should also be 
made for children to participate in decision-making that affects their rights or future. Here, 
Article 12 of the CRC offers guidance, stating that the weight attached to a child’s views 
depends on their age and development.268 The IACtHR explained that it is necessary to adjust 
the degree of participation allowed because “there is great diversity in terms of physical and 
intellectual development” amongst children.269  
Relying on Street Children, the IACtHR reiterated that the right to life requires states to 
provide conditions that are conducive to children’s development.270 Attention was drawn to the 
importance of the right to education as an important mechanism through which the right to a 
dignified life is to be realised, and which contributes to the protection of children from 
unfavourable situations.271 It is also “through education that the vulnerability of children is 
overcome”.272 In this sense, the IACtHR explained that the right to education derives from 
Article 4(1). Moreover, in light of Articles 3 and 4 of the CRC and Article 16 of the Protocol 
of San Salvador, the child’s right to protection also enshrines the right to education.273 As such, 
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both Articles 4(1) and 19 protect this right.274 Of particular importance is the IACtHR’s 
statement that “education and care for the health of children require various measures of 
protection and are the key pillars to ensure enjoyment of a decent life by the children”.275 
Regardless of the significance of education to the development of the child and its connection 
to various rights, the IACtHR did not mention it in relation to Article 26.276 
In Juvenile Re-education Institute v Paraguay, the IACtHR considered the impact of 
inhumane conditions at a juvenile institute on the children who were held there.277 For purposes 
of this discussion, the statements made in relation to the right to life, respect for physical, 
mental, and moral integrity, as well as the child’s right to special protection, are important.  
Because the state has heightened control over prisoners, it has to take special care to ensure 
their rights to life and humane treatment.278 Where children are involved, the state “must be all 
the more diligent and responsible in its role as guarantor and must take special measures based 
on the principle of the best interests of the child”.279 Here, the IACtHR drew from Articles 6 
and 27 of the CRC to illustrate that the child’s right to life requires states to ensure the survival 
and development of the child.280 In discussing the content of incarcerated children’s right to a 
dignified life, reference was made to the obligation on states to put in place “special periodic 
health care and education programs”.281 This is because all children, regardless of being 
incarcerated or not, have the right to an adequate education.282 According to the IACtHR: 
 
“Such measures are of fundamental importance inasmuch as the children are at a critical stage in 
their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development that will impact, in 
one way or another, their life plan”.283 
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Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic284 concerned the refusal of birth certificates and 
nationality to children of Haitian descent, born in the Dominican Republic.285 The petitioners 
argued that the State’s refusal rendered the children stateless, making them vulnerable to 
discrimination and the non-recognition of their rights.286 Of particular relevance was the impact 
of the refusal of a birth certificate on one of the children’s ability to attend public school. 
Because she did not have a birth certificate, she could not be registered at a public school. As 
a result, she had to attend evening classes, meant for adults. According to the IACtHR, this 
“exacerbated her situation of vulnerability, because she did not receive the special protection, 
due to her as a child, of attending school during appropriate hours together with children of her 
own age, instead of with adults”.287 In this regard, the IACtHR indicated that Articles 19 and 
26 read with the CRC and the Protocol of San Salvador requires that the State “provide free 
primary education to all children in an appropriate environment and in the conditions necessary 
to ensure their full intellectual development”.288 Similar to the matters discussed above, the 
IACtHR applied the CRC to the ACHR to develop the scope of children’s rights. 
Although finding a violation of the right of the child to juridical personality and her right to 
special protection, Melish criticises the IACtHR’s decision in Yean and Bosico, stating that 
“without a clear merits-based finding of State responsibility for violating the young girl’s right 
to education, that core violation was left without a substantive remedy”.289 The IACtHR’s order 
was silent on the reforms required in relation to the registration procedures at public schools to 
ensure that other children do not suffer similar harm in the future.290 
The child’s right to protection also dictates that no violence against children can be 
justified.291 In its Report on Corporal Punishment and Human Rights of Children and 
Adolescents, the IACmHR explained that the use of corporal punishment on children in the 
inter-American system is prohibited because it contradicts the notion that children are entitled 
to special protection, and infringes on their rights to personal integrity, a dignified life, and not 
to be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.292 Reference was also made to the CRC 
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as setting the standards for protecting children, as provided for under Article 19 of the ACHR, 
confirming the statement made in Street Children.293 The IACtHR explained that the best 
interests of the child principle requires that decisions be made in a manner that guarantees 
children the effective enjoyment of their rights and ensure their full and harmonious 
development.294 In light of the best interests principle, states are obligated to adopt both 
positive and negative measures to protect children against “any form of violence … in every 
realm and by any method”.295 This is particularly important in settings where children are in 
the custody of the state, such as at schools.296  
In Atala, the IACtHR explained that Article 8(1) adds to Article 19 that children have the 
right to be heard in all proceedings that affect their rights.297 In interpreting Articles 8(1) and 
12 of the CRC, which concern the child’s right to be heard, should be considered.298 The 
IACtHR referred extensively to General Comment 12 of the Children’s Committee, stressing 
the relationship between the best interests of the child and the weight to be given to children’s 
views on decisions that have an impact on their lives.299  
The point of departure when ensuring that children have the right to be heard is that they are 
capable of expressing their views. In this regard, children do not have to illustrate a 
comprehensive understanding of the matter, but merely a sufficient understanding. This 
requires that children be informed of the possible decisions that can be made, as well as the 
corresponding consequences. The weight attached to a particular child’s view should depend 
on their capacity and not be uniformly based on their biological age. However, it should be 
borne in mind that “children exercise their rights progressively as they develop a greater degree 
of personal autonomy”.300  
Article 12 not only guarantees children the right to be heard, but requires that their views be 
taken into account.301 This means that where conflict exists between the child’s view and 
parental or institutional authorities, the child’s views can only be disregarded where “weighty 
and profound arguments” are presented.302 The argument presented is that this interpretation 
can be extended to Article 19 in general, as this can contribute to ensuring that children are 
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provided with the special protection due to them, while considering their views on their best 
interests. 
It is important to note the IACtHR’s statement in its advisory opinion on Gender Identity, 
and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples that children too have the right to 
legal gender recognition.303 Protecting children requires “encourag[ing] their development, 
offering them the conditions required to be able to live and develop their capabilities taking 
full advantage of their potential”.304 The IACtHR stipulated that where decisions are made to 
protect children, including the “design of public policies and … the drafting of laws concerning 
childhood”, the four principles set forth in General Comment 5 of the CRC Committee must 
be considered.305 The IACtHR also drew from to Articles 7(1) and 8 of the CRC, which 
provides that all children have the right to a name and to have their identity preserved. 
According to the IACtHR, these two provisions support the notion that children have the right 
to self-determination.306 Based on these considerations, the IACtHR held that the statements 
made regarding the right to legal gender recognition and the procedure to be adopted apply 
equally to children who wish to alter their personal documents to correspond to their identified 
gender. However, this right should be understood in the context of Article 19 of the ACHR and 
the four guidelines established by the CRC Committee. A restriction on the right of the child 
to legal gender recognition for purposes of protecting the child must be “justified based on 
these principles and should not be disproportionate”.307 
Recently, the IACtHR in Guzmán Albarracín v Ecuador308 issued its first judgment 
regarding sexual violence against children in schools. The matter concerned the sexual abuse 
of a schoolgirl, Paola del Rosario Guzmán Albarracín, by her vice principal. Although school 
officials were aware of the ongoing abuse, no one intervened. Moreover, when Paola 
approached the school’s doctor, concerned about being pregnant, he refused to assist her unless 
she had sex with him. Soon thereafter, she committed suicide.309 The IACtHR found the state 
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to be in violation of Paola’s right to education under the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as 
her rights to life, human dignity, and humane treatment under the ACHR read with the right of 
the child to special protection.310 As to the right to education, the IACtHR held that children 
have the right to be safe and free from sexual violence at school. In this regard, states have to 
take steps to “protect girls and adolescents from sexual violence in schools, including by 
monitoring the situation, developing policies of prevention, and establishing simple 
mechanisms for accountability”.311 Moreover, the right to education includes the right to sexual 
and reproductive education.312  
In light of the IACtHR’s judgment in Atala and its advisory opinion on Gender Identity, and 
Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples, it is argued that this should be 
interpreted to mean that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE are also entitled to be safe 
and free from sexual violence at schools and that sexual and reproductive education includes 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. This is further supported by the reference made in Guzmán 
Albarracín as to the “role of patriarchal norms, gender stereotypes, the power imbalance 
between students and educators, and multiple discrimination in sexual violence against girls 
and adolescents”.313 
Unlike under the ICESCR, CRC, ECHR, ESC(r), and the ADRDM, the jurisprudence 
regarding the right to education under the ACHR is much more complex.314 This is a result of 
the IACmHR and IACtHR failure to recognise Article 26 as justiciable. However, considering 
the discussion here in light of the Cuscul Piraval and Our Land judgments, the expectation is 
that the IACmHR and IACtHR will not refrain from finding a violation of the right to education 
under Article 26 in the future. However, in Guzmán Albarracín, the IACtHR did not find a 
violation of the right to education under Article 26, but rather under the Protocol of San 
Salvador. The IACmHR and IACtHR have, nonetheless, given content to the right to education 
through their interpretation of civil and political rights, as well as by drawing from Article 19 
of the ACHR and provisions of the CRC. The result is the guarantee of a comprehensive range 
of rights for children, adding content to their right to education. Significantly, the explicit 
recognition of the rights of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE provides a clear 
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framework for the protection of their right to education and their equal protection in the 
educational environment. 
 
6 5 Further developments in the region: The Protocol of San Salvador and the Convention 
of Belém do Pará 
6 5 1 Protocol of San Salvador 
With the adoption of the ACHR, the IACmHR commenced a discussion on the promotion and 
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights. The Protocol of San Salvador was adopted 
in 1988 as the standard-setting economic, social, and cultural rights document of the region.315 
The Preamble of the Protocol is similar to that of the ACHR, confirming that all persons have 
essential rights that flow from their inherent human dignity and that these rights are therefore 
worthy of protection.  
The Protocol of San Salvador protects a wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
including the right to education.316 The Protocol imposes three overarching obligations on State 
Parties to ensure the realisation of the rights contained therein: (i) to adopt measures; (ii) to 
enact domestic legislation; and to (iii) guarantee the rights set forth without discrimination of 
any kind.317 In this regard, states have to take steps within their available resources for the 
progressive realisation of the rights contained in the Protocol.318  
 Article 19 of the Protocol of San Salvador provides for its implementation. The Working 
Group on the Protocol of San Salvador was created in 2007 and is responsible for the 
monitoring and implementation.319 Member states are required to submit periodic reports to 
the Working Group. After examining these reports, recommendations are made.320 The ACHR 
grants unrestricted competence to the IACtHR and the IACmHR to adjudicate the rights 
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contained therein. In comparison, Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador provides this 
mandate to these bodies only where a violation of trade union rights321 or the right to 
education322 is attributable to a member state. These two provisions are, therefore, the only 
ones that may be directly invoked under the Protocol and in terms of which individual petitions 
may be brought.323 
Despite the wide range of rights protected under the Protocol, the nature of the monitoring 
and implementation of the Protocol means that there is little jurisprudence available on its 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the IACtHR has referred to the Protocol in its interpretation of 
rights enshrined in the ACHR.324  
The IACtHR’s judgment in Gonzales Lluy v Ecuador and Guzmán Albarracín are the only 
two matters in which a violation of the right to education under the Protocol of San Salvador 
was found.325 Because Guzmán Albarracín was discussed under 6 4 3 2, only Gonzales Lluy is 
discussed here. The relevant facts pertain to the expulsion from school of an HIV-positive child 
based on the supposed risk she posed to the right to life of the other learners and staff at the 
school. Domestic courts held that the expulsion was justifiable, as the right to life of a group 
of persons outweighs the individual’s right of access to education. Moreover, the domestic 
courts found that she could still access education through individual and distance learning.326 
Although the IACtHR found a violation of Article 13 of the Protocol of San Salvador in 
relation to Articles 1(1) and 19 of the ACHR, the discussion centred on the obligation resting 
on states to ensure that HIV-positive individuals are not discriminated against in accessing 
education.327 The IACtHR reaffirmed that HIV-status is included as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under the reference to “any other status” under Article 1(1).328 Restricting a 
right on these grounds requires the state to bring serious reasons as justification, with a 
proportional relationship having to exist between the means employed and the legitimate aim 
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sought to be achieved.329 The IACtHR found that the expulsion from school of the child was 
based solely on prejudicial statements of the child’s teacher and the school’s director pertaining 
to her HIV-status, disregarding the medical evidence showing an almost non-existent risk of 
the disease being passed on to other children or persons in the school environment.330  
Despite the protection of the right to life of other learners being a legitimate aim, the 
IACtHR held that the individual circumstances of the child were not taken into 
consideration.331 Rather than evaluating the real and proven risk or harm, the domestic courts 
relied on speculation.332 The means chosen “constituted the most harmful and disproportionate 
of those available to meet the objective of protecting the integrity of other children at the 
school”.333 Expelling the child from attending school infringed on her right to education under 
the Protocol of San Salvador, preventing her from benefitting from the developmental aims of 
education as set forth under the CRC, aimed at reducing children’s vulnerability.334    
 
6 5 2 Convention of Belém do Pará 
The Convention of Belém do Pará was adopted in 1994 to prevent, punish, and eradicate 
violence against women as it is “an offense against human dignity and the manifestation of the 
historically unequal power relations between women and men”.335 Moreover, violence against 
women affects their enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms, preventing “their full and equal 
participation in all walks of life”.336 The Convention has been ratified by 32 out of the 34 OAS 
Member States337 
Chapter IV of the Convention provides the mechanisms of protection and implementation. 
State Parties must submit reports to the inter-American Commission of Women (“Women’s 
Commission”) on the measures taken to address violence against women.338 In 2004, the 
 
329 Para 257. 
330 Para 264. 
331 Para 265. 
332 Para 270. 
333 Para 274. 
334 Para 278. 
335 Preamble to the Convention of Belém do Pará. 
336 Peamble. 
337 OAS “About the Belém do Pará Convention” (2020) OAS <https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/convention.asp> 
(accessed 05-06-2020). 
338 Article 10 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. See also, Articles 11-12. State Parties and the Women’s 
Commission may request an advisory opinion from the IACtHR on the interpretation of a Convention provision. 
Any legally recognised person, group of persons or non-governmental organisation in a particular state may also 
bring a claim against that particular state concerning and alleged violation of Article 7, which sets out the state 




Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention (“MESECVI”) was established.339 It 
operates through a multi-lateral evaluation round, during which Member States have to provide 
information on its compliance with the Convention based on a questionnaire. The MESECVI 
then makes recommendations, published in hemispheric reports.340 
The relevance of the Convention to the topic of this chapter lies in its definition of violence 
against women. In terms of Article 1, violence against women refers to “any act or conduct, 
based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, whether in the public or the private sphere” [own emphasis].341 Considering this 
definition in light of the reports, recommendations, and declarations of the MESECVI, it is 
clear that “woman” is to be understood as all persons who identify as women. In these 
publications, the MESECVI has expressed concern over violence and discrimination against 
women based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE and how it exacerbates their vulnerability 
and impacts their enjoyment of other rights and freedoms. The MESECVI has also explained 
the necessity to provide sexual and reproductive healthcare to all women and drew attention to 
domestic legislation that incorporates non-heteronormative SOGIE rights.342  
According to Article 6(a), the right of women to be free from violence includes the right to 
not be discriminated against, including their right to equal protection of the law. It further 
includes the right of all women “to be valued and educated free of stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour and social and cultural practices based on concepts of inferiority and 
subordination”.343 Article 5 enshrines the right of women to economic, social, and cultural 
rights, indicating that they “may rely on the full protection of those rights as embodied in 
regional and international instruments on human rights”. Related hereto is the obligation on 
states to address the prejudices and customs which support the idea that women are inferior to 
men through education, to remove the legitimisation of violence against women.344 
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Considering these provisions, the Women’s Commission and MESECVI have explained that 
states are required to guarantee “education in sexual and reproductive rights for all [children] 
according to their age” and should “integrate a gender and human rights perspective” in the 
curriculum.345 States should also: 
 
“Include the issue of masculinities in all educational curricula in order to guide the socialization of 
boys and girls, with an emphasis on health and respectful gender and power relations, peaceful 
conflict resolution and the exercise of sexuality in conditions of equality and free from 
discrimination”.346 
 
Considering the references made to the rights of women with non-heteronormative SOGIE, 
together with the expressions made regarding ensuring equal access to education for all women, 
including comprehensive sexual health education, it is argued that there is real potential for 
development under the Convention of Belém do Pará towards more explicit protection in the 
education environment of those who identify as women and the inclusion in the curriculum of 
diverse sexual and reproductive health education. 
 
6 5  Conclusion 
As is evident from the discussion in this chapter, the strongest support for the rights of persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE is found under the inter-American system. Compared to the 
treaties discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the OAS treaty bodies have made great strides towards 
the comprehensive recognition and protection of equal rights for persons of non-
heteronormative SOGIE in a manner not yet seen under the international and European 
systems. This is a result of the willingness of the IACmHR and the IACtHR to give expression 
to the fundamental value of human dignity, as well as a teleological approach to interpretation. 
This chapter discussed the unique approach of the inter-American system in developing the 
rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE in general, drawing attention to how these 
rights are provided for in the educational environment. Although the ADRDM, Protocol of San 
Salvador, and the Convention of Belém do Pará all contribute to this, it is the IACtHR’s 
interpretation of the ACHR that has placed the inter-American system at the global forefront 
of legal developments in this field.  
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In discussing the ADRDM and the ACHR, the importance of human dignity and the notion 
of a dignified life for the protection of all other rights enshrined therein was explained. Ensuring 
the right to human dignity requires states to ensure equality before the law, and equal protection 
of the law, requiring that discrimination be prohibited. The discussion proceeded to illustrate 
that the IACmHR and the IACtHR have, through their respective mandates, established the 
clear prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identities, and gender 
expressions under the ACHR. The ADRDM too prohibits discrimination on these grounds. 
However, the jurisprudence is less developed as a result of most OAS states being bound by 
the ACHR, claims therefore having to be considered in terms thereof. 
The right to education under the ADRDM is similar to the ICESCR, CRC, ECHR, and the 
ESC(r). In contrast, the development of the right to education under the ACHR has been more 
complex as a result of the formulation and initial interpretation of Article 26. Because the 
IACmHR and IACtHR have not yet had the opportunity to interpret the right to education in 
light of Article 26, it remains to be seen what the content thereof will be. However, based on 
the tendency of the IACmHR and the IACtHR to draw from the right to a dignified life and the 
child’s right to special protection under the ACHR in protecting the right to education, and the 
recourse made to the CRC and the Protocol of San Salvador, the expectation is that the right to 
education will be interpreted similarly to the CRC. 
The significance of the IACtHR’s approach to the protection of the rights of the child is the 
incorporation of broad principles under Article 19. These principles were drawn from the CRC 
and include the right to non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, the right of the child 
to be heard, as well as their right to life, survival, and development. It has great potential for 
further developing the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
the inter-American system as these principles must inform all decisions made in giving effect 
to the rights of the child. Moreover, the IACtHR’s proclamation in its advisory opinion on 
Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples as to the right of 
the child to legal gender recognition is particularly telling for future developments pertaining 
to all children’s rights, including their right to education. 
Chapter 7 will provide an analysis of the right to education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. Because 
the African human rights system is much younger than the international, European, and inter-
American human rights systems, there has been less development of the rights of persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE, in general. Regardless, the African Commission and African 




Commission and the African Court have drawn extensively from the international, European, 
and inter-American human rights systems in their interpretation of the right to human dignity 
and the right to non-discrimination, in particular. Chapter 7, therefore, incorporates the 
principles established under chapters 4 to 6 insofar as it can assist in establishing an 
interpretation of the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the 




7  The right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
regional African human rights law 
7 1  Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. Similar to the 
discussions in chapters 4 to 6, this chapter aims to provide an interpretation of the right to 
human dignity, non-discrimination, and the best interests of the child that protects the right to 
education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. The point of departure of this chapter 
is that the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol provide equal rights to all persons, 
including those with non-heteronormative SOGIE. It is argued that, through the ACRWC, the 
rights guaranteed under these treaties also extend to children.  
In the interpretation of these instruments, it is important to bear in mind that there has been 
no decision dealing specifically with the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
by the African Commission, the African Court or the ACERWC. This is in stark contrast with 
the international, European, and inter-American systems, all of which have established the 
rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. However, as pointed out in chapter 1, this 
is what makes analysing the African regional human rights system, in light of the international 
and other regional human rights systems, so critical. This examination enables the research to 
make recommendations as to how African human rights bodies could, and arguably should, 
interpret the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
7 2 The African human rights system 
Established with the adoption of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (“OAU 
Charter”)1 in 1963, the African human rights system is the youngest regional human rights 
system. The OAU Charter was adopted against the backdrop of the liberation of the continent 
from colonisation. It focused on self-determination, the protection of the independent state, and 
creating African unity.2 The OAU transformed itself into the AU in 2000 with the adoption of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union.3 The shift was necessitated by the increasingly 
democratic political landscape of the African continent.4 Like the OAU Charter, the 
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Constitutive Act of the AU reiterated the importance of African unity. Importantly, it includes 
explicit references to the promotion and protection of human rights as an objective of the AU.5 
In this way, human rights play a more significant role under the AU than under the OAU.6 
The ACHPR was adopted in 1981 by the OAU and entered into force in 1986.7 Comparable 
to the human rights treaties discussed under chapters 4 to 6, the purpose of the ACHPR is to 
promote and protect the human rights of all persons. In its Preamble, the ACHPR recognises 
that “fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which justifies their 
national and international protection”. As a result, all forms of discrimination must be 
eradicated.  
The ACHPR protects a wide range of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social, 
and cultural rights. Although the drafters drew inspiration from existing international and 
regional systems, the ACHPR is unique in that it also protects peoples’ rights and requires that 
African values and historical traditions be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the 
rights enshrined therein.8  
Similar to the human rights treaties discussed under chapters 4 to 6, the ACHPR requires 
member states to recognise the rights and freedom enshrined therein and to “adopt legislative 
or other measures to give effect to them”.9 The point of departure is that states bind themselves 
to human rights instruments aware of the obligations imposed upon them.10 Upon ratification, 
states therefore undertake to bring its legislation and practices in line with the ACHPR as soon 
as possible and must take immediate steps to do so.11 In this regard, the African Commission 
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recognition that the human rights situation in African states is of concern to each individual state. 
8 Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights System” in International Protection of Human Rights 570-571: 
Although not defined in the ACHPR, “peoples” have been interpreted to refer to all persons living in a state, as 
well as distinct groups. See also, Preamble to the ACHPR; Jawara v Gambia (Communication No 147/95; 149/96) 
[2000] ACHPR 17 (11 May 2000) para 173 (“Jawara”); Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia (Communication 
No 211/98) [2001] ACHPR 31 (7 May 2001) (“LRF v Zambia”) para 73. 
9 Article 1 of the ACHPR. See also, (Communication No 147/95; 149/96) para 46; Amnesty International v Sudan 
(Communication No 48/90; 50/91; 52/91; 89/93) [2018] ACHPR 11 (15 November 2018) para 42 (“Amnesty 
International”). According to the African Commission in Jawara, “Article 1 gives the Charter the legally binding 
character always attributed to international treaties of this sort. Therefore, a violation of any provision of the 
Charter, automatically means a violation of Article 1”. Moreover, in Amnesty International, the African 
Commission explained that Article 1 requires states to bring its legislation in line with the ACHPR. 
10 Purohit v the Gambia (Communication 242/01) [2003] ACHPR 49 (29 May 2003) (“Purohit”) para 41. 




in Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria12 explained that state parties to human rights treaties are obligated to “respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil” all rights enshrined therein.13  
The African Commission and the African Court oversee and ensure the implementation of 
the ACHPR. The ACHPR created with it the African Commission, which started functioning 
in 1987.14 The African Commission has both a protective and promotional mandate. Whereas 
its protective mandate is concerned with considering complaints of alleged violations of the 
ACHPR, its promotional mandate is concerned with examining state reports and adopting 
corresponding thematic and country-specific resolutions aimed at enhancing the protection of 
human rights in African states.15 Although it has a protective mandate, the African Commission 
is not empowered to “grant remedies to redress the violations nor to enforce its orders”.16 
Rather, the Commission compiles a report with recommendations which is sent to the 
impugned state.17  
Articles 60 and 61 of the ACHPR provides that, in the interpretation of the ACHPR, the 
Commission shall draw from international law, including the UN Charter, UDHR, and other 
UN-based treaties. In terms of Article 60 of the ACHPR, recourse should be had to human 
rights treaties that AU member states are bound to.18 Moreover, Article 61 provides that other 
international conventions and “African practices consistent with international norms” should 
also be considered insofar as it sets out recognised legal principles.19 With regard to these two 
provisions, the African Commission in General Comment 2 established that international and 
 
12 (Communication No 155/96) [2001] ACHPR 34 (27 October 2001) (“SERAC”) paras 44-47. 
13 Paras 44-47. The obligation to respect places a negative duty on the state and requires it to “refrain from 
interfering in the enjoyment of all fundamental rights”. The failure to comply with a negative obligation may, 
therefore, constitute a violation of the ACHPR. In contrast, the obligation to protect, promote, and fulfil requires 
positive action from the state. Protection demands the adoption of legislation and provision of effective remedies 
where rights have been infringed. This is tied to the duty to promote, which expects states to create conditions for 
the realisation of all rights. Finally, the obligation to fulfil, similar to the duty to promote, requires states to “move 
its machinery towards the actual realisation of the rights”. 
14 Article 30 of the ACHPR. 
15 Articles 45-47, 55-56, and 66. See also, Parts Two and Three of the Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 2 to 13 February 1988, revised from 19 February to 4 March 
2020, entered into force 2 June 2020). 
16 Chirwa “African Regional Human Rights System” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 335. 
17 335: According to Chirwa, implementing the findings of the African Commission has been sparse as a result of 
a lack of political will from African states. The African regional human rights system has, therefore, been 
described as the least effective of the regional systems. 
18 Article 60 of the ACHPR.  




regional human rights treaties are valuable for setting benchmarks to measure the application 
and interpretation of the ACHPR against.20  
The African Court was created in 1998 with the adoption of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“Protocol”).21 With the entering into force of the Protocol in 2004, an independent court with 
advisory and contentious jurisdiction was established.22 The African Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction allows it to “provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any 
other relevant human rights instrument”.23 There have been limited requests for advisory 
opinions. Apart from one, all requests have been struck out, withdrawn, or declared as 
inadmissible under Article 4(1) of the Protocol for not being submitted by an African 
organisation recognised by the AU.24  
 In terms of the African Court’s contentious jurisdiction, and considering their overlapping 
mandates, it is from the outset important to note two main distinctions between the African 
Commission and the African Court. First, the African Court’s judgements are binding. Second, 
the African Court is empowered to grant remedies where a violation has been found.  
The African Court’s contentious jurisdiction only applies in respect of states who have 
ratified the Protocol. The African Commission provides indirect access to the Court, regulated 
by the amended Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which entered into force on 2 June 2020. Rule 130 provides that the Commission may, prior to 
its decision on the admissibility of a communication, refer that communication to the Court. 
However, this is dependent on the relevant state having ratified the Protocol. If a 
 
20 African Commission “General Comment 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa” (adopted 
28 April-12 May 2014) para 2. 
21 (adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004). 
22 Articles 4-5 of the African Court Protocol. See also, Parts IV (contentious procedure) and V (advisory 
procedure) of the Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force 2 June 2010). 
23 Article 4 of the African Court Protocol. 
24 African Court “Advisory Proceedings” (2020) <https://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-
19-35#finalised-opinions> (accessed 26 July 2020). See also, Request for Advisory Opinion by the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Advisory Opinion) (2014) 1 AfCLR 725. This is 
the only advisory opinion that has been delivered. It did not concern the interpretation of a substantive provision 
of the ACHPR. Rather, the question posed was whether the Committee of Experts, the enforcement mechanism 
of the ACRWC, has standing before the African Court. It was held that the Committee of Experts may request an 
advisory opinion, but that it cannot submit a contentious matter to the African Court. Currently, there is one 
opinion pending before the African Court. As a result, the advisory opinions of the African Court are of limited 




communication is referred to the Court, the African Commission also becomes an applicant to 
the proceedings.25  
For individuals or non-governmental organisations to have direct access to the African 
Court, Article 5(3) requires states to make an Article 34(6) declaration.26 However, of the 55 
member states to the AU, only 30 are party to the African Court Protocol. Of the 30, only ten 
states have made this declaration. However, of these 10, 4 have withdrawn.27 As such, there is 
a clear issue of locus standi in bringing complaints of alleged human rights violations to the 
Court. Nonetheless, most matters have reached it via the direct access route.28  
In terms of its contentious jurisdiction, Articles 3(1) of the African Court Protocol empowers 
the Court to consider complaints of alleged violations of the ACHPR, as well as “any other 
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned”. Article 7 adds to this that 
the Court may apply the ACHPR and other relevant human rights treaties. This is unique to the 
African system, allowing the Court to directly apply UN treaties, including finding a violation 
of a UN treaty, as long as the state concerned has ratified that treaty. For example, in Omary 
and Others v Tanzania29, the African Court relied on Article 3(1) of the African Court Protocol 
and Article 60 of the ACHPR in holding that it is authorised to draw inspiration from the 
UDHR. Furthermore, despite the UDHR not being a ratifiable human rights instrument, it 
nonetheless constitutes a human rights instrument for purposes of Article 3(1) of the African 
Court Protocol.30 
In light hereof and considering that each of the UN treaties discussed under chapter 4 have 
been ratified by most African states, the Court has an exceptionally wide material jurisdiction 
if compared to the UN treaty bodies and the other regional human right courts.31 Furthermore, 
 
25 Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 2 to 13 February 1988, 
revised from 12-26 May 2010, entered into force August 2010). The current provision regulating access to the 
Court is, arguably, a much more watered-down version than Rule 118 of the previous set of rules, which was in 
force from 2010 until 2020. This rule allowed the Commission to refer communications to the Court if states did 
not comply with its recommendations or provisional measures, where a situation of “serious or massive violations 
of human rights” was brought to its attention, or where it was deemed necessary during any stage of examining a 
communication, but before a decision is made on the merits. For a discussion of Rule 118, see: F Viljoen 
“Understanding and overcoming challenges in accessing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2018) 
67 ICQL 63 75-84. 
26 As of 23 November 2018, nine states have made an Article 34(6) declaration. These are: Burkina Faso (1998), 
Malawi (2008), Mali (2010), Tanzania (2010), Ghana (2011), Côte d’Ivoire (2013), Rwanda (2013), Benin (2016), 
and the Gambia (2018) 
27 African Court “Declarations entered by member states” (2020) African Court <https://www.african-
court.org/en/index.php/basic-documents/declaration-featured-articles-2> (accessed 07-12-2020) 
28 Viljoen (2018) ICQL 65. 
29 (admissibility) (2014) 1 AfCLR 358. 
30 Paras 71-77. 
31 See, OHCHR “Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard” (2020) ohchr <https://indicators.ohchr.org/> 




the wording of Article 3(1) suggests that it is possible to allege a violation of a UN treaty 
without having to simultaneously allege a violation of the ACHPR.32 As is illustrated in this 
chapter, the Court can, in this way, be influential in shaping the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE by drawing from and applying UN treaties. 
The ACRWC, the regional equivalent of the CRC33, was adopted in 1990 and entered into 
force in 1999.34 The ACRWC stemmed from the increasing recognition of the impact that 
regional conflict has on children’s well-being and is a call to action for states to protect 
children’s rights.35 Furthermore, it represents an African perspective on the CRC. Nonetheless, 
the ACRWC is meant to complement the CRC, enhancing children’s rights in Africa.36 In this 
regard, it is significant that the ACRWC was adopted in 1990, only one year after the CRC was 
adopted, and the same year that it entered into force. 
The African system is the only regional system with a children-specific human rights treaty. 
The purpose of the ACRWC, like the CRC, is to promote and protect the rights of the child. 
Protecting children is necessary due to their physical and mental vulnerability. Children should 
also be protected to ultimately ensure their full and harmonious development.37 What makes 
the ACRWC unique is an appreciation of the critical conditions that complicate the 
development of the African child, as well as its recognition of the role of “cultural heritage, 
historical background and the values of the African civilization” on the understanding of 
children’s rights.38  
 
chapter 4 is: ICCPR – 52; ICESCR – 50; CRC – 54; CEDAW – 52. Here, it is also important to note that the UN 
does not recognise the Sawari Arab Democratic Republic as a state, whereas it is recognised as a member of the 
AU. 
32 Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights System” in International Protection of Human Rights 438. 
33 See discussion under chapter 4, part 4 5. 
34 The Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (AHG/ST.4 Rev.l) (adopted 17-20 July 1979) was the 
precursor to the ACRWC. For more information on the drafting and coming into force of the ACRWC, see: F 
Viljoen “Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa: the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” (1998) 31 CILJSA 199-212; 
B D Mezmur “Happy 18th birthday to the African Children’s Rights Charter: not counting its days but making its 
days count” (2017) 1 AHRY 125-139. 
35 Murray Human Rights in Africa 164-165. For a critical discussion on the reasons behind the adoption of the 
ACRWC, see: F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2012) 2ed 391-397. 
36 A Lloyd “Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African Committee 
of Experts: raising the gauntlet” (2002) 10 IJCR 179 182. 
37 Preamble to the ACRWC, paras 5-6. The special measures set out in the Preamble include that children “grow 
up in a family environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding” and that they receive 
“particular care with regard to health, physical, mental, moral and social development”. To this end, children 
require “legal protection in conditions of freedom, dignity and security”. 




The ACRWC created with it the ACERWC.39 The ACERWC is mandated to promote and 
protect the rights enshrined in the ACRWC, monitor its implementation, and to issue general 
comments on the interpretation of its provisions.40 In terms of its monitoring mandate, states 
have to submit reports to the ACERWC outlining the measures adopted to give effect to the 
obligations imposed by the ACRWC, as well as the progress made in this regard.41 Its 
protective mandate allows it to receive communications of alleged violations of the ACRWC.42 
Comparable to the mandate of the African Commission, the ACERWC is empowered to adopt 
recommendations; however, it also cannot take a binding decision, reducing its effectiveness.43 
In carrying out its functions, the ACERWC may, in general, draw from international human 
rights law. Article 46 of the ACRWC specifically refers to “instruments adopted by the United 
Nations”.44 As such, the CRC is of particular importance to the interpretation of the ACRWC. 
Based on this exposition, Viljoen’s assertion that the Committee of Experts “has more 
extensive powers than its UN equivalent” is justifiable.45  
Whereas the ACRWC focuses on the rights of the child, the Maputo Protocol, which entered 
into force in 2005, aims to promote the equal treatment of women in Africa and ensure their 
equal enjoyment of human rights.46 The Maputo Protocol was adopted to supplement the 
provisions of the ACHPR and is the African regional equivalent of CEDAW and similar to the 
Convention of Belém do Pará.47  
The Maputo Protocol is significant for speaking to issues of particular concern to African 
women.48 Considering the conclusion in chapter 2 that “African public life has been and still 
is dominated by men”, a women-specific instrument is essential to ensure the effective 
 
39 Article 32. 
40 Article 42. See also, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Procedure; ACERWC “Terms of reference for country 
and thematic rapporteurs of the ACERWC” (2019) <https://www.acerwc.africa/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/ToR_ 
establishing_the_Offices_of_rapportuers_of_the_ACERWC.pdf> (accessed 08-09-2020). This rule authorises the 
ACERWC to establish country and thematic rapporteurs. The ACERWC established 10 rapporteurs at its 30th 
Ordinary Session, held in 2017. Importantly, a thematic rapporteur on education was established. To date, no 
reports have been published. 
41 Article 43. 
42 Article 44. 
43 Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights System” in International Protection of Human Rights 557. 
44 Article 46 of the ACRWC. 
45 Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights System” in International Protection of Human Rights 553. 
46 For more information on the drafting of the Maputo Protocol, see: Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights 
System” in International Protection of Human Rights 250-251. 
47 Article 66 of the ACHPR provides that “[s]pecial protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement the 
provisions of the present Charter”. 




realisation of African women’s rights.49 This is because, despite the ratification of the ACHPR 
and other international human rights treaties prohibiting it, women continue to experience 
discrimination and harmful practices against them.50  
The African Commission and the African Court are responsible for monitoring compliance 
of the Maputo Protocol. Similar to the ACHPR, state parties to the Maputo Protocol have to 
submit periodic reports to the African Commission on the “legislative and other measures 
undertaken for the full realisation of the rights therein recognised”.51 In November 2010, 
Guidelines for State Reporting under the Maputo Protocol were adopted, requiring states to 
cover specific topics on their domestic compliance with the obligations imposed.52 
Furthermore, the African Court is responsible for dealing with “matters of interpretation arising 
from the application or implementation of this Protocol”.53  
The ACHPR, ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol should be interpreted in terms of the 
Vienna Convention. Unlike the regional systems discussed under chapters 4 to 6, there are 
sparse references to, or application of, the teleological approach by the African Court, African 
Commission, or the ACERWC. The presumption is nonetheless that the teleological approach 
as outlined in the Vienna Convention applies. This is, firstly, becausethe Vienna Convention 
does not distinguish “human rights treaties from the umbrella of other general treaties”.54 As a 
result, Amin explains that human rights instruments fall under the definition of “treaty” 
provided in the Vienna Convention.55 Amin, writing in the context of socio-economic rights 
under the ACHPR, further argues that the teleological approach is particularly important in the 
African context as it ensures that the instruments are interpreted consistent with current 
conditions and remain reflective of changing times.56 Secondly, the African Court has 
considered the Vienna Convention in relation to ACHPR, albeit sparsely.57 Of particular 
 
49 Viljoen “The African Regional Human Rights System” in International Protection of Human Rights 249-250. 
See the text to parts 2 5 and 2 6. 
50 Preamble to the Maputo Protocol, para 12. 
51 Article 26. 
52 The Guidelines for State Reporting requires that states report on its implementation of the Maputo Protocol is 
the same report that covers its compliance with the ACHPR. Considering the basic reporting of states in relation 
to the Maputo Protocol, combining these reports have been detrimental to its implementation. 
53 Article 27 of the Maputo Protocol. There has only been one case brought in terms of this provision: Association 
pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes (APDF) and the Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa (IHRDA) v Mali (merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 380 (“APDF”). See also the text to part 7 5. 
54 A Amin A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights LLD thesis, Stellenbosch University (2017) 51. 
55 51. 
56 33-34 and 62-63. 
57 In Tanganyika Law Society, Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v Tanzania 
(merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34 para 108, the African Court drew from Article 27 of the Vienna Convention in holding 




relevance is the references made to Article 31 in the Court’s advisory opinions. In the Request 
for Advisory Opinion by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, the Court recognised that the “purposive theory or presumption is one of the tools, if not 
the most important, of interpreting or construing a legal instrument”.58 Therefore, the African 
Court has established the applicability of the Vienna Convention to the ACHPR, as well as the 
ACRWC. Because the Maputo Protocol is a Protocol to the ACHPR, the Vienna Convention 
applies to it as well.  
 
7 3 ACHPR 
7 3 1  A unique right to human dignity 
The Preamble of the ACHPR refers to the OAU Charter, which includes dignity as an “essential 
objective for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples”. Dignity is 
an underlying value of the ACHPR and informs all the rights enshrined therein. It is also an 
explicit right provided for under Articles 4 and 5, the latter of which is of particular importance 
to the current discussion.  
Regarding the right to respect for the sanctity of life under Article 4, it suffices to note that 
the African Court and African Commission have given a broad interpretation to this right. In 
General Comment 3,59 the right to life is interpreted as including the right to a dignified life,  
requiring that all the rights recognised under the ACHPR be realised.60 Of significance is the 
reference made to the importance of the progressive realisation of economic, social, and 
cultural rights for a dignified life, later reiterated by the Chairperson of the Working Group on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.61 This iteration recognises, in a broad sense, the 
interdependence between, for example, the right to education as a social right and the ability 
 
ACHPR. Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda (jurisdiction) (2016) 1 AfCLR 540 para 54 referred to the indirect 
application of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention to Rwanda’s withdrawal from the African Court Protocol. 
58 (2014) 1 AfCLR 725 paras 84 and 92. See also, Request for Advisory Opinion by the Socio-Economic Rights 
and Accountability Project (Advisory Opinion) (2017) 2 AfCLR 57. Here, the African Court relied on Article 31 
in holding that only African organisations that are recognised by the AU, and not any of its other organs, may 
request an advisory opinion from the Court in terms of Article 4(1) of the African Court Protocol. See further: 
Urban Mkandawire v Malawi (admissibility) (2013) 1 AfCLR 283 (separate opinion of Niyungeko J) para 9, 
where Niyungeko J, in his separate opinion, referred to the guiding role of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
in relation to the Court’s interpretative mandate. 
59 African Commission “General Comment No 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the right 
to life (Article 4)” (4-18 November 2015). 
60 Paras 3 and 6. 
61 Para 43. See also, African Commission “Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (18 April-




of individuals to have a dignified life. In light hereof, Vollmer explains that human dignity 
derives from and informs all the rights enshrined under the ACHPR.62  
Through Article 4, the African Court in African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v Kenya63 established the relationship “between the right to life and the inviolable nature and 
integrity of the human being”, also recognising that all individuals are entitled to the right to 
life, regardless of their group belonging.64 The Court acknowledged that violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights can result in a violation of the right to a dignified life.65 
However, it was explained that such a violation does not, per se, result in a violation of Article 
4. Nonetheless, Vollmer argues that a denial of certain economic and social rights based on the 
individual’s non-heteronormative SOGIE constitute an infringement of Article 4.66  
In comparison to Article 4, Article 567 contains a more explicit and comprehensive right to 
human dignity, providing for three interrelated rights. First, respect for the individual’s inherent 
human dignity. Second, recognition of the individual’s legal status. Third, the prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As a point of departure, it should be noted that 
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is absolute.68 Furthermore, because 
treatment prohibited under Article 5 can take various forms, determining whether the right to 
human dignity has been violated requires consideration of the unique circumstances of each 
case.69 
Purohit v the Gambia guides the interpretation of Article 5. In this matter, the Lunatics 
Detention Act, which prescribed the “automatic and indefinite institutionalisation” of anyone 
described as a “lunatic”, was challenged.70 The complainants argued that this constituted a 
violation of the right to non-discrimination and equal protection of the law.71 Moreover, it was 
put forth that the existence and implementation of the Act infringed on the right to human 
dignity and the prohibition of degrading treatment.72  
 
62 Vollmer Queer families 242. 
63 (merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 9 (“African Commission v Kenya”). 
64 Paras 152-153. 
65 Para 153. 
66 Vollmer (2019) 243. 
67 Article 5 provides that “[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human 
being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited”. 
68 Huri-Laws v Nigeria Communication 225/98 (2000) AHRLR 273 para 41. See also, Guehi v Tanzania (merits 
and reparations) (2018) 2 AfCLR 477 para 131. 
69 (2018) 2 AfCLR 477 para 129. 
70 (Communication 242/01) para 44. 
71 Para 44. See the text to part 7 3 2. 




According to the African Commission, human dignity is “an inherent basic right which all 
human beings … are entitled to without discrimination”.73 Here, a clear link between the 
respect for human dignity and the right to non-discrimination is established. The right to human 
dignity also places an obligation on all persons to respect the inherent dignity of others.74 As 
such, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. To protect the inherent 
dignity of all persons, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should be interpreted to 
include the “widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental”.75 As a 
result, the right to human dignity is violated when persons are exposed to “personal suffering 
and indignity”.76  
Applying these principles to the facts, the African Commission held that referring to persons 
with mental illnesses as “lunatics” and “idiots” is undignifying, thereby recognising the impact 
of degrading language on human dignity.77 The following statement of the African Commission 
also provides insight into the meaning of human dignity under the ACHPR, stating that: 
 
“[M]entally disabled persons would like to share the same hopes, dreams and goals and have the 
same rights to pursue those hopes, dreams and goals just like any other human being. Like any other 
human being, mentally disabled persons or persons suffering from mental illnesses have a right to 
enjoy a decent life, as normal and full as possible, a right which lies at the heart of the right to human 
dignity. This right should be zealously guarded and forcefully protected by all States party to the 
African Charter in accordance with the well-established principle that all human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights”.78 
 
Clearly in the African system, like the UN,79 European,80 and inter-American81 systems, human 
dignity is tied to the individual’s life project and requires the existence of certain minimum 
conditions to constitute a dignified life. Importantly, states must guard the individual’s right to 
pursue their life project and create the necessary societal conditions for this. Despite the 
 
73 Para 57. 
74 Para 57. 
75 (Communication 242/01) para 58. See also, Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (Communication 224/98) [2000] 
ACHPR 24 (6 November 2000) para 71; Curtis Doebbler v Sudan (Communication 236/2000) [2009] ACHPR 
103 (25 November 2009) para 37. 
76 (Communication 242/01) para 58. See also, International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, INTERIGHTS on 
behalf of Ken Sara-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 21 para 79; Modise v 
Botswana (Communication 97/93) [2000] ACHPR 25 (6 November 2000) para 91. 
77 (Communication 242/01) para 59. 
78 Para 61. 
79 See the text to parts 4 3 1 and 4 4 1. 
80 See the text to parts 5 3 1 and 5 4 1. 




statement being made in the context of persons with mental disabilities or illnesses, it is argued 
that these standards apply to all persons without discrimination. The presumption is, therefore, 
that the right to human dignity and the conception thereof set forth here should extend to 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE by virtue of their being human beings, born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.  
Whereas Purohit dealt with the rights of the disabled as a vulnerable group, Nubian 
Community in Kenya v the Republic of Kenya82 concerned the violation of numerous rights of 
the Nubian people, a vulnerable minority ethnic group in Kenya. The Nubian people were 
brought from Sudan to Kenya by British colonialists. However, despite being established there, 
they were not recognised as citizens of Kenya.83 It was argued that the denial of legal status to 
the Nubian people infringed on their right to human dignity, which informs all other rights 
enshrined in the ACHPR.84 This is because legal recognition is an “indispensable requirement 
for the enjoyment rights enshrined in the Charter”.85 Citing the IACtHR’s decision in Yean and 
Bosico,86 the African Commission held that placing burdensome requirements for Nubian 
people to obtain identification documents because of their religious and ethnic association 
places them in a vulnerable position as it complicates their enjoyment of the rights that they 
are entitled to in terms of the ACHPR.87 
In Open Society Justice Initiative v Côte d’Ivoire,88 the African Commission again 
considered the impact of legal recognition on the right to human dignity. At issue was a policy 
that made nationality dependent on both parents being Ivorian citizens. The outcome of this 
policy was social and political exclusion, which restricted access to various rights.89 With 
reference to the Preamble, the African Commission described human dignity as: 
 
“[T]he soul of the African human rights system … and inherent to the human person. In other words 
when the individual loses his dignity, it is his human nature itself which is called into question … In 
short, when dignity is violated, it is not worth the while to guarantee most of the other rights”.90 
 
82 (Communication 317/06) [2015] (19-28 February 2015) (“Nubian Community”). 
83 Para 5. 
84 Para 137. 
85 Para 138. 
86 IACtHR Series C No 130 (8 September 2005) para 179: According to the IACtHR, “the failure to recognize 
juridical personality harms human dignity, because it denies absolutely an individual’s condition of being a subject 
of rights and renders [them] vulnerable to non-observance of [their] rights by the state or other individuals”. See 
also the text to part 6 4 3 2. 
87 (Communication No 317/06) [2015] para 149. 
88 (Communication No 318/06) [2015] (19-28 February 2015). 
89 Paras 4 and 9. 




Dignity, therefore, underlies all other rights. In particular, according to the African 
Commission, the right to legal status has “a supreme and dependent relationship with the right 
to dignity”.91 Here, the African Commission referred to the partly concurring and partly 
dissenting opinion of Vučinić J in the ECtHR’s decision of Kuric v Slovenia in which a similar 
statement was made.92 The right to legal recognition also places a corresponding obligation on 
the state to respect and provide for it. The Ivorian state’s failure to comply herewith was found 
to reduce the individual’s capability to enjoy various other rights enshrined in the ACHPR. In 
light of these considerations, it was held that making nationality dependent on both parents 
having to be Ivorian citizens constituted a serious infringement of the right to human dignity 
because it compromised the existence of these individuals within Côte d’Ivoire.93 
 The African Commission’s statements in Open Society Justice Initiative v Côte d’Ivoire 
about the relationship between legal personality and human dignity may provide insight into 
how the failure to recognise the identities of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE could 
prevent them from benefitting from the rights that accrue to all individuals under the ACHPR. 
This is because legal recognition is often a prerequisite for access to numerous rights, including 
education and healthcare. Considering Open Society Justice Initiative v Côte d’Ivoire, it is 
argued that the African Commission has already created a framework for understanding legal 
gender recognition. Ultimately, legal gender recognition will enable persons with non-
heteronormative gender identities and gender expressions to live a dignified life.  
As mentioned above, the right to human dignity also includes the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In Shumba v Zimbabwe,94 the African Commission found 
that the mistreatment of the complainant prior to and during detention violated Article 5.95 In 
voicing its disapproval of the mistreatment of the complainant in detention, the African 
Commission explained that “[d]isrespect for human dignity cannot serve as the basis for any 
state action”.96 Thus, although the complainant was suspected of, and charged with, 
contravention of the Public Order Security Act, which “relates to organising, planning or 
conspiring to overthrow the government through unconstitutional means”, the state still had to 
ensure that he was treated with respect for his human dignity.97 Here, it was reiterated that the 
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prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment includes physical or 
psychological humiliation or suffering.98  
According to Rudman, discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE forces persons 
with these orientations, identities, or expressions to denounce an integral part of their existence. 
This amounts to a clear violation of the right to human dignity guaranteed under the ACHPR.99 
This is problematic given that the African Commission has recognised that human dignity 
underlies all the rights enshrined under the ACHPR and that ensuring respect for it is key to 
the individual’s enjoyment of the rights to which they are entitled. Furthermore, there exists a 
clear link between human dignity and the prohibition of discrimination in that respect for 
human dignity requires non-discrimination and vice versa. In this regard, the statement in 
Purohit is significant. Replacing “disabled persons” with “persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE”, or even “any person”, illustrates the purpose of human dignity under the ACHPR.  
 
7 3 2  Non-discrimination 
7 3 2 1 Defining non-discrimination under Article 2 
Articles 2 and 3 form the non-discrimination provisions of the ACHPR. Article 2 provides that:  
 
“Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as … sex … or other status”. 
 
Whereas Article 2 enshrines the right to non-discrimination in respect of the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms contained in the ACHPR, Article 3 sets out the right to equality before the 
law and equal protection of the law.100 These two provisions are crucial to the enjoyment of all 
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human rights101 and are mutually reinforcing102. Both the African Court and African 
Commission have confirmed that equality and non-discrimination are fundamental principles 
of international law. In this regard, reference has been made to the significance of these two 
principles being guaranteed in the founding international human rights law instruments.103  
As a point of departure, it should be noted that Articles 2 and 3 require that citizens “be 
treated in a fair and equitable manner before the law and have the right to enjoy, with no 
distinction whatsoever, the rights guaranteed by the Charter”.104 More specifically, Article 3 
means that individuals should expect fair treatment before the law and have equal access to the 
rights enshrined under the ACHPR to the same extent as others.105 Similar to the human rights 
treaties discussed under chapters 4 to 6, the ACHPR does not define discrimination or 
distinction. As a result, the African Commission and the African Commission have done so. 
The elements of these definitions are similar to those under the human rights treaties previously 
discussed and often draw from the international or regional systems. For example, with 
reference to Article 26 of the ICCPR, the African Court in Actions pour la Protection des Droit 
de l’Homme v Côte d’Ivoire noted that “equality … presupposes that the law protects everyone 
without discrimination”.106 Furthermore, drawing from General Comment 18 of the HRC107, 
the African Commission in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe defined 
discrimination as: 
 
“[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as 
[numerous listed grounds] or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
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105 Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Zimbabwe (Communication 
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impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms”.108 
 
From this definition, it is clear that the ACHPR prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination.109 Because the non-discrimination principle is “essential to the spirit” of the 
ACHPR, it is necessary to eradicate all forms of it.110 States should, therefore, refrain from 
discriminating against individuals or groups in their conduct, policies, and legislation, as well 
as adopt legislative and other measures to ensure the rights enshrined under the ACHPR 
without discrimination.111 This is important because the mere formal recognition of the rights 
to equality and non-discrimination does not guarantee that it is effective.112 Moreover, states 
should provide effective remedies where there has indeed been a violation of the right to non-
discrimination because “rights without remedies have little value”.113 As such, Murray argues 
that special attention must be accorded to vulnerable or marginalised groups.114 Here, the 
question of whether “other status” under Article 2 includes non-heteronormative sexual 
orientations, gender identities or gender expressions becomes relevant.  
Similar to the human rights treaties discussed under chapters 4 to 6, Article 2 prohibits 
discrimination based on numerous listed grounds, including “other status”. Thus, the grounds 
of discrimination provided does not constitute a closed list.115 In African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya, the African Court incorporated indigenous peoples as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination under the ACHPR, explaining that: 
 
“The expression ‘any other status’ under Article 2 encompasses those cases of discrimination, which 
could not have been foreseen during the adoption of the Charter. In determining whether a ground 
falls under this category, the Court shall take into account the general spirit of the Charter”.116 
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According to Vollmer, this suggests that, when considering the expansion of grounds of 
discrimination under the ACHPR, its general spirit should be taken into account.117 The 
ACHPR aims to promote and protect the human rights of all African peoples without 
discrimination, achieving “freedom, equality, justice, and dignity” for all.118 However, 
discrimination and unequal treatment are in direct contradiction with these aims, ultimately 
preventing individuals to enjoy the rights they are guaranteed under the ACHPR.119 In light 
hereof, Vollmer further explains that “where protection is denied to a class of persons, arguably 
on grounds such as sexual orientation or gender identity, it is inconsistent with the ACHPR”.120 
In asserting that non-heteronormative SOGIE are protected under Article 2’s “other status”, 
Vollmer draws from Murray and Viljoen’s claim that: 
 
“[T]he grounds that are ‘allowed in’ as ‘other’ grounds should be sufficiently serious. If such an 
approach were to be followed, it is suggested that a ‘new’ ground should be included if it relates to 
a human characteristic, which has the impact of impairing human dignity in a manner that is serious 
and comparable to the impact of the factors already listed”.121 
 
Framed by this statement, the development of a framework within which discrimination based 
on non-heteronormative SOGIE is prohibited under the ACHPR is explored in more detail in 
part 7 3 2 2. 
Drawing from the HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR, the African Commission in Kenneth 
Good v Republic of Botswana established the test for determining an Article 2 violation.122 In 
terms of this test, a violation occurs where: (i) “equal cases are treated in a different manner”; 
(ii) there is no “objective and reasonable justification” for the differential treatment; and (iii) 
there does not exist a proportional relationship between the means and the aim sought to be 
achieved. Importantly, “[t]hese three benchmarks are cumulative requirements and hence the 
non-compliance with any of the three requirements makes a treatment discriminatory”.123 
Considering Kenneth Good in light of numerous other decisions of the African Commission 
and the African Court, the test consists of the following steps. First, the complainant should 
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allege a violation of one or more of the rights enshrined under the ACHPR. For an infringement 
to be established, complainants should be specific in their allegation and provide sufficient 
evidence of differential treatment in support of the alleged violation.124 In this regard, the 
violation has to be based on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article 2 or 
“other status”. Second, it should be shown that persons equally situated are treated differently 
or that persons differently situated are treated the same.125 To this end, the complainant’s 
treatment should be compared to those in a similar position.126  
Once differential treatment has been established based on one of the listed grounds or “other 
status” under Article 2, discrimination is presumed. The burden then shifts to the state to prove 
that the discrimination was justifiable.127 Thus, if a distinction can be justified, it will not 
constitute discrimination.128 Here, Article 27(2) becomes relevant, providing that the “rights 
and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, 
collective security, morality and common interest”. Considering the wording of Article 27(2), 
it is not intended to be used as a limitations clause. However, as illustrated in the discussion 
below, it has been used as such by the African Commission and the African Court.  
Article 27(2) is situated in Chapter II of the ACHPR which sets out individual duties. It is 
not uncommon for duties to be imposed on individuals under human rights treaties.129 During 
the drafting of the ACHPR, Senghor stressed the interconnectedness of traditional African 
societies, referring to the relationship between the individual’s rights and the protection of the 
family and the community.130 As such, rights and duties cannot be separated. However, it is 
important to note that the individual does not owe these duties to the state.131 Rather, duties 
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seek to create and strengthen the relationship “among individuals and between individuals and 
the state”.132  
Although fears have been expressed over the duties imposed under Chapter II and, in 
particular, its potential to water-down the rights enshrined under Chapter I, the jurisprudence 
of the African Commission and African Court has illustrated that this fear is yet to be 
realised.133 According to the African Commission in Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria, Article 
27(2) sets out the “only legitimate reasons” for restricting a right enshrined under the 
ACHPR.134 Importantly, the African Commission explained that: 
 
“The reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state interest and the evils of 
limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages 
which are to be obtained. Even more important, a limitation may never have as a consequence that 
the right itself becomes illusory”.135 
 
A legitimate state interest is determined with reference to whether the limitation is “necessary 
in a democratic society”.136 Relevant hereto, the African Court in African Commission v Kenya 
explained that the limitation should be “genuinely prompted by the need to protect such 
common interest”.137 However, a limitation should not be accepted as legitimate without 
weighing up its “impact, nature and extent … against the legitimate state interest serving a 
particular goal”.138 Furthermore, if the aim sought to be achieved cannot be identified and 
justified, the means used cannot be deemed proportional.139 
The African Commission in Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v 
Arab Republic of Egypt140 drew attention to the importance of considering the situation of 
victims in determining whether discrimination and unequal treatment is justified. It was alleged 
that the victims who were demonstrating against an amendment to the Constitution aimed at 
removing multi-candidate presidential elections were discriminated against based on their sex 
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and political opinions.141 The allegation as to the sex-based discrimination relied on the sexual 
nature of the violations.142 In this regard, the African Commission referred to the demeaning 
language used and the gender-specific sexual harassment directed at the female-
demonstrators.143 Considering that male protesters were not subjected to the same treatment, 
the African Commission agreed that the women were targeted because they are women.144 With 
reference to the HRC and the IACtHR, the African Commission held that the differential 
treatment cannot be deemed reasonable or legitimate because there was “no reasonable cause 
behind the discrimination that was inflicted”.145  
Importantly, the African Court in Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights 
Centre and Reverend Christopher R Mtikila v Tanzania also explained that limitations cannot 
be used to invalidate human rights and freedoms or to circumvent the obligations that treaties 
impose on states.146 Similarly, the African Commission in Legal Resources Foundation v 
Zambia specifically stated that “[j]ustification … cannot be derived solely from popular will, 
as this cannot be used to limit the responsibilities of state parties in terms of the [ACHPR]”.147 
In this context, the margin of appreciation doctrine should also be considered. In Gareth Anvar 
Prince v South Africa148, the African Commission was tasked with determining whether the 
criminalisation of the use of cannabis for religious purposes constituted an unreasonable 
limitation of the complainant’s right to freedom of religion.149 The state argued that the matter 
had been considered by its highest court, which decided that the “restrictions placed on the use 
of cannabis do not erode the necessity to ensure religious pluralism, are rational and legitimate 
and do not invade the right any further than it needs”.150  
In determining whether the state placed an unreasonable limitation on the right to freedom 
of religion, the African Commission referred to the value of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, recognising that the state is often better situated to adopt legislation and policies in 
line with the needs of its people, bearing in mind the “competing and sometimes conflicting 
forces that shape its society”.151 The criminalisation of cannabis use in the respondent state is 
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based on that, as “admitted by the complainant cannabis is an undesirable dependence-
producing substance”.152 According to the African Commission, this is a justifiable limitation 
in terms of Article 27(2).153 The African Court nonetheless emphasised that it maintains its 
mandate to ensure that states comply with the human rights standards imposed under the 
ACHPR and other relevant instruments. Importantly, despite the relevance of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, it “cannot be used by States to oust the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction” 
and its “duty to assess if a fair balance has been struck between societal interests and the 
interests of the individual”.154  
As discussed in chapter 4 to 6 non-heteronormative SOGIE has been established as 
prohibited grounds of discrimination under the international, European, and inter-American 
human rights systems because a limitation of rights on this basis could not be justified. In this 
regard, there is a substantive body of case law, general comments, country reports, and 
resolutions that set out the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Under the 
ICCPR and the ECHR, the HRC and the ECtHR have referred extensively to the importance 
of weighing up individual and societal interests to determine whether a limitation is justifiable. 
In this regard, the ECtHR, in particular, has made use of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
Although this doctrine allows states to determine what constitutes a pressing social need in its 
specific cultural and societal context, the ECtHR has nonetheless explained that negative 
attitudes, traditional values, and cultural considerations cannot justify restricting the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.155  
Considering the importance of SOGIE to an individual’s ability to live a dignified life, to 
reach their developmental potential, and to have a sense of belonging, states must present 
“particularly weighty reasons” to justify a limitation of rights based on non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. This has was confirmed by the HRC in Toonen and Young,156 as well as by the IACtHR 
in Atala, Freire, and its advisory opinion on Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-
discrimination of Same-sex Couples.157 Importantly, in Atala, the IACtHR drew attention to 
the historical and structural discrimination that sexual minorities have suffered and continue to 
suffer from, and how an alleged lack of consensus as to the recognition of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE cannot be accepted as a valid argument for restricting their rights.  
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The African Commission and the African Court’s approach to the limitation of rights is 
consistent with the international and regional jurisprudence discussed under chapters 4 to 6. 
The international, European, and inter-American human rights bodies have all rejected 
common interest and morality as legitimate justifications for the non-recognition of the rights 
of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE as this would render the object and purpose of 
human rights treaties to protect the rights of all persons as illusory. On the African continent, 
some African states nonetheless perceive SOGIE rights as not constituting human rights.158 As 
explained by Vollmer: 
 
“The firm declaration that SOGI rights are not human rights and that such rights are contrary to 
African values and traditions gives legitimacy to the notion that homosexuality, and by extension 
non-heteronormative families, are ‘un-African’”.159 
 
As set out under chapter 2, there exists a perception that non-heteronormative SOGIE was 
imported with the colonisation of Africa. However, this ignores research that shows the 
existence and acceptance of non-heteronormative SOGIE in pre-colonial Africa.160 It also does 
not take into consideration that the criminalisation of same-sex sexual conduct was a result of 
colonial influence and that the pledge reiterated in the Preamble of the ACHPR to “eradicate 
all forms of colonialism from Africa”, therefore, supports the decriminalisation and acceptance 
of non-heteronormative SOGIE.161 Murray and Viljoen draw attention to the similarity between 
Toonen and the situation in many African countries that criminalise sodomy.162 As a result, 
Vollmer argues that the African Court and African Commission will not be able to “accept 
justifications of the limitation of SOGI rights in Africa on the basis that such laws are necessary 
to uphold and maintain traditional African morals and values”.163 In light hereof, Rudman’s 
argument that non-discrimination has been recognised as a jus cogens norm in Atala is 
significant. This means that limiting a person’s rights solely based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE would “constitute an arbitrary deprivation or limitation of that 
right”.164 Article 27(2) cannot be used to limit the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
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SOGIE because there is no underlying legal justification. As such, “it is impossible to justify 
arbitrariness with morality or common interest”.165  
Ultimately, the argument that non-heteronormative SOGIE is un-African disregards the 
ever-changing nature of cultures across time and space and overlooks the diverse cultures, 
religions, and experiences on the African continent.166 In this context, the African Commission 
in Sudan Human Rights Organisation, Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v Sudan167 
explained that “cultural diversity … is a cause for celebration … [and] should not be seen as a 
source of conflict”.168  
Neither the African Commission nor the African Court has dealt with a limitation based on 
“morality”. However, the references made to African values help to understand the potential 
meaning of “morality” under Article 27(2). Article 18(3) places an obligation on the state to 
protect the “moral and traditional values recognised by the community”. In this regard, it has 
been explained that the state should protect positive African values. In both the Pretoria 
Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa169 and the Principles and 
Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, positive African values are referred to as those 
“consistent with international human rights realities and standards”.170 The Working Group on 
the Rights of Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities in Africa have added that positive 
African values include those which “inspire and characterize the provision of mutual social and 
communal care and support”.171  
 
7 3 2 2 Developing the prohibition of discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE 
The protection of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR 
remains a contentious issue as a result of cultural and political factors. Unlike the instruments 
discussed under chapters 4 to 6, the jurisprudence of the African Commission and African 
Court provide limited guidance. Nonetheless, the argument presented here is that, although 
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haphazard, the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are protected under the 
ACHPR. More specifically, it is argued that the reference in Article 2 to “other status” includes 
non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
As a point of departure, it should be noted that the African Commission has prohibited 
discrimination based on “other status”, showing its willingness to incorporate non-listed 
grounds.172 In Purohit, the African Commission found a violation of Article 2 as a result of 
discrimination against disabled persons, as discussed above.173 Significantly, the African 
Commission utilised the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 and the United 
Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care in support of its inclusion of disability as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under the ACHPR.174 Similarly, in African Commission v Kenya, the African 
Court incorporated indigenous peoples under “other status”, drawing attention to the role of 
the object and purpose of the ACHPR in promoting and protecting human rights when 
expanding prohibited grounds of discrimination.175 According to Rudman, this is “important 
because it shows the possibilities of an analogous ground and the ease with which the 
Commission accepted this argument, [as well as] its willingness to utilise soft law”.176  
The African Commission first referred to sexual minorities in 2005 in its concluding 
observation on the periodic report of Cameroon.177 This came two decades after sexual 
orientation was declared a prohibited ground of discrimination by the ECHR in Dudgeon, but 
a few years before any mention was made to non-heteronormative SOGIE by the OAS or 
IACtHR.178 In its concluding observation on Cameroon, the African Commission expressed 
concern over “an upsurge of intolerance against sexual minorities”.179 The state was asked to 
take steps to address these concerns and inform the African Commission of the progress made 
in its next periodic report.180 In Cameroon’s second periodic report, considered in 2010, the 
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state argued that its condemnation of persons with homosexual sexual orientations did not 
contravene the UDHR or the ICCPR, and that Article 29181 of the ACHPR, in fact, protects the 
moral peculiarities of the state.182 According to the state: 
 
“In the current state of African culture, homosexuality does not only appear to be an unaccepted 
value by the Cameroonian society but is also considered universally as a manifestation of moral 
decadence that should be fought”.183 
 
However, the state then continues to discuss the importance of eliminating all forms of 
discrimination, which requires “tolerance and acceptance of the way of life of others as well as 
[promoting] understanding and harmonious relations between [peoples]”.184 Although these 
statements were made in the context of the challenges posed by Cameroon’s ethnic and 
religious diversity, it is ironic that it followed directly after homosexuality, an expression of 
diverse sexual orientation, was dismissed as mere “moral decadence”.185  
Considering the discussion regarding the limitation of rights under Article 27(2), this is a 
clear example of where the state’s reliance on the values of the Cameroonian people and 
“popular will” to deny human rights to a portion of the population ultimately renders the rights 
contained in the ACHPR illusory. Despite recognising that states are better situated to balance 
the often-conflicting values of their people, it remains obligated to comply with the human 
rights standards imposed under the ACHPR and other relevant instruments. 
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Since its 2005 expression of concern regarding the treatment of sexual minorities in 
Cameroon, the African Commission has also twice referred to sexual orientation as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination under Article 2 in its communications.186 Although these were obiter 
statements, Garrido nonetheless argues that it constitutes an explicit recognition that people 
suffer unequal treatment and discrimination as a result of their non-heteronormative sexual 
orientation.187 In 2010, the African Commission published its Principles and Guidelines. These 
are meaningful because at the time of its publication there had only been one direct reference 
to non-heteronormative SOGIE – in the concluding observation of Cameroon in 2005 – and 
two obiter statements in decisions of the African Commission.  
In discussing the obligations on states to ensure economic, social, and cultural rights, the 
African Commission lists sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.188 
Persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are further included as vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups “who have faced and/or continue to face significant impediments to their 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights”.189 States, therefore, have a heightened 
obligation to ensure that vulnerable and disadvantaged groups enjoy their rights on par with 
other persons. To this end, it should adopt special measures aimed at ensuring substantive 
quality, as well as “reduc[ing] or suppress[ing] conditions that perpetuate discrimination” 
against these groups.190 Moreover, states should take steps to “recognise and … combat 
intersectional discrimination”.191  
 The most significant step taken to protect the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE by the African Commission was in 2014 with the adoption of Resolution 275, focusing 
exclusively on protecting these persons against violence and other human rights violations.192 
Considering Articles 2 to 5 of the ACHPR, the African Commission expressed concern over 
the violence committed against persons based on their real or imputed non-heteronormative 
SOGIE, as well as against human rights defenders and organisations that seek to protect them.  
Against this backdrop, the African Commission urged states to end all forms of violence against 
persons based on their real or imputed non-heteronormative SOGIE and to ensure that human 
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rights defenders can carry out their human rights protection activities “in an enabling 
environment that is free of stigma, reprisals or criminal prosecution as a result of their human 
rights protection activities, including the rights of sexual minorities”.193 To this end, states 
should enact legislation aimed at protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE and investigate human rights violations against them.194 According to Rudman, the 
adoption of this resolution “shows that the Commission has accepted that violence on the basis 
of sexual orientation amounts to discrimination and violates the rights to equality, integrity and 
dignity”.195 However, it “does not mean that the Commission has accepted non-discrimination 
based on sexual orientation”.196 
In comparison with the resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council197 which 
incorporates provisions from the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW, Resolution 275 does not refer 
to the other instruments adopted under the auspices of the AU. Moreover, the resolutions of 
the Human Rights Council go beyond an expression of concern over the human rights 
violations perpetrated against persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE and making 
general recommendations. In this way, the Human Rights Council has illustrated a broader 
commitment to investigating the nature and the extent of the violence suffered by persons based 
on their non-heteronormative SOGIE and formulate its responses accordingly.198 This includes 
the establishment of an Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. However, during the voting on the resolution, 
the Nigerian delegation objected against the establishment of the Independent Expert, stating 
that the decision on whether or not to recognise the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE “fall within the purview of each individual State in accordance with the principle of 
national sovereignty”.199 It was further argued that non-heteronormative SOGIE rights “has not  
been recognized by the vast majority of legal systems as part of the international human rights 
structure” and that, as a result, establishing an Independent Expert would contravene 
“principles  such  as cooperation  and  respect  for  each  other’s  cultural  and  religious  
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particularities”.200 However, Rudman argues that this contradicts the international and regional 
jurisprudence that provides explicit recognition of the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE.201 
Considering the discussion under chapter 3, regarding cultural relativism and universal 
human rights, the opposition to the resolution based on the argument that it does not represent 
universally agreed-upon values does not hold to a universalist conception of human rights.202 
This is because human rights are not founded on global values. Rather, at its core is the 
recognition of the inherent dignity of the human being which warrants protection from all forms 
of violence and discrimination, in order to allow persons, whether as individuals or in groups, 
to reach their full potential and contribute to their societies. Thus, as Rudman explains, “[a]s a 
basic principle, universality does not consider differences but simply humanity”.203  
Shortly before the adoption of Resolution 275, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Defenders expressed her disapproval of the violence against and intimidation of persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE in Uganda, encouraged by the promulgation of the Anti-
Homosexuality Act.204 She also stated her concern over the implications of this legislation for 
the human rights defenders who protects “sexual minorities who are already vulnerable as a 
result of social prejudice”.205 Against this backdrop, similar recommendations were made to 
the Ugandan state as the African Commission made in Resolution 275. Importantly, the Special 
Rapporteur called on the Ugandan state to “maintain an atmosphere of tolerance towards sexual 
minorities in the country” and encouraged “political authorities to continue dialogue on this 
sensitive issue of homosexuality in Africa”.206 
Since the adoption of Resolution 275, the African Commission has increasingly 
incorporated recommendations on the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
under the ACHPR. In this regard, concern has been expressed over the criminalisation of 
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consensual same-sex sexual conduct in Liberia.207 The African Commission has also drawn 
attention to how discrimination against and marginalisation of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in Namibia limits their access to healthcare, enshrined under Article 
16.208 No subsequent periodic reports have been submitted by Liberia and Namibia. It is, 
therefore, unclear whether the states involved have addressed the concerns expressed and 
complied with the recommendations made. 
The African Commission has further commended the steps taken by the Malawian state to 
investigate allegations of discrimination against sexual minorities preventing their right to 
health care access.209 In response to South Africa’s second periodic report, the African 
Commission lauded the existence of legislation that prohibits discrimination based on 
numerous grounds, including based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation.210 However, it 
nonetheless expressed concern over the continuing “discrimination, homophobia, and 
prejudice against homosexuals resulting in murder and violence against [them] despite the 
existence of legal frameworks” and the failure to list “corrective rape as a sexual offence”.211  
Besides the references made to persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE in concluding 
observations, the African Commission has also included these persons as those entitled to 
protection in terms of General Comment 4 on the right to redress for victims of torture and 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment212 and the Guidelines on 
combating sexual violence and its consequences in Africa.213  
General Comment 4 includes a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
but also specifically lists sexual orientation and gender identity.214 In this comment, the African 
Commission explains that certain groups have a heightened risk of ill-treatment because of 
discrimination and marginalisation, presenting “systemic barriers to accessing justice”.215 
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However, all persons are nonetheless entitled to redress without discrimination for harm 
suffered including sexual and gender-based violence.216 Importantly, it is stated that any person 
can be a victim of this type of violence, including persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE.217 
The African Commission explained that violence against these persons should receive equal 
attention, with the violence having to be “adequately and effectively addressed”.218  
The Guidelines on combating sexual violence outlines member states’ obligations in 
preventing and addressing sexual violence, defined as “any non-consensual sexual act”, 
including corrective rape, the use of rape to “cure” women of their non-heteronormative sexual 
orientation.219 The harm suffered does not have to be physical but can be psychological.220 
Similar to General Comment 4, it is recognised that non-heteronormative SOGIE can increase 
the risk of sexual violence.221 
In these Guidelines, the African Commission explains that the right to non-discrimination 
requires states to adopt measures that guarantee the rights of victims of sexual violence, 
regardless of their age, sexual orientation, and gender expressions, amongst others.222 Besides 
investigating these crimes and providing effective remedies to victims, states should also adopt 
legislative or other measures to prevent sexual violence by addressing its causes, including:  
 
“[S]exist and homophobic discrimination, patriarchal preconceptions and stereotypes about women 
and girls … [or] based on gender identity, real or perceived sexual orientation … or certain 
preconceptions of masculinity and virility”.223  
 
This is because sexual violence leads to social exclusion and stigmatisation. In the case of 
children, this often means that education is abandoned.224 The approach adopted supports a 
constructionist perception of sex, gender, and sexual orientation and presents a queer 
theoretical understanding of the impact of heteronormativity on the enjoyment of certain rights, 
as well as how to prevent violations.  
It is further significant that the African Commission illustrates a broad understanding of 
gender, acknowledging the societal expectations placed on men and women based on their sex. 
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It is explained that gender identity is a personal perception that can differ from the gender 
assigned at birth. Gender expression, in comparison, concerns how an individual externalises 
their personal experience of their gender through, for example, wearing the clothing or using 
the body language and tone of voice that is attributed to a specific gender. The African 
Commission also indicated that “[g]ender identity and gender expression are not necessarily 
related”.225 
In 2016, the African Commission published the Joint Dialogue on Ending Violence and 
Other Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity with the 
IACmHR and the UN. The value of the Joint Dialogue lies in, first, setting out terms related to 
non-heteronormative SOGIE.226 These definitions are similar to those set out under the YP and 
the YP+10. Second, the Joint Dialogue confirms that existing international and regional human 
rights standards apply equally to persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE as to persons with 
heteronormative SOGIE.227 Significantly, the African Commission, the IACmHR, and the UN 
highlighted “human dignity and personhood, universality, non-discrimination, and equality 
before the law [as] common foundational and crosscutting principles in all three systems”.228 
Considering this statement in light of the jurisprudence discussed under the international and 
inter-American treaties, there is clear support for the protection of the rights of persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE by the African Commission.229 The Joint Dialogue is further 
significant for facilitating the sharing of information and experiences across the international, 
African, and inter-American human rights systems. Through this, the Joint Dialogue 
encourages the adoption of the international best practice in protecting the rights of persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE.230  
Importantly, in 2016, the African Commission made a joint statement with human rights 
experts calling for an end to the pathologisation of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE.231 Attention was drawn to the impact of pathologisation on various rights, including 
the rights to health and education as a result of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE often 
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being subjected to harmful medical practices against their will, as well as the societal exclusion 
that arises from their marginalisation.  
The experts explained that non-heteronormative SOGIE are “part of the rich diversity of 
human nature”.232 It is, therefore, necessary to de-pathologise medical classifications and to 
reform policies and legislation to protect persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Furthermore, states should ensure that health services are provided to persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE without marginalisation, discrimination or pathologisation and that 
gender-affirming treatment be made available to persons wishing to receive it.233 Considering 
the African Commission’s outspoken statements on the protection of the rights of persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE, it is surprising that it has not referenced the YP or the YP+10 
since its adoption in 2007. 
A few months after the joint statement was published, the African Group criticised the 
adoption of Resolution 32/2 by the Human Rights Council because it interferes in “matters 
which fall within the domestic jurisdiction of States”.234 The African Group argued that this 
infringes on state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.235 It also resisted the notion 
that non-heteronormative SOGIE can be “linked to existing international human rights 
instruments” as there is “no legal foundation [for this] in any international human rights 
instrument”.236 According to the African Group:  
 
“[T]he attempts to focus on certain persons on the grounds of their sexual interests and behaviours, 
while ignoring that intolerance and discrimination regrettably exist in various parts of the worlds … 
undermine not only the intent of the drafters and signatories to various human rights instruments, 
but also seriously jeopardize the entire international human rights framework as they create 
divisions”.237 
 
Against this backdrop, the tension between the African Commission’s work towards the 
protection of the rights of non-heteronormative SOGIE and the push-back from African states, 
in general, becomes relevant. Despite the progress made, non-heteronormative SOGIE remains 
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a contentious issue on the African continent.238 There has been increasing backlash against the 
African Commission’s statements in support of protecting the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the African regional human rights instruments.  
Despite the rising tension, the African Commission, the IACmHR, and the UN adopted a 
follow-up Joint Thematic Dialogue on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex 
Related Issues in 2018.239 The second Joint Thematic Dialogue builds on the Joint Dialogue, 
with its most important contribution being that of the inclusion of discrimination based on sex 
characteristics.240 The second Joint Thematic Dialogue drew particular attention to the socio-
economic difficulties that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE face, including the denial 
of education to children based on their “perceived sexual orientation or gender identity”.241 In 
its discussion of the African human rights system, the African Commission, the IACmHR, and 
the UN confirmed that the rights enshrined under the ACHPR accrue to all persons without 
distinction.242 Moreover, considering the broad and open-ended non-discrimination provision 
enshrined under Article 2, it was put forth that: 
 
“The logic of the Charter – a holistic reading, informed by its object and purpose – also demands 
that non-discrimination be understood broadly, because exclusion from the ambit of Article 2 would 
have the far-reaching effect of foreclosing reliance on all other Charter rights. It is, quite obviously, 
unthinkable that an African lesbian woman may – for example – not invoke the right not to be 
tortured or the right to a fair trial before the African Commission (or the African Human Rights 
Court) just because of her sexual orientation”.243 
 
This statement is significant because it supports a teleological interpretation of the rights 
enshrined under the ACHPR and reflects a universalist perception of human rights that does 
not allow the limitation of rights where it would render those rights illusory.244 In this regard, 
the African Commission, the IACmHR, and the UN also consider two potential grounds for 
limiting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE, namely African values and 
majority morality. The Joint Thematic Dialogue confirm that there is no credible evidence that 
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non-heteronormative SOGIE are indeed un-African and that majority morality or public 
opinion cannot justify the limitation of restricting fundamental human rights.245 
One of the greatest pushbacks involve removing CAL from the list of NGOs with observer 
status before the African Commission. Although CAL was granted observer status in 2015246, 
the African Commission revoked this shortly after the publication of the second Joint Thematic 
Dialogue in 2018 as a result of pressure from the AU’s Executive Council.247 According to the 
Executive Council, CAL did not represent “fundamental African values, identity and good 
traditions”.248 Furthermore, it argued that CAL “may attempt to impose values contrary to the 
African values”.249 Before their observer status was revoked, CAL requested an advisory 
opinion from the African Court on the “extent to which the African Union political organs may 
direct the Commission to adopt a particular interpretation of the African Charter”.250 However, 
the African Court dismissed the request, stating that CAL, despite being an African 
organisation in terms of Article 4(1), is not recognised by the AU. As a result, CAL lacked 
standing.251 According to Murray: 
 
“[T]his sequence of events illustrates the highly sensitive nature of the debate on the continent, the 
lack of consensus among the Commissioners themselves as to their position on the issue, and the 
willingness of the AU to interfere in the independence of the African Commission”.252 
 
With the removal of CAL’s observer status and a clear step back from the AU in respect of 
recognising the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE, it remains to be seen 
whether the African Commission will, in its upcoming sessions, continue its trend of expressing 
concern over the criminalisation of non-heteronormative SOGIE or the impact of 
discrimination and stigmatisation on the rights of these individuals, and recommend the 
adoption or adaption of legislation and policies.253  
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7 3 3 Education  
7 3 3 1  Socio-economic rights interpretation 
The social, economic, and cultural rights guaranteed under the ACHPR are phrased in vague 
and general terms.254 For example, Article 17(1) provides that “[e]very individual shall have 
the right to education” without expanding on its content or aims. As a result, “innovative 
interpretation” is required to enable states to fulfil these rights.255  
Prior to 2000, the African Commission found violations of economic, social, and cultural 
rights without exploring the meaning of these rights or drawing from international human rights 
law.256 The jurisprudence is still significant for establishing that the economic, social, and 
cultural rights guaranteed under the ACHPR are justiciable and that Article 1 obligates states 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights just like it has to civil and political rights.257 
Ssenjonyo explains that this was the position because of the African Commission’s lack of 
expertise and “little concrete international jurisprudence”.258 Furthermore, few complaints 
concerning social, economic, and cultural rights were submitted to it.259  
After 2000 there was a clear shift towards developing the normative content of these rights. 
This was a result of a combination of factors, being the willingness of Commissioners to 
articulate the reasons for their decisions, the increase in socio-economic complaints brought, 
the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU which “placed more emphasis on the promotion 
and protection of human rights”, and the development of the social, economic, and cultural 
rights at the international level, particularly by the CESCR.260 Against this backdrop, the 
African Commission started to increasingly rely on international jurisprudence. For example, 
in SERAC, the African Commission drew from the ICESCR in interpreting the right to health 
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and the right to a clean environment.261 Similarly, in Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
v Sudan, reference was made to General Comment 14 of the CESCR on the right to health.262 
The ACHPR imposes identical obligations on states to realise economic, social, and cultural 
rights as it does civil and political rights, meaning the same enforcement mechanisms apply in 
respect of both sets of rights.263 This is unlike the ACHR where there have been inconsistencies 
in the interpretation of the obligations imposed under Parts II and III respectively.264 As stated 
above, Article 1 of the ACHPR imposes an obligation on states to respect, protect, promote, 
and fulfil all the rights enshrined therein. 
Because there are no limitations that apply to state obligations in respect of ensuring social, 
economic, and cultural rights besides those provided under Article 27(2)265, Chirwa asks 
whether these rights are then immediately realisable.266 Considering the African Commission’s 
decision in Purohit, it is clear that states should take concrete and targeted steps within their 
available resources to ensure the full realisation of socio-economic rights without 
discrimination.267 With regard to the meaning of “within its available resources”, a lack of 
resources is a valid defence for the state’s failure to immediately realise socio-economic rights. 
However, Chirwa argues that in terms of General Comment 3 of the CESCR, states should 
nonetheless illustrate the optimal use of its available resources to meet basic needs.268  
In light of Chirwa’s statement, the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights becomes 
relevant. This requires states to revisit the measures adopted to ensure that it remains in line 
with its most efficient use of its available resources, gearing it towards the full realisation of 
socio-economic rights.269 Despite the obligation of progressive realisation, states nonetheless 
have to provide for a minimum core in respect of each socio-economic right regardless of 
potential resource constraints.270 The African Commission’s Principles and Guidelines sets out 
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the applicable minimum core obligations. This is explored in more detail below with a focus 
on the right to education. Despite the existence of minimum core obligations, the realisation of 
socio-economic rights on the African continent remains hampered by poverty.271 Ultimately, 
the potential meaningfulness of socio-economic rights depends on their effective 
implementation.272  
 
7 3 3 2 Defining education under Article 17(1)  
Article 17 enshrines the right to education, the right to participate in cultural life273, as well as 
the “promotion and protection of morals and traditional values”. 274 Despite this, education has 
nonetheless developed as a right independent to culture, morals, and traditional values.275 The 
M’Baye Draft enshrined a much more detailed right to education under draft Article 12 than 
the general right to education provided for under Article 17(1). Draft Article 12 contained 
elements of Article 26 of the UDHR, Article 13 of the ICESCR, and Articles 28 and 29 of the 
CRC.276 It included the aims of education and state obligations in respect of the different levels 
of education, and also enshrined the right of parents or legal guardians to have their children 
receive an education in line with their moral and religious values. Murray explains that 
considering the focus of the right to education in the M’Baye Draft, it is unclear why the right 
to education was diluted to what now appears in the ACHPR.277  
The wording of the right to education under the European and inter-American human rights 
treaties contain aspects similar to the international instruments discussed under chapter 4. 
However, each provision guarantees the right to education in a unique manner. Nonetheless, 
the ECtHR and the IACtHR have drawn extensively from the ICESCR and the CRC in their 
interpretation of the right to education under the ECHR and the ACHR. This can also be seen 
in relation to the ESC and the ESC(r), albeit to a lesser extent.  
Although Article 17(1) lacks detail, the African Commission has given the same meaning 
to the right to education as under international and regional human rights law. The Principles 
and Guidelines provide the most significant guidance on the interpretation of the right to 
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education under the ACHPR, giving substance to the statements made in the African 
Commission’s resolutions. As a point of departure, it should be noted that states have the 
obligation to ensure that socio-economic rights are available, adequate, accessible, and 
acceptable. This is in line with the 4-A scheme adopted by the Human Rights Council, the 
CESCR, the CEDAW Committee, and the CRC Committee.278 The Principles and Guidelines 
also give the same meaning to the scheme under the ACHPR.279  
According to the African Commission, the right to education includes all levels of 
education.280 Whereas, primary education must be “free and compulsory”, states only have to 
provide for all other levels of education.281 In this regard, states should ensure “equal 
opportunity and general accessibility, both physical and economic, for all persons to education 
without discrimination”.282 Because education is “a fundamental right that affects the growth, 
development and welfare of human beings”, it should be aimed at:283  
 
“[T]he promotion and development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical 
abilities to their fullest potential, without discrimination; … fostering respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms [and]… the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in 
the spirit of understanding, equality, tolerance, dialogue, mutual respect and friendship among all 
peoples”.284 
 
These aims are almost identical to those provided under the UDHR, the ICESCR and the 
CRC.285 Given the limited guidance from the African Commission and the lack of 
jurisprudence from the African Court regarding the interpretation of Article 17(1), inspiration 
can be drawn from these instruments, in particular, the CRC. 
Considering the developmental aim of education, states should ensure that learners are 
taught in an enabling and safe school environment.286 To this end, corporal punishment should 
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be prohibited because it infringes on their right to not be subjected to harmful treatment, as 
well as their inherent dignity.287 This has been confirmed by the CRC Committee, requiring 
that non-violent forms of discipline be adopted at schools.288 Both the OHCHR and the CRC 
Committee have also established that bullying in schools infringes on the ability of learners to 
benefit fully from education.289 
In the Guidelines on Combatting Sexual Violence and its Consequences in Africa, the 
African Commission drew attention to the importance of sexual health education at all levels 
for protecting children from sexual violence. Sexual health education should cover sexual and 
reproductive health, but also “all forms of sexual violence, its causes and consequences”. In 
this regard, education should “challenge gender and sexist stereotypes”.290 This illustrates that 
the African Commission is open to a constructionist understanding of sex and gender that 
unpacks and addresses the harmful effects of the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation.291 
The developmental aim of education also requires that states take steps to ensure that 
children from vulnerable and marginalised groups have equal access to education.292 To this 
end, states have to ensure that the curriculum and the school environment is inclusive of, and 
appropriate, to these groups.293 Against the backdrop of the research discussed under 1 1, it is 
clear that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE are vulnerable to discrimination and 
marginalisation in the context of education. Thus, the obligation on states should apply in this 
context as well. 
Fostering respect for human rights and preparing children for a responsible life in a free 
society supports the inclusion of human rights education at all levels of education. According 
to the African Commission, Article 17(1) read with Article 25294 also requires this.295 
Importantly, in its Resolution on Human Rights Education, the African Commission 
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acknowledged that human rights education “is a prerequisite for the effective implementation 
of the [ACHPR] and other international human rights instruments”.296 It was further recognised 
that education is an important medium through which the “values and corresponding 
behaviours in a civil society based on full respect for human and peoples’ rights, democracy, 
tolerance and justice” can be instilled.297 As a result, the African Commission requested that 
states include human rights education at all school levels, underlying the importance of 
ensuring that education is inclusive of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.298  
The ACHPR contains two unique aspects related to the right to education. First, that 
education should be directed towards the “preservation and strengthening of positive African 
morals, traditional values and cultures”.299 Second, that education should promote “African 
unity and solidarity”.300 Related hereto, and similar to the UDHR, CESCR, CRC, and the 
ECHR, states also have to respect the freedom parents or guardians to have their children’s 
education conform to their religious and moral convictions.301 Parents or guardians’ religious 
and moral convictions can sometimes conflict with the broader aims of education, as well as 
an inclusive human rights curriculum. Despite this, it is argued that the freedom of parents or 
guardians is only one of a range of aims of education.302 As a result, it cannot outweigh, for 
example, the importance of the child’s development or the value of human rights education, 
seeking to promote non-discrimination and mutual respect among all. In support of this 
argument, the African Commission has also explained that, although Article 17(2) and (3) 
provides the right to participate in cultural activities and requires the state to promote and 
protect the “morals and traditional values” of its communities, it is nonetheless obligated to: 
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“Eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and 
development of the child and in particular … those customs and practices discriminatory to the child 
on the grounds of sex/gender or other status”.303 
 
This is because the ACHPR “protects positive African values consistent with international 
human rights standards” and requires states to eradicate “harmful traditional practices that 
negatively affect human rights” [own emphasis].304 This too is required when considered in 
light of the best interests principle and the child’s right to protection, in general. According to 
the Principles and Guidelines, harmful traditional practices include those that promote and 
entrench discrimination against vulnerable groups. In this regard, the African Commission has 
explained that practices that negatively affect children’s “welfare, dignity, normal growth and 
development” should be addressed, in particular “customs and practices prejudicial to the 
health or life of the child” or those that discriminate against children based on “sex/gender or 
other status”.305  
The M’Baye Draft of the ACHPR incorporated children’s rights under various provisions, 
guaranteeing that children have equal rights regardless of being born out of wedlock and 
irrespective of their parentage. Children were also “protect[ed] from economic and social 
exploitation in the context of the right to work” and states were obligated to ensure the “healthy 
development of the child”.306 Furthermore, parents had the right to “choose the school and 
religion for their children”.307 In comparison, the ACHPR only deals with children’s rights 
under Article 18(3), providing that states shall protect the rights of the child “as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions”. Few references have been made to children’s 
rights in the interpretation of the rights enshrined in the ACHPR. Murray explains that this is 
not strange given the existence of the ACRWC, dealing explicitly and exclusively with 
children’s rights.308 In general, these references are made in relation to the rights of children in 
the context of their families.309  
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Despite the references made to the best interests principle, it has not been defined in relation 
to the ACHPR. Given the discussion undertaken here, it is argued that the best interests 
principle requires the special protection of children because of their inherent vulnerability and 
the importance of their development. Furthermore, as Article 18(3) refers to the rights of the 
child “as stipulated in international declarations and conventions”, inspiration should be drawn 
from the CRC and the ACRWC, both of which provides for the best interests principle.310  
In light hereof, and drawing from the CRC, it is argued that the African child has the right 
to have their best interests be considered in all matters concerning them. According to the CRC 
Committee, this means that all decisions or actions that affect children, either as individuals or 
as a group, should be made considering various factors. These include, but are not limited to, 
the child’s views, their right to preserve their identities, the need to protect them, the importance 
of promoting their development, as well as giving effect to their rights to health and education, 
amongst others.311  
Considering the increasing reliance of the African Commission and the African Court on 
international human rights law, it is suggested that the UDHR and the ICESCR can guide the 
interpretation of the right to education under the ACHPR. As mentioned above, the African 
Commission and the African Court also consider facts in light of all applicable rights, not just 
those alleged to have been violated. This approach simplifies the holistic development of the 
right to education, informed by the rights to human dignity and non-discrimination.  
Although there is no explicit reference to non-heteronormative SOGIE concerning the right 
to education, the discussion undertaken here illustrates the importance of education to the 
development of the child. This is in line with the obligation on states to adopt special measures 
to “ensure that all children, including those belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, 
enjoy equal access to and progress in the educational system” [own emphasis].312 Furthermore, 
in discussing the general obligations on states in realising socio-economic rights under the 
ACHPR, the African Commission explains that states should adopt measures towards 
addressing discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexuality.313 In light of the broad 
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understanding of these terms, in particular gender, it is suggested that discrimination based on 
non-heteronormative SOGIE is prohibited within the context of the right to education. 
 
7 4 ACRWC  
7 4 1 Weighing the best interests of the child and the child’s right to participate against the 
duties imposed by Article 31   
The ACRWC, like the CRC, defines ‘child’ as anyone under the age of 18.314 Article 1 places 
comprehensive obligations on states to realise the rights of children. Article 1(1) requires states 
to recognise the rights enshrined under the ACRWC, taking steps to give effect to these rights 
through adopting necessary legislative or other measures.315 Article 1(2) adds to this obligation 
that where national legislation or an applicable international convention places a heightened 
obligation on a state, that standard should apply. In this sense, the ACRWC sets out the 
minimum standards applicable to children’s rights.316 Furthermore, Article 1(3) requires that 
traditional, cultural, or religious practices inconsistent with the ACRWC should be 
discouraged.  
The overarching purpose of the obligations is to guarantee children’s rights and prevent 
violations thereof. It applies equally in respect of civil and political rights as it does to 
economic, social, and cultural rights.317 The ACRWC, therefore, “adopts a holistic approach to 
issues relating to the rights and welfare of the child by affirming the principle that rights are 
indivisible and interdependent”.318 Corresponding to the CRC, the ACRWC lists (i) non-
discrimination, (ii) the best interests of the child, (iii) the right to life, survival, and 
development, and (iv) the right to participate in decision-making as the four core principles of 
children’s rights.319 These core principles guide all state obligations. 
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Importantly, Article 4 of the ACRWC enshrines the best interests principle, stating that “[i]n 
all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the 
child shall be the primary consideration” [own emphasis]. In comparison, the CRC provides 
that the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.320 In this context, the 
ACERWC stated that: 
 
“[T]he best interests standard applies across cultural, political and geographical settings, to members 
of all ethnic groups, and, as “the primary consideration”, must be an extremely important 
consideration, when ranked against any other competing considerations”.321 
 
Vollmer explains that this means that no other consideration can be elevated above the child’s 
best interests.322 This supports the argument presented below that cultural, religious or moral 
considerations cannot be used to limit the right to education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. In this regard, drawing from the CRC Committee, the ACERWC has 
also confirmed that the best interests principle is “flexible and adaptable so that it can be applied 
to the needs of children taking into account their special circumstances”.323  
According to Sloth-Nielsen, “[i]n customary and traditional African society, children 
occupied a silent space in the kinship structure, depending on adult intervention for a voice”.324 
The ACRWC represents a shift from this approach, with Article 4(2) requiring that states 
“develop laws and policies that allow child participation in matters that concern them”.325 
Through participation in decision-making, children become “engaged actors rather than 
passive beneficiaries of their rights”.326 Due weight should be accorded to children’s views on 
what would be in their best interests to ensure that it leads to real change.327 The ACERWC 
has recognised the challenges relating to implementing child participation in different contexts. 
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Regardless, the ACERWC still encourages states to integrate child participation in official 
processes.328 To this end, it has listed nine principles of child participation that should be 
complied with, requiring that:  
 
“[P]rocesses should be transparent and informative; voluntary; respectful; relevant; child friendly; 
inclusive; be supported by training for adults; be safe and sensitive to risk; and be accountable”.329 
 
Although the ACRWC contains comprehensive protections for children’s rights, it also 
imposes obligations on the child. Article 31 imposes duties on the child towards their families, 
communities, and the state. This is similar to the duties imposed under the ACHPR.330 The 
duties of the child should, nonetheless, be in line with the purpose of the ACRWC, namely the 
promotion and protection of children’s rights.331 Considering this, Article 31 should be viewed 
in the larger context of the ACRWC and cannot be used to limit children’s rights in favour of 
their responsibilities.332 The purpose of Article 31 is not to restrict the rights enshrined under 
the ACRWC.333 Rather, the ACERWC understands responsibilities as cultivating children’s 
participation in decision-making, helping them “contribute to shaping their own lives, families, 
communities and the wider society”.334  
Article 31(a) requires children to “work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, 
superiors and elders at all times and to assist them in case of need”. According to Chirwa, this 
duty of respect can undermine the right of the child to participate in decision-making.335 
However, the ACERWC has explained that this does not mean that children should obey adults 
without question or that this can be expected.336 Rather, it should be considered in light of the 
obligation on parents and caregivers “to ensure, to the best of their abilities and capabilities, 
the proper care and upbringing of the child until adulthood”.337 This can also be applied in the 
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Of particular relevance is the obligation imposed on children under Article 31(d) to 
“preserve and strengthen African values”. This refers to positive African values, excluding 
those that perpetuate harmful practices against children.338 In this regard, Article 21(1) 
becomes relevant, placing an obligation on states to: 
 
“[T]ake all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the 
welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child and in particular: (a) those customs 
and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and (b) those customs and practices 
discriminatory to the child on the ground of sex or other status”. 
 
The ACERWC has expanded on this, including “all behaviours, attitudes and or/practices” that 
undermine children’s fundamental rights.339 In this regard, specific reference has been made to 
the right to human dignity, health, mental and physical integrity, and development.340 In 
particular, these practices are harmful “regardless of their being condoned by a society, culture, 
religion, or tradition”.341 For example, in its joint general comment on ending child marriage, 
the ACERWC explained that child marriage is harmful because it “reinforces harmful social 
constructions of gender, supports systems of patriarchy and entrenches patterns of 
discrimination”.342 Here, the ACERWC illustrates a constructionist understanding of gender, 
how heteronormativity facilitates the infringement of fundamental rights, and how this can 
facilitate the continued existence of harmful practices under the guise of culture.  
The obligation to eliminate harmful practices exists because practices that undermine the 
fundamental rights enshrined under the ACRWC cannot be justified.343 Lloyd argues that this 
is significant because harmful practices often have their origins in culture or religion.344 
Eradicating these practices can prove challenging because of the perceived threat to cultural 
values or being a western import.345 However, in light of the discussion under 2 5, it is clear 
that non-heteronormative SOGIE was not brought to the continent with colonialism. Instead, 
research suggests that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE often played an important role 
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in pre-colonial African societies.346 Furthermore, considering non-discrimination as jus cogens, 
morality cannot justify the limitation of rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
because it constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of rights.347 
Article 21(1)(b) has specific relevance when considering the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Where children are denied their right to education as a result 
of the non-recognition of their non-heteronormative SOGIE, with non-recognition derived 
from religious and cultural beliefs, this can constitute a harmful practice. It is suggested that 
discriminating against children based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools can 
constitute a harmful practice because: (i) it denies the recognition of the child’s inherent human 
dignity; (ii) it reinforces harmful stereotypes and encourages unjustifiable discrimination; and 
(iii) it prevents children with non-heteronormative SOGIE from enjoying the right to education 
– a fundamental right enshrined under the ACRWC. 
 
7 4 2 Dignity 
The Preamble to the ACRWC recognises that children, due to their vulnerability, require 
special care and legal protection to ensure their development “in conditions of freedom, dignity 
and security” [own emphasis]. Unlike the ACHPR, the ACRWC does not enshrine an exclusive 
provision dealing with the right to human dignity. However, human dignity has been mentioned 
in the interpretation of numerous provisions, as further discussed below.  
 Article 6 contains the right to a name and nationality. According to the ACERWC, the use 
of the term “every child” means that the right finds universal application.348 In Institute for 
Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative on 
behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya v Kenya, the ACERWC held that the refusal of 
the Kenyan state to legally recognise children of Nubian descent “is an affront to their dignity” 
and prevents them from enjoying their rights under the ACRWC.349 Although this statement 
was made in the context of the impact of statelessness on children, it should also be applied in 
respect of legal gender recognition of official documents. Relying on the decisions of the 
ECtHR in Goodwin, the ECSR in Transgender Europe, and the IACtHR’s advisory opinion on 
the Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples, it is argued 
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that denying legal gender recognition to children with non-binary gender identities or gender 
expressions violate their inherent human dignity and compromises their ability to enjoy other 
rights.350 
Article 13 protects the rights of disabled children and requires states to adopt special 
measures of protection to ensure respect for their inherent dignity. Drawing from the African 
Commission’s decision in Purohit, the ACERWC has explained that referring to mentally 
disabled children as “lunatic” or “idiots” is undignifying.351 Furthermore, it has also been 
recognised that legislation that discriminates against disabled children prevents them from 
pursuing their “hopes, dreams and goals” like all other persons.352 The ACERWC, therefore, 
recognises the potential degrading impact of language and its effects on the child’s human 
dignity, sense of belonging and self-worth.353 This is similar to the approach under the 
UDHR.354 Considered in the context of this research and in light of the discussion in part 1 1, 
using degrading language in legislation or to address learners with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE infringes on their inherent dignity.  
Human dignity has also been referred to in relation to Article 16, which protects children 
against degrading treatment. Article 16 reads similar to Article 5 of the ACHPR, with the 
exception that a specific reference to human dignity is excluded. The ACERWC in IHRDA v 
Cameroon nonetheless explained that Article 16 aims to protect children from violations of 
their inherent dignity, as well as their physical and mental integrity.355 This approach is in line 
with that of the Human Rights Council, the CRC Committee, the ECtHR, and the ACtHR, and 
the African Commission, all of which have referred to the impact of degrading treatment on 
human dignity. Importantly, these bodies have also agreed that degrading treatment has a wide 
scope including physical, emotional or mental violence, as well as corporal punishment 356  
As reiterated throughout this dissertation, despite the protection from abuse of children 
under international and regional law, children are often subject to abuse at the hands of 
teachers, parents, or other adults, people who should protect them.357 Although, as mentioned 
under 1 1, there exists little research on the discrimination and marginalisation experienced by 
children with non-heteronormative in SOGIE at schools, this does not mean that the problem 
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does not exist. Rather, as Kassan explains, all forms of violence against children are often 
underreported and under-investigated.358 This is even more so insofar as it relates to children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Given the broad understanding of degrading treatment, 
bullying or discriminating against learners based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE is 
prohibited under Article 16(1).  
 
7 4 3  Non-discrimination 
The prohibition of discrimination is the core of the ACRWC and applies in respect of all its 
substantive provisions. Article 3 of the ACRWC provides that: 
 
“Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed 
in this Charter irrespective of the child’s or [their] parents’ or legal guardians’ … sex … or other 
status”. 
 
The wording is similar to the ACHPR and the human rights instruments discussed under 
chapters 4 to 6. The test applied to determine whether differential treatment constitutes unfair 
discrimination under the ACRWC was derived from the ACHPR and is, therefore, identical.359 
Importantly, the ACERWC has explained that Article 3 does not require all persons to be 
treated the same. Rather, states should identify children who are particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination and have to adopt “special measures in order to diminish or eliminate conditions 
that cause discrimination”.360  
The ACERWC’s decision in IHRDA v Kenya is relevant to the obligation on states to take 
special measures in respect of vulnerable groups. The facts are similar to those of Nubian 
Community.361 The ACERWC acknowledged the importance of birth registration to ensuring 
that children are included in their communities.362 Statelessness or any other form of non-
recognition leaves the child vulnerable because legal recognition is often required for accessing 
certain rights, for example, the right to education and health care.363  
Children of Nubian descent were “treated differently from other children in Kenya” who 
were registered at birth. Because there was no legitimate justification for the differentiation, 
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there was a prima face case of unfair discrimination based on race and ethnicity under Article 
3 of the ACRWC.364 As a result, the burden shifted to the state to justify the differentiation.365 
Drawing from the African Commission’s decision in LRF v Zambia366, the ACERWC 
explained that discrimination will be justified where there exists a legitimate state interest, with 
a proportionate relationship between the limitation and the aim sought to achieve. The 
limitation “must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages 
which are to be obtained”.367 None of the reasons presented by the state passed this test. 
Considering the inherent dignity of the child, as well as their best interests, the ACERWC 
decided that the failure to recognise the rights of the Nubian peoples on an equal basis to other 
Kenyans “violate[d] the principle of equal treatment … [and] ha[d] no place in a democratic 
and pluralistic society”.368  
Similarly, in Minority Rights Group International and SOS-Esclaves on behalf of Said Ould 
Salem and Yarg Ould Salem v Mauritania, it was alleged that Article 3 was violated because 
the enslaved children were treated differently to the children of their slave-master based on 
their Haratine ethnic heritage, as well as their status as slaves.369 The ACERWC reiterated the 
test applicable to determine whether differentiation constitutes discrimination.370 Because 
slavery is prohibited under national and international law, there can be no justification.371  
The decisions in IHRDA v Kenya and Salem illustrate the importance of non-discrimination 
to the enjoyment of all the rights enshrined under the ACRWC, requiring states to take special 
measures in respect of vulnerable children. States must take steps to ensure that all children are 
guaranteed their rights under the ACRWC. This obligation should be viewed in the context of 
the aim of the ACRWC to ensure that children grow up to become active members of their 
communities, contributing to its development. In this context, it is also possible to draw on 
Rudman’s reference to non-discrimination as jus cogens and the resulting inability to justify 
discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE.372  
Despite the absence of any reference to non-heteronormative SOGIE, the ACERWC has 
established a broad understanding of gender-based discrimination in IHRDA and Finders 
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Group Initiative on behalf of TFA (a minor) v Cameroon.373 The facts concerned the rape of a 
girl-child, then aged 10, and the subsequent failure of the state to investigate the sexual violence 
perpetrated. The complainants alleged that this failure constituted gender-based discrimination, 
prohibited under Article 3.374 Although acknowledging that gender-based discrimination is 
prohibited, the ACERWC stated that it is unclear whether sexual violence constitutes gender-
based discrimination.375 In its determination of whether sexual violence constitutes gender-
based discrimination, the ACERWC drew from CEDAW.376 
In General Comment 19, the CEDAW Committee defined gender-based violence as 
“violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately”.377 The ACERWC agreed with the CEDAW Committee that gender-based 
violence includes rape.378 In this regard, the ACERWC explained that gender-based 
discrimination includes gender-based or sexual violence because: 
 
“[It] is caused by a deep-rooted ideology and stereotype that men have privilege over women as well 
as the cultural urge to ensure men’s power and control over women. In addition, violence against 
women perpetuates the relegated status women have been socially given for a long period of time”.379  
 
However, the ACERWC went further, holding that the social subordination of women in itself 
constitutes gender-based discrimination because it sustains the beliefs and attitudes regarding 
men’s dominance that causes and maintains gender-based violence.380 Moreover, the 
ACERWC recognised that “[w]omen suffer from gender-based violence because of the unequal 
distribution of power between men and women”.381 In light hereof, it was held that gender-
based violence, through its disproportionate impact on women, constitutes gender-based 
discrimination.382  
In Finders Group Initiative, the ACERWC illustrated a constructionist understanding of 
gender and how the design of societies to serve African masculinity sustains inequality, 
discrimination, and violence.383 It is suggested that, through this decision, the ACERWC set 
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the framework for understanding gender-based discrimination as including discrimination 
based on non-heteronormative gender identities or gender expressions in the future.  
 
7 4 4  Education 
7 4 4 1 Right to education 
The ACRWC does not add any socio-economic rights to those enshrined under the ACHPR. 
Instead, it defines these rights in greater detail and considers its application to children.384 The 
ACRWC provides a comprehensive right to education under Article 11.385 Like the ACHPR, 
the ACERWC has drawn from the CESCR in asserting that states should ensure that education 
is available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable.386 
Article 11(1) provides every child with the right to education. Considered in light of the 
right to non-discrimination, Article 11(1) quite literally means that there are no grounds upon 
which any child can be denied this right. Relying on Article 13(1) of the ICESCR, it is argued 
that, even though non-heteronormative SOGIE are not listed as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination under Article 3, the wording of the right to education excludes all forms of 
discrimination that would prevent any child from enjoying this right.387 In this regard, the 
ACERWC, drawing from the CESCR’s statement in General Comment 13, explained that 
Article 11 obligates states to take “deliberate, concrete, and targeted action” to provide 
education without discrimination. As such, no child may be excluded.388  
Article 11(3) deals with the more formalistic aspects of education that is required for its full 
realisation.389 Article 11(3) not only necessitates the establishment of the appropriate 
infrastructure and the appointment of qualified teachers, but also demands that the “well-
recognised corollaries of the fulfilment of this right” be provided.390 Articles 11(3)(d) and (e) 
are of particular importance, requiring that states: 
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“[T]take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools … [and] take special measures in 
respect of … disadvantaged children, to ensure equal access to education for all sections of the 
community” 
 
In IHRDA v Kenya, children from Nubian communities were provided with fewer schools and 
fewer resources for education. The ACERWC found a violation of the right to education 
because the state did not take the necessary measures to ensure that children from Nubian 
communities, as a disadvantaged group, had equal access to education.391  
Similarly, the ACERWC in Hunsungule v Uganda392 also found a violation of Article 
11(3)(e) for the same reason, but in respect of children affected by armed conflict as a 
disadvantaged group.393 The state argued that the insurrection in Northern Uganda from 1986 
to 2005 complicated its ability to comply with its obligations imposed under Article 11.394 
However, the ACERWC drew attention to the title of the ACRWC which indicates that the 
promotion and protection of the rights of the child should result in their “well-being and 
welfare”. As a result, states are obligated to “promote and improve the lived reality of children 
on the ground” regardless of the circumstances.395 In determining whether the state violated 
Article 11, the ACERWC recognised the “important role of education for creating an Africa fit 
for children”.396 Whether the state complied with the obligations imposed by Article 11 
depends on whether it took all reasonable measures given the circumstances.397 Here, the 
ACERWC considered the efforts of the state to build schools in camps, setting up scholarships, 
increasing the education budget, as well as providing capital for various campaigns that helped 
children get back to school.398  
 
7 4 4 2 Aims of education 
Article 11(2) lists the aims of education. These are similar to those provided under the UDHR, 
CRC and the ICESCR, but with some elements added to it.399 According to Article 11(2), 
education should be aimed at the development of the child, fostering respect for human rights 
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and fundamental freedoms, strengthening positive African values, and preparing the child for 
a responsible life in society in the spirit of tolerance and mutual respect amongst all peoples.400  
The developmental aim of education should be viewed in the context of Article 5(1), which 
places an obligation on states to ensure children’s development to their full potential.401 The 
developmental aim of education is linked to the purpose of enabling children to grow up into 
active members of their communities, contributing to its future improvement. To this end, 
education should equip children with the necessary life-skills.402 The role of education in 
fostering respect for human rights and strengthening positive African values is central. 
Strengthening and preserving positive African values require that children “be taught and 
encouraged to avoid xenophobic, discriminatory and disrespectful attitudes and practices in all 
settings, as they detract from the moral well-being of society”.403 Under the ACHPR, positive 
African values are defined as those that are consistent with international human rights 
standards, including those that encourage solidarity and mutual care.404 In comparison, under 
the ACRWC, harmful cultural practices guide what cannot be included under positive African 
values. As discussed in 7 4 1, harmful practices refer to those that undermine fundamental 
rights, such as the right to education. Thus, in the context of education, behaviours or practices 
that discriminate against children based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE should be 
discouraged.  
The ACERWC has further explained that education should teach children about their own 
diverse national communities, but also about the African continent and the world in general. 
Children should also be taught how to “maintain good and healthy relations with their peers 
and play with other children in a spirit of respect, tolerance and equality with one another”.405  
Through this, education can contribute to inculcating the values of understanding and 
friendship amongst peoples, promoting African solidarity.406 Despite its central notion that 
“every individual is an extension of others”, African solidarity does not refer to or necessarily 
even promote homogeneity.407 Rather, it underscores the notion that everyone has an important 
role to play in ensuring the functioning and development of their societies. In this way, African 
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solidarity aims to promote “a common sense of humanity” and “a sense of belonging” in a 
manner that celebrates difference.408 
Although not explicitly stated, considering these aims in light of the interpretations under 
the UDHR, the ICESCR, and the CRC, it is suggested that the ACRWC require human rights 
education to be incorporated at all levels of education.409 Human rights education should cover 
the rights enshrined under the ACRWC, teaching children to respect the human rights of their 
peers.410 Education should further reflect values of participation and inclusion, enabling 
learners to recognise that cultural or moral differences amongst people do not justify 
discrimination or degradation.411 An inclusive education also requires that sexual health 
education cover non-heteronormative SOGIE and remove content that discriminates against 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE from the curriculum.412 Not only is this central to 
promoting the aims of education but is required to ensure that all children can indeed enjoy the 
right to education enshrined under Article 11(1). 
 
7 5 Maputo Protocol  
7 5 1 Defining ‘women’ 
Against the backdrop of the discussion under 2 5, men dominate African life.413 The Maputo 
Protocol presents a shift from this, providing for the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
against women. According to Viljoen, the Maputo Protocol aims to address the lack of 
implementation of the ACHPR and CEDAW in protecting the rights of women in Africa.414 
Although CEDAW was adopted before the ACHPR, the drafters did not afford much attention 
to its provisions, illustrating a lack of support for CEDAW.415 However, the ACHPR 
nonetheless provides explicit protection to women’s rights under Article 18(3). Significantly, 
Article 18(3) requires eliminating discrimination against women “as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions”.416 Through this, CEDAW can guide the interpretation of 
women’s rights under the ACHPR.  
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Despite the protection of women’s rights under the ACHPR and CEDAW, the Maputo 
Protocol is valuable for establishing an African-specific instrument focused solely on the 
challenges facing women in Africa in the recognition and realisation of their rights. Through 
this, the Protocol also “locates CEDAW in the African reality and returns some casualties of 
the quest for global consensus into its fold”. 417 The Preamble of the Maputo Protocol states 
that its purpose is to: 
 
“[E]liminate all forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women … [including] any 
practice that hinders or endangers the normal growth and affects the physical and psychological 
development of women and girls”.  
 
Article 1(k) defines “women” as “persons of female gender, including girls” [own emphasis]. 
In comparison, “discrimination against women” is defined as “any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction … based on sex” [own emphasis]. The Maputo Protocol, therefore, seems to view 
“sex” and “gender” as interchangeable concepts. However, as set out under 2 2 1, sex and 
gender are distinct. Whereas sex is biological, gender is a social construct and a personal 
experience. The idea that sex is determinative of gender or sexual orientation is a result of 
conflation.418 In turn, this conflation has made its way into all aspects of life, establishing 
heteronormativity as the only acceptable way of being.419 However, as illustrated under 
chapters 4 to 6, the international, European and inter-American human rights systems have 
started unpacking this, calling for legal and social reform.  
Although discrimination against women is defined with reference to sex, it is suggested that, 
when considering the provisions of the Maputo Protocol, the need to eliminate discrimination 
is not based on biological attributes. For example, although Article 2(2) refers to “practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes [own 
emphasis]”, states are required to eliminate this through adjusting the social and cultural 
expectations regarding suitable behaviour for women and men. The focus on modifying social 
and cultural behaviours and attitudes correspond to an understanding of gender that appreciates 
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heteronormativity as a site of violence.420 This is supported by the African Commission and 
the ACERWC’s developing understanding of the meaning of gender-based discrimination and 
how African masculinities undermine the rights of women, girls, and children.421 The mere 
existence of women with non-heteronormative SOGIE challenges the traditional gender roles 
and the dominance of men in African societies.422 It has been shown that these individuals, as 
a result of not conforming to expected expressions, are at a heightened risk of discrimination 
and violence.423 As such, protecting the rights of women with non-heteronormative SOGIE has 
direct bearing on the obligation on states to address attitudes or behaviour that promotes or 
maintain women’s inferiority to men.  
Against this backdrop, it is argued that “women” under the Maputo Protocol includes 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Where a female identifies as a woman, but has a 
non-heteronormative sexual orientation, it is still simple to include them under the definition 
of “women”.424 In comparison, where a male identifies and expresses herself as a woman, the 
situation becomes more complex as a result of the conflation of sex and gender in many modern 
African cultures.425 However, if gender is understood in terms of a constructionist approach, 
women with non-heteronormative gender identities or gender expressions do fall under the 
definition of “women” based on their experience of themselves as women.426 
The conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation in domestic legislation that 
criminalises homosexuality means that there is no appreciation of the distinction between 
homosexual men and transgender women. In effect, this often leads to the persecution of 
transgender women under the guise of the criminalisation of homosexuality because, like 
homosexual men, transgender women “do not comply with the heteronormative expectation of 
what a ‘real’ man is”.427 In this way, heteronormativity justifies human rights violations.428  
In comparison with the Maputo Protocol, CEDAW and the Convention of Belém do Pará 
do not define “women”.429 Under both CEDAW and the Convention of Belém do Pará, woman 
is defined with reference to “violence against women”. Although CEDAW defines 
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discrimination against women as a “distinction, exclusion or restriction” based on sex, it has 
nonetheless been interpreted as including gender. In this regard, reference has been made to 
the difference between sex and gender and concern expressed over discrimination against 
women based on sexual orientation and gender identity.430 According to MESECVI, “women” 
includes any person who identifies as a woman. Its reports illustrate that this includes women 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE.431 The Maputo Protocol contains corresponding rights to 
CEDAW and the Convention of Belém do Pará. As a result, it is argued that, despite the limited 
references to women with non-heteronormative sexual orientation and the absence of any 
reference to women with non-binary gender identities or gender expressions, women with non-
heteronormative SOGIE are nonetheless protected under the Maputo Protocol. 
 
7 5 2 Human dignity and the obligation to eliminate harmful practices 
Article 3 enshrines an explicit right to human dignity. This includes the right to legal 
recognition, respect for the free development of the personality, and protection from all forms 
of violence. Nubian Community and IHRDA v Kenya illustrated that the African Commission 
and the ACERWC appreciate the relationship between legal recognition for minority groups 
and the ability to enjoy fundamental rights.432 As a result of its relationship with the inherent 
dignity of individuals, the right to legal gender recognition has been established under the 
ICCPR, the ECHR, the ESC, and the ACHR.433 According to the ECtHR in Goodwin, due to 
its connection to human dignity, the development of the individual, and their sense of self, legal 
gender recognition cannot be refused as a result of being deemed controversial by certain 
sectors of society.434 Correspondingly under the international and regional human rights 
treaties discussed in chapters 4 to 6, human dignity under the Maputo Protocol is also tied to 
the free development of the human personality.435 In this regard, the African Commission in 
General Comment 2 stated that: 
 
“The right to dignity enshrines the freedom to make personal decisions without interference from 
the State or non-State actors. The woman’s right to make personal decisions involves taking into 
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account or not the beliefs, traditions, values and cultural or religious practices, and the right to 
question or to ignore them”.436 
 
According to Vollmer, this means that states should not “interfere in personal decisions”, 
including matters related to SOGIE.437 It also means that states cannot justify infringements on 
the right to dignity by arguing that it is contrary to cultural values.438 The Preamble to the 
Maputo Protocol defines “positive African values” as those that are “based on the principles of 
equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice, solidarity and democracy”.439 This corresponds with 
the approach under the ACHPR, in terms of which African values are only deemed positive, 
and therefore protected, if they correspond to standards of international human rights law.440 
As established under 7 4 1, harmful practices are contradictory to positive African values 
because it undermines fundamental rights.441 Similarly, the Maputo Protocol defines harmful 
practices as:  
 
“[A]ll behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women 
and girls, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity”.442 
 
This is similar to the ACRWC.443 However, the Maputo Protocol goes further than the ACHPR 
and the ACRWC in the obligations imposed on states to eliminate all forms of harmful 
practices. This requires creating public awareness of harmful practices through education 
programmes and taking steps to protecting at-risk women.444 The elimination of harmful 
practices should also be viewed in the context of Article 3(4) which requires states to respect 
women’s dignity and to protect them from “all forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal 
violence”.  
The African Court’s judgement in APDF and IHRDA v Republic of Mali445 illustrated that 
culture, morals, and religion cannot outweigh international human rights standards. In 2009, 
Mali adopted a Family Code that was in line with international law standards regarding the age 
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of and consent to marriage, as well as inheritance rights.446 As a result of Islamic-led protests, 
this law could not be promulgated and a new Family Code was adopted and promulgated in 
2011.447 The new Family Code allowed marriage from the age of 15, did not require 
“verification of the parties’ consent by religious ministers”, and enshrined “religious and 
customary law as the applicable regime, by default, in matters of inheritance”.448 As a result, 
the state violated numerous provisions of the ACRWC, the Maputo Protocol, and CEDAW, 
including the obligation of states to “eliminate traditional practices and conduct harmful to the 
rights of women and children”.449  
The significance of this matter lies in the reparations ordered. The African Court went 
beyond stating that the new Family Code be amended to comply with the ACRWC, the Maputo 
Protocol, and CEDAW.450 It held that the state is obligated to sensitise and educate the 
“population on the dangers of early marriage… [and to] ensure equal share of inheritance 
between legitimate children and children born out of wedlock … [and] between man and 
woman”.451 The decision indicates that the African Court appreciates that Africans are not a 
homogenous group; diverse cultures and morals should be able to co-exist in a manner that 
allows all persons to enjoy the fundamental human rights that they are entitled to. The 
judgement further elucidates state obligations in respect of implementing positive measures of 
re-socialisation to ensure that the population understand their rights and are thus enabled to 
enjoy them.  
 
7 5 3 A right to education without discrimination 
Article 12 of the Maputo Protocol places comprehensive obligations on states to ensure the 
right to education of women without discrimination. These obligations should be read with 
those imposed on states under Article 2, which provides for the elimination of discrimination 
against women. Neither Article 1(f), nor Article 2 provides a list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. This corresponds to the approach under CEDAW and the Convention of Belém 
do Pará.452 However, as indicated under 7 5 1, ‘women’ should be given a wide meaning, 
including any person who identifies as a woman in the gendered sense of the word. 
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In General Comment 2, the African Commission recognised the impact of intersecting 
grounds of discrimination, such as “sex, sexuality, sexual orientation, age … harmful 
customary practices and/or religion”, on the ability of women to realise their rights.453 This is 
of particular relevance in the context of the right to education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE because multiple grounds of discrimination are involved; sex, gender, 
sexual orientation, gender identities or gender expressions and age. 
Article 12(1)(a) requires states to “eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and 
guarantee equal opportunity and access”. According to Article 2(1), discrimination should be 
eliminated through the adoption of “appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures”. 
These measures should prohibit and prevent practices that are harmful to the well-being of 
women, ensure that a gender perspective is incorporated in the formulation and implementation 
of these measures, as well as “take corrective and positive action in those areas where 
discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist”.454  
In the context of education, Article 2(1) means that states should adopt legislation that is 
explicit in its prohibition of discrimination against the girl-child, as well as policies aimed at 
assuring this. It is suggested that the incorporation of a gender perspective requires states to, in 
line with Article 2(2), adjust social and cultural ideas and practices that undermine the rights 
of women in favour of those that serve African masculine ideals. In this regard, Article 12(1)(b) 
provides guidance, indicating that states should “eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks [and] 
syllabuses … that perpetuate such discrimination”. As such, Article 2(2), read with Article 
12(1)(b), stipulates that states cannot choose to only depict men and women in terms of 
heteronormative ideals as this would undermine the equality that the Maputo Protocol seeks to 
promote. Rather, educational materials should include persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE in the same manner as persons with heteronormative SOGIE. Thus, derogatory content 
that encourages violence or discrimination should be removed. This approach has been 
confirmed under the CRC and the ESC.455  
Related to the obligations imposed under Article 12(1)(b), Article 12(1)(d) requires states 
to protect the girl-child from all forms of abuse at school. Violence against women includes 
“physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm”.456 Read with Article 12(1)(b) and (d) 
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this increases support for the removal of content from the curriculum that promotes violence 
against women and undermines their equal rights. Protecting girls with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE from violence also means that states should address behaviour that excludes and 
dehumanises them. Importantly, in General Comment 2, the African Commission set out the 
obligation on states to provide “comprehensive information and education on human sexuality, 
reproduction and sexual and reproductive rights” [own emphasis].457 It is suggested that the 
African Commission’s reference to sexuality should be understood in terms of queer theory, 
which appreciates sexuality as a personal experience.458 This is also in line with the approach 
adopted by the Human Rights Council, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR.459 As a result, and with 
support from the ECSR’s decisions in Dojan and INTERIGHTS, “education on human 
sexuality” should include not only information on heterosexuality but should also teach 
children about non-heteronormative SOGIE.460 
Article 12(1)(e) further demands that states “integrate gender sensitisation and human rights 
education at all levels of education curricula”. The African Commission has not expanded on 
what human rights education entails under the Maputo Protocol. In respect of the ACHPR, the 
African Commission has explained that it should foster respect for the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. Respect for the rights of others is integral to ensuring that these rights can 
become effective.461 According to the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, human 
rights education provides the platform for addressing degrading and discriminatory ideas of 
women. Recognition of the inherent human dignity of all persons to be treated with respect and 
concern without discrimination is central hereto.462 The CESCR adds that human rights 
education should reflect values of participation and inclusion. As such, education has the 
potential to address stigma against particular groups of individuals.463 Against this backdrop, 
human rights education under the Maputo Protocol should, therefore, at least teach children of 
the rights enshrined under this instrument and elucidate state obligations. Considering the 
discussion undertaken here, it is clear that the Maputo Protocol, in fact, envisages a human 
rights-based approach in eliminating all forms of discrimination against women in education, 
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one that corresponds to the framework for human rights education set forth under international 
human rights law. 
 
7 6  Concluding remarks: a teleological approach to the interpretation of the right to 
education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the African regional 
human rights system 
Denying any person their rights prevents them from living a dignified life through which they 
can contribute to the development of their communities. This goes against the very core of the 
ACHPR, the ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol. The African Commission and the ACERWC 
have indicated that legal recognition is integral to human dignity. Relying on the ICCPR, the 
ECHR, the ESC, and the ACHR, it has been suggested that human dignity under the ACHPR, 
ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol not only requires legal recognition, but also legal gender 
recognition.464 This is because legal recognition of any kind affects the individual’s ability to 
enjoy the rights to which they are entitled. Although no mention is made to children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in the context of the right to human dignity (or any other rights under 
the ACRWC), the entitlement of all children to respect for their inherent human dignity without 
discrimination of any kind is a well-established principle of international law. 
To date, there is, in general, little support for the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE from the AU. However, the African Commission has nonetheless illustrated its 
willingness to recognise the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE based on each 
person’s inherent human dignity and the general prohibition on discrimination. The ACERWC 
presents a similar position, adding strong protection for the rights of the child, requiring that 
their best interests shall be the primary consideration in matters concerning them.  
It is suggested that the lack of an explicit decision dealing specifically with the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE does not mean that these persons are not entitled to 
the rights enshrined under the ACHPR, ACRWC, or the Maputo Protocol. This is based on two 
related points that formed the core of this chapter: (i) that the African Court, the African 
Commission, and the ACERWC have started challenging the religious, moral, and cultural 
norms that undermine the rights of any person who does not promote African masculinity; and 
(ii) that international, European, and inter-American jurisprudence on the right to non-
discrimination, in particular, supports the global development towards the protection of persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE.  
 




As to the first point, it has been shown that given the object and purpose of the African 
human rights treaties – to protect the rights of all persons without discrimination – whether 
concerning all persons under the ACHPR, children under the ACRWC, or women under the 
Maputo Protocol – religious, moral, or cultural practices that limit human rights can only be 
deemed as promoting positive African values, and thus protected, if they do not render the 
rights protected as illusory and also comply with internationally recognised human rights 
principles. Arguments of African values and the supposed un-African-ness of non-
heteronormative SOGIE should be weighed up against universalist notions of human rights, 
cultural developments, as well as the provision made for the elimination of harmful practices 
and addressing gender stereotypes that promotes the subjugation of women. As such, it is 
unlikely that the AU states can legally uphold their arguments against the recognition of the 
rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, ACRWC, and the 
Maputo Protocol.  
As to the second point, non-heteronormative SOGIE have been established as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination under international, European, and inter-American human rights 
treaties. The rights under the international, European, and inter-American treaties discussed 
above have been interpreted in the same manner, although the developments did not all occur 
at the same time. Under international and inter-American treaties, this development occurred 
in relation to the right to non-discrimination.465 In comparison, the ECtHR developed the right 
of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE through the right to respect to private life, 
enshrined under Article 8 of the ECHR.466 Adopting a broad understanding of private life, the 
ECtHR referred to sexual life as a most intimate aspect of private life and tolerance as a 
hallmark of democratic societies, using these values to protect the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE.  
The ACHPR does not enshrine an explicit right to privacy. Murray and Viljoen argue that 
the right to privacy is implicit to the right to human dignity.467 As a result, it is possible to 
recommend that the African Commission and the African Court follow the approach of the 
ECtHR in its development of the protection of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. However, Rudman argues that using the right to privacy to protect the rights of persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR is a “double-edged sword”.468 This is 
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because although it would be the “path of least resistance” to get states to accept non-
heteronormative SOGIE, the use of privacy would mean that non-heteronormative SOGIE are 
in fact not openly accepted, but that it is ignored as long as it remains hidden. Thus, “the use 
of privacy would leave the stigma completely untouched and the state without any positive 
obligations.469 In light of this, the ECtHR’s decisions arguably offer valuable insight into using 
the rights to human dignity and non-discrimination read with the right to privacy, it should not 
be used to promote a privacy-based argument under the ACHPR, ACRWC, or the Maputo 
Protocol. Rather, the focus should be on the rights to human dignity and non-discrimination, 
as was the approach under the international and inter-American treaties discussed. Considering 
the establishment of universal human rights over cultural relativism, it is expected that, in time, 
the African Commission and the ACERWC will explicitly recognise the existing protection of 
the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, ACRWC, and the 
Maputo Protocol.  
This chapter also explored the right to education of children in general. It was found that 
similar to the international and regional instruments discussed, the ACHPR, ACRWC, and the 
Maputo Protocol provides a comprehensive and watertight right to education. In this regard, it 
is clear that all children are entitled to the right to education and that states have to ensure equal 
access to and enjoyment of the right to education without discrimination. Thus, the right to 
education goes beyond mere access to education. Considering the right to human dignity, the 
child’s best interest, their right to development, as well as their right to protection from harm, 
it was illustrated that the state’s obligations in respect of the right to education do not leave 
room for discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE. There is a clear duty to 
promote fundamental rights and freedoms through human rights education, to ensure that 
children do not suffer marginalisation in their enjoyment of this right, as well as to encourage 
children to complete their education. As such, the right to human dignity, non-discrimination, 
and the best interests of the child read with the right to education places an obligation on states 
to ensure the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the 






8  Conclusions 
8 1 Introduction 
At the centre of this dissertation is the denial of a fundamental right based on personal 
attributes. This denial is due to preconceptions regarding what people should be, the behaviours 
they should adopt, and the romantic relationships that they should form. The question that the 
dissertation sought to address is part of a larger issue of how heteronormative conceptions of 
SOGIE shape the law and its institutions, excluding persons who do not fit this conceptual 
approach. Because the research concerns the right to education of children, a further challenge 
that arises is that of protecting children from all harm, to ensure their full development. 
However, because heteronormativity influences all aspects of life, protecting children from 
harm has also been viewed in this context. This has led to the exclusion of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in conversations regarding children’s protection. As a result, children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE are denied the enjoyment of numerous rights, including the 
right to education, which forms the focus of the dissertation. 
The ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol protect the rights of persons without 
distinction. Whereas the ACHPR applies to all persons, the ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol 
apply to all children and all women, respectively. All three instruments explicitly enshrine the 
rights to human dignity, equality, non-discrimination and education. The ACRWC further 
guarantees the right of the child to have their best interests as the primary consideration in all 
matters concerning them.  
Throughout this dissertation, it was argued that all children are entitled to the right to 
education. When read together with the rights to dignity, equality and non-discrimination, 
states are obligated to protect and promote the right to education of vulnerable groups. Against 
the backdrop of the vulnerability of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE to 
discrimination in the context of education, it was established that states must apply specific 
special measures to ensure that these children have an equal right to education as children with 
heteronormative SOGIE. In support thereof, the right to education under international, 
European, and inter-American human rights treaties was considered, to determine to what end 
these instruments can guide the interpretation of the right to education under the ACHPR, the 
ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol. 
The rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE have not been directly confirmed 
in the jurisprudence of the African Commission and the African Court. However, the African 




heteronormative SOGIE under the established principles of the ACHPR and the Maputo 
Protocol. From within the AU, as discussed in part 7 3 2 2, some states argue against the 
recognition of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE based on the perception 
that these identities conflicts with African cultural values and, therefore, are un-African. 
Considering states’ obligations under international human rights law and utilising a teleological 
approach to treaty interpretation together with a queer theoretical lens, it was suggested 
throughout this research that these arguments contradict the object and purpose of the ACHPR, 
the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol to protect the rights of all persons without distinction. 
As a result, states must eliminate harmful practices and stereotypes that promote the exclusion 
of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE through the re-socialisation of its people through 
the law and its institutions. 
 
8 2 Findings  
8 2 1 Value of a queer theoretical lens  
Chapter 2 elaborated on queer theory and QLT to create an understanding of how the conflation 
of sex, gender, and sexual orientation has culminated in the establishment of heteronormativity 
as a site of violence, permeating all aspects of the lives of non-conforming individuals. Queer 
theory recognises the instability of sexual and gender identities, reconsidering the meaning of 
‘man’ and ‘woman’ and the gendered behaviour attached thereto. Through its inclusion of 
diverse non-heteronormative SOGIE without elevating one above the other, queer theory 
provided the needed framework within which to question heteronormativity in an educational 
setting. Together with queer theory, this research also utilised QLT to interrogate how 
heteronormativity has shaped the interpretation and application of the law. In this regard, QLT 
invited the consideration of the lived realities of sexual and gender minorities in the 
development and formulation of the law. QLT furthermore played an important role in 
analysing and queering the case law. 
Considering the jurisprudence of the international, European, and inter-American human 
rights bodies, the research essentially illustrated that queer theory and QLT are increasingly 
applied by courts and human rights bodies to protect the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE. For example, the Independent Expert understands discrimination 
based on non-heteronormative SOGIE to be a result of non-conformance with established 
gender norms. The jurisprudence of the HRC, the ECtHR, the ECSR, and the IACtHR has 




acceptable romantic couplings and expected behaviour based on sex cannot be justified because 
of the impact on the individual’s human dignity and ability to other enjoy fundamental human 
rights.  
These references indicate that these bodies recognise the existence of the conflation of sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation and how the conflation has been used to prescribe “acceptable” 
SOGIE through the establishment of heteronormativity. It further indicates an understanding 
that non-compliance with the behavioural expectations attached to the conflation results in 
sociocultural exclusion. As a result, these bodies have decided that states should adopt special 
measures to ensure that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are protected against 
discrimination and guaranteed equal rights.  
Under African human rights law, the African Commission and, to a lesser extent, the 
ACERWC, have also incorporated tenets of queer theory and QLT in its work. In this regard, 
the African Commission has illustrated a broad understanding of gender, explaining that it is a 
personal experience that can change from birth because it is unrelated to biological sex. 
Furthermore, the African Commission is increasingly recognising how preconceptions of 
masculinity and femininity exacerbate violence and discrimination, ultimately undermining the 
potential for individuals to enjoy the rights that they are entitled to.  
Of particular interest to this research is the embodiment of a queer theoretical approach in 
the YP and YP+10 in suggesting how existing fundamental human rights should be applied to 
protect persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE and to ensure their equal rights. Even though 
statements of the international and European human rights bodies correspond with the YP and 
the YP+10, these instruments have nonetheless seen limited application in these systems. 
Contrary to the trend in the international and European systems thus far, the YP and YP+10 
have been of immense value to the IACtHR in establishing the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHR. 
 
8 2 2 A teleological approach to the interpretation of treaties 
Chapter 3 introduced a teleological approach to the interpretation of treaties, as set forth under 
the Vienna Convention. Although Article 31 contains elements of the ‘intention of the parties’ 
and the textual approach, it favours a teleological one. In terms of this approach, treaties should 
be interpreted in line with what would best promote its object and purpose, viewed in its current 
context. The relevance and value of a teleological approach for purposes of this research were 




and African human rights treaties that go beyond what is included in the text that is, beyond a 
mere textual approach. In this regard, the Preamble of these treaties and evidence of changing 
societal values to promote the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE was 
considered. Moreover, in respect of the right to education, reference was made to how general 
comments, resolutions, and joint declarations have given detailed content to state obligations, 
especially regarding the equal treatment of learners. 
Under chapter 3, it was also illustrated that the universality of human rights has great bearing 
on the object and purpose of all human rights. The UDHR represents the foundation of 
international human rights norms, confirming the entitlement of all persons to human rights 
without distinction by virtue of being human. The rights guaranteed under the UDHR are 
reiterated under all the international and regional human rights treaties discussed in this 
dissertation, albeit different in phrasing or detail. In this way, the universality of human rights 
was established. The wide ratification of these international and regional treaties further 
confirmed this argument. 
The universality of human rights was discussed in opposition to cultural relativism. In its 
most absolutist form, cultural relativism demands respect for cultural differences to the extent 
that no understanding of human rights can stand in the face of cultural values or traditions. 
However, as shown in this research, culture is malleable and changes across time and space. 
This is not to say that there is no room for cultural considerations in the interpretation of 
fundamental human rights. Rather, as established in this research, cultural considerations 
cannot outweigh fundamental human rights. 
The international, European, inter-American and African jurisprudence discussed, illustrate 
that cultural and religious traditions should be respected as part of celebrating difference across 
the world. However, under each of these systems, it has been established that the moral, cultural 
and religious traditions or considerations referred to here are positive ones, that is, those that 
are in line with agreed-upon human rights norms and do not undermine human rights. The 
acceptance of positive culture requires the eradication of stereotypes and practices that are 
harmful to the full realisation of human rights and perpetuate social exclusion. Harmful 
practices are defined in relation to gender-based violence and discrimination. It is the 
heteronormative conceptions of masculine and feminine behaviours that encourage and uphold 
harmful practices. 
States are obligated to take steps to ensure the rights of all persons without distinction. The 
violence and discrimination perpetrated against persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 




and rejection are a result of non-conformance with expected norms of behaviour and 
expression. Thus, ensuring the universal human rights of all persons requires states to address 
cultural relativist arguments aimed at undermining the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE through re-socialisation. At the core of this project of re-socialisation 
lies the need to unpack heteronormativity as a site of violence and how it has come to permeate 
all aspects of our existence, including the formulation and interpretation of the law. 
 
8 2 3 Arguments for protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE  
8 2 3 1 Human dignity 
Whether or not human dignity is explicitly referred to in the Preambles or substantive 
provisions of the international or regional human rights treaties, it has been established, 
together with equality and non-discrimination, as universal principles of international law. As 
such, it underscores all human rights. The rights to human dignity, equality, and non-
discrimination have been crucial to the development of the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the international, European, inter-American, and African 
human rights systems. Significantly, as shown in this research, despite the differences in the 
formulation of these rights, the right to human dignity, equality, and non-discrimination have 
been given similar interpretations by the international and regional human rights bodies. 
What comes across in international, European, inter-American, and African human rights 
jurisprudence is that human dignity is integral to self-worth, development, and the enjoyment 
of fundamental rights. As a result, all forms of degrading treatment are prohibited. All treaty 
bodies have further confirmed that human dignity requires that people be valued, and their 
rights respected based on the mere fact of being human. The failure to recognise the inherent 
dignity of individuals, therefore, prevents them from enjoying the rights to which they are 
entitled. 
The ICCPR, ADRDM, ACHR, and the ACHPR recognises that the right to life includes the 
right to a dignified life. This means that states should ensure a certain level of well-being for 
individuals to enable their full development. The IACmHR’s decision in Giraldo is of 
particular significance here, drawing attention to the sacredness of interpersonal relationships, 
whether heteronormative or non-heteronormative and the importance of respect for it to a 
dignified life. The IACmHR further explained that the use of stigmatising language in 
addressing persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE shows aversion towards them, thereby 




connected to the individual’s right to experience and express their SOGIE as an integral part 
of the self. Similarly, although not stated in the context of persons with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE, both the African Commission and the ACERWC have pronounced that humiliating 
language and discrimination undermines the individual’s self-worth, ultimately preventing 
them from pursuing their life goals.  
Degrading treatment has been interpreted broadly under the UDHR, CRC, ECHR, ACHR, 
as well as the ACHPR, ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. The prohibition of degrading 
treatment prohibits all forms of violence, including corporal punishment, humiliation, sexual 
or gender-based violence, and harmful practices inimical to the recognition of fundamental 
rights. The ECtHR has explicitly included respect for the individual’s non-heteronormative 
SOGIE under the right to human dignity. In Goodwin, it was held that the right to human 
dignity read with the right to respect for private life demands legal gender recognition because 
the failure to do so would amount to continuous undignified treatment. In this regard, the rights 
of persons with non-binary gender identities and gender expressions cannot be rejected based 
on majority morality. Legal gender recognition is, ultimately, tied to the individual’s ability to 
enjoy their fundamental rights. As such, requiring that steps be taken to enable them to do so 
is a restatement of the notion that all persons are entitled to equal rights because of their 
inherent human dignity.  
The IACtHR adopted a similar approach in its advisory opinion on the Gender Identity, and 
Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples, stating that the right to a dignified life 
means that individuals have a right to choose and live their identities. Because legal recognition 
is central to the ability to lead a dignified life, the IACtHR also confirmed that the right to legal 
recognition requires legal gender recognition. In Nubian Community and IHRDA v Kenya, the 
African Commission and the ACERWC established the relationship between human dignity, 
legal recognition, and the enjoyment of human rights. It was illustrated in parts 7 3 1 and 7 4 2 
that relying on the decisions in Goodwin, Transgender Europe, and the advisory opinion on 
the Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples, the right to 
human dignity facilitates legal gender recognition under the ACHPR and the ACERWC. 
Ultimately, denying legal gender recognition to persons with non-binary gender identities and 
gender expressions violate their inherent human dignity and compromise their ability to enjoy 
other rights. 
The prevention of degrading treatment and elimination of harmful practices against women 
are central to CEDAW, the Convention of Belém do Pará, and the Maputo Protocol. Harmful 




harmful practices refer to persistent practices that undermine women’s ability to fully enjoy 
the right that they are entitled to, like other persons. Here, the CEDAW Committee has 
specifically referred to the undermining impact of gender-based discrimination on the human 
dignity of women with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Similarly, in the Convention of Belém do 
Pará, violence against women is defined as an affront to human dignity. The Maputo Protocol 
has gone further than CEDAW and the Convention of Belém do Pará, providing that human 
dignity includes the freedom to make personal decisions without interference. In their decision-
making, women can choose whether to take into consideration traditional, cultural, or religious 
practices or values or not. As such, states cannot use arguments of cultural considerations to 
undermine human dignity. This is further supported by the Preamble of the Maputo Protocol, 
which provides that African values are only deemed positive if it complies with equality, 
freedom, and dignity as international human rights standards.  
In this context, the question as to how negative conceptions of SOGIE inform the current 
interpretation of these instruments also becomes relevant. Here, attention is drawn to how 
conceptions of SOGIE in terms of traditional and religious norms have been used by the 
Executive Council to undermine the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
African human rights law. This has been most evident in the removal of CAL’s observer status 
because its mandate, according to the Executive Council, contradicts fundamental African 
values. In light hereof, the prohibition of discrimination should be considered.  
 
8 2 3 2 Non-discrimination 
The international, European, inter-American, and African human rights bodies have all 
implicitly unpacked heteronormativity as a site of violence in the development of non-
heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds of discrimination. As a point of departure, it 
should be reiterated that all persons are entitled to human rights without distinction. 
Discrimination refers to when persons similarly situated are treated differently or when persons 
differently situated are treated the same. The human rights treaties discussed prohibit 
discrimination based on numerous grounds, including an open-ended reference to “other 
status”. The relevant human rights bodies understand this as meaning that the drafters intended 
that the prohibited grounds of discrimination could be expanded upon to reflect legal and social 
developments.  
Under the UDHR, the Human Rights Council established that support for prohibiting 




principles: that human rights are universal, that all persons are free and equal in dignity and 
rights, and that as such, all persons deserve equal protection and concern. Importantly, the 
Independent Expert recognised, as indicated under 8 2 1, that persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE are vulnerable to discrimination for not conforming to expected 
behaviours and expressions. Thus, they are prevented from the full recognition and enjoyment 
of their rights.  
The HRC has made the most significant pronouncement towards protecting the rights of 
persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under international human rights law. Having 
established that all persons are equally entitled to the rights guaranteed under the international 
human rights instruments discussed, it is important to reiterate that rights may only be limited 
if it is reasonable and justifiable. This is determined by weighing up the extent and impact of 
the limitation with the aim that the restriction seeks to achieve. 
In Toonen, the HRC held that the moral considerations in favour of criminalising sodomy 
do not outweigh the right to privacy of individuals with non-heteronormative sexual 
orientations. Importantly, in Fedotova, the HRC established that limitations based on morality 
should be viewed in the context of the universality of human rights and the right not to be 
discriminated against. Here, it was decided that the state cannot limit the right to freedom of 
expression of persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientations based on the perceived 
need of the state to protect minors from being exposed to non-heteronormative sexual 
orientations. The ICCPR has further established that laws discriminating against persons in 
their equal access to the enjoyment of their rights should be revised to ensure equal enjoyment 
of all rights. The ICCPR’s jurisprudence illustrates that rights and freedoms should be 
interpreted broadly and restrictions narrowly. Through this approach, the HRC has established 
non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article 26 of the 
ICCPR  
Although less prominent than the ICCPR, the CESCR has listed discrimination based on 
non-heteronormative SOGIE as prohibited under “other status” in its general comments. Under 
CEDAW, non-heteronormative SOGIE has been recognised as grounds that exacerbate 
discrimination. The CEDAW Committee has also expressed concern over discrimination based 
on these grounds. Similarly, the CRC Committee has requested states to address stigmatisation, 
violence, and discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE in all contexts. Thus, 
although not explicitly found in the jurisprudence of the CEDAW and CRC Committees, 





Under European human rights law, the ECtHR established the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE through reading the right to respect for private life with the prohibition 
of discrimination. Comparably to the HRC, the ECtHR holds that moral considerations or 
negative social attitudes do not constitute legitimate justifications to limit the rights of persons 
based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. Despite the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine, particularly weighty reasons will still have to be presented as 
justification for a restriction where a most intimate aspect of private life is involved. Of 
significance is the ECtHR’s recognition of private life as the right to establish relationships 
with other individuals, to personal development, and to express themselves in public and in 
private. Although the right of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE was developed under 
the right to respect for private life, the recognition that individuals should be allowed to express 
themselves in public illustrates the public element of the right to respect for private life. As 
such, position under the ECHR is that non-heteronormative SOGIE cannot be restricted to the 
private sphere.  
The prohibition of discrimination is less pronounced under the ESC and ESC(r) than under 
the ECHR. The ESC does not enshrine non-discrimination in a substantive provision. However, 
discrimination is prohibited under the Preamble. The ECSR in GSEE v Greece explained that 
non-discrimination is an open-ended list, and that, as a result, anti-discrimination legislation 
should prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace. In INTERIGHTS 
v Croatia, the ECSR further found a violation of the right to comprehensive sexual and 
reproductive health education based on the degrading depictions of non-heteronormative 
sexual orientations in educational materials. Despite not stating that sexual orientation was the 
prohibited ground of discrimination involved, it is argued that INTERIGHTS v Croatia, 
together with GSEE v Greece, establish sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under the ESC.  
The ESC(r) explicitly prohibit discrimination under Article E in identical terms as Article 
14 of the ECHR. Unlike under the ECHR, non-heteronormative SOGIE have not been 
established as prohibited grounds of discrimination under the ESC(r) in the decisions of the 
ECSR. However, the ECSR has expressed concern over discrimination based on these grounds 
and requested information from states on the measures taken to eliminate such discrimination. 
In light hereof, the ESC(r) favours an interpretation of non-discrimination that prohibits 
discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
As indicated above, inter-American human rights law provides the most comprehensive and 




international law, as developed by the IACtHR and the IACmHR under the ACHR. In 
establishing sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 1(1), the 
IACtHR in Atala referred to the importance of interpreting the ACHR in a manner that reflects 
changing times. The IACtHR held that, given the historical and structural discrimination that 
sexual minorities have suffered and continue to suffer, an alleged lack of consensus as to the 
recognition of persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientation cannot be accepted as a 
valid argument for restricting their rights. Drawing from the ECtHR, the IACtHR explained 
that the right to non-discrimination extends to the person’s expression of their sexual 
orientation. This means that individuals should be allowed to establish and maintain 
relationships with people of the same sex. Furthermore, in Freire, the IACtHR established that 
negative moral perceptions of non-heteronormative sexual orientations are not a legitimate 
justification for discrimination. Both Freire and Duque establish that states must ensure the 
equal rights of persons with non-heteronormative sexual orientations in all contexts. 
The IACtHR’s advisory opinion on Gender Identity and Equality and Non-discrimination 
of Same-sex Couples is ground-breaking for clarifying states’ obligations in respect of 
recognising, protecting, and ensuring the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Importantly, the IACtHR explained that the state’s obligation to legally recognise an 
individual’s gender stems from the individual’s experience of the self. Because legal gender 
recognition has implications for the enjoyment of fundamental rights, states cannot deny this 
because of moral prejudice against persons who do not conform to the behavioural norms of 
their societies. In this advisory opinion, the IACtHR further confirmed that patrimonial rights 
derive from same-sex relationships because there is no exclusive definition of what families 
should look like. Rejecting the right to marry of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
based on philosophical, religious, or procreation-related reasons is unacceptable because it 
renders the right to equal treatment arbitrary. Moreover, there can be no legitimate purpose for 
such a restriction considering the purpose of the ACHR, to protect the human rights of all 
persons. 
In comparison to the international, European, and inter-American human rights systems, the 
African human rights bodies have not yet established non-heteronormative SOGIE as 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. However, in its interpretation of the rights to equality 
and non-discrimination under the ACHPR, the African Commission and the African Court has 
drawn extensively from the international, European, and inter-American human rights bodies. 
For example, in its definition of discrimination, the African Commission in Zimbabwe Human 




the test for determining discrimination under Article 2, the African Commission in Kenneth 
Good referred to the HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR. Considering this, the interpretation of 
the right to non-discrimination has been similar to that under the international and regional 
human rights bodies.  
Article 2 prohibits discrimination based on numerous listed grounds, including an open-
ended reference to “other status”. Chapter 7 set out the arguments for including non-
heteronormative SOGIE under “other status”. The point of departure is that all persons are 
entitled to the rights enshrined under the ACHPR without distinction. Article 27(2) provides 
the only legitimate reasons for restricting a right enshrined under the ACHPR. Although not 
intended to be a limitations clause, it has been used as such by the African Court and the African 
Commission. Importantly, Article 27(2) allows limitations based on morality, which, in turn, 
is related to, and determined, by popular will, culture and religion.  
Considering the discussions in parts 7 3 2, 7 4 2, and 7 5 2 the African Commission and the 
ACERWC have adopted a clear position on the promotion of positive African values; those 
that are consistent with international human rights standards and inspire mutual care and 
support. As such, religious, moral, or cultural practices that undermine human rights or render 
it illusory cannot be deemed as promoting positive African values. To this end, African values, 
and the supposed un-African-ness of non-heteronormative SOGIE are weighed up against 
universalist notions of human rights and cultural developments. The obligation to eliminate 
harmful practices and address gender stereotypes that promote the subjugation of women and 
support systems of patriarchy is essential hereto. In this regard, the African Commission and 
the ACERWC illustrate a constructionist understanding of gender, how heteronormativity 
facilitates the infringement of fundamental rights, and how this can facilitate the continued 
existence of harmful practices under the guise of culture. 
It was illustrated that religious, moral, or cultural practices that infringe on fundamental 
rights can only be protected if it is considered to reflect positive African values. Importantly, 
these practices may not render the rights protected under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, or the 
Maputo Protocol as illusory. In light hereof, it is suggested that a universal conception of 
human rights outweigh arguments of cultural absolutism that favour the oppression of beliefs 
that do not promote African masculinities. As such, AU states cannot legally uphold their 
arguments against the recognition of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
under the ACHPR, ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. 
Relying on obiter statements, concluding observations, interpretive guidelines, and 




of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR. Similar to the 
international, European, and inter-American human rights bodies, the African Commission has 
expressed concern over the violence and discrimination perpetrated against persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE, stating that popular will does not constitute a legitimate justification 
for the non-recognition of the rights of these individuals. The African Commission has also 
recognised that persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE face significant challenges in their 
enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights as a result of continued non-acceptance and 
discrimination. As such, states have heightened obligations to adopt special measures aimed at 
ensuring their equal rights and must enact legislation to this end.  
The wording of the prohibition of discrimination under the ACRWC is similar to the 
ACHPR. As such, the test applied to determine discrimination is the same. The ACERWC 
requires states to take special measures to eliminate discrimination against vulnerable groups 
of children who face challenges in their equal enjoyment of their human rights. For example, 
in IHRDA v Kenya, the ACERWC held that there are no legitimate reasons for denying legal 
recognition to children of Nubian descent, thereby preventing their access to equal rights. 
Significantly, the ACERWC has interpreted sexual violence as gender-based discrimination 
because it is caused by beliefs and attitudes regarding men’s dominance, causing and 
maintaining gender-based violence. Through this, the ACERWC provides a framework to 
incorporate non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ACRWC. Correspondingly, the Maputo 
Protocol aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. The discussion on the 
Maputo Protocol concluded that ‘women’ is inclusive of any person who identifies as a woman. 
Of significance, in addressing discrimination against women, is the obligation to eliminate 
harmful practices. In this regard, the African Court in APDF followed a similar approach to 
the ACHPR, holding that culture, morals, and religion cannot outweigh international human 
rights standards. Like under the ACRWC, harmful practices include those that promote 
heteronormativity as a site of violence. 
 
8 2 4 A comprehensive right to education under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo 
Protocol  
Given the experiences of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE set out under 1 1 and the 
failure of the African treaty bodies to explicitly pronounce on the right to education of children 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE, the assumption set out under 1 2 that the ACHPR, the 




non-heteronormative SOGIE an equal right to education as it does to children with 
heteronormative SOGIE was confirmed.  
The second assumption was that the rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, equal 
protection of the law, and the best interests principle can be purposefully interpreted to provide 
a framework for the protection of SOGIE rights in education. Under 8 4 3, it was established 
that a teleological interpretation of the rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, and 
equality protects the right of all persons from discrimination based on their non-
heteronormative SOGIE. Because the rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, and equality 
inform the interpretation of all other rights, it necessarily also applies to the right to education. 
The essence of the right to education under the international, European, and inter-American 
human rights treaties is that all persons have the right to education. The UDHR, ICESCR, CRC, 
and CEDAW enshrine an explicit right to education. The ECHR, the E SC(r), the ADRDM, 
the Protocol of San Salvador, and the Convention of Belém do Pará also guarantee the right to 
education. In comparison, the ESC(r) contains an implicit right to education. Although the 
formulation of the right is different under these instruments, their interpretations, as the 
research has shown, are similar.  
The right to education under the ACHR is unique. Whereas the ADRDM enshrine an explicit 
right to education, the right to education is protected under Article 26 of the ACHR, providing 
a general right to the progressive realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights. Neither 
the IACmHR nor the IACtHR has yet interpreted the right to education in light of Article 26. 
However, it has protected the right to education through reading it with the child’s right to life 
and special protection. In this regard, extensive references have been made to the CRC. As a 
result, the expectation is that the right to education under Article 26 will be interpreted similarly 
to the CRC. 
Across these instruments, the right to education has been interpreted as accruing to all 
individuals. As a result, no one may be discriminated against in their enjoyment of this right. 
Considering that discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE has been established as 
a prohibited ground of discrimination under these systems, all persons are entitled to the right 
to education without discrimination based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE. However, it 
is not enough that the right to education is recognised. The right to education should also be 
effective to ensure that all children can benefit from the opportunities that the right provides.  
To this end, the aims of education guide state obligations in respect of addressing 
discrimination against children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in schools. This includes the 




age-appropriate diverse sexual and reproductive education. In this context, reference has also 
been made to the best interests principle. Ultimately, education should be child-centred, child-
friendly and empowering. Because children spend so much time in school, the environment is 
vital to ensuring that all children can equally benefit from the right to education.  
Similar to the international, European, and inter-American treaties discussed, the ACHPR, 
ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol provides a comprehensive right to education. All children 
are entitled to the right to education. States, therefore, must ensure equal access to, and 
enjoyment of, the right to education without discrimination. The right to education goes further 
than requiring states to only provide access to education. Considering the right to human 
dignity, the child’s best interests, their right to development, as well as their right to protection 
from harm, chapter 7 illustrated that states’ obligations in respect of the right to education do 
not leave room for discrimination based on non-heteronormative SOGIE. In this regard, states 
must promote fundamental rights and freedoms through human rights education, as well as to 
ensure that children do not suffer marginalisation in their enjoyment of education. Importantly, 
children should be encouraged to complete their education. Considering the discussion in part 
1 1, states must take steps to ensure that children with non-heteronormative SOGIE are not 
subjected to physical, verbal, or sexual violence by their peers or their teachers. Mphela v 
Manamela and Limpopo Department of Education illustrate the consequences of unchecked 
discrimination and victimisation in schools. Learners who feel threatened and rejected by their 
school environment are more likely to abandon their education. In light hereof, the rights to 
human dignity, non-discrimination, and the best interests of the child read with the right to 
education place an obligation on states to ensure the right to education of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol.  
In the interpretation of the rights to education under these instruments, specific guidance 
can be taken from the explicit references made by the international and European human rights 
bodies to the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. For example, 
the Human Rights Council drew attention that children are often targets of violence and 
harassment based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE, which includes being refused 
admission to schools or being expelled. The Independent Expert has further explained that a 
lack of awareness of non-heteronormative SOGIE further exacerbate stigma and aggravates 
violence and harassment. Addressing this requires that educational materials be revised to 
include non-heteronormative SOGIE in the curriculum, in particular, in sexual education. 





Under the ECHR, the ECtHR in Dojan explicitly referred to the role of sexual education in 
encouraging tolerance amongst individuals regardless of their non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
The ECSR’s decision in INTERIGHTS v Croatia provides the most significant guidelines on 
ensuring the right to education of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE under the ESC 
and the ESC(r). Here, the ECSR explained that sexual health education should cover the 
spectrum of heteronormative and non-heteronormative SOGIE to provide for each child’s 
SOGIE. Moreover, states must ensure that the curriculum does not portray persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in a discriminatory manner. 
 
8 3 Value of research  
The research is valuable for setting forth and combining the current interpretation of the rights 
to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, the best interests of the child principle, and 
the right to education under international and regional human rights law. It presents a 
comprehensive analysis of these rights under the international and regional human rights 
instruments, importantly elucidating how the systems draw from one another in the 
interpretation of these rights.  
The research specifically applied these rights to children with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
In this context, the research illustrated how the right to non-discrimination has been developed 
under international, European, and inter-American human rights law to include non-
heteronormative SOGIE under the prohibition of discrimination based on “other status”. 
In particular, the research is of value for illustrating how queer theory and queer legal theory 
have been used by international and regional human rights bodies to unpack how 
heteronormative conceptions of SOGIE have influenced the formulation and interpretation of 
the law. The jurisprudence was discussed in light of how laws that facilitate discrimination 
against persons based on their non-heteronormative SOGIE culminate in a rejection of 
fundamental rights. Importantly, the research considered how the international and regional 
human rights bodies have interpreted treaty provisions to promote legal reform in favour of 
protecting the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
Utilising a comparative perspective together with a universal conception of human rights, 
the research is also valuable for setting forth how the international, European, and inter-
American human rights treaties have guided the interpretation of the right to human dignity, 





The most significant contribution of this dissertation is with respect to the establishment of 
a comprehensive right to education under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol 
for children with non-heteronormative SOGIE on the African continent. In this regard, the main 
tenets of the right to education under these instruments were explored, focusing on how 
education relates to the development of African children to grow up to become active members 
of their communities. Importantly, it was shown that neither Article 27(2) of the ACHPR, nor 
the obligation to promote positive African values under the ACRWC and the Maputo Protocol 
can be used to justify the limitation of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. 
 
8 4 Recommendations 
The effective protection of the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE under 
African human rights law requires an explicit pronouncement that discrimination based on 
these grounds are prohibited under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol.  
It suggested, first, that, in the interpretation of the rights enshrined under the ACHPR, the 
ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol, reference should be had to the international, European, and 
inter-American human rights instruments discussed for its representation of how universal 
human rights norms are applied in different contexts. In particular, the interpretation of the 
rights to human dignity, non-discrimination, and equality under the international, European, 
and inter-American human rights treaties provides valuable guidance to how non-
heteronormative SOGIE should be established as a prohibited ground of discrimination under 
“other status” in Article 2 of the ACHPR and Article 3 of the ACRWC. This is further 
supported by the already extensive reference made by the African Commission, African Court, 
and the ACERWC to the interpretation of these rights by the international, European, and inter-
American human rights bodies. 
Secondly, given the interpretation set forth of the rights to human dignity, equality, and non-
discrimination under chapter 7, the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE are 
protected under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol. This is in line with the 
purpose and object of the African human rights treaties to protect the rights of all persons 
without distinction. Against this backdrop, it is recommended that should the African 
Commission, the African Court, or ACERWC have to decide on a matter concerning the rights 
of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE, it must consider the arguments presented here. 
These arguments do not allow a conclusion other than that the African human rights treaties 




Third, following on the discussion in part 7 3 2 2, the African Commission should also 
continue to promote the rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE in its concluding 
observations, resolutions, recommendations, and other communications. However, in this 
context, the problem faced by the African Commission is pushback from, amongst others, the 
Executive Council, the Africa Group and individual states regarding the recognition of the 
rights of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Nonetheless, the African Commission can 
maintain its independence through reliance on its mandate. It is tasked with considering 
complaints of alleged violations of the ACHPR, as well as to examine state reports and adopt 
corresponding resolutions aimed at promoting human rights in African states. Therefore, 
regardless of the resistance against the recognition of the rights of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE, the African Commission must continue to promote and protect the 
rights of all persons. 
Finally, states should be encouraged to reflect the comprehensive right to education 
established under the ACHPR, the ACRWC, and the Maputo Protocol in their legislation and 
policies. In this regard, human rights education should be included at all levels of the 
curriculum. Human rights education has been interpreted as requiring that children be taught 
the human rights principles enshrined under the African human rights instruments. Considering 
the discussion undertaken under chapter 7, great value is attached to human dignity and non-
discrimination to the development of individuals to become active members of their 
communities. Thus, human rights education has an important role to play in facilitating 
tolerance and respect for the diverse peoples on the African continent, including persons with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE. Through this, education has the potential to address stigma and 
prejudice towards vulnerable groups, contributing to the effective implementation and 
realisation of human rights.  
Related to human rights education is the obligation to remove derogatory and stereotypical 
depictions of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE from educational materials. This 
includes replacing references that encourage the social exclusion of persons with non-
heteronormative SOGIE with information that recognises heteronormative and non-
heteronormative SOGIE without elevating one above the other. Derogatory and stereotypical 
depictions of persons with non-heteronormative SOGIE encourage violence and discrimination 
because it facilitates the continued existence of harmful practices, gender stereotypes, and 
patriarchal values, which rely on and uphold heteronormativity. Education, therefore, has an 
important role in re-socialising individuals to eliminate the conceptions that undermine the 




The right to education further requires the establishment of age-appropriate sexual education 
at all levels of the curriculum. Sexual health education should cover sexual and reproductive 
health, as well as teach children of all forms of sexual violence and its consequences. The 
purpose of sexual and reproductive health is to develop children’s understanding of the 
biological and social aspects thereof, enabling them to make responsible decisions regarding 
sexual and reproductive behaviour. To this end, children should be taught of the wide spectrum 
of SOGIE without raising either heteronormative or non-heteronormative sexual and 
reproductive health or relationships above the other. Sexual health information should, 
therefore, not perpetuate prejudice or social exclusion. In this way, gender and sexist 
stereotypes can be challenged. 
In providing for the right to equal access to education, states should furthermore take steps 
to ensure that children with non-heteronormative are not prevented from registering at schools 
where their identification documents do not correspond to their identified gender identities or 
gender expressions. This is important, as refusing these children to register will prevent them 
from accessing educational institutions, the most fundamental aspect of the right to education. 
Finally, compliance with the recommendations provided here requires that policies be 
adopted to guide schools on how to best accommodate learners with non-heteronormative 
SOGIE. In this regard, the state should address issues such as bathroom use, school uniform, 
and gendered extra-curricular activities in consultation with communities. At the core of its 
considerations should be how best to ensure that each child can enjoy their right to education 
without discrimination to reach their full developmental potential in a manner that respects 
their inherent human dignity. Ultimately, states must take steps to accommodate children with 
non-heteronormative SOGIE to ensure their equal enjoyment of the right to education to 
children with heteronormative SOGIE.  
 
8 5  Areas for further research 
As has been pointed out throughout this research, there is limited information available on the 
experiences of children with non-heteronormative SOGIE in any context on the African 
continent, including education. As such, research on the experiences of children with non-
heteronormative SOGIE in schools can facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of how 





This dissertation did not consider, to any extent, how the criminalisation of homosexual 
conduct in individual African states exacerbates the discrimination experienced by persons 
with non-heteronormative SOGIE. Further research into this area would be valuable for 
elucidating how criminalising legislation prevents children with non-heteronormative SOGIE 
from their equal right to education as children with heteronormative SOGIE. Related hereto, it 









Alston P & Gilmour-Walsh G The best interests of the child: towards a synthesis of 
children’s rights and cultural values (1996), UNICEF. 
An-Na’im A A Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus 
(1992), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Antkowiak T M & A Gonza The American Convention on Human Rights: Essential rights 
(2017), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beiter K D The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (2005), Marthinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
Brown A W & M Bochenek Hatred in the Hallways: Violence and discrimination against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender students in U.S. schools (2001), Human Rights 
Watch. 
Butler J Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity (1990) 116, London: 
Routledge. 
Cramer E P Addressing Homophobia and Heterosexism on College Campuses (2014), 
Routledge.  
Craven M The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
perspective on its development (1998), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
D’Emilio J Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (1983), Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Detrick S A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1999), New York: Springer. 
Formby E The impact of homophobic and transphobic bullying on education and 
employment: A European survey (2013), Sheffield Hallam University. 
Gordon P Review of Homophobic Bullying in Educational Institutions (2012), UNESCO.  
Guasp A The school report: The experiences of gay young people in Britain’s schools in 
2012 (2012), Stonewall. 
Harris D J, O’Boyle M, Bates E & Buckley C Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick: Law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (2014), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jagose A Queer Theory: An Introduction (1996), Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Joseph S, Schultz J & Castan M The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, materials, and commentary (2004), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lithuanian Gay League Homophobic bullying in Lithuanian schools: survey results and 




Mnookin R In the interest of children: advocacy, law reform and public policy (1985), W.H. 
Freeman. 
Morsink J Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (1998), 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Murray R Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (2004), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Murray R The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Commentary (2019), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ouguergouz F The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive 
Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003), Leiden: 
Marthinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Rainey B, Wicks E & Ovey C The European Convention on Human Rights 7ed (2017), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Saul B, Kinley D & Mowbray J The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Commentary, cases, and materials (2014), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schabas W A The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (2015), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schabas W A The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2013), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Signliore M Queer in America: sex, the media and the closets of power (1993), Random 
House. 
Ssenyonjo M Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2 ed) (2016), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thoreson R R “Like walking through a hailstorm” Discrimination against LGBT youth in 
US Schools (2016), Human Rights Watch. 
Viljoen F International Human Rights Law in Africa (2012) 2ed, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Villiger M E Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2009). 
Wallace R M M & Martin-Ortega O International Law (2013) 7 ed, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Chapters in books 
Arajärvi P “Article 26” in A Eide, G Alfredsson, G Melander, LA Rehof & A Rosas (eds) 





Battaglia J E “Gender” in R L Jackson II & M A Hog (eds) Encyclopedia of Identity (2010), 
New York: SAGE Publications. 
Bennet J “Subversion and resistance: activist initiatives” in S Tamale (ed) African 
Sexualities: A Reader (2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press. 
Burgorgue-Larsen L “Economic and Social Rights” in L Burgorgue-Larsen & M U De 
Torres (eds) Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case law and commentary (2011), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Byrne A “Article 1” in M A Freeman, C Chinkin & B Rudolf (eds) The UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A commentary (2012), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chirwa D “African Regional Human Rights System” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chirwa D M & L Chenwi “The protection of economic, social and cultural rights in Africa” 
in D M Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cook R J & Cusack S Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (2009), 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Costa J “Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” in 
C McCrudden (ed) Understanding Human Dignity (2013), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Craven M “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the inter-
American System of Human Rights” in D J Harris & S Livingstone (eds) Inter-American 
System of Human Rights (1998), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
De Schutter O “The Two Lives of the European Social Charter” in J Carlier, O De Schutter 
& M Verdussen (eds) The European Social Charter: A social constitution for Europe 
(2010), Council of Europe Publishing. 
De Vos P “Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2014), Cape Town: Juta & Co. 
Eekelaar J & Tobin J “Article 3. The Best Interests of the Child” in J Tobin The UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Commentary (2019), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Eekelaar J “The interests of the child and the child’s wishes: the role of dynamic self-
determinism” in P Alston (ed) The best interests of the child: reconciling culture and 
human rights (1994), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Farer T “The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No longer a unicorn, not 
yet an ox” in D J Harris & S Livingstone (eds) Inter-American System of Human Rights 




Fineman M A “Introduction: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory” in M A Fineman, J E Jacson 
& A P Romero (eds) Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, 
Uncomfortable Conversations (2009), United Kingdom: Ashgate. 
Fitzmaurice M “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties” in D Shelton (ed) International 
Human Rights Law (2013), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gerards J “Prohibition of Discrimination” in P van Dijk, F van Hoof, A van Rijn & L Zwaak 
(eds) Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 5 ed (2018), 
Intersentia Publishers. 
Hall D E “A Brief, Slanted History of ‘Homosexual’ Activity” in I Morland & A Willox 
(eds) Queer Theory (2005), Palgrave Macmillan. 
Halley J “Queer Theory by Men” in M A Fineman, J E Jacson & A P Romero (eds) Feminist 
and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (2009), 
Ashgate. 
Harris D J “Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American achievement” in D 
J Harris & S Livingstone (eds) Inter-American System of Human Rights (1998), 
Dartmouth Publishing. 
Hinz M O “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? The Need for 
Anthropological Jurisprudence in the Globalising World” in A Bösl & J Diescho (eds) 
Human Rights in Africa (2009), Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia. 
Holtmaat H M T “The CEDAW: A holistic approach to women’s equality and freedom” in 
A Hellum & H Sinding-Assen (eds) Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, 
Regional and National Law (2013), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Izugbara C O “Sxuality and the supernatural in Africa” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: 
A Reader (2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press. 
Kassan D “The protection of children from all forms of violence” in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) 
Children’s rights in Africa: a legal perspective (2008), London: Routledge. 
Khaliq U & Churchill R “The European Committee of Social Rights: Putting flesh on the 
bare bones of the European Social Charter” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging trends in international and comparative law (2008) 435, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Le Bouthillier Y “Article 32 Convention of 1969” in O Corten & P Klein “The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary” Vol 1 (2011), Springer. 
Lewis D “Representing African Sexualities” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A Reader 
(2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press. 
Lindholm T “Article 1” in G Alfredsson & A Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration of 





Lloyd A “The African regional system for the protection of children’s rights” in J Sloth-
Nielsen (ed) Children’s rights in Africa: a legal perspective (2008), London: Routledge. 
Medina Quiroga C “The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights” in C 
Krause & M Schenin (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook 
(2012), Turku: Åbo Akademi University. 
Melish T J “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Defending social rights 
through case-based petitions” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Melish T J “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond progressivity” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Muir Watt H “Globalization and comparative law” in M Reimann & R Zimmerman The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Murray S O & W Roscoe “Overview: Horn of Africa, Sudan, and East Africa” in S O 
Murray & W Roscoe Boy-Wives and Female Husbands (1998), New York: Palgrave. 
Murray S O & W Roscoe “Preface: All Very Confusing” in S O Murray & W Roscoe Boy-
Wives and Female Husbands (1998), New York: Palgrave. 
Mutua M “Sexual orientation and human rights: putting homophobia on trial” in S Tamale 
(eds) African Sexualities: A Reader (2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press.  
Neuman G “Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law” in D Simon & M Weiss 
(eds) Zur Autonomie des Individuums: Liber Amicorum Spiros Simitis (2000), Nomos 
Publishers. 
Pechota V “The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” in L Henkin 
(eds) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981), 
New York: Colombia University Press. 
Quiroga C M “The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights” in C Krause 
& M Schenin (eds) International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (2012), Turku: 
Åbo Akademi University. 
Ramcharan B G “Equality and non-discrimination” in L Henkin (ed) The International Bill 
of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981), New York: Colombia 
University Press. 
Ratele K “Male sexualities and masculinities” in S Tamale (ed) African Sexualities: A 
Reader (2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press. 
Romero A P “Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal Theories” in M 





Sloth-Nielsen J “Children’s rights and the law in African context: an introduction” in J 
Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children’s rights in Africa: a legal perspective (2008), London: 
Routledge. 
Sorel J M & V Boré Eveno “Article 31 Convention of 1969” in O Corten & P Klein “The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary” Vol 1 (2011), Springer. 
Ssenyonjo M “Economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter” in M Ssenyonjo 
(ed) The African Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years after the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (2012), Leiden: Marthinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ssenyonjo M “The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African 
Charter” in D M Chirwa & L Chenwi (eds) The Protection of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Africa: International, Regional and National Perspectives (2016), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tamale S “Researching and theorising sexualities in Africa” in S Tamale (ed) African 
Sexualities: A Reader (2011), Oxon: Pambazuka Press. 
Verheyde M “Article 28: The Right to Education” in A Alen, J Vande Lanotte, E Verhellen, 
F Ang, E Berghmans & M Verheyde (eds) A Commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (2006), New York: Springer. 
Viljoen F “The African Regional Human Rights System” in C Krause & M Scheinin (eds) 
International Protection of Human Rights: a textbook (2012), Turku: Åbo Akademi 
University. 
Weiwei L “Equality and Non-Discrimination Under International Human Rights Law” in B 
A Andreassen Research Notes 03/2004 (2004), University of Oslo. 
Yep G A “Queer Theory” in S W Littlejohn & K A Foss (eds) Encyclopaedia of 
Communication Theory (2009), London: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Journal articles 
Baisley E “Reaching the tipping point? Emerging international human rights norms 
pertaining to sexual orientation and gender identity”(2016) 38 Human Rights Quarterly  
149.   
Bhana D “Ruled by hetero-norms? Raising some moral questions for teachers in South 
Africa” (2014) 43 Journal of Moral Education 362. 
Bohórquez Monsalve V & Aguirre Román J “Tensions of human dignity: conceptualisation 
and application to international human rights law” (2009) 6 International Journal on 
Human Rights 39. 
Bucataru A “Using the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Project the Rights of 
Transgender Children and Adolescents: The Context of Education and Transition” 
(2016) 3 Queen Mary Human Rights Law Review 59.   
Carbado D W “Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights” (2000) 47 University of California 




Carpenter D “So made that I cannot believe: The ICCPR and the protection of non-religious 
expression in predominantly religious countries” (2017) 18 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 218.   
Cerna C “Reflections on the Normative Status of the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man” (2009) 30 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 1211. 
Cerna C M “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity” Implementation of 
Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts” (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 
740.   
Chirwa D M “The merits and demerits of the African Charter or the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child” (2002) 10 International Journal of Children’s Rights 157. 
Coyne & Harder (2011) Journal of Child Health Care 313. 
D Pearce, E Campbell & D Harding (‘Pearce Committee’) Australian Law Schools: A 
Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (1987) 
quoted in Hutchinson & Duncan (2012) Deakin Law Review 101. 
De Jesús Butler I “The rights of the child in the case law of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Recent cases” (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 151. 
Donnelly J “The Relative Universality of Human Rights” (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly 281. 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) The American Journal of International Law 
657.  
Eberle E J “The method and role of comparative law” (2009) 8 Global Studies Law Review 
451. 
Eborah S T “Africanising human rights in the 21st Century: gay rights, African values and 
the dilemma of the African legislator” (2012) 1 International Human Rights Law Review 
110. 
Evju S “The European Social Charter – Instruments and Procedures” (2007) 25 Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 61. 
Fitzmaurice G G “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points” (1951) 28 British Yearbook of 
International Law. 1.  
Fitzmaurice G G “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: 
Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points” (1957) 28 British Yearbook of 
International Law 203. 
Frankenberg G “Critical comparisons: Re-thinking comparative law” (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal 411. 
Garrido R “Patterns of discrimination based on sexual orientation in Africa: is there a 




Ghidirmic B “The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: An underrated 
gem of international human rights law” (2018) 4 Journal of Law and Public 
Administration 50. 
Hartley B “Rwanda’s post-genocide approach to ethnicity and its impact on the Batwa as 
indigenous people: an international human rights law perspective” (2015) 15 Queensland 
University of Technology Law Journal 51. 
Haskin S “The influence of Roman laws regarding same-sex acts on homophobia in Africa” 
(2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 393. 
Herek G M “The psychology of sexual prejudice” (2000) 9 Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 19. 
Hoffman L H “The Universality of Human Rights” (2009) Judicial Studies Board Annual 
Lecture 1.  
Holtmaat R & Post P “Enhancing LGBTI rights by changing the interpretation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women?” (2015) 
33 Nordic Journal of International Law 319. 
Howard E H “Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community” (1993) 15 Human 
Rights Quarterly 315. 
Ibrahim A M “LGBT rights in Africa and the discursive role of international human rights 
law” (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 263. 
Jonas D S & T N Saunders “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative 
Methods” (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565. 
Joseph S “Extending the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: General Comment 36” (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 1. 
Kepros L R “Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the Garden of Legal Theory” (1999-2000) 9 
Law & Sexuality 279. 
King J “The violence of heteronormative language towards the queer community” (2016) 7 
Aisthesis 17. 
Lau H “Sexual orientation: testing the universality of international human rights law” (2004) 
71 University of Chicago Law Review 1689. 
Leckey R “Review of comparative law” (2017) 26 Social & Legal Studies 3. 
Lloyd A “Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the 
African Committee of Experts: raising the gauntlet” (2002) 10 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 179. 
Lloyd M “Heteronormativity and/as violence: the “sexing” of Gwen Araujo” (2013) 28 
Hypatia 818. 




McCall L “The complexity of intersectionality” (2005) 30 Signs 1771. 
McCrudden C “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 655. 
McGuire K M, Cisneros J & McGuire T D “Intersections at a (heteronormative) crossroad: 
Gender and sexuality among black students’ spiritual-and-religious narratives” (2017) 58 
Journal of College Students Development 175. 
Melish TJ “Rethinking the “Less as More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas” (2007) 39 International Law and Politics 
171. 
Mezmur B D “Happy 18th birthday to the African Children’s Rights Charter: not counting 
its days but making its days count” (2017) 1 African Human Rights Yearbook 125. 
Mittelstaedt E “Safeguarding the rights of sexual minorities: the incremental and legal 
approaches to enforcing international human rights obligations” (2008) 9 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 353. 
Msibi T “‘I’m used to it now’: experiences of homophobia among queer youth in South 
African township schools” (2012) 24 Gender and Education 515. 
Murray R & F Viljoen “Towards non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: the 
normative basis and procedural possibilities before the ACmHPR and the AU” (2007) 29 
Human Rights Quarterly 86. 
Mutua M “The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the 
language of duties” Virginia Journal of International Law (1995) 339. 
O’Flaherty M & Fisher J “Sexual orientation, gender identity and international human rights 
law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles” (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 
207. 
O’Flaherty M “The Yogyakarta Principles at ten” (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 280. 
Okanlawon K “Homophobic bullying in Nigerian schools: The experiences of LGBT 
university students” (2017) 14 Journal of LGBT Youth 51. 
Oloka-Onyango J “Debating love, human rights and identity politics in East Africa: The 
case of Uganda and Kenya” (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 49. 
Örücü E “Methodological aspects of comparative law” (2007) 1 European Journal of Law 
Reform 29. 
Otto D “Queering gender [identity] in international law” (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 299. 
Peters A & Schwenke H “Comparative law beyond post-modernism” (2000) 49 




Răduleţu S “Regional Human Rights Systems and the Principle of Universality” (2013) 37-
38 RSP 283.  
Ramcharan B G “A Debate About Power Rather Than Rights” (1998) 4 IPG 423. 
Rosenfeld M “Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural 
Relativism – A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities” (1999) 30 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 249.  
Rudman A“The Value of the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights 
Law” (2019) 22 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1. 
Spano R “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights – Strasbourg in the Age of 
Subsidiarity” (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 487.  
Ssenyonjo M “Analysing the economic, social and cultural rights jurisprudence of the 
African Commission: 30 years since the adoption of the African Charter” (2011) 29 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 358. 
Stango A “Human Rights Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism” (2014) 7 
Chorzowskie Studia Polityczne 157. 
Todd-Gher J “Policing bodies, punishing lives: The African Women’s Protocol as a tool for 
resistance of illegitimate criminalisation of women’s sexualities and reproduction” 
(2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 735. 
Tóth M A “The right to dignity at work: Reflections on Article 26 of the Revised European 
Social Charter” (2008) 29 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 275. 
Ukiwo U “The study of ethnicity in Nigeria” (2005) 33 Oxford Development Studies 7. 
Valdes F “Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” 
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society” (1995) 83 
California Law Review 1. 
Van Hoecke M & Warrington M “Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: 
Towards a New Model for Comparative Law” (1998) 47 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 495. 
Viljoen F “Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa: 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child” (1998) 31 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa 199. 
Viljoen F “Understanding and overcoming challenges in accessing the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2018) 67 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 63. 
Weiss J T “The gender caste system: Identity, privacy, and heteronormativity” (2001) 10 
Law & Sexuality 123. 
Wu Y & Cao L “Race / ethnicity, discrimination, and confidence in order institutions” 





Amin A A teleological approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights LLD thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2017). 
Snyman T C The protection of African transgender women’s right to dignity, life and health 
through a teleological reading of the Maputo Protocol LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University (2019). 
Vollmer D T Queer families: An analysis of non-heteronormative family rights under the 
African human rights system LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2017). 
Other documents, regional reports and statements 
Africa Group “Statement of the African Group on the presentation of the annual report of 
the United Nations Human Rights Council” (4 November 2016). 
African Commission, IACmHR, UN “Ending violence and other human rights violations 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity: A joint dialogue of the African 
Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Inter-America Commission on Human 
Rights and United Nations” (2016), PULP. 
Commission of Human Rights “Annual report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Katarina Tomaševski, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human 
Rights resolution 2000/9” (11 January 2001) E/CN.4/21/52. 
Commission of Human Rights “Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Ms. Katarina Tomasevski, submitted in accordance with Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 1998/33” (13 January 1999) E/CN.4/1999/4. 
Commission of Human Rights “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against 
violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (11 May 
2018) A/HRC/38/43. 
Conclusions of the fifty-seventh meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (24-29 March 1958) 23. 
Council of Europe “Consultative Assembly Committee on Economic Questions” (28 
February 1956) AC/EC (7) 24 in European Social Charter: Collected (Provisional) 
Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” (1956) Vol III. 
Council of Europe “Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights” 
(2018) 170. 
Council of Europe “European Social Charter (revised) Explanatory Report” (3 May 1996) 
ETS 163. 
Council of Europe “Governmental Committee of the European Social Charter – New system 





Council of Europe “Memorandum of the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe on 
the Role of the Council of Europe in the Social Field” (16 April 1953) SG (53) 1. 
Council of Europe “Memorandum of the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe on 
the Role of the Council of Europe in the Social Field” (16 April 1953) SG (53). 
Council of Europe “Preparatory work on Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (9 May 1967) CDH (67) 3. 
Council of Europe “Recommendation 104 (1956) concerning a European convention on 
social and economic rights” (26 October 1956) in European Social Charter: Collected 
(Provisional) Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires” (1956) Vol III. 
Council of Europe “Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or 
gender identity” (31 March 2010). 
Council of Europe “Resolution 1728: Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity” (29 April 2010). 
Council of Europe “Resolution 2048: Discrimination against transgender people in Europe” 
(2 April 2015). 
Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) edition of the “travaux 
préparatoires” Vol II (1955).  
Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) edition of the “travaux 
préparatoires” Vol III (1956). 
Council of Europe, European Social Charter: Collected (provisional) edition of the “travaux 
préparatoires” Vol IV (1957). 
ECOSOC “Report of the Committee on the Organisation of the Economic and Social 
Council” (15 February 1946) E/20. 
ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 1(2)” (31 May 1969) I. 
ECSR “Statement of interpretation: Article 15” (30 November 1998) XIV-2. 
Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for 
a System of Collective Complaints (9 November 1995) CETS 158. 
Human Rights Council “Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity” (17 November 2011) 
A/HRC/19/41. 
Human Rights Council “Girls’ right to education. Report submitted by the Special 





Human Rights Council “Mandate of the Independent Expert of protection against violence 
and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (10 July 2019) 
A/HRC/41/L.10/Rev. 
Human Rights Council “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence 
and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (19 April 2017) 
A/HRC/35/36. 
Human Rights Council “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand 
Grover” (27 April 2010) A/HRC/14/20. 
Human Rights Council “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health” (4 December 2012) A/HRC/22/31. 
Human Rights Council “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Estonia” (28 March 2011) A/HRC/17/17. 
Human Rights Council “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Chile” (4 June 2009) A/HRC/12/10. 
Human Rights Council “The right to education of persons in detention, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to education, Vernor Muñoz” (2 April 2009) A/HRC/11/8. 
Human Rights Council “Thematic study on the right of persons with disabilities to 
education, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (18 December 2013) A/HRC/25/29. 
Human Rights Council “Universal Periodic Review: Peru” (28 May 2008) A/HRC/8/37. 
IACmHR “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2011” (30 
December 2011) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 69. 
IACmHR “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2018” (21 
March 2019) Chapter VI. 
IACmHR “Juvenile justice and human rights in the Americas” (13 July 2011) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 78. 
IACmHR “Report on Corporal Punishment and Human Rights of Children and 
Adolescents” (5 August 2009) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1980-1981” 
(16 October 1981) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54 Doc. 9 rev. 1 Chapter II. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1993” (11 
February 1994) OEA/Ser.L/V.85 Doc. 9. rev. Chapter V. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 1997” (13 April 




OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2000” (16 April 
2001) OEA/Ser./L/II.111 doc. 20 rev. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2014” (7 May 
2015) Chapter IV. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2015” (17 
March 2016) Introduction. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2016” (27 April 
2017) Chapter III. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2017” (22 
March 2018) Chapter IV. 
OAS “Annual Report of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2019” (6 April 
2020) Chapter VI. 
OAS “Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and 
Environmental Rights: 2019” (24 February 2020) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5. 
OAS “Children and adolescents in the United States’ adult criminal justice system” (1 
March 2018) OAS/Ser.L/V/II. 167 Doc. 34. 
OAS “General Recommendation of the Committee of Experts of the MESECVI (No. 2): 
Missing Women and Girls in the Hemisphere” (2018). 
OAS “Hemispheric Report on Child Pregnancy in the States Party to the Belém do Pará 
Convention” (2016). 
OAS “Human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity” AG/Res.2435 (XXXVIII-
O/08) (3 June 2008). 
OAS “Preliminary Draft Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights 
(Pact of San Jose)” (20 November 1981) AG/Res. 619 (XII-08/82). 
OAS “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights” (5 June 2018) AG/RES. 2928 (XLVIII-
O/18). 
OAS “Protocol of San Salvador: Composition and Functioning of the Working Group to 
Examine the Periodic Reports of States Parties” (5 June 2007) AG/Res. 2262 (XXXVII-
O/07). 
OAS “Report on Corporal Punishment and Human Rights of Children and Adolescents” (5 
August 2009) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135 Doc. 14. 
OAS “Second Follow-Up Report of the Recommendations of the Committee of Experts of 
the MESECVI” (2014). 
OAS “The rights of the child in the inter-American human rights system” (29 October 2008) 




OAS “Third Hemispheric Report in the Implementation of the Belém do Pará Convention” 
(2017). 
OAS “Towards the effective fulfilment of children’s rights” (30 November 2017) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.166 Doc. 206/17. 
Report of the Sitting of the Consultative Assembly (19 August 1949). 
Report of the Sitting of the Consultative Assembly (7 September 1949). 
Report of the Sitting of the Consultative Assembly (7 September 1949). 
Report of the Working Party appointed to draft articles for a European Social Charter (12 
April 1957) CE/Soc (57) 5. 
UNHRC “Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity” (11 May 2018) 
A/HRC/38/43. 
Working Party for the Preparation of a Draft European Social Charter: Preliminary Draft of 
Social Charter submitted by the Secretariat of the Committee (19 April 1955) AS/Soc I 
(6). 
Declarations, resolutions, principles, guidelines, and rules 
African Commission “Decision on the Thirty-Eighth Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (7-12 June 2015) EX.CL/Dec.887 
(XXVII). 
African Commission “Guidelines on combating sexual violence and its consequences in 
Africa” (2017). 
African Commission “Guidelines on Combating Sexual Violence and its Consequences in 
Africa” (Adopted, 5 November 2017). 
African Commission “Resolution on Human Rights Education” (Adopted at the 14th 
ordinary session, 1-10 December 1993) ACHPR/Res.6(XIV)93. 
African Commission “Resolution on Protection against Violence and other Human Rights 
Violations against Persons on the basis of their real or imputed Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity” (Adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session, 28 April-12 May 2014). 
African Commission “Resolution on the Right to Education in Africa” (Adopted at the 58th 
ordinary session, 6-20 April 2016). 
African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Right in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (November 
2010). 





Human Rights Council “Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity” (14 July 
2011) A/HRC/RES/17/19. 
Human Rights Council “Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity” (15 July 2016) A/HRC/RES/32/2. 
M’Baye Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (28 November-8 December 
1979) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1. 
OAS “Declaration of Pachua: Strengthening efforts to prevent violence against women” (27 
May 2014) OEA/Ser.L/II.5.32 CIM/CD/doc.16/14 rev.310. 
OAS “Declaration on violence against women, girls and adolescents and their sexual and 
reproductive rights” (19 December 2014) OEA/Ser.L/II.7.10 
MESECVI/CEVI/DEC.4/14. 
OAS “Human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity” AG/Res.2435 (XXXVIII-
O/08) (3 June 2008).  
Pretoria Declaration on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa (adopted 7 
December 2004). 
Resolution on the Situation of Migrants in Africa, ACHPR/ Res. 333 (EXT.OS/ XIX) 2016, 
25 February 2016. 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 2 
to 13 February 1988, revised from 19 February to 4 March 2020, entered into force 2 
June 2020). 
Rules of Procedure of the inter-American Court of Human Rights (entered into force 1 
January 1997). 
Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (entered into force 2 June 2010). 
UNGA ‘UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child’ (20 November 1959) Resolution 1386 
(XIV). 
UNGA “Draft International Covenants on Human Rights” (1 July 1955) A/2929. 
UNGA “Official records of the twelfth session” (16 October 1957) A/C.3/SR.782. 
UNGA “Official records of the twelfth session” (16 October 1957) A/C.3/SR.783. 
UNGA “United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training” (19 
December 2011) A/RES/66/137. 
UNGA “Verbatim Record of the Hundred and Eighty-Third Plenary Meeting” (10 
December 1948) A/PV.183. 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (29 June 1993). 




Treaties and other regional and international instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 
21 October 1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 (1982). 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, entered into 
force 29 November 1999) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
African Youth Charter (adopted 2 July 2006). 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978) 1144 UNTS 143. 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted 2 May 1948). 
Convention of Belém do Pará (adopted 9 June 1994, entered into force 5 March 1995). 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 3 
September 1981, entered into force 3 September 1981) A/RES/34/180. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.  
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
European Social Charter (adopted 18 October 1961; entered into force 26 February 1965) 
ETS 35. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
Protocol No 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances (adopted; entered into force 
1 July 2003) CETS 187. 
Protocol of San Salvador (adopted 17 November 1988, entered into force 16 November 
1999). 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/66.6 (2003). 
Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004). 





Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949) ETS 1. 
Statute of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights (entered into force 1 November 
1979). 
Statute of the inter-American Court of Human Rights (adopted 1 October 1979, entered into 
force 1 January 1980). 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1115 UNTS 331. 
General Comments, Recommendations, Concluding Observations, Reports and Statements of 
Treaty Bodies 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
African Commission “Cameroon: 2nd Periodic Report, 2003-2005” (Submitted on 26 May 
2010, Considered at the 47th Ordinary Session, 12-26 May 2010). 
African Commission “Cameroon: 4th – 6th Periodic Report, 2015-2019” (Submitted on 3 
January 2020, Considered at the 66th Ordinary Session, 13 July-7 August 2020). 
African Commission “Cameroon: Third Periodic Report, 2008-2011” (Submitted on 5 
November 2013, Considered at the 54th Ordinary Session, 22 October-5 November 
2013). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations - Malawi: Initial & 
Combined Periodic Reports, 1995-2013” (Adopted at the 57th Ordinary Session, 4-18 
November 2015). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations - South Africa: 2nd 
Periodic Report, 2003-2014” (Adopted at 20th Extraordinary Session 9-18 June 2016).  
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations – Cameroon: 1st 
Periodic Report, 2001-2003” (Adopted at the 39th Ordinary Session, 11-25 May 2005). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations – Cameroon: 2nd 
Periodic Report: 2003-2005” (Adopted at the 47th Ordinary Session, 12-26 May 2010). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations – Cameroon: Third 
Periodic Report, 2008-2011” (Adopted at the 54th Ordinary Session, 22 October-5 
November 2013). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations – Liberia: Initial 
and Combined Periodic Reports, 1982-2012” (Adopted at the 17th Extraordinary 
Session, 19-28 February 2015). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations and Recommendations – Namibia: 6th 
Periodic Report, 2011-2014” (Adopted at the 20th Extraordinary Session. 9-18 June 
2016).  




African Commission “Concluding Observations: Botswana” (16-30 July 2019). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Burkina Faso (23 Feb-4 March 2017). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Cameroon” (7-14 March 2014). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Ethiopia” (12-26 May 2010). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Gabon” (7-12 March 2014). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Mauritius (8-22 May 2017). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Mauritius” (8-22 May 2017). 
African Commission “Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone” (16-25 Feb 2016). 
African Commission “Final Communiqué of the 24th Extra-Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (30 July 30-8 August 2018). 
African Commission “Final Communiqué of the 56th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights” (21 April-7 May 2015). 
African Commission “General Comment 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 
14. 2 (a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa” (adopted 28 April-12 May 2014). 
African Commission “General Comment 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 
14. 2 (a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa” (28 November 2011). 
African Commission “General Comment 4 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: the right to redress for victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment (Article 5)” (Adopted, 4 March 2017). 
African Commission “General Comment 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: the right to life (Article 4)” (4-18 November 2015). 
African Commission “Mission report: Benin” (7-11 August 2000). 
African Commission “Mission Report: Lesotho” (2006).  
African Commission “Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2010). 
African Commission “Statement of the Working Group on the Rights of Older Persons and 
Persons with Disabilities in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, on the occasion of the 25th international day of older persons” (1 October 2015). 
African Commission, IACmHR, UN “Joint Thematic Dialogue on Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Identity and Intersex Related Issues” (2018). 




ACERWC “General Comment 2 on Article 6 of the ACRWC: The Right to a Name, 
Registration at Birth, and to Acquire a Nationality" (16 April 2014) ACERWC/GC/02. 
ACERWC “General Comment 5 on state party obligations under the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of Rights and Welfare of the Child (Article 1) and systems 
strengthening for child protection” (2018). 
ACERWC “General Comment on Article 22 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child: Children in situations of conflict” (2020).  
ACERWC “General Comment on Article 31 of the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child on the responsibilities of the child” (2017). 
ACERWC/ African Commission “Joint General Comment of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) on ending child marriage” (2017). 
Commission of Human Rights 
Commission of Human Rights “Summary Record of the Eighty-Ninth Meeting [of the Third 
Committee]” (30 September 1948) A/C.3/SR.89. 
Commission of Human Rights “Question of the realization in all countries of the economic, 
social and cultural rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special 
problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to achieve these human 
rights” (17 April 1998) E/CN.4/1998/33. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CEDAW Committee “General recommendation 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on 
temporary special measures” (2004). 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Cameroon” (25 March 2019) E/C.12/CMR/CO/4. 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Chile” (7 July 2015) E/C.12/CHL/CO/4. 
CESCR “Concluding observations: Costa Rica” (21 October 2016) E/C.12/CRI/CO/5. 
CESCR “Concluding observations: Estonia” (16 December 2011) E/C.12/EST/CO/2. 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Germany” (27 November 2018) E/C.12/DEU/CO/6.  
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Guatemala” (9 December 2014) E/C.12/GTM/CO/3. 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Kazakhstan” (29 March 2019) E/C.12/KAZ/CO/2. 
CESCR “Concluding observations: Nepal” (16 January 2008) E/C.12NPL/CO/2. 
CESCR “Concluding Observations: Peru” (30 May 2012) E/C.12/PER/CO/2-4. 




CESCR “Concluding observations: Venezuela” (7 July 2015) E/C.12/VEN/CO/3. 
CESCR “General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1) of the Covenant) 
(13 December 1991) E/1992/23. 
CESCR “General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities” (9 December 1994) E/1995/22. 
CESCR “General Comment 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13)” (8 December 1999) 
E/C.12/1999/10. 
CESCR “General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Art. 12)” (11 August 2000) E/C.12/2000/4. 
CESCR “General Comment 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights 
(art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)” 
(2 July 2009) E/C.12/GC/20. 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
CEDAW Committee “General recommendation 21: Equality in marriage and family 
relations” (1994) A/49/38.  
CEDAW Committee “General recommendation 24: Article 12 of the Convention (women 
and health)” (1999) A/54/38/Rev.1. 
CEDAW Committee “General recommendation 28 on the core obligations of States parties 
under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women” (16 December 2010) CEDAW/C/GC/28.    
CEDAW Committee “General Recommendation 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women on harmful practices (14 November 2014) 
CEDAW/C/GC/31. 
CEDAW Committee “General Recommendation 36 (2017) on the right of girls and women 
to education” (16 November 2017) CEDAW/C/GC/36. 
CEDAW Committee “Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Albania” (16 September 2010) CEDAW/C/ALB/CO/3. 
CEDAW Committee “Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Argentina” 
(25 November 2016) CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/7. 
CEDAW Committee “Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Mexico” (25 
July 2018) CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/9. 
CEDAW Committee “Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of the 
Netherlands” (18 November 2016) CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/6. 
Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRC Committee “General Comment 1 (2001) Article 29(1): the aims of education” (17 




CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Argentina” (1 October 2018) 
CRC/C/ARG/CO/5-6. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Belgium” (13 June 2002) CRC/C/15/Add.178 
CRC Committee “Concluding observation: Belgium” (23 May 2002) CRC/C/15/Add.178. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Benin” (12 August 1999) CRC/C/15/Add.106. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Bhutan” (5 July 2017) CRC/C/BTN/CO/3-5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Bulgaria” (23 June 2008) CRC/C/BGR/CO/2. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (23 
October 2017) CRC/C/PRK/CO/5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Denmark” (26 October 2017) 
CRC/C/DNK/CO/5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: El Salvador” (29 November 2018) 
CRC/C/SLV/CO/5-6. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)” (13 February 1996) CRC/C/15/Add.49. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Islamic Republic of Iran” (14 March 2016) 
CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Japan” (5 March 2019) CRC/C/JPN/CO/4-5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Kuwait” (29 October 2013) 
CRC/C/KWT/CO/2. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observation: Maldives” (14 March 2016) 
CRC/C/MDV/CO/4-5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: New Zealand” (21 October 2016) 
CRC/C/NZL/CO/5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding Observations: New Zealand” (27 October 2003) 
CRC/C/15/Add.216. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Pakistan” (11 July 2016) CRC/C/PAK/CO/5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Russian Federation” (25 February 2014) 
CRC/C/RUS/CO/4-5. 
CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Slovenia” (26 February 2004) 
CRC/C/15/Add.230. 





CRC Committee “Concluding observations: Zimbabwe” (7 June 1996) CRC/C/15/Add.55 
CRC Committee “General Comment 4: Adolescent health and development in the context 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” (21 July 2003) CRC/GC/2003/4. 
CRC Committee “General Comment 5 (2003) General measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6)” (27 November 2003) 
CRC/GC/2003/5. 
CRC Committee “General Comment 8 (2006) The right of the child to protection from 
corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment (arts. 19; 28, para 
2; and 37, inter alia) (2 March 2007) CRC/C/GC/8. 
Committee “General Comment 12 (2009) The right of the child to be heard” (20 July 2009) 
CRC/C/GC/12. 
CRC Committee “General Comment 13 (2011) The right of the child to freedom from all 
forms of violence” (18 April 2011) CRC/C/GC/13. 
CRC Committee “General comment 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her 
best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1)” (29 May 2013) 
CRC/C/GC/14. 
CRC Committee “General Comment 15 (2013) on the right of the child to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of health (art. 24)” (17 April 2013) CRC/C/GC/15. 
CRC Committee “General Comment 20 (2016) on the implementation of the rights of the 
child during adolescence” (6 December 2016) CRC/C/GC/20. 
CRC Committee “General guidelines for periodic reports” (20 November 1996) CRC/C/58. 
CRC Committee “Violence against children in the family and at school” (28 September 
2001) CRC/C/111. 
European Committee of Social Rights 
ECSR “Conclusions 2017: Articles 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23 and 30 of the European Social 
Charter” (2018). 
ECSR “Conclusions: Albania” (7 December 2012) 2012/def/ALB/1/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Azerbaijan” (7 December 2012) 2012/def/AZE/1/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina (9 December 2011) 2011/def/BIH/7/3/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Czech Republic (Art 17)” (9 December 2011) XIX-4. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Czech Republic” (9 December 2011) XIX-4. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Estonia” (6 December 2013) 2013/def/EST/14/2/EN. 




ECSR “Conclusions: Netherlands” (9 December 2011) 2011/def/NLD/7/3/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Poland” (30 June 2005) XVII-2. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Poland” (31 October 2000) XV-1. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Portugal” (8 December 2017) 2017/def/PRT/14/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Romania” (31 March 2002) 2002/def/ROU/7/3/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Serbia” (4 December 2015) 2015/def/SRB/7/3/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Slovak Republic” (4 December 2015) 2015/def/SVK/7/3/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Slovenia” (30 June 2003) 2003/def/SVN/17/1/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Slovenia” (30 June 2006) 2003/def/SVN/17/1/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Spain (Art 14(2))” (6 December 2013) XX-2. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Spain” (30 June 2005) XVII-2. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Spain” (4 December 2015) XX-4. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Spain” (6 December 2013) XX-2. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Sweden” (30 June 2003) 2003/def/SWE/17/1/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Sweden” (30 June 2006) 2006/def/SWE/1/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Turkey (Art 1(2))” (30 May 2003) XVI-1 
ECSR “Conclusions: Turkey” (9 December 2011) 2011/def/TUR/17/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Ukraine” (7 December 2012) 2012/def/UKR/1/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: Ukraine” (9 December 2016) 2016/def/UKR/1/2/EN. 
ECSR “Conclusions: United Kingdom” (4 December 2015) XX-4. 
ECSR “Conclusions: United Kingdom” (9 December 2011) XIX-4. 
ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 17” (31 December 2001) XV-2. 
ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 26(2) (Moral Harassment) 2007_Ob_5/Ob/EN. 
ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 7(10)” (31 December 2001) XV-2. 
ECSR “Statement of Interpretation: Article 7(3)” (31 July 1971) II. 
Human Rights Committee 




HRC “General Comment 17: Article 24 (Rights of the Child)” (7 April 1989). 
HRC “General Comment 18: Non-discrimination” (10 November 1989) CCPR/C/37. 
HRC “General Comment 21: Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of their 
liberty)” (10 March 1992) A/44/40. 
HRC “General Comment 22: Article 18 (Freedom of thought, conscience or religion)” (30 
July 1993) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. 
HRC “General Comment 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression)” (12 
September 2011) CCPR/C/GC/34. 
HRC “General Comment 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, on the right to life” (30 October 2018) CCPR/C/GC/36. 
Table of cases and advisory opinions 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Amnesty International v Sudan (Communication No 48/90; 50/91; 52/91; 89/93) [2018] 
ACHPR 11 (15 November 2018). 
Bissangou v Congo (Communication 253/02) [2006] ACHPR 74 (29 November 2006). 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v Sudan Communication 279/03, 296/05) [2009] 
ACHPR 100 (27 May 2009). 
Courson v Zimbabwe (Communication 136/94) [1995] ACHPR 2 (22 March 1995). 
Curtis Doebbler v Sudan (Communication 236/2000) [2009] ACHPR 103 (25 November 
2009).  
Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front v the Republic of South Africa (Communication 335/06) 
[2013] ACHPR 115 (23 April 2013). 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Arab Republic of Egypt 
(Communication 323/2006) [2011] ACHPR 85 (16 December 2011). 
Gareth Anvar Prince v South Africa (2004) AHRLR 105 (ACHPR 2004). 
Huri-Laws v Nigeria Communication 225/98 (2000) AHRLR 273.  
International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, INTERIGHTS on behalf of Ken Sara-
Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 21. 
Isiaga v Tanzania (merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 218. 
Jawara v Gambia (Communication No 147/95; 149/96) [2000] ACHPR 17 (11 May 2000). 




Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana (Communication 313/05) [2010] ACHPR 106 (26 
May 2010). 
Kwoyelo v Uganda (Communication 431/12) [2018] ACHPR 129 (17 October 2018). 
Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia (Communication 211/98) [2001] ACHPR 31 (7 May 
2001). 
Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia (Communication No 211/98) [2001] ACHPR 31 (7 
May 2001). 
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998). 
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (Communication 224/98) [2000] ACHPR 24 (6 November 
2000). 
Modise v Botswana (Communication 97/93) [2000] ACHPR 25 (6 November 2000). 
Mr Mamboleo M. Itundamilamba v Democratic Republic of Congo (Communication 
302/05) [2013] ACHPR (18 October 2013). 
Nubian Community in Kenya v the Republic of Kenya (Communication 317/06) [2015] (19-
28 February 2015).  
Open Society Justice Initiative v Côte d’Ivoire (Communication No 318/06) [2015] (19-28 
February 2015). 
Purohit v the Gambia (Communication 242/01) [2003] ACHPR 49 (29 May 2003). 
Shumba v Zimbabwe Communication No 288/04) [2017] ACHPR 142 (30 June 2017). 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria (Communication No 155/96) [2001] ACHPR 34 (27 October 2001). 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation, Centre on Housing Rights And Evictions v Sudan 
(Communication 279/03, 296/05) [2009] ACHPR 100 (27 May 2009). 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (Communication 245/02) [2006] 
ACHPR 73 (25 May 2006). 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v Zimbabwe 
(Communication 284/03) [2009] ACHPR 97 (3 April 2009). 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development 
(on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe (Communication 294/04). 
African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
African Centre of Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) and People’s Legal Aid Centre 
(PLACE) v Sudan Communication 001/2015 (May 2018) 




Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice 
Initiative on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya v Kenya Communication 
2/2009. 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) v Cameroon 
Communication 002/2015 (May 2018). 
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and Finders Group Initiative on 
behalf of TFA (a minor) v Cameroon Communication 002/2015 (May 2018). 
Minority Rights Group International and SOS-Esclaves on behalf of Said Ould Salem and 
Yarg Ould Salem v Mauritania Communication 003/2015 (15 December 2017). 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Actions pour la Protection des Droit de l’Homme v Côte d’Ivoire (2016) 1 AfCLR 668. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya (merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 9. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Kenya (merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 9. 
Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes (APDF) and 
the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) v Mali (merits) 
(2018) 2 AfCLR 380. 
Guehi v Tanzania (merits and reparations) (2018) 2 AfCLR 477. 
Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda (jurisdiction) (2016) 1 AfCLR 540. 
Lucien Ikili Rashidi v United Republic of Tanzania (Merits and Reparations) Application 
009/2015 (28 March 2019). 
Omary and Others v Tanzania (admissibility) (2014) 1 AfCLR 358. 
Request for Advisory Opinion by the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (Advisory Opinion) (2014) 1 AfCLR 725. 
Request for Advisory Opinion by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria and 
the Coalition of African Lesbians (Advisory Opinion) (2017) 2 AfCLR 606. 
Request for Advisory Opinion by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project 
(Advisory Opinion) (2017) 2 AfCLR 57. 
Tanganyika Law Society, Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. 
Mtikila v Tanzania (merits) (2013) 1 AfCLR 34. 
Urban Mkandawire v Malawi (admissibility) (2013) 1 AfCLR 283. 
Werema v Tanzania (merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 520. 




Association for the Protection of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd v Belgium Complaint 
98/2013 (20 January 2015). 
Association for the Protection of all Children (APPROACH) Ltd v Czech Republic 
Complaint 96/2013 (20 January 2015). 
Association for the Protection of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd v France Complaint 
92/2013 (12 September 2014). 
Associazione Nazionale Giudici di Pace v Italy Complaint 102/2013 (5 July 2016). 
Associazione sindacale "La Voce dei Giusti" v Italy Complaint 105/2014 (18 October 2016). 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy Complaint 58/2009 (25 June 
2010). 
Committee for Home-Based Priority Action for the Child and the Family (EUROCEF) v 
France Complaint 114/2015 (24 January 2019). 
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) v France Complaint 50/2008 
(9 September 2009). 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v Italy Complaint 91/2013 (12 
October 2015). 
Defence for Children International (DCI) v Belgium Complaint 69/2011 (23 October 2012). 
Defence for Children International (DCI) v Netherlands Complaint 47/2008 (20 October 
2009). 
Defence for Children International v Belgium Complaint 69/2011 (23 October 2012). 
Equal Rights Trust (ERT) v Bulgaria Complaint 121/2016 (16 October 2018). 
European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v Czech Republic Complaint 104/2014 (17 
May 2016). 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria Complaint 31/2005 (18 October 2006). 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France Complaint 51/2008 (19 October 2009). 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Italy Complaint 27/2004 (7 December 2005). 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Portugal Complaint 61/2010 (30 June 2011). 
European Roma Rights Centre v Greece Complaint 15/2003 (8 December 2004). 
Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) v Greece Complaint 111/2014 (23 March 
2017). 




International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v Croatia 
Complaint 45/2007 (30 March 2009). 
International Commission of Jurists v Portugal Complaint No 1/1998 (9 September 1999). 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues v France Complaint 14/2003 (8 
September 2004). 
International Planned Parenthood Federation - European Network (IPPF EN) v Italy 
Complaint 87/2012 (10 September 2013). 
Médecins du Monde-International v France Collective Complaint 67/2011 (11 September 
2012). 
Médecins du Monde-International v France Complaint 67/2011 (11 September 2012). 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v Bulgaria Complaint 41/2007 (3 June 2008). 
Syndicat national des Professions du Tourisme v France Complaint 6/1999 (10 October 
2000).  
Transgender Europe and ILGA-Europe v the Czech Republic Complaint 117/2015 (15 May 
2018). 
World Organisation against Torture (“OMCT”) v Greece Complaint 17/2003 (7 December 
2004). 
World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v Ireland Complaint 18/2003 (7 December 
2004). 
World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v Portugal Complaint 20/2003 (7 December 
2004). 
World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v Portugal Complaint 34/2006 (5 December 
2006). 
European Court of Human Rights 
Advisory Opinion concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child 
relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad 
and the intended mother, ECtHR Request P16-2018-001 (10 April 2019). 
Alekseyev v Russia Applications 4916/07; 25924/08; 14599/09 (21 October 2010). 
Artico v Italy Application 6694/74 (13 May 1980). 
Baralija v Bosnia and Herzegovina Application 30100/18 (29 October 2019). 
Belgian Linguistics Applications1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 
(23 July 1968).  




Çam v Turkey Application 51500/08 (23 February 2016). 
Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom Applications 7511/76; 7743/76 (25 February 
1982). 
Carson and Others v United Kingdom Application 42184/05 (16 March 2010). 
Catan and Others v Republic of Moldova and Russia Applications 43370/04, 8252/05; 
18454/06 (19 October 2012). 
Chbihi Loudoudi and Others v Belgium Application 52265/10 (16 December 2014). 
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom Application 28957/95 (11 July 2002). 
Cosey v United Kingdom Application 10843/84 (27 September 1990). 
Cyprus v Turkey Application 25781/94 (10 May 2001). 
DH and Others v Czech Republic Application 57325/00 (13 November 2007). 
Dojan and Others v Germany Application 319/08 (13 September 2009). 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom Application 7525/76 (22 October 1981). 
EB v France Application 43546/02 (22 January 2008).  
Engel and Others v Netherlands Applications 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 
(8 June 1976). 
European Commission of Human Rights v Belgium Applications 1474/62; 1677/62; 
1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 (23 July 1968). 
Evans v United Kingdom Application 6339/05 (10 April 2007). 
Folgerø and Others v Norway Application 15472/02 (29 June 2007). 
Greece v United Kingdom Application 176/56 (26 September 1958). 
Hämäläinen v Finland Application 37359/09 (16 July 2014). 
Handyside v United Kingdom Application 5493/72 (7 December 1976). 
Identoba v Georgia Application 73235/12 (12 May 2015). 
Kalashnikov v Russia Application 47095/99 (15 July 2002). 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark Applications 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72 
(7 December 1976). 
Kudla v Poland Application 30210/96 (26 October 2000). 




Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom Applications 31417/96; 32377/96 (27 
September 1999). 
Mandet v France Application 30955/12 (14 January 2016). 
Médecins du Monde-International v France Complaint 67/2011 (11 September 2012). 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v Bulgaria Complaint 41/2007 (3 June 2008). 
N.T.s v Georgia Application 71776/12 (2 February 2016). 
National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium Application 4464/70 (27 October 1975) 
Niemietz v Germany Application 13710/88 (16 December 1992). 
Norris v Ireland Application 10581/83 (26 October 1988) 
Oršuš and Others v Croatia Application 15766/03 (16 March 2010). 
Pretty v United Kingdom Application 2346/02 (29 April 2002). 
Rees v United Kingdom Application 9532/81 (17 October 1986). 
S.A.S. v France Application 43835/11 (1 July 2014). 
Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom Applications 22985/93 and 23390/94 (20 July 
1998). 
Smith and Grady v United Kingdom Applications 33985/96; 33986/96 (27 September 1999). 
Soering v United Kingdom Application 14038/88 (7 July 1989). 
Strand Lobben and Others v Norway Application 37283/13 (10 September 2019). 
Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia Applications 32541/08; 43441/08 (17 July 2014). 
Taddeucci and McCall v Italy Application 51362/09 (30 June 2016). 
Tanda-Muzinga v France Application 2260/10 (10 July 2014). 
Thlimmenos v Greece Application 34369/97 (6 April 2000). 
Timishev v Russia Applications 55762/00; 55974/00 (13 December 2005). 
Tyrer v United Kingdom Application 5856/72 (25 April 1978). 
Valsamis v Greece Application 21787/93 (18 December 1996). 
Van der Ven v Netherlands Application 50901/99 (4 February 2003).  
Velyo Velev v Bulgaria Application 16032/07 (27 May 2014). 




X and Y v Netherlands Application 8978/80 (26 March 1985). 
X v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Application 29683/16 (17 January 2019). 
X v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Application 29683/16 (17 January 2019). 
X v Turkey Application 24626/09 (9 October 2012). 
X Y and Z v United Kingdom Application 21830/93 (22 April 1997). 
XY v Turkey Application 14793/08 (10 March 2015). 
Zarb Adami v Malta Application 17209/02 (20 June 2006). 
Zhdanov and Others v Russia Applications 12200/08; 35949/11; 58282/12 (16 July 2019). 
Human Rights Committee  
Bakhtiyari v Australia Communication 1069/2002 (6 November 2003) 
CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002. 
Blessington and Elliot v Australia Communication 1968/2010 (17 November 2014) 
CCPR/C/112/D/1968/2010. 
D and E v Australia Communication 1050/2002 (9 August 2006) CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002. 
Dovadzija v Bosnia and Herzegovina Communication 2143/2012 (10 November 2015) 
CCPR/C/114/D/2143/2012. 
Hartikainen v Finland Communication 40/1978 (9 April 1981) CCPR/C/OP/1. 
Huamán v Peru Communication 1153/2003 (22 November 2005) 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003. 
Leirvåg, Orning and Galåen v Norway Communication 1155/2003 (23 November 2004) 
CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003. 
Maalem v Uzbekistan Communication 2371/2014 (4 September 2018) 
CCPR/C/123/D/2371/2014. 
Nakarmi v Nepal Communication 2184/2012 (8 May 2017) CCPR/C/119/D/2184/2012. 
Tharu v Nepal Communication 2038/2011 (21 October 2015) CCPR/C/114/D/2038/2011. 
Vos v Netherlands Communication 218/1986 (29 March 1989) CCPR/C/35/D/218/1986. 
X v Colombia Communication 1361/2005 (30 March 2007) CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005. 
Z v Australia Communication 2279/2013 (7 December 2015) CCPR/C/115/D/2279/2013 





International Court of Justice 
Belgium v Senegal (Judgement) ICJ Rep 2012 508. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (Judgement) ICJ Rep 1996 595. 
Croatia v Serbia (Judgement) ICJ Rep 2015 3. 
Marshall Islands v United Kingdom (Judgement) ICJ Rep 2016 833. 
Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep 2010 
639.  
South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep 1971 77. 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
Franz Britton v Guyana (Merits) IACmHR Report No 01/06 (28 February 2006). 
Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 81/11 
(21 July 2011). 
Jehovah’s Witnesses v Argentina (Merits) IACmHR Case No 2137 (18 November 1978). 
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 
80/11 (21 July 2011). 
Jose Isabel Salas Galindo and Others v United States (Merits) IACmHR Report No 121/18 
(5 October 2018). 
Lopez Aurelli v Argentina (Merits) IACmHR Report No 74/90 (22 February 1991). 
Luiza Melinho v Brazil (Admissibility) IACmHR Report No 11/16 (14 April 2016). 
Manickavasagam Suresh v Canada (Merits) IACmHR Report No 08/16 (13 April 2016). 
Mayan Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize (Merits) IACmHR Report No 
40/04 (12 October 2004). 
Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo v Colombia (Merits) IACmHR Report No 122/18 (5 October 
2018). 
Mónica Carabantes Galleguillos v Chile (Friendly Settlement) IACmHR Report No 33/02 
(12 March 2002). 
Oscar Elías Biscet et al v Cuba (Merits) IACmHR Report No 67/06 (21 October 2006). 
Prince Pinder v Commonwealth of the Bahamas (Merits) IACmHR Report No 79/07 (15 
October 2007). 
Rafael Ferrer-Mazorro et al v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 51/01 




Tamara Mariana Adrián Hernández v Venezuela (Admissible) IACmHR Report 66/16 (6 
December 2016). 
Undocumented Workers v United States of America (Merits) IACmHR Report No 50/16 (30 
November 2016). 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
“Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series 
C No 112 (2 September 2004).  
“Street Children” (Villagran-Morales et al) v Guatemala (“Street Children”) (Merits) 
IACtHR Series C No 63 (19 November 1999). 
Acevedio Buendia v Peru (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR 
Series C No 198 (1 July 2009). 
Atala Riffo and daughters v Chile (Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series C No 239 
(24 February 2012). 
Bueno Alves v Argentina (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACtHR Series C No 164 (11 
May 2007). 
Cuscul Piraval et al v Guatemala (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
IACtHR Series C No 395 (23 August 2018). 
Duque v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR Series 
C No 310 (26 February 2016). 
Fernández Ortega et al v Mexico (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Costs) 
IACtHR Series C No 215 (30 August 2010). 
Five Pensioners v Peru (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR 
Series C No 98 (28 February 2003). 
Gender Identity, and Equality and Non-discrimination of Same-sex Couples Advisory 
Opinion OC-24, IACtHR Series A No 24 (24 November 2017). 
Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Cost) IACtHR Series C No 130 (8 September 2005). 
Gonzales Lluy v Ecuador (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) IACtHR 
Series C No 298 (1 September 2015).  
Guzmán Albarracín v Ecuador (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR Series C No 405 
(24 June 2020). 
Homero Flor Freire v Ecuador (Merits) IACmHR Report No 81/13 (4 November 2013). 
Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v Argentina (Merits, 




Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the 
framework of Article 64 of the American Convention of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89, IACtHR Series A No 10 (14 July 1989). 
Ituango Massacres v Colombia (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Costs) 
IACtHR Series C No 148 (1 July 2006). 
Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18, 
IACtHR Series A No 18 (17 September 2003) 
Juridical Conditions and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17, IACtHR 
Series A No 17 (28 August 2002). 
López Álvarez v Honduras (Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series C No 141 (1 
February 2006). 
Poblete Vilches v Chile (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR Series C No 349 (8 March 
2018). 
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Advisory Opinion OC-04/84, IACtHR Series A No 4 (19 January 1984). 
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-02/82, IACtHR Series A No 02 (24 September 1982). 
Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (Merits) IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July 1988). 
Winston Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago (Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series C No 
123 (11 March 2005). 
Ximenes Lopes v Brazil (Merits, Reparations, Costs) IACtHR Series C No 149 (4 July 2006) 
Yatama v Nicaragua (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR 
Series C No 127 (23 June 2005). 
South Africa 
Mpehla v Manamela and Limpopo Department of Education (2017) (unreported case). 
Electronic resources 
ACERWC “Terms of reference for country and thematic rapporteurs of the ACERWC” 
(2019) <https://www.acerwc.africa/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ToR_establishing_ 
the_Offices_of_rapportuers_of_the_ACERWC.pdf>. 
African Commission “Press Release on the implications of the anti-homosexuality Act on 
the work of Human Rights Defenders in the Republic of Uganda” African Commission 
(10-03-2014) <https://www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=228>. 
African Commission “Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (18 April-




African Court “Advisory Proceedings” (2020) <https://en.african-court.org/ 
index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-19-35#finalised-opinions>. 
African Court “Declarations entered by member states” (2020) <https://www.african-
court.org/en/index.php/basic-documents/declaration-featured-articles-2>. 
African Union “Member States” (2020) <https://au.int/en/member_states 
/countryprofiles2>.  
ARC International and ILGA “Compilation of the adoption of the 2016 SOGI Resolution” 
(30 June 2016) <https://ilga.org/downloads/SOGI_Resolution_Vote_compilation.pdf>. 
AU “Permanent observer mission of the African Union to the United Nations” (2020) 
<https://www.africanunion-un.org/history-of-the-mission>. 
Council of Europe “A Convention to protect your rights and liberties” Council of Europe 
(2020) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention>. 
Council of Europe “Follow-up of the Conclusions of the European Committee of Social 
Rights by the Committee of Ministers” Council of Europe 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/follow-up-by-the-governmental-
committee-of-the-european-social-charter-and-the-european-code-of-social-security>. 
Council of Europe “Home” (2020) Council of Europe 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home>. 
Council of Europe “Human Rights” Council of Europe (2020) 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/human-rights>. 
Council of Europe “Reform of the Court: History of the ECHR’s reforms” (2020) European 
Court of Human Rights 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/reform&c=>. 
Council of Europe “Who we are” (2020) Council of Europe 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are>. 
Delivered by Argentina “Joint statement on human rights, sexual orientation and gender 
identity” (18-12-2008) <https://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/sogi-
statements/2008-joint-statement. 
Delivered by New Zealand “Joint statement on sexual orientation & human rights” (03-
2015) ARC International <https://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/sogi-
statements/2005-joint-statement/>. 
Delivered by Norway “Joint statement: Human rights, sexual orientation and gender 
identity” (01-12-2006) <https://ilga.org/statement-by-norway-unhrc-2006>. 
European Union “The EU in Brief” (2020) European Union <https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en#from-economic-to-political-union>. 
IACmHR “IACHR Created Unit on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and 






IJRC “Inter-American Court Decides First Environmental Rights Case Against Argentina” 
(08-04-2020) IJRC <https://ijrcenter.org/2020/04/08/inter-american-court-decides-first-
environmental-rights-case-against-argentina/>. 
IJRC “Inter-American Court issues first judgement on sexual violence in schools” (26-08-
2020) IJRC <https://ijrcenter.org/2020/08/26/inter-american-court-issues-first-
judgment-on-sexual-violence-in-school/>. 
IJRC “Inter-American Court: State Inaction on HIV Violated Progressive Realization 
Obligation” (8-11-2018) IJRC <https://ijrcenter.org/2018/11/06/inter-american-court-
state-inaction-on-hiv-violated-progressive-realization-obligation/>. 
International Justice Resource Centre “African Commission bows to political pressure, 
withdraws NGO’s observer status” (18-08-2018) 
<https://ijrcenter.org/2018/08/28/achpr-strips-the-coalition-of-african-lesbians-of-its-
observer-status/>. 
OAS “A-52 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador”” (2020) OAS 
<https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic6. Prot.Sn%20Salv%20Ratif.htm>. 
OAS “About the Belém do Pará Convention” (2020) OAS 
<https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/convention.asp>. 
OAS “Member States” (2020) OAS <http://www.oas.org/en/member_states/default.asp>. 
OAS “Protocol of San Salvador” (2020) OAS <http://www.oas.org/en/sare/social-
inclusion/protocol-ssv/>. 
OAS “Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons” (2020) OAS 
<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/>. 
OAS “The MESECVI process” (2020) OAS <http://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/process.asp>. 
OAS “What is MESECVI” (2020) OAS <http://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/about.asp> 
(accessed 06-06-2020). 
OHCHR “Pathologization – Being lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans is not an illness” 
OHCHR (17-05-2016) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. 
aspx?NewsID=19956&LangID=E>. 
OHCHR “Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard” (2020) 
<https://indicators.ohchr.org/>. 
UNHRC “Joint statement on ending acts of violence related human rights violations based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity” (22-03-2011) 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4eb8f32e2.html>. 




  Yogyakarta Principles “Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law 
in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” (03-2007) 
yogyakartapinciples.org <http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/principles_en.pdf>.  
Yogyakarta Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 “Additional Principles and State Obligations on 
the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics to Complement the 
Yogyakarta Principles” (11-2017) <http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-2.pdf>. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
